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ABSTRACT 
The primary aim of this thesis-is to expound and elaborate the-concept 
of "packaging" in international technology-transfer transactions, both 
theoretically and empirically. Certain hypotheses concerning the determinants 
of the packaging level in transfer transactions are put forward and sub- 
sequently examined in the light of empirical findings. 
The basic theoretical framework is elaborated within the first eight 
chapters. Apart from expounding relevant concepts, these discuss the variety 
of methods which may be utilized to transmit technology, drawing substantially 
on published theories and field studies. The notion of "packaging" is 
explored and five levels of packaging are put forward, whereby the different 
transfer methods are categorized, accordingly. 
Some of these chapters are concerned with matters closely allied to 
decisions regarding the packaging level. These include the role played by 
the country's technological infrastructure, financial aspects of technology- 
transmission, and the causes and effects of State legislation, policy, 
and regulation. 
The last eight chapters are devoted to the two-fold task of analysing Iraq's 
experience in technology-acquisition and the methodology and findings of 
the empirical study. The role of the State in industrial development and 
technology-transfer is elucidated, with primary emphasis on the decade of 
the 1970's. Also, the parts played by the private and mixed sectors are 
assessed, and the changes in the country's imports of technology products 
analysed. 
After initiating contact with a sample of British firms, a group was 
finally chosen after ascertaining that they had exported manufacturing 
equipment to Iraq. These companies were visited, resulting thereby in a 
core sample of 32 transfer cases. In each case relevant information was 
obtained from the visited firm. The data were subsequently analysed to 
derive the general features of the transactions in question, and the various 
hypotheses were subjected to statistical testing. 
The results of these tests have proved negative in some cases and positive 
in others. Accordingly certain quantitative relationships have been 
established, which express the association of the level of packaging with 
a few relevant variables. 
CERTIFICATE OF ORIGINALITY 
This is to certify that I am responsible for the work submitted in this 
thesis, that the original work is my own except as specified in 
acknowledgements or in footnotes, and that neither the thesis nor the 
original work contained therein has been submitted to this or any 
other institution for a higher degree. 
Kadom JA Shubber 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
The author wishes to express his gratitude to a large number of people 
who have helped and co-operated in various ways to make this research 
possible. Work on the research began in October 1980, first at the City 
University Business School, and then at the Department of Management Studies, 
Loughborough University of Technology. Work at the City University lasted 
for nearly one academic year, so that the bulk of the theoretical and 
empirical work was undertaken at Loughborough during the period 1981 to 
March 1985. 
First and foremost, debt is due to the supervisor of the research, 
Dr M. R. Hill, who has been generous throughout with pertinent advice and 
encouragement. Constantly and without exception, Dr Hill has been willing 
to listen, eager to help, and thorough in checking the progress of work at 
each stage and in every detail. 
A special word of thanks is also due to Professor G. Gregory, Director 
of the Research, who oversaw the whole project and contributed with 
helpful comments and assistance, particularly with regard to the chapters 
relating to the empirical part of the research. The researcher also wishes 
to thank Professor K. J. Shone, who has now retired from the City University 
Business School, for his supervision during the academic year 1980-81. 
More than forty industrialists, who have been interviewed in the course 
of the visits made to thirty-five firms in various parts of the country, 
supplied the researcher with the basic data without which the project 
could not have come to fruition. The information gathered during these 
visits, as well as the personal comments of respective executives, were 
indispensable for the conduct of the field study and its final conclusions. 
Assessments made by executives have been of particular assistance in the 
case of the larger transactions, which run into millions of pounds. In 
these cases, respondent executives belonged to fairly large organizations 
and were busy people, with the implication that the time they devoted for 
meeting the researcher and providing him with requisite information 
was to be especially appreciated. In this connection, a word of thanks 
is due to the following executives: 
(. V) 
1) Mr B. A. Burden, of Meyer Dumor International Ltd., London. 
2) Mr B. J. Dunbar, of Adamson & Hatchett Ltd., London. 
3) Mr G. Foster, of Chloride Technical Ltd., Swinton. 
4) Mr D. Kennedy, of Davy Mckee Ltd., London. 
5) Mr D. Lesser, of Paper Converting Machine Co. Ltd., Plymouth. 
6) Mr C. H. Marshall, of Crosrol Ltd., Halifax. 
7) Mr K. Yoshida, of Chiyoda International Ltd., London. 
8) Mr P. D. Young, of Ruston Diesels Ltd., Newton-le-Willows. 
On the institutional level, the researcher wishes to express his gratitude 
to the authorities at Baghdad University, who in 1980 granted him the study 
leave to undertake this research, and also to various agencies of the Iraqi 
Government who provided requisite facilities. Relevant assistance rendered 
by both the Cultural and Commercial Sections at the Iraqi Embassy, London, 
need to be particularly appreciated. 
Thanks are also due to the staff at Loughborough University of Technology, 
especially those working at the Department of Management Studies and the 
central University Library. 
There is, however, one person whose name must be noted here, for her enormous 
patience and understanding during the period of this research, namely, 
Mrs Wafaa Shubber. It is also necessary to acknowledge the special 
talent and devotion shown by the Ellis Marchant Secretarial Bureau, 
Wellingborough, who had the thankless task of typing the manuscript, 
including some rather cumbersome tables! 
The Researcher 
(v) 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Pages 
Abstract i 
Certificate of Originality ii 
Acknowledgements iil 
Table of Contents v 
1. Chapter One: Introduction 1-13 
1.1 Importance of Technology to Third World 1 
1.2 Purpose of Investigation 7 
1.3 Plan of the Research 10 
Part I: Analysis of the Process of Technology Transfer 14-154 
2. Chapter Two: Basic Concepts 14-41 
2.1 Definition of Technology 14 
2.2 Definition of "Technology Transfer" 19 
2.3 "Success" in Transferring Technology 22 
2.4 Costs and Benefits of Transfers 26 
3. Chapter Three: Obstacles Associated with North-to- 
South Transfers 42-83 
3.1 North-based Obstacles 42 
3.2 South-based Obstacles 56 
3.3 Appropriateness of Technology Transferred 68 
3.4 Comments and Conclusions 81 
(vi) 
Paces 
4. Chapter Four: Technological Infrastructure 
in Developing Countries 84-111 
4.1 Significance of Infrastructure 84 
4.2 Planning for Science and Technology 92 
4.3 The State of Technological Research in the 
Third World 94 
4.4 Role of Technological Research Centres 102 
4.5 Comments and Conclusions 108 
5. Chapter Five: The Role of the State in Technology 
Transfer 112-154 
5.1 The Case for State Intervention 113 
5.2 Aspects of the State's Role in Technology Transfer 122 
5.3 Relevant Strategies and Policies 124 
5.4 State Legislation and Regulation of Technology 
Transfer 128 
5.5 International Aid and Technology Transfer 137 
5.6 Comments and Conclusions 152 
Part II: Methods of Technology Transfer 155-217 
6. Chapter Six: Levels of Packaging in Transfer 
Transactions 155-176 
6.1 Categorization of Transfer Methods 155 
6.2 The Element of Packaging in Transfer Transactions 159 
6.3 Relevant Factors in Determining Transfer Packaging 167 
6.4 Comments and Conclusions 175 
(vii) 
Pages 
7. Chapter Seven: Ultra- and Highly-Packaged 
Transfer Methods 177-194 
7.1 Total Project Contracting 177 
7.2 Total Process Contracting 182 
7.3 An Evaluation 184 
7.4 Comments and Conclusions 193 
8. Chapter Eight: Other Methods of Technology 
Transference 195-217 
8.1 Major Process Contracting 195 
8.2 Patent and Know-how Contracting 196 
8.3 Trade-mark and Franchise Contracting 202 
8.4 Package-free Methods of Technology Transfer 204 
8.5 Comments and Conclusions 216 
Part III: Industrial Development and Transfer of 
Technology in Iraq 218-325 
9. Chapter Nine: The Pattern of Industrial Development 
in Iraq 218-238 
9.1 Economic Growth in the 1970's 219 
9.2 Structure and Growth of Iraqi Industry 225 
9.3 Comments and Conclusions 237 
10. Chapter Ten: The Pattern of Iraqi Imports of 
Technology Products 239-263 
10.1 Growth of Iraqi Imports in the 1970's 240 
10.2 Iraqi Imports of Technology Products in the 1970's 242 
10.3 British Exports of Technology Products to Iraq 245 
10.4 Comments and Conclusions 251 
(viii) 
Pages 
Appendix 10.1: Iraqi Imports of Technology Products 
During 1964-80 254 
Appendix 10.2: UK Exports and Iraqi Imports of 
Technology Products During 1964-80 257 
Appendix 10.3: Iraqi Imports of Manufacturing 
Technology Products During 1964-80 259 
Appendix 10.4: UK Exports and Iraqi Imports of 
Manufacturing Technology Products 
During 1964-80 262 
11. Chapter Eleven: Transfer and Development of 
Technology in the State-owned 
Industrial Sector in Iraq 264-301 
11.1 Project Appraisal, Selection and 
Execution 265 
11.2 State Organization for Industrial Design and 
Construction (SOIDAC) 272 
11.3 Other Transfer-related Industrial Bodies 281 
11.4 Technological Research and Development 286 
11.5 Comments and Conclusions 294 
Appendix 11.1: Industrial Projects Executed Under 
the Supervision of SOIDAC 1970-78 297 
12. Chapter Twelve: Technology Transfer to the Private 
and Mixed Sectors of Iraqi 
Industry 302-325 
12.1 Process of Industrialization in the Private Sector 303 
12.2 Process of Industrialization in the Mixed Sector 310 
12.3 State Organization for Industrial Development (SOID) 316 
12.4 Comments and Conclusions 323 
(Ix) 
Paqes 
Part IV: Empirical Study, Conclusions and Proposals 326-439 
13. Chapter Thirteen: Methodology of the Empirical 
Study 326-354 
13.1 Selection of Relevant Product Groups 327 
13.2 Selection of Firms and Initial Contacts 332 
13.3 Core Sample and Collection of Data 341 
Appendix 13.1: Researcher's Initial Enquiry Letter to 
Firms 347 
Appendix 13.2: Research Supervisor's Covering Letter 348 
Appendix 13.3: Commercial Counsellor's Covering Letter 349 
Appendix 13.4: Preliminary Enquiry Form 350 
Appendix 13.5: Questionnaire Format 351 
14. Chapter Fourteen: General Findings of the 
Empirical Study 355-393 
14.1 Transaction Values, Recipient Firms' Ownership, 
and Transfer Methods 355 
14.2 Technological and Industrial Characteristics of 
Sample Transfers 367 
14.3 Appraisal of Recipient Firms' Success in 
Assimilating Technology 370 
14.4 Comments and Conclusions 376 
Appendix 14.1: Case No 29/15/24 378 
Appendix 14.2: Case No 7/4/41 384 
Appendix 14.3: Case No 6/4/38 389 
(x) 
P ac, eess 
15. Chapter Fifteen: Determinants of the Level of 
Packaging in Technology Transfer 
Transactions 394-423 
15.1 Relevance of Industrial Sector and Ownership 
Pattern 394 
15.2 Newness of Enterprise, Technologi. cal 
Complexity, and Project Size 397 
15.3 A Linear Regression Model 411 
15.4 Comments and Conclusions 
419 
16. Chapter Sixteen: General Appraisal and Some 
Proposals 424-439 
16.1 Theoretical Framework and Basic Findings 424 
16.2 Up-grading the Process of Technology Transfer 
in Iraq 426 
16.3 Some Further Comments 433 
Bibliography 440 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
Socio-economic development is seen today as a major objective of every 
nation, but in the case of less developed countries such development is 
considered as particularly urgent due to widespread features of back- 
wardness. Foremost amongst these features are the prevalence of poverty, 
illiteracy, disease, and overall social deprivation. 
In their drive for development, Third World countries have been anxious 
to effect a process of smooth and successful transfers of required 
technologies from abroad. Many of these nations have therefore made 
strenuous efforts to obtain and operate industrial technology that they 
consider as well-suited for their conditions, despite the impact of 
various constraints hindering such technological transfers. Due to the 
influence of these constraints, the desired process of technology-transfer 
has been proceeding against a background of difficulties and frequent 
setbacks. In consequence, the process of "smooth and successful" 
transfers of technology to less developed nations has been at best only 
a partially attainable objective. 
An attempt is made in this chapter to explain the area of the research 
described in this thesis, as well as its importance against the background 
of Third World economic development. After expounding the current 
significance of adequate and effective technology-acquisition by Third 
World nations, attention is directed to the aim and plan of this current 
investigation. 
1.1 Importance of Technology to Third World 
Two important objectives have been put forward to justify international 
efforts for Third World industrialization, namely a "humane" objective 
and a "stabilizing" objective. The justifications for these objectives 
are discussed in the following subsections of this chapter. 
2 
1.1.1 The "Humane" Factor 
It has been pointed out that other nations ought to enjoy the 
fruits of progress which are so evidently present in the case of 
the industrially advanced countries. As one writer on this subject, 
DD Evans, points out, "the need for development derives from 
the physical, economic, and social conditions of man, from the 
fact that great disparities and inequalities exist in this condition, 
and from the realization that the means for redressing such 
discrepancies are at hand and can be brought to bear on the problem 
effectively". 
' 
The prosperous nations are essentially those possessing industrial 
technology, whereas less developed nations are mostly those who 
lack such expertise. This imbalance in terms of industrial technology 
and advancement is both paralleled and aggravated by the profile of 
national distribution of world population, since the less developed 
countries are inhabited by the vast majority of the world's 
population. Another expert in the field expresses the view that 
due to the population explosion, the slowness of technology transfer 
has become "a very serious problem, because starvation disaster, or 
even premature death, are threatening the poor countries, if the 
transfer of technology cannot be accelerated" .2 The fact that less 
developed countries account for the vast majority of the world 
population is a central part of the problem. Out of a total world 
population of 4.415 billion in 1980, those living in developing 
countries numbered 3.245 billion, ie, 73.5% of the total. 
3 
100 Evans: "Appropriate Technology and its Role in Development" 
in DD Evans and LN Adler (editors): "Appropriate Technology for 
Development: A Discussion and Cast Histories" Boulder, Colorado 
(Westview Press 1979) p3. 
2I Svennilson: "The Strategy of Transfer" in 0L Spencer and A Woroniak 
(editors): "The Transfer of Technology to Developing Countries" New 
York (Praeger 1967) p175. 
3 UNESCO: "Statistical Year Book 1982" (Paris 1982) pl-7. Total 
population figures given in this publication for "developed countries" 
and "developing countries" are 1.17 billion and 3.245 billion 
respectively. 
3 
It is estimated that by 1979, per capita GDP in developed market- 
economy countries reached $9190 compared with $800 in developing 
market-economy countries. 
4 It can, however, be argued that these 
two figures are not strictly comparable due to certain discrepancies, 
including the unrealistic state of exchange rates for many 
currencies, and variations in the cost of living among. countries. 
Notwithstanding these differences, there still remains a wide 
and discernible gap in personal incomes (and living standards) 
between the two sides of the world economic divide. 
As evidence of this, some brief data is presented in Table l. l. 
where population and per capita incomes are given for a group of 
22 countries. Included here are 10 developed countries drawn from 
Europe, North America, Asia and Africa. On the other hand, the 
list of developing countries comprises 12 nations in Asia, Africa 
and Latin America. These figures tend to indicate that, unlike 
the developed countries, the developing Third World is beset by 
low personal incomes and relatively high population levels. 
It may further be asserted that the plight of the world's poor 
has worsened over the years. Some support for this assertion is 
rendered by the widening income gap between the two major groups 
of countries, as well as the frequency of famine and popular 
discontent against rising living costs in the Third World. 
5 
4 United Nations: "Statistical Year Book 1981" (New York 1983) p 151. 
Relevant figures for socialist countries (both developed and developing) 
are not given in this publication. 
5 As evidence of the increasing disparity between the developed "North" 
and less developed "South" the hiatus. in average personal incomes in 
1980 may be compared with that in 1975. In the latter year average 
per capita income in developing market-economy countries was $594 
whereas that in developed market-economy countries was $5235, the 
former thus representing 11.4% of the latter. The relevant "South" 
and "North" averages in 1980 were $800 and $9190 (as mentioned 
earlier), with a corresponding percentage of 8.7%. Detailed income 
figures for 1975 were obtained from the UN Statistical Yearbook 1979. 
Li 
TABLE 1.1 
Population Figures and Per Capita GDP for Selected Countries 
Developed Market-Economy Countries 
Country Population Per Capita 
in 1980 GDP in 1980 
(millions) (US Dollars) 
Developing Market-Economy Countries 
Country Population Per Capita 
in 1980 GDP in 1980 
(millions) (US Dollars) 
Australia 14.616 10127 Algeria 18.919 1724 
(1) 
Austria 7.505 10250 Argentina 27.064 1448 (2) 
Canada 23.941 10584 Brazil 123.032 2021 
France 53.713 12137 Egypt 42.201 435 (1) 
Germany 61.561 13304 India 663.596 241 
(Fed Rep) 
Indonesia 148.033 472 
Israel 3.871 5431 Iraq 13.072 1226 
(2) 
Japan 116.782 8873 Mexico 71.911 1749 
(1) 
South Africa 29.285 2639 Nigeria 74.082 534 
(2) 
U. K. 55.945 9352 Pakistan 81.451 339 
U. S. A. 227.658 11363 Turkey 44.924 1161 (3) 
Zimbabwe 7.360 538 
(1) 
Average 1 59.488 19406 1 Average 1 109.637 1 990 
Notes: (1) Figure refers to 1979 (latest year available) 
(2) Figure refers to 1975 (latest year available) 
(3) Figure refers to 1978 (latest year available) 
Source: United Nations: "Statistical Year Book 1981" (New York 1983) 
pp 61-66 and 151-155. 
5 
Writing in 1979, DD Evans remarks that it is "estimated that 
in the thirty-five LICs (low income countries - those with GNP 
per capita values below $250 per annum), 80 per cent of the 
population is'below the Food and Agriculture Organization's 
minimum food and nutrition standards, and that 25 per cent has a 
serious food deficiency of over 250 calories per day. This situation 
is somewhat better in the fifty-seven middle income countries 
(MICs: $250 to about $3500 GNP per capita), where sixty-six per 
cent are above the minimum food and nutrition requirement level, 
and only eight per cent are below the minimum daily caloric intake 
level". 6 
It is therefore possible to contend that the "humanistic" argument 
furnishes some basis for an overall global effort to develop 
the economies of the poorer nations. Whilst a multitude of issues 
may be raised regarding the best strategy and tactics of Third 
World development, one factor seems to be clear: the need for 
technology. It may indeed be stressed that developing countries 
have an almost constant requirement at present for suitable and 
worthwhile technologies in most branches of their economies, 
particularly industry and agriculture. 
1.1.2 The "Stabilizing" Factor 
The argument is put forward by some writers that the export of 
technology from "North" to "South" may contribute towards strengthening 
mutual interests and thus act as a stabilizing force in the world. 
If welfare is reasonably widespread in the world, so the argument 
runs, this will probably be conducive to more realistic and 
commensurate co-operation, thereby contributing to international 
progress, peace and stability. 
60D Evans, Op. Cit., p6. This author gives the following source 
for the estimates cited: The Development Co-ordination Committee, 
"Development Issues: U. S. Action Affecting the Development of 
Low-Income Countries" (Washington, D. C. April 1978). 
6 
Commenting on the increasing importance of the industrialized world in 
supplying technology, its need for the natural resources of the developing 
nations and the emerging phenomenon of the export of industrial goods by 
these nations to the developed countries, DD Evans points out that 
"the growing interdependence of the industrialized and developing countries 
is recognized and is considered favourable for increasing world stability, 
both economically and politically". 
7 
Another writer in this field, M Turpin looks at this problem basically 
from the angle of advanced countries by expressing the view that the 
facilitation of the transfer of technology to the countries of the "South" 
is to a large extent in the interest of the more developed nations. He 
explains that "technology transfer enables developing countries to catch 
up and participate in the world industrial trading system that has 
contributed so much to our prosperity over the last 25 years. And in 
recent years, increases in exports of capital goods to developing 
countries have helped some industrial countries to offset the effects 
of lowered domestic demand". 
8 
The maxim that there needs to be a "balance" in economic, social, and 
military power between nations has often in the past been invoked and 
advocated as a practical basis for peace and progress. However, it must 
be a moot point that the elements of mutual strength embodied in such a 
"balance" or "interdependence" may open the way for sharp disagreements, 
or even conflicts, between the opposing parties. These may be fuelled 
by such factors as competition for resources, desire for political 
leverage, control of strategic transportation routes, and the need for 
market accessibility. It could be retorted, on the other hand, that 
when different countries exhibit similar and/or complementary standards 
of development, it is likely that a reasonable degree of convergence 
will come about in their socio-economic notions, aspirations and general 
outlook. This would contribute, it may be maintained, to providing the 
groundwork for common understanding, eagerness for trade, and a certain 
degree of co-operation. 
7 Ibid. p 10. 
8M Turpin in "North/South Technology Transfer: The Adjustments Ahead" 
Paris (OECD 1981) p7. This publication was prepared by a specialist 
committee within OECD with M Turpin as chairman. The excerpt quoted 
is part of the Preface to the book. 
- 
7 
Indications presently exist that certain influential sections of public 
opinion in the West do support the movement of technology to less fortunate 
nations. It is increasingly being realized that the growing gap between 
rich and poor coupled'with increasing unrest are not in the long-term 
interests'of the prosperous societies. Moreover, it'can in principle be 
argued that the industrialization of the less developed countries may 
facilitate a more` appropriate degree of country specialization based 
on comparative advantage. This assumes, however, the concurrent 
minimization of barriers to international' trade. 
1.2 Purpose of Investigation 
The primary aim of this thesis'is to expound and elaborate the 'concept 
of "packaging" in international technology-transfer transactions. This 
problem is analysed both theoretically and empirically in the relevant 
parts of this research, in order to define this concept and examine how 
transfer'packaging may be determined in practice. 
In spite of the practical significance of determining the level of 
transfer packaging in each case, no systematic attempt seems to have 
been made in the literature to dwell'in depth on this idea. The 
definition suggested by this researcher refers to "packaging" as the 
degree of comprehensiveness in the provision, by the principal 
technology-supplier, of the basic and ancillary components of the 
technology in question. It is thus possible"to speak of various degrees, 
or levels, of packaging in the process of technology transfer. Very 
broadly, when the main transferor undertakes to provide a large number 
of the constituent aspects of the prospective project, the level of 
transfer packaging can be regarded as relatively high, and vice versa. 
Five major factors have been hypothesized as significant in affecting 
the level of packaging, namely: 
(a) Industrial sector receiving the technology. 
(b) Ownership of the recipient enterprise/project, ie, whether public, 
private, or mixed type of ownership. 
(c) Operational age of recipient enterprise. 
(d) Complexity of technology to be transferred. 
(e) Size of project receiving the technology. 
1.2.1 Focus of Research, 
Transfers of technology across national boundaries can be carried 
through by various types of organizations, in both transferor and 
transferee countries. It is, however, possible to classify the 
organizations which may be involved in this process into two main 
sectors, ie civilian and military spheres, and within each of these 
two main categories pertinent institutions may be subdivided further. 
Also, -countries involved in technology-transfer may be grouped according 
to their level of industrial development. 
On this basis-, an°attempt is made through Figure 1.1 to delineate the 
general field of interest of this research. As attention is directed 
towards transfers from "North" to "South" in the civilian sector, 
emphasis is'focused on horizontal and diagonal transfers within the 
upper part of the diagram. Moreover, the empirical part of the 
research has been confimed almost exclusively to cases where British- 
based manufacturing firms have exported technology items (mainly 
machinery) to Iraqi manufacturing enterprises, thereby resulting in the 
virtual concentration of the empirical analysis on solid-line type of 
transfer cases. 
Transfers from UK to Iraq were taken as an 'example for the purpose of 
conducting the study. The United Kingdom was chosen as the developed 
"North" country in question because the whole research has been carried 
out in Britain. Also, Iraq was selected as the relevant Third World 
developing country due to the researcher being an Iraqi national. 
This latter fact proved instrumental in obtaining relevant information 
and facilities, which have contributed materially to the completion of 
this project. Moreover, it is perhaps possible to classify Iraq among 
the middle-developed Third World countries, on the basis of both per 
capita income levels and the degrees of economic development that have 
been attained. 
8 
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1.2.2 Contribution of Research 
It is hoped that this research will contribute to a better understanding 
of the process of North-to-South technology transfer. In particular, 
"transfer packaging" may henceforth gain increasing recognition as a 
crucial ingredient, within the wider topic of technology-transfer. 
A high degree of understanding of transfer packaging by developing 
countries can enable them to make more rational decisions in their 
quest for foreign technology. Decision-makers may thus avoid packaging 
levels that are needlessly high under certain circumstances, with consequent 
financial savings to the country's budget. Conversely, initially-approved 
packaging levels may be raised somewhat in certain cases, so as to 
attain higher qualitative standards in project execution and operational 
performance. 
An informed appreciation of the factor of "transfer-packaging" has 
also some merits from the angle of technology-supplying countries. 
If forthcoming demand from the developing countries can be predicted 
reasonably well, this can help transferor organizations to plan their 
operations on a sound footing. Orders for technology items and 
technology-related services may be forecast more accurately and this can 
enable supplying firms to provide their services more efficiently and 
profitably. 
1.3 Plan of the Research 
The thesis is divided into four main parts. The first two deal with 
the theoretical background to the problem including the basic framework 
on which the field study Is based. Attention in the third part is 
directed towards the process of industrialization in Iraq and the 
country's general experience in acquiring technology from abroad, 
while the final part is devoted to the empirical study. 
1.3.1 Analysis of the Process of Technology Transfer 
The first major part of the thesis comprises four chapters. These deal 
with basic concepts, obstacles to technology-transfer, technological 
infrastructure and the role of the State. Throughout this part, views 
expressed by a number of writers on the various topics under discussion 
are spelled out. In addition, the researcher attempts to summarize 
and cover those views for the sake of expounding various aspects of 
the transfer problem. 
After elaborating some relevant terms, an attempt is made to explain 
the problems which frequently hinder or slow down the transmission of 
technologies to developing regions. The significance of the recipient 
country's technological infrastructure is also subjected to scrutiny, 
with particular emphasis on research and development activity. 
The causes and effects of State intervention in technology-transfer is 
given some prominence in this part. Aspects of the State's role in the 
transfer process are clarified, and examples given of relevant legislation 
and regulations by Third World developing countries. Moreover, an attempt 
is made to evaluate the part played by international aid in the North- 
to-South movement of technology. 
1.3.2 Methods of Technology Transfer 
Three chapters are included in this second part which is directed to 
explaining and evaluating the different available methods for transmitting 
technology. The concept of transfer "packaging" is also put forward 
and elaborated. 
Three different classifications of transfer methods are cited from the 
literature, namely those of UNCTAD, M Wilkins, and SJ Patel. 
Subsequently, the present author's own thirteen point classification 
is put forward. After dwelling on the idea of "packaging", five 
packaging levels are suggested, and the thirteen transfer methods 
categorized accordingly. A number of factors which may influence the 
determination of the level of packaging in relevant transactions are 
proposed in this context. These factors furnish the basis for the 
formulation of the hypotheses which are examined in the empirical study. 
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Two chapters are assigned in this part for the purpose of providing a 
detailed account of the nature, constituents, and characteristics of 
each possible transfer method included in the researcher's classification. 
These methods are explained and assessed in a descending order in 
accordance with their associative packaging level. 
1.3.3 Industrial Development and Transfer of Technology-in Iraq 
This part contains four chapters dealing with Iraq's economic growth, 
industrial development, and experience in technology-transfer. While 
emphasis is placed on these aspects over the 1970's decade, certain 
other dimensions of Iraq's growth and industrialization are touched 
upon, together with some earlier historic developments. 
After'summarizing the expansion of the Iraqi economy, focus is centered 
on the growth and structure of manufacturing industry. -Traditionally, the 
oil sector has always been separated from manufacturing, due to its 
singular importance in the country and the high level of secrecy 
attached to it. Consequently, the general analysis of Iraqi industry 
was concentrated on manufacturing activity. Hence the oil sector was 
largely excluded in this context, though brief reference-to it was made 
at certain points. In particular, mention was made of the growth in 
oil revenues as well as the institutions dealing with the transfer of 
technology to this sector. In addition, the field study of the research 
comprised six cases of transfer to the oil sector. 
A separate chapter is devoted in this part to expounding the process of 
transferring technology to the publicly-owned industrial sector. The 
general flow of project appraisal, selection and execution is dealt 
with here, as well as the institutional structure tackling tasks related 
to this area. Also, the present set up for technological research 
and development is described and appraised. 
Another chapter is assigned to private and mixed branches of Iraqi 
industry. Their respective. processes of industrial development are 
sketched, both historically and procedurally. State policy and 
institutions pertaining to these two sectors are also expounded. 
13 
1.3.4 Empirical Study, Conclusions and Proposals 
A stratified sample of British firms was selected and contact was 
initiated with them through formal correspondence. The total sample 
comprised 302 firms spread among 14 different groups of manufacturing- 
technology items. 
9 These firms were contacted in 2 phases of the study, 
and a total of 173 firms replied to our enquiry. Of these replies 
only 38 were positive, in the sense that the firms concerned had in 
fact exported manufacturing equipment to Iraq and it was possible to 
pursue 32 of these cases successfully. 
10 
The results obtained in these 32 cases of UK-to-Iraq transfers form the 
basis for the empirical findings of this research. These findings are 
divided under 2 main headings, as follows: 
(a) General Findings. These relate to the frequency of use associated 
with different transfer methods;. values of transactions; ownership- 
type of transferee firms; technological and industrial distributions 
of transfers; and levels of success achieved by recipient firms in 
assimilating technology. 
(b) Testing of Fundamental Hypotheses. Two of the hypothesized 
factors considered to influence technology transfer methods seemed to 
be statistically insignificant, namely, the factors of industrial sector 
and ownership type of recipient enterprises. On the other hand, 2 other 
factors came out as highly relevant, ie, size of project in question 
and its technological complexity in the pre-operational stages. 
On the basis of the results obtained, a regression equation has been 
evolved. It is suggested that further research in this field may test 
this model and/or suggest different models for other sets of circumstances. 
It is possible, for instance, that the pattern of transfer packaging 
exhibited by some developing countries, with circumstances very different 
from those of Iraq, may require another model. 
9 An additional 38 firms, within 5 other product groups, were written to in 
phase I of the survey. But these product groups were later thought to be 
of peripheral nature, and hence the respective firms were dropped from 
further investigation. 
10 The other 6 cases could not be followed further, due essentially to 
unwillingness and/or inability of the respective firms to co-operate. 
PART I 
ANALYSIS OF THE PROCESS OF 
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
CHAPTER TWO 
BASIC CONCEPTS 
It is the task of this chapter to define and elaborate certain basic 
terms within the general field of technology-transfer. These definitions 
and elaborations will furnish the basis for the subsequent analysis of 
the major issues and the design of the empirical study. 
Four main concepts are dealt with in this chapter, namely, "technology", 
"technology-transfer", "success" in technology-transfer, and "costs and 
benefits" of transfer. 
2.1 Definition of "Technology" 
Differing views have been expressed in the context of defining the 
general nature of "technology". The central point of divergence revolves 
around the relevance and importance of the socio-economic background in 
the general formulation of technology and its actual and detailed 
determination in each individual case. As JJ Murphy points out in this 
regard, the "simplest version views 'technology' as involving only 
changes in artifacts. A more sophisticated approach adds to the 
physical objects, labour and managerial skills ..... A third approach 
views technology as a 'socio-technological' phenomenon; that is, 
besides involving material and artifact improvements, technology is 
considered to incorporate a cultural, social and psychological process 
as well". 
1 
Nowadays, many authors tend to identify "technology" in general with the 
detailed application of scientific knowledge with reference to the 
socio-economic setting within which this application takes place. 
The views of 2 authorities on the subject may be cited in this connection. 
14 
1JJ Murphy: "Retrospect and Prospect" in DL Spencer and A Woroniak 
(editors): "The Transfer of Technology to Developing Countries" 
New York (Praeger 1967) p6. 
15 
Firstly, M Wilkins expresses 'a considered conviction that a definition 
of "technology" is required to encompass a reference not merely to 
"tools and machines", but'also to "product design, know-how, and 
organizational ability, that is, concept along with technique .2 
Secondly, DD Evans describes'technologV'as "the means by which man 
3 undertakes to, change or influence his environment". 
A relevant publication by OECD defines "technology" as "the use of 
scientific knowledge by a given society at a given moment to resolve 
concrete problems facing its development, drawing mainly on the means at 
its disposal, in accordance with its culture and scale of, values". 
4 
It is obvious that this definition looks at technology rather philosophically, 
attempting thereby to determine its general basis and boundaries. 
A more practical definition was provided by the OECD countries during 
negotiations for an international code of conduct on the transfer of 
technology. This definition considers that "technology means systematic 
knowledge for the manufacture of a product, for the application of a 
process or for the rendering of a service, including any integrally 
associated managerial and marketing techniques". 
5 
A somewhat similar definition is suggested by EW Hayden who views 
"technology" as "the quantum of knowledge by which such inputs as 
patent rights, scientific principle and R&D are translated into 
production of marketable items. This quantum comprises 2 parts: 
the 'engineering documentation' and the 'manufacturing techniques'. 
The latter are the human implementation of the written instructions 
contained in the former". 
6 
2M Wilkins: "The Role of Private Business in the International Diffusion 
of Technology" Journal of Economic History Vol XXXIV, No 1 (March 1974) 
P166, footnote 1. 
3DD Evans: "Appropriate Technology and Its Role in Development" in 
DD Evans and LN Adler (editors): "Appropriate Technology for Development: 
A Discussion and Case Histories" Boulder, Colorado (Westview Press 1979) 
P24. 
4 OECD/Interfutures, "The Problems of Technology Transfer Between Advanced 
and Developing Societies" Midway Through Interfutures, Chapter XII, Paris, 
February 1978, mimeo. Cited in OECD: "North/South Technology Transfer: 
The Adjustments Ahead", Paris (OECD 1981) p18. 
5 OECD "North/South Technology Transfer... " Op-Cit. pla. 
6EW Hayden: "U. S. Corporate Experience in Transferring Industrial Technology 
to the Soviet Bloc" in MJ Cetron and HF Davidson (editors): "Industrial 
Technology Transfer" Leyden (Noordhoff 1977) p259. 
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A broader definition of "technology" is presented by UNIDO in one of 
its publications on the subject, where "technology" is seen to consist 
"of a system of knowledge, skills, experience and organization that is 
7 
required to produce, utilize and control goods and services". 
A rather restricted definition is put forward by S Thebaud who views 
"technology" as a "codified and programmed know-how, which depends on 
scientific knowledge". 
8 Reflecting on his definition, Thebaud explains 
that "this know-how is the expression of a relationship between the 
system of research-development in which scientific knowledge is produced 
and other social systems to which this knowledge is applied. This is 
why we are justified in speaking not only about industrial and 
agricultural technology but also about medical technology or educational 
technology. It is advisable, however, to emphasize that technology 
which is 'incorporated' into material goods plays an essential role in 
a society, because it is often a necessary condition for technological 
progress in spheres of non-productive activity". 
9 
On the basis of the foregoing views expressed on the subject, the 
present author believes that "industrial technology" can be defined 
as consisting of those human skills and detailed knowledge which make 
possible, when utilized-in an integrated fashion with the relevant 
hardware and software, the manufacture of a given product or a group of 
products by using a specified mix of material inputs. 
10 
2.1.1 Characteristic Features of Industrial Technology 
Three major points are raised in the above definition of "industrial 
technology". It Is necessary to clarify these points in order to 
present an analytical picture of the transfer problem. 
7 UNIDO: "Technological Self-Reliance of the Developing Countries: Towards 
Operational Strategies" Development and Transfer of Technology Series 
No 15, Vienna (United Nations 1981) p3. 
8S Thebaud: "An Evaluation of Technology-Transfer in Under-Developed 
Countries" in MJ Cetron and HF Davidson (editors) Op. Cit. p396. 
9 Loc. Cit. 
10 Due to the pronounced focus of this research on technology transfer 
for the service of manufacturing industry, the definition given here 
pertains essentially to "industrial technology" rather than "technology" 
in general. It is, however, possible to modify this definition slightly 
so as to make it more widely applicable. 
As to the three points, these are as follows: 
(a) Human Skills. A prime feature of industrial technology is that 
it entails the use of human skills, and in many cases the number of 
requisite skills is quite large. However, the range of skills required 
differs from case to case, and so does the depth of each skill and the 
number of constituent human jobs. 
(b) Equipment. A major characteristic of industrial technology is the 
utilization of equipment. These include machines, of various types, 
as well as other kinds of equipment such as material-handling apparatus 
and testing devices. 
(c) Integration. Industrial technology involves integration, in the 
sense that all the constituent elements need to match and support one 
another. Equipment is normally operated through human skills on the 
basis of certain information, so that the materials utilized are 
transformed into final products. Operational management has to attain 
a pre-determined level of performance, represented by pre-set production 
levels and certain quality standards. The relevant technical specifications 
and production levels are determined in each case on the basis of the 
organization's objectives and policies, together with pertinent stipulations 
relating to technical limitations, market and cost factors. 
The information pertaining to the operation of the necessary equipment 
and the utilization of materials are embodied in human skills and 
knowledge bearing on those techniques which make up the technology. 
A significant proportion of this knowledge and these skills is normally 
documented in various ways. These include drawings, process formulae, 
blueprints, product specifications, material and component requirements 
for each unit of the product, and registered patents (if any). 
2.1.2 Bases for Classification of Technology 
Several principles for the classification of technologies may be put 
forward. Among the most useful, from the practical standpoint, are the 
following three: 
1 
17 
(a) Efficiency. Alternative technologies that are utilized for the 
production of a given product or a group of products, may be differentiated 
on the basis of their "efficiency". Technology A can be regarded 
as more efficient than technology B if at least one of the following 
2 conditions holds: 
(i) Technology A involves the use of less inputs than technology B 
in order to turn out at least the same level of output in both physical 
and qualitative terms. Where the amount of at least one of these inputs 
is smaller (while others constant), technology A 's efficiency edge 
vis-a-vis B can be seen as absolute. 
In some cases, the total value of inputs utilized by A is lower than 
that relating to alternative B, where such values are determined 
within a set of given conditions, eg, prices of materials and labour 
wages ruling in a given country or region. If these values are subject 
to variations between different countries/regions, the observed efficiency 
of Technology A is relative rather than absolute. 
(ii) Technology A involves the use of the same inputs (or possibly 
less inputs) as 8 but turns out more and/or better output. Again, 
when this sameness (or reduction) in inputs is exhibited in physical 
terms, the efficiency of A can be regarded as absolute. In contrast, 
wherever these inputs are measured in their respective values when 
viewed in the context of a certain country/region, the efficiency of 
the technology is relative rather than absolute. 
The industrialized countries of the Western world have been witnessing 
a growing and almost uninterrupted movement of technological innovation. 
This has been the case since the onset of the Industrial Revolution, but 
the phenomenon has intensified during the twentieth century, particularly 
after the Second World War. In almost every industrial field, each 
technology is often seen to have a "life cycle" beginning with its' 
initial adoption to replace a less efficient technology but ending 
with its own gradual replacement by a more efficient one. 
1, 
(b) Novelty. A distinction can be made between antiquated and modern 
technology. This is based on the timing of the availability and/or 
commercialization of the technology in question, as comparisons arise 
between corresponding technologies within the same field serving the 
same purpose. In this general context, a differentiation is occasionally 
made between state-of-the-art technologies and those which are 
"leading-edge". As opposed to the former, the latter are characterized 
by very few previous applications and a short time-period since development. 
(c) Factor-intensity. This principle refers to the magnitude required 
of each of the major factors of production, where comparison is usually 
made between alternative technologies that can be used for the production 
of a certain product or group of products. A given technology which 
necessitates a relatively high number of operatives is usually said 
to be "labour-intensive". It is frequently possible to speak, within 
a defined industrial setting, of technologies which are "labour-intensive" 
and others which are "capital-intensive". 
2.2 Definition of "Technology Transfer" 
H Brooks is quoted in a recent OECD publication as defining the process 
of "technology-transfer" as that "by which science and technology are 
diffused throughout human activity". 
11 It is obvious that this definition 
is exceedingly broad, encompassing within its boundaries transfers of 
all categories of specialist knowledge, irrespective of whether this 
knowledge is "technological". However, that writer goes on to assert 
that "technology transfer" is different "from ordinary scientific 
information transfer in the fact that (for a technology) to be really 
transferred it must be embodied in an actual operation of some kind". 
12 
Hence, the transfer of a technology is achieved through systematic and 
organized action, the result of which would be the practical utilization 
of the technology in question within the new area. 
11 H Brooks, "National Science Policy and Technology Transfer" Conference 
on Technology Transfer and Innovation" NSF 1966 mimeo. Cited in OECD: 
"North/South Technology Transfer ..... " Op. Cit. plß. 
12 Loc. Cit. 
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Another authority in the field, I Svennilson, views "technology-transfer" 
in a rather broad spectrum, on lines somewhat similar to those of Brooks. 
Svennilson contends that "to establish modern technology in an under- 
developed country, we need to change: 
(a) Social systems and human attitudes; 
(b) Knowledge and human skills; 
(c) The physical implements in which modern technology 
is embodied". 
13 
S Gee states plainly that the transfer of technology is simply "the 
application of technology to a new use or user". 
14 He maintains further 
that this activity "involves principally the increased utilization of 
the existing science-technology base in new areas of application as. 
1 
opposed to its expansion by means of further R& pýý, 
5 
Similarly, Utterback conceives a "transfer" as referring to "communication, 
adoption, and use of technology in a firm, industry, economic sector, 
 16 or region. 
It is thus obvious that the transfer of technology refers to the event 
whereby a given technology is utilized within a new field and/or area. 
Apart from the presence of various methods for effecting the transfer 
of a technology, the time-span required for the transfer may differ 
quite considerably from one case to another. 
13 I. Svennilson: "The Strategy of Transfer" in 0L Spencer and A Woroniak 
(editors): "The Transfer of Technology to Developing Countries" New York 
(Praeger 1967) p176. 
14 S. Gee: "Technology Transfer, Innovation, and International Competitiveness" 
New York (Wiley 1981) p18. 
15 Loc. Cit. 
16 J. Utterback: "The Role of Applied Research Institutes in the Transfer of 
Technology in Latin America" World Development, Vol 3, No 9 [September 
1975) p666. 
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Types of Technology Transfer Cases 
Various types of cases of technology transfer exist in the real world. 
An initial distinction can be made between two principal categories of 
such a transfer, depending on whether it occurs within the same country 
or across country-boundaries. Each one of these two types may be 
sub-divided into a number of sub-types. The resultant classification 
would thus be on the following lines: 
(a) National technology transfers. These take place within the boundaries 
of one country, as there is no movement over national boundaries. 
Three sub-types of this transfer can be identified, as follows: 
(i) Intra-sector transfers, ie, transfers between establishments 
within the same sector, eg, the transfer of technology from 
one manufacturing concern to another in the same. industry. A 
transfer that occurs between two dissimilar establishments would 
be included here provided they both belong to the same sector, 
eg a research centre and a manufacturing firm within the same 
industry. Hence the element of "similarity" in the case of this 
transfer-type lies in the sector-attachment of the firms under 
question. 
(ii) Inter-sector transfers between comparable establishments 
which perform broadly similar fields of activity. Technology 
transfers among manufacturing firms belonging to different sectors 
of the economy (eg civilian and military) would fall within this 
group. While the two respective parties in this case operate 
within different sectors, the point of semblance is exhibited 
by the general nature of their activities. 
(iii) Lateral transfers, where the two establishments involved 
neither belong to the same major sector of the economy nor, 
undertake broadly parallel areas of activity. Hence this class 
of technology transfer deals includes those not covered by the 
previous two categories. 
22 
For instance, the exploitation of a private individual's 
innovation by an industrial firm would fall under this heading. 
So would a transfer of a technological innovation from a 
research and development institution or a university to a 
commercial enterprise. 
(b) Trans-national technology transfers. In contrast to the first 
category, this second major transfer type occurs across national 
boundaries. Although transfers among the industrialized countries 
account for the majority of international transfer transactions, Third 
World developing nations still obtain the bulk of their technology 
requirements from the advanced countries. 
'7 
There is, however, a relatively recent but increasing phenomenon of 
technology transfer taking place amongst the developing countries 
themselves. A transmission of technology across national boundaries 
may be undertaken between establishments which are similar, as well as 
those which are dissimilar, in the nature of their activities (Figure 1.0. 
2.3 "Success" in Transferring Technology 
As this research is primarily concerned with the question of transferring 
technology from developed to less developed countries, it is pertinent 
to ask the question as to what might constitute a "successful" 
technology transfer. Remarking on this problem, Gee points out that 
"successful technology transfer ..... hinges, to a large extent, on 
whether effective communication is developed between the principal 
parties. Effective communication, however, is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition to assure success in technology transfer. 
Many other technical, economic, and social factors also have a bearing 
on the eventual outcome". 
18 
17 Payments made by developing countries for transactions in technology have 
been estimated at $1 billion in 1975, representing less than 10% of the 
total world value of these transactions, which were estimated to have been 
over $11 billion in that year. These transactions were mainly in the 
form of lump-sum payments, royalties and fees. The source of these figures 
is UNIDO Op. Cit. p4. 
18 S Gee, Op. Cit. p19. 
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JJ Murphy puts forward a useful and clear conception in this regard. 
He maintains that "because technology is a process, the ability to 
diffuse technology is determined by the amount and type of system 
changes that are a necessary concomitant to the incorporation of any 
technical change into an equilibrium situation. These system changes 
to be effectuated will require both economic and value modifications, and 
these modifications will have to occur before diffusion can proceed to 
the point where the technology can be considered as the norm of the 
economy". 
19 
Due to the evident generality of these statements, few would be inclined 
to dispute their validity. But this leaves a pressing need for elucidating 
the nature and characteristics of those patterns of technology transfer 
that can truly be regarded as "successful". In the course of discussing 
the subject of transferring petroleum technology, HS Zakariya advances 
the view that a "real" transfer of technology lies in the "ability of 
the developing country to purchase or hire directly the most advanced 
technical means of petroleum exploration and development, if and when it 
so wishes, at a reasonable price. It also lies, above all, in developing 
the mental skills of its citizens to utilize these technical means 
effectively alone if they choose to do so". 
20 
Commenting on this very problem, Svennilson asserts that there is a 
need in each developing country for the determination of a "strategy 
for transferring technology in an effective and rapid way". 
21 
That author puts forward four features of such a strategy, namely: 
22 
(a) The integrated approach, ie combining efforts to change the social 
framework of production with improvement of education and training 
alongside the introduction of modern equipment. To arrive at this point 
a strong leadership is needed. 
19 JJ Murphy, Op. Cit. p8. 
20 HS Zakariya: "Transfer of Technology Under Petroleum Development 
Contracts" Journal of World Trade Law, Vol 16 (1982) p208. 
21 I Svennilson, Op. Cit. p180. 
22 Ibid. ppl80-182 
24 
(b) The team approach. To achieve the efficient application of a given 
technology, it is often necessary to provide a range of know-how, while. 
at'the same time a significant contribution is made in these circumstances 
by personal contact, demonstration and training. 
(c) The practice of training in operations and learning-by-doing. 
Formal education in underdeveloped countries is usually of low quality, 
because it often clings to textbook wisdom which is remote from 
application. 
(d) The introduction of equipment that embodies modern technology 
into an underdeveloped milieu. 
A'useful process of differentiation is presented by Wilkins who 
proposes three distinct terms in the context of dynamic international 
transfer'and acquisition of technology. The three terms are: 
23 
(a) Geographical Technology Transfer. 
This means 'the production for the first time by country B of a product 
when utilizing a technology obtained from country A. The relevant 
lapsed period between the initial point when the product is produced 
in country A and when it is first made, using the technology borrowed, 
in country B; is referred to as the "imitation lag". 
24 The "imitation 
lag" concept does not differentiate between a case where the product is 
produced in the technology-recipient country by nationals of that country 
on their own, or by''such nationals with extensive foreign assistance, 
or indeed by subsidiaries of multinational enterprises. 
25 
(b) Technology Absorption. 
This is referred to when a given technology is utilized by a recipient 
country B to manufacture the desired product(s) with the proviso 
that the ownership and control of the relevant enterprise rests with' 
nationals of that country. 
23 M Wilkins, Op. Cit. p169-71 
24 Ibid, P169 
25 Loc. Cit. 
25 
The associated "absorption gap" is defined by Wilkins as"the "lapsed 
time between the introduction of a new technology, process or product, 
into a nation and the point when that technology is used in processes 
of comparable or near comparable efficiency and the manufacture of 
products of comparable or near comparable quality under ownership and 
control (defined here as technological ability) of nationals of that 
country". 
26 
When a given technology is being absorbed by other countries throughout 
the world, it is said to be internationally "diffused". Technological 
diffusion is'thus a' consequence of absorption, and may at times be 
largely concomitant with it. 
(c) Technology Infusion. 
This takes place in the recipient country when "the new technology 
is not only adopted and adapted by nationals but also becomes the 
dominant technology of the host'nation industry". 
27 It is suggested 
by Wilkins that this stage would probably'be achieved when 50% or 
more of the output of the product in question is coming from the use of 
the new technology. 
28 
On the basis of the foregoing points it is now possible to make an 
attempt at summarizing the nature'and'characteristics of successful 
technology transfer. When viewed from the developing countries' angle, " 
"success" In the transfer process can generally be'described as that 
pattern of technology-acquisition that results in a genuine upgrading 
of, technical expertise while contributing at the same time towards 
enhancing gross national product. Consequently, three relevant 
characteristics of'successful transfers may be singled out for analysis. 
These comprise the following: 
(i) Total' absorption of the new technology by the recipient 
enterprise. This implies that subsequent to an initial learning 
period, the technology becomes fully understood by those who 
operate it. This opens the way for Improvements in that 
technology, its utilization for different purposes, and the 
ability for its transference from its first use-establishment 
to other useful potential applications within other enterprises. 
26 Ibid, p170 
27 Loc. Cit. 
28 Loc. Cit. Footnote 9 
26 
To quote Gee again, the importance of the process of technology 
transfer "lies in, its ability to stimulate and strengthen the 
innovation process.. As such it provides the means by which the 
29 
rate of technological innovations might be increased". 
(ii) Speed of absorption of the new technology. 
Other things being equal, we can generally say that a speedy 
assimilation of any technology-intake implies, at least in, 
principle, that, the desired benefits shall accrue that much 
earlier. It is thus possible to say that ceteris paribus, the 
speedier the absorption of. any. technology the more successful 
is the transfer. 
(iii) Minimization of costs to the developing country. 
Again, if we suppose other things to be equal, the, less costs 
borne in the process of technology transfer the more successful 
this process will be. Various types of costs are relevant in this 
connection, including capital outlays, human resources utilized, 
operating expenses, as well as opportunity costs. 
2.4 Costs and Benefits of Transfers 
There is little doubt that "cost" is a prime consideration affecting 
the flow of technology from the industrial "North" to thedeveloping 
"South". Equally, these transfers embody certain benefits, the expected 
value of which play a significant part in the whole process of decision- 
making in this sphere. Essentially, the decision of a prospective 
transferee to acquire a given technology implies that his net expected 
benefit of that action is sufficiently high. However, the situation is 
confounded by the fact that both vendor and buyer expect costs and 
benefits, each from his own standpoint. Also, the actions of each 
party are influenced by assessments of the expectations and calculations 
made by the other. 
29 S Gee, Op. Cit. p19 
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A strong link seems to exist between the degree of packaging associated 
with any transfer transaction and the overall cost of the deal, 
particularly when the "true" cost of the relevant foreign exchange 
outlay is assessed. In general, highly packaged transfer transactions 
are associated with higher costs. While this in itself encourages the 
adoption of low-packaged transfers, the available options to the buyer are 
in many cases severely limited. Hence, the trio of packaging level, 
cost and decision to purchase a given technology, forms a linkage in which 
the three factors need to be considered jointly. 
2.4.1 Categorization of Transferee-incurred Costs 
Differing opinions have been expressed as to how relevant costs may 
be categorized. Two of these opinions are presented here and a new 
classification is subsequently suggested by the researcher. 
(a) UNCTAD's Classification 
UNCTAD points out in one of its publications that the "financial costs 
of contractual transfer may be direct or indirect and may be classified 
under six headings", thus: 
30 
(1) Direct costs, these including: 
(i) "Charges for the right to use patents, licences, 
know-how and trade marks"; 
31 
(ii) "Charges for technical information and know-how 
required at all stages from pre-investment, 
32 
through investment to training operations". 
(2) Indirect costs, these being: 
(i) "Overpricing of inputs of intermediate goods, 
some of which may not have a market price"; 
33 
(ii) "Charges through profits on capitalization of 
know-how, by equity participation in place of, 
or in addition to, other payments for technology. 
30 UNCTAD: "Handbook on the Acquisfä on of Technology by Developing Countries" 
New York (United Nations 1978) p31 
31 Loc. Cit. 
32 Loc. Cit. 
33 Loc. Cit. 
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Dividends on such holdings are in part, therefore, 
payment for the technology transferred"; 
34 
(iii) "Charges through part of the repatriated profits of 
wholly-owned subsidiaries, or joint ventures, the 
establishment of which does not make specific 
provision for payment for the transfer of technology"; 
35 
(iv), "Charges for capital and other technical equipment 
imported, the price of which normally allows for the 
exporters' valuation of the technology embodied". 
36 
It is further added by UNCTAD that "there are also opportunity costs 
still more difficult to measure, eg, social costs arising from the transfer 
of unsuitable technology, inadequate or delayed transfer and 'non- 
transfer', ie, when although a plant is set up in a given country by a 
foreign investor, the technology involved is simply not effectively 
transferred to the nationals of that country - this last instance is 
37 
a common situation". -' 
(b) Teece's Classification 
A distinction is made by DJ Teece between "two basic forms in which 
technology can be transferred". 
38 
This researcher goes on by pointing out that the "first form embraces 
physical items such as tooling, equipment, and blue prints ... The 
second form of technology is the information that must be acquired if 
the physical equipment or 'hardware' is to be utilized effectively. 
This information relates to methods of organization and operation, 
quality control, and various other manufacturing procedures. The effective 
conveyance of such 'peripheral' support constitutes the crux of the 
process of technology transfer, and it typically generates the associated 
information flows", 39 
34 Loc. Cit. 
35 Loc. Cit. 
36 Loc. Cit. 
37 Loc. Cit. 
38 DJ Teece: "Technology Transfer by Multinational Firms: The Resource Cost 
of Transferring Technological Know-how" The Economic Journal, 87 (June 1977) 
p245. 
39 Loc. Cit. 
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Teece's aim in making this distinction is to emphasize-that a significant 
difference exists between "project costs" and "transfer costs". The 
latter, he maintains, are a "subset" of the former. 
40 
Accordingly, Teece defines "technology transfer costs" as the "costs 
of transmitting and absorbing all the relevant unembodied knowledge". 
41 
This writer explains further that "the costs of performing the various 
activities which have to be conducted to ensure the transfer of the, 
necessary technological know-how will represent the cost of_technology 
transfer. Clearly, a , great many skills from other industries 
(eg 
design engineering) will be needed-for plant design, plant construction 
and equipment installation. However, not all of these skills will have to 
42 be transferred to ensure the success of the project". 
A subdivision of "transfer. cost" into four groups is subsequently 
presented by Teece, as follows: 
43 
(1) Cost of pre-engineering technological exchanges, so that the 
"basic characteristics of. the technology are revealed to the 
, transferee, and the necessary theoretical insights are conveyed" 
44 
(2) Engineering costs. These relate to "transferring the process 
design and the associated process engineering in the case of 
process innovations, or the product design and production engineering 
in the case of product innovations. If the technology has already 
been commercialized, transmission may simply involve transferring 
existing drawings and specifications with the minimum of 
modification. However, the process of absorption may be more 
difficult requiring the utilization of considerable consulting or 
advisory resources. 'Engineering' costs not falling into the 
specified categories are excluded from transfer costs". 
45 
(3) R&D costs that are "associated with solving unexpected 
problems and adapting or modifying the technology". 
46 
40 In a sample study of 26 international technology transfer projects, Teece 
found that the percentage of transfer costs to total project costs ranged 
from 2% to 59%-(Ibid. p247) 
41 Ibid., p245 
42 Loc. Cit. 
43 Ibid., p245-7 
44 Ibid., p245 
45 Ibid., p245-6 
46 Ibid., p246 
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(4) Pre-start-up training costs and the "excess manufacturing 
costs". The latter "represent the learning and debugging costs 
incurred during the start-up phase, and before the plant achieves 
the design performance specifications. It is quite possible that 
no marketable output will be produced during the initial phases 
of the start-up. Nevertheless, normal labour, materials, utilities 
and depreciation costs, will be incurred, together with the costs 
of the extra supervisory personnel that will inevitably be required 
to assist in the-start-up. The operating losses incurred during 
the initial production are very often a close approximation to 
excess manufacturing costs'". 
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(c) A Proposed Classification 
The structure of costs suggested by UNCTAD is based essentially on 
considering the host country's interests, so much so that all conceivable 
costs incurred by the recipient nation are included. In contrast, 
Teece's classification of costs is shaped basically from the angle of 
multinational enterprises which are keen to expand by establishing new 
branches or subsidiaries in other regions. 
Looking at this matter from the viewpoint of the recipient enterprise 
in a Third World country (whatever may be its ownership pattern), it is 
possible to classify technology transfer costs under four principal 
types, as follows: 
(1) Costs of patents, trademarks and industrial secrets. 
The first major element in the cost of technology transfer is the 
expense incurred in obtaining whatever patents, trademarks and 
industrial secrets (ie know-how) that are deemed necessary for the 
acquisition of that technology. Payment(s) made by the transferee 
in this regard may be in the form of an initial lump-sum and/or 
running royalties. In the case of the former, agreement is sometimes 
reached by the respective parties for the sum to be divided into a 
number of periodic (eg annual) and specified amounts. 
47 Ibid., p246-7 
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Running royalties are often fixed in relation to value of sales 
attained by the transferee. In other cases, calculation of these 
royalties is based on one of three other criteria, viz volume of 
production, added value achieved, or gross (or net)A profits. 
The royalty rate differs from case to case. A study of technology 
recipient enterprises in South-East Asia has shown that royalties 
paid to US firms ranged mostly between 5% and 10%, whereas those paid 
48 
to Japanese companies varied in the main between 2% and 5%. 
(2) Costs of technological hardware and software. 
It is normal for the required technology to be embodied in one or 
more pieces of machinery or other equipment and/or associated 
software. As the purchase of these items is usually indispensable 
in such situations, the cost of acquiring them becomes a chief 
constituent of the total cost of transferring the technology. Apart 
from the price of the equipment, the cost referred to in this case 
includes such items as freight, insurance, and relevant correspondence 
with suppliers. 
(3) Costs of specialized services. 
In many cases the transferee enterprise requires certain specialized 
services to be rendered alongside the technological ingredients 
mentioned under (1) and/or (2) above. Among the most obvious of 
these services are those relating to the installation and commissioning 
of machinery, but there are others. All in all, it is possible to 
subdivide these services into two principal groupings, as follows: 
(i) Pre-operational services and facilities. 
These may, once again, be deemed to fall into two types. 
There is, firstly, those services which are comparatively 
technical in nature, being closely allied with the needed 
technology. The more important in this regard are the 
services of product or process design, production or 
48 TW Allen: "Direct Investment of Japanese Enterprises in South-East Asia: 
A Study of Motivations, Characteristics, and Attitudes" Bangkok (Economic 
Co-operation Centre for Asian and Pacific Region, 1973) p15. Cited in UNIDO: 
"National Approaches to the Acquisition of Technology" New York (United 
Nations, 1978) p59. 
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process engineering, detailed plant layout, equipment 
installation and commissioning, personnel training, and R&D 
efforts to adapt or modify the technology in accordance with 
local requirements. As to the second group, this encompasses 
the provision of those services and/or facilities that are 
less technically linked with the essential elements of the 
respective technology, including the design and/or construction 
of buildings, design. of material-handling. systems, and 
arrangements for the supply of requisite plant energy. 
(ii) Post-operational services. 
These may comprise maintenance, assistance with technical 
improvements, running continual training programmes, and 
the supply of required spare parts, materials and components. 
(4) Other costs. There are other items of costs which are - 
incurred in certain cases by the transferee enterprise vis-a-vis 
the technology supplier. These costs relate to matters that are 
principally within the financial, marketing and general fields. 
Provisions of investment finance (either wholly or partly), the 
distribution of the new project's output, secondment of managerial 
and/or technical staff, and overall management responsibility 
for the project would come under this heading. 
It is necessary to point out here that the four aforementioned cost 
elements need not in every case be incurred by the transferee towards 
the principal technology supplier. Indeed, it is imperative for 
every Third World enterprise to search very hard in order to reduce 
its liabilities towards its main transferor. The clear implication 
here is that the recipient enterprise ought to endeavour whenever 
feasible to obtain the necessary ingredients of the requisite 
technology and related services/facilities from indigenous sources. 
Alternatively, effort should be exerted to obtain those services/ 
facilities from abroad if necessary. Whenever such external procurement 
is seen as inevitable, the source of supply must be chosen with great 
care in order to obtain the best possible price and other terms and 
conditions, without sacrificing either the quality or quantity of the 
technological content being sought. 
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The basic theme here is that there is a need to differentiate, in 
every case where a tehcnology transfer to a Third World country is 
being attempted, between the "actual" and "desirable" levels of packaging 
associated with that particular transfer. When the packaging level 
has been correctly chosen, this difference will be non-existent. 
However, there are grounds for hypothesizing that in a large number of 
cases (possibly the majority) a dichotomy will surface between the 
actual shape of the main technology transaction and the desirable 
level of packaging under the particular circumstances of that individual 
case. 
It is possible that the recipient enterprise requests certain services/ 
facilities from the main technology supplier where these'services/ 
facilities could be obtained either locally or from external sources 
at lower costs and/or more favourable other terms and conditions, ' 
with the added advantage of enhancing indigenous skills and accelerating 
relevant experience-accumulation. It may happen, for instance, that 
the principal technology supplier is asked to provide training 
services, construct the necessary buildings, or provide equity capital 
where such provisions can conceivably be made equally-efficiently by 
other suppliers. Where these other suppliers offer lower prices 
and/or better terms and conditions, while other aspects remain constant, 
it would be a mistake to deny them these opportunities in favour of 
the main transferor. Such a preclusion would mean that the level of 
packaging attached to the main transfer. transaction is needlessly high. 
2.4.2 Determination of the Price of Technology 
Despite the existence of certain imperfections in the technology 
supply market, it is reasonable to assert that the forces of supply 
and demand still play a significant role in determining the price of 
technology. The approach adopted here is to look at the operation 
of these two forces while at the same time attempting to incorporate 
other factors as much as possible and at various points throughout 
the analysis. 
0 
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(a) The Supply Side 
A technology supplier is generally prepared to sell whenever the 
prospective price and other terms and conditions are viewed by him to 
be acceptable, having regard to the nature and characteristics of 
other possible options. While it is possible to imagine that the owner 
of a technology would, in most cases at least, be ready to make it 
available if he is satisfied with the level of payment(s) and 
associative conditions, it is reasonable to imagine a minimum "price" 
below. which the technology holder would refrain from selling. 
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Also, the technology vendor must have some idea of the nature of the 
other alternatives that can be pursued by him and the likely consequences 
of each. If both rationality and fairly adequate information are 
presumed, the technology transferor should normally have in front of 
him two or more possible courses of action and the costs, revenues, 
and net returns consequent upon each. 
An additional element can be introduced concerning the technical 
standing of the technology buyer. As the essential cause of the 
appropriation of technology lies in the ability of the transferor to 
conduct fruitful research and/or accumulate exploitable experience in 
the relevant field, those who are interested in acquiring a given- 
technology may possess the required capabilities to develop that 
technology. It must, however, be conceded that different seekers of 
the same technology may exhibit varying capacities for its successful 
development, whilst such a development is bound to consume time and 
require patient efforts together with the necessary capital outlays. 
It can, therefore' be supposed that an inverse relationship exists 
between the technological strength of the'prospective purchaser and 
the price of the relevant technology (Figure 2.1). 
50 
49 It shall be assumed henceforth that, "price" encompasses all relevant terms 
and conditions in addition to direct and specified monetary payments. 
50 The idea that a generally inverse relationship exists between "price" and 
the prospective buyer's"technological strength" has appeared in certain 
works, including: 
(i) F Stewart: "Technology and Underdevelopment" London (Macmillan 
Press, 1977) p127-9. Stewart postulates a direct link between 
price of technology and the degree of technological dependence 
displayed by the buyer. 
(ii) A description of the factors which contribute towards shaping 
the relative negotiating strength or weakness of the parties 
is given by UNCTAD in the following: 
UNCTAD, Op. Cit. p12 
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The clear implication here is that when ahigh level of technological 
strength is possessed by the would-be buyer, the seller is usually 
prepared to concede a low price, and vice versa, with the ever-present 
proviso that in every set of circumstances, there is a minimum limit. 
beyond which the supplier will feel that it is not worthwhile to continue 
lowering the price any further. 
Figure 2.1 
A General Curve of Minimum Acceptable Price of Technology 
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Two major cost elements act to influence the shaping of the curve CC 
in Figure 2.1, these being as follows: 
(1) Opportunity Cost. 
This arises from foregoing the best other alternative open to 
the transferor.., Alternative'opportunities may be present in 
the form of direct exports, to, the country or area in question, 
or other types of technology transfer contracts, where each of 
these exemplify a given transfer method. 
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Needless to say that any of these methods or their variants, 
would be feasible only if it was possible to employ them having 
regard to all relevant circumstances. When a combination of 
transfer methods is practicable, this also needs to be 
considered. The opportunity cost of a given envisaged transfer 
transaction is, therefore, the expected net returns associated 
with the best possible alternative to that transaction. 
(2) Source-related transfer costs. 
These are basically costs which have to be incurred by the 
technology supplier in order to fulfil his obligations as set 
out in the transfer transaction. The relevant obligations fall 
into two classes, as follows: 
(i) Embodied obligations, in the form'of specific supplies 
of various physical items (hardware and/or software) in' 
order to enable the transferee to grasp and, utilize the 
technology in question. 
(ii) Unembodied obligations, in the form of relevant 
knowledge and required information to enable the transferee 
to make proper use of the physical items. These obligations 
bring about certain costs that have to be borne by the 
technology supplier, including expenses for training of 
transferee personnel, provision of engineering services, 
visits to the transferee's location, correspondence, face-to- 
face exchanges, and start-up costs. 
The inverse relationship between the price of technology and technological 
strength of the purchaser is self-evident. Assuming that the would-be 
technology recipient has approached the best possible source, there 
are three significant dimensions of his technological capability which 
may influence the transferor in fixing his final price. These relate 
to cost, time and quality. When the transferee is potentially able to 
develop the technology in question with low costs and minimum time-span 
while attaining high qualitative standards, the supplier's price is 
likely to be correspondingly lower. Consequently, wherever the technology 
buyer shows signs of being incapable of evolving the requisite technology 
within reasonable cost, time and quality dimensions, he is likely, 
ceteris paribus, to face higher prices fixed by the transferor. 
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(b) The Demand Side 
The nature and characteristics of the demand side of the technology 
market set the maximum possible price of any given technology being' 
considered for transference. Two principal factors are pertinent 
in influencing prospective technology purchasers, and thus indicating 
the price ceiling of the technology in question. 
(1) Future benefits and costs of the technology. 
If we assume rational behaviour, it is reasonable to expect 
prospective buyers to make forecasts of their likely benefits 
from acquiring the technology in question. Whether the 
organization seeking the technology is State-owned or privately- 
owned relevant estimates can be made, on the basis of the funda- 
mental objectives of such an acquisition coupled with estimates 
of likely consequences. Substitution of imports, the provision 
of jobs, enhancement of national product, accumulation of 
technical expertise, development of a backward area, these are 
some of the possible objectives prompting governmental bodies 
to follow the path of industrial development. Private enterprises, 
on the other hand, are often'keen to increase their market shares, 
raise profit levels, or attain other commercial objectives. 
Costs that are likely to be incurred, as a result of the decision 
to obtain the technology, also have to be assessed. Investment 
as well as operating expenses need to be estimated, so that 
commercial, and if need be social, returns associated with the project 
may be estimated. A prospective project's forecasted net returns 
can subsequently be compared with certain set standards, or 
alternatively with those of other projects, in order to assist 
in arriving at a final decision. 
(2) Costs of alternatives. 
It frequently happens in practice that other alternatives do 
exist for the technology buyer. He may be able to develop a 
similar type of know-how given time and resources, or he may have 
the option to utilize a lower level of packaging (ie less-packaged 
transfer methods) in effecting the requisite transfer. 
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The costs of an indigenous development of a certain know-how 
include such items as remunerations of personnel, costs of 
equipment and buildings, risk element involved, as well as other 
miscellaneous expenses and the cost of lapsed time in utilizing 
the relevant technology. As regards the tapping of other transfer 
methods, respective costs can once again be estimated. Needless 
to say, whenever the total cost figure associated with any one 
of the possible alternatives is lower than that of the deal 
under consideration, a prima facie case does exist for adopting 
this option. The implied assumption here is that the expected 
benefits of the different courses of action are identical. 
It is bound to occur in many cases, however, that the initial 
contemplated transaction emerges as the best available path as 
a result of this costing process. This implies that the net 
benefit of this alternative exceeds those of all others. Under 
these circumstances, the net benefit derived by the buyer from 
following this option is quite simply the result of subtracting 
total cost from gross benefit. It can thus be generalized that 
any prospective buyer of a given technology should not be prepared 
to pay a price that exceeds the value of this net benefit. 
Figure 2.2 sets out the general shape of the curve representing the 
transferee's maximum price. It is noticeable that this maximum varies 
inversely with the degree of technological strength shown by the 
transferee, so that the price ceiling of the technologically able 
transferee is low, and vice versa. 
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Figure 2.2 
A General Curve of Maximum Acceptable Price of Technology 
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Whenever-a deal is struck, a price must have been chosen between the 
seller's minimum and the buyer's maximum. Actual fixing of the final 
price is influenced by several considerations, each of which plays 
some role in this process. It is obvious from Figure 2.3 that when the 
curve KK'is below CC there is no basis for agreement between the two 
parties. 
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Figure 2.3 
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In many cases, however, CC is below KK, thereby furnishing the necessary 
condition for a possible agreement. Three principal factors can be 
suggested as instrumental in arriving at the final agreed price 
within the pre-determined range. These three factors are as follows: 
(1) The role of the State. 
The past two decades have witnessed a steady growth in State 
legislation, policies, and regulations in the Third World. 
This is particularly noticeable in those developing countries 
where the State has assumed a dominant role in the process of 
industrialization and technological acquisition/development. 
State intervention seems to act in the direction of placing the 
transferee at a vantage point. This is due to various measures 
and regulations restraining the transferor. 
=mq 
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(2) Negotiating skills. 
Past experience and dormant negotiating ability of each party 
can play a notable part in determining the terms of the final 
settlement. As negotiation is an art by itself, industrial 
firms often opt to employ expert negotiators or select from their 
employees those who are deemed to be most skillful in this sphere. 
(3) Other considerations. 
Other factors are often significant in the process of technology 
price-fixing. Examples of such considerations include the 
financial abilities of the respective parties, prevailing economic 
conditions internationally and regionally-,,, and 'the role played by 
international and multiple-country organizations. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
OBSTACLES ASSOCIATED WITH NORTH-TO-SOUTH TRANSFERS 
Developing countries of the Third World have for some time realized the 
significance of the inflow of industrial technology to their economies. 
What'has, not been readily comprehended, however, 'seems to be the truly 
formidable obstacles to genuine and successful transfers of technology 
to their regions. 
It is possible to classify' obstacles to technology transfer into two 
main categories on the basis of their source, namely: 
(a)+ Those obstacles which are-associated-With the supply side of 
technology, 
and 
(b) Those factors which originate basically within the technology 
seeking Third World regions. 
On the basis of this differentiation, a number of factors'that are 
thought to hinder the general process of technology transmission will 
be discussed here. Also, the problem concerning the "appropriateness" 
of technologies that are transferred is subsequently dealt with. 
3.1. North-based Obstacles 
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) has 
conducted a number of studies relating to external factors which hinder 
Third World nations in their quest for technology. ' In one of its 
publications on this topic, UNCTAD concludes that "the principal issues 
which have constituted the core of concern" of the less developed 
nations vis-a-vis the technology exporting countries include "the 
large number of limitations imposed by foreign enterprises on the field 
of activity and ownership by foreign enterprises; explicit clauses in 
contractual agreements and implicit practices which are either deemed 
to be illegal or otherwise controlled in the countries of the suppliers 
of technology but which are very widely practised in developing countries; 
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industrial property regulations and administrative policies which 
hamper the effective utilization of the technology required; a 
whole series of implicit and explicit practices followed by trans- 
national and other enterprises which work towards limiting the possibility 
of the developing countries obtaining access to the right technology 
for the right product under the right terms and conditions and at the 
right time. All these adversely affect the development of national 
scientific and technological capabilities and perpetuate the technological 
dependence of developing countries". 
' 
The various obstacles that operate from the supplying end, and which 
have been hindering the smooth process of technology transfer to Third 
World developing countries, may thus be grouped under three main 
categories. Namely, these relate to political and legal barriers, 
monopolistic and restrictive practices, and managerial shortcomings. 
3.1.1 Political and Legal Barriers 
There is some evidence to suggest that political friction, sensitivity 
and manoeuvring play a role in circumventing the commercial process of 
transferring technology to Third World nations. Economic historians 
have recorded cases going as far back as the early part of the 19th 
century where the sale of industrial equipment had been barred for 
fear of diffusing the technology embodied in relevant equipment 
(eg, the 19th century prohibition by Britain of the export of certain 
textile machine 
2 
ry). Sales of technology items from one country to 
another are often viewed today as signifying a friendly overture and a 
contribution to the solidification of relations between such nations. 
Conversely, it is frequently the case that when the political relationship 
between two countries is strained the flow of technology between them 
is discouraged or even blocked. 
I UNCTAD: "An International Code of Conduct on Transfer of Technology" 
Report by the UNCTAD Secretariat, New York (United Nations, 1975) p2. 
2M Wilkins: "The Role of Private Business in the International Diffusion 
of Technology" Journal of Economic History Vol XXXIV, No 1 (March 1974) 
p173. 
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Statutes, by-laws, and regulations enforceable in developed countries 
have had important effects on the possibilities of technology transfer, 
the conduct of negotiations, and the execution of related agreements. 
Nearly all major developed countries have enacted laws dealing with 
restrictive practices, which in some cases have effectively circumscribed 
the firm or establishment in its freedom of action. This has frequently 
resulted in a marked reduction in the willingness of the respective 
firm to enter into contracts involving the transference of its in 
know-how and/or patents to other enterprises. Moreover, legislation 
regarding the export of technical know-how has in some countries 
prohibited completely or partially the transfer of certain defined 
spheres of industrial technology to other countries. 
One of the most overt post-war examples of the international restriction 
on the flow of technology across country boundaries of differing 
ideologies is the "Western strategic, embargo" on the export of materials 
and equipment which embody advanced technology and/or military significance 
co-ordinated through the Paris-based COCOM. This embargo restricts the 
range of goods that can be exported by Western countries to the USSR and 
other Socialist countries of Eastern Europe. Among Western countries, 
the USA has always been the most stringent and comprehensive in applying 
these controls, so much so that in the early 1950's the prohibited list 
covered over 1300 items, whilst those barred by other Western countries 
involved about half this number. 
3 Since earlyr1970's these lists have 
been revised several times, whereby many previous items have been 
removed. 
4 At present the embargo nations are the NATO countries (except 
Iceland) and, Japan. 
5 Many other nations have also participated in the 
embargo due to political considerations. As for the Socialist countries 
affected, these were the nine East European countries (including 
Yugoslavia) In addition to China, Cuba, North Korea, Mongolia, and 
North (later unified) Vietnam. 
6 
3J Wilczynski: "Licences in the West-East-West Transfer of Technology" 
Journal of World Trade Law, Vol II (March-April 1977) p121-2. 
4 Ibid., p122. 
5 Ibid., p121. 
6 Loc. Cit. 
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Operation of the Patent System 
Another illustration of the significance of legal and regulative 
provisions is afforded by the operation of the industrial property 
system. Whatever may be the global advantages of the present provisions 
regarding patents and trade marks, this whole situation can be seen 
as working against the interests of the less developing nations in 
their continual quest for more technology. Indeed, the vast majority 
of registered patents in the developing countries are owned by foreign 
enterprises/individuals. 
Although patenting does not itself lead to technological dependence, it 
is certainly an important vehicle for the application of technological 
knowledge in various countries. As a recent UNIDO publication makes 
clear "the international patent system thus exerts considerable influence 
on who get industrialized, and the. -method, conditions and cost 
(involved 
therein) ..... The extensive patenting activity of Western transnational 
corporations has undoubtedly suppressed the development of local innovative 
activity and has contributed to a continuous decline in the share, of 
locally owned patents". 
7 
S Thebaud'draws attention to three salient characteristics of the 
present system which in effect are very similar to the points raised 
by UNIDO. This writer remarks that the system grants the holder of 
the patent a "commercial monopoly" that is seen in the context of 
"underdeveloped countries (to) extend to-non-patented products. 
Indeed the control over the importation of a patented product can 
limit the production of other goods if this product is an intermediate 
necessary for-the manufacture of other goods". 
8 
7 UNIDO: "Technological Self-Reliance of the Developing Countries: Towards 
Operational Strategies" Development and Transfer of Technology Series No 15, 
Vienna (United Nations 1981) pp7-8. It is pointed out in this publication 
that during the final years of the 1970's some 3.5 million patents were 
effective. Of these only approximately 200,000 Cie 6%) had been granted by 
developing countries, out of which five of every six patent-holders were 
foreigners and only one-sixth Cie 1% of the world total) were held by 
nationals of developing countries. Most of developing-country patents that 
were held by foreigners were possessed by large corporations headquartered 
in five developed market-economy countries, namely the Federal Republic 
of Germany, France, Switzerland, the UK, and the'US. Approximately 90 to 
95% of the patents granted by developing countries to foreigners were not 
actually used in production processes within those countries= instead the 
overwhelming majority are used to secure import monopolies (Loc. Cit). 
8S Thebaud: "An Evaluation of Technology Transfer in Under-Developed Countries" 
in MJ Cetron and HF Davidson (editors): "Industrial Technology Transfer" 
Leyden (Noordhoff, 1977) p404. 
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As regards the three characteristics of the, patent system mentioned by 
Thebaud these are as follows: 
9 
(a) The majority of patents granted in the developing countries belong 
to foreign firms. 
(b) Patents granted in the Third World belong in the majority of, 
cases to large foreign firms, thus reflecting the concentration of 
industrial research on a world-wide scale. 
(c) Those patents belonging to large companies. are mostly not exploited 
in under-developed, countries. 
3.1.2 Monopolistic and Restrictive Practices 
Firms operating in industrialized countries often embark on monopolistic 
or restrictive practices that may have obvious adverse repercussions on the 
process of technological flow to Third World nations. This is very likely 
to happen in the case of, large firms in the Western world, especially when 
the relevant corporation possesses some monopolistic advantages. 
Advantages of this kind may accrue if the technology supplying firm 
is the, sole or major producer of the equipment, particularly when this 
firm owns important legal patents. and/or holds significant secret 
technical know-how. 
The aforementioned UNIDO publication makes the point that"the market 
power of transnational corporations largely determines the availability 
and pattern of technology transfer in advanced science-based sectors 
where technology ownership is mainly concentrated in a few large enterprises. 
In'these sectors, owing to increasing R and D costs, the economies of 
scale involved in technological innovation and commercialization, and 
high costs of market failure, large companies have become the major 
source of, technological development and, consequently, the owners of 
improved and new technology. Similarly, in sectors where fast technological 
change reduces the product life cycle, for example, drugs, scientific 
instruments and electronics, 'the importance of technological advantage 
makes control over the technology within the corporate system the major 
motivating factor in its commercialization". 
10 
9 Ibid. pp 403-4 
10 UNIDO, Op. Cit. p5 
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S Thebaud comes out strongly in-support of the above-mentioned theme 
advanced by UNIDO. - After stressing that the developing countries 
suffer-from the virtual absence of industrial research In the private 
sector (and very little else that could be described as worthwhile 
industrial/technological research), -Thebaud argues that "the enormous 
potential of private and public industrial research which presently 
exists in developed countries allows them to produce new technologies 
at a rate unprecedented in history, and to accumulate a know-how which 
places them in a monopolistic position vis-a-vis the under-developed 
countries on the international market of technologies". 
11 He continues 
by asserting that "this monopolistic position is all the stronger in 
that the research activities of developed countries are concentrated in 
the large enterprises". 
12 
It may be argued that Western firms often supply`a refined technology 
based on rigorous R and D activity and years of practical utilization. 
This, it may be said, is bound to constitute a sizeable cost element 
of the technology possessed by these corporations and is reflected in 
the price affixed to such a technology when sold to the developing 
nations. In fact no one would seriously doubt that the cost of 
researching and developing modern technology is often-very high. 
However, the problem seems to emanate from the inability of developing 
nations to carry out corresponding research efforts, and the level of. 
remunerations and other terms and conditions demanded by Western 
corporations for parting with research-based knowledge. Those remunerations, 
terms, and conditions, are often thought to be excessive and seriously 
detrimental to development efforts in the Third World. 
Three main points may be raised with regard to monopolostic and 
restrictive practices thought by developing countries to have an 
adverse impact on their quest-for technology. These are as follows: 
(a) Restrictive clauses in technology transfer agreements. 
It may be argued, that a market standing underpinned by a monopolostic 
element can in practice induce the technology supplier to demand harsh 
terms. These terms may take various forms. They include stringent 
11 S Thebaud. Op. Cit., p398 
12 Loc. Cit. 
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restrictions on marketing territory, field-of-use of the technology 
under question, production volumes, sub-licensing to third parties, and 
the grant-back of technical advances achieved by the recipient to 
the supplier. Other stipulations that are occasionally, inserted 
include the right of the supplier to inspect the premises of the buyer, 
that the contract should run indefinitely, or that the transferor 
cannot guarantee the successful operation of the technology. 
As a case in point, the question of restricting the right of Third 
World technology recipients to export to other regions was investigated 
by UNCTAD in the early part of the 1970's. The nature of "explicit 
restrictions on exports, if any, in over 2000 contractual agreements 
on the transfer of technology made, by 10 developing. countries" was 
looked into. 13 On this basis, UNCTAD notes that the proportion of 
contracts containing export restrictions varies "from as much as 
99 per cent in Peru, 97 per cent in Mexico and 93 per cent in Chile 
to as little as 
.6 
per cent in Israel. India and the Philippines 
are in an intermediate position, with proportions of 43 per cent and 
32 per cent respectively. Comparisons between countries should, 
however, be made with caution, since the coverage and also representative- 
ness of the different samples are not known. Even so, the proportion 
of contracts containing restrictive export clauses is strikingly high_ 
in most of the countries". 
14 
11 
In addition to export restrictions (or in lieu of them) advanced 
country transferors often demand high (sometimes excessive) payments 
from transferees, whether directly or indirectly. These may take the 
form of running royalties, fixed lump sums, intermittent payments, or 
payments for services such as engineering and managerial services. 
After pointing out that technology transfer to the developing countries 
is essentially a one way process, Patel makes the point that "the 
economic position and technical capabilities of their enterprises are 
considerably weaker than those of the external suppliers of technology. 
Moreover, most developing countries are faced with serious shortages of 
foreign exchange. As a result of these factors they are inherently in 
the position of unequal partners in the transfer process". 
15 
13 UNCTAD: "Major Issues Arising from the Transfer of Technology to 
Developing Countries" New York (United Nations 1975) p18. 
14 Loc. Cit. 
15 SJ Patel: "The Technological Dependence of Developing Countries" 
Journal of Modern African Studies, 12,1 (1974) p7. 
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Consequently, Patel continues, it is not surprising that "external 
suppliers of technology have often acted as what RH Tawney called 
'virtuosos in unscrupulous prof iteering"'. 
16 
On the basis of research undertaken by UNCTAD, Patel makes the claim 
that advanced country enterprises often succeed in obtaining "effective 
royalty payments which range as high as 10-30 per cent of value of 
sales; and salaries for their consultants, in some instances, are as 
much as 50 times those paid to local personnel undertaking similar work. 
When the negotiating position of the developing countries is strengthened, 
this, usually leads to a considerable lowering of both these ranges". 
17 
Transferees are, moreover, faced by the insistence of technology 
suppliers on certain provisions granting them exclusive rights to 
supply the required equipment and/or materials. Transferors also demand 
in some cases the employment of their nominees for crucial managerial 
or technical posts within the project. Though these demands are 
normally linked by transferors with product or process guarantees, they 
do represent serious limitations on the operational freedom of the 
technology buyer. 
It may be possible in many cases to rationalize such demands by 
technology transferors. Apart from the high cost of developing modern 
industrial techniques, there are the obvious concerns for protecting 
other marketing territories, preserving quality standards, and protecting 
the interests of other transferees. Technology transferors may at 
times have firm grounds for believing that the prospective producer 
requires constant advice, surveillance and coaching for an initial 
period to tackle the myriad number of problems that will inevitably 
surface in the various aspects of the business. 
Whatever may be the rationale of the terms and conditions requested by 
technology vendors, their acceptance by transferees in developing 
countries is governed by two major determinants. The first is the 
availability of other suppliers and their probable terms and conditions, 
while the second concerns the benefits that are expected by the buyer 
from acquiring that technology. It is possible that after studying 
16 Loc. Cit. 
17 Ibid. p10 
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all the relevant information (including financial aspects) the technology 
buyer concludes that the proposed deal is unfair and/or unworthy, and 
hence declines to accept it. Moreover, there is bound to appear a 
"carry-on" effect of these limitations to other potential transferees, 
as some would-be transferees may contemplate the impact of such 
stipulations as too burdensome. This would hinder and discourage 
even further the process of technology transfer to developing countries. 
(b) Non-transference of technology. 
Another aspect of friction between "North" and "South" is to be found 
in what may be denoted as "non-transference coupled with utilization" 
of technology on Third World nations' soil. This problem is associated 
primarily with the operation of multi-national enterprises whereby 
certain policies and practices adopted by these organizations are deemed 
by some researchers to run against the essential spirit of technology 
transference. These policies and practices are often described as 
"restrictive" or "monopolistic" having the resultant effect of 
hindering any genuine process of technology transfer. As DD Evans 
remarks, it is often the case that "if a foreign firm departed, no 
residual indigenous capability would remain to perpetuate the 
utilization of the technology. No one would have been trained in-country 
to operate the production system, much less to design and fabricate/ 
assemble another unit. Although machine operators and other semi- 
skilled labour are trained, no capability is created in the design or 
engineering functions"18 
It needs to be stressed, however, that multi-national corporations do 
not readily accept this criticism. Scarcity of qualified and reliable 
personnel to man crucial managerial and technical positions is 
frequently cited as justification for employing expatriates, and the 
need for co-ordination between the various segments of a global 
enterprise is also regarded as the basis for certain policies and practices. 
It can be pointed out, furthermore, that multi-nationals face a constant 
requirement to consider factors relating to cost and quality of their 
products against a background of haphazardness in local legislation and 
regulations, material shortages, hostile attitudes, and even general 
political and social instability. 
18 D0 Evans: "Appopriate Technology and Its Role in Development" in D0 Evans 
and LN Adler (eds): "Appopriate Technology for Development: A Discussion 
and Case Histories" Boulder, Colorado (Westview Press 1979) p32. 
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(c) Restrictive agreements among transferor firms. 
5 
A further problem compounding the technology supply market iIs the 
possibility of collusion amongst technology suppliers who may otherwise 
be considered as rivals. A number for firms operating in the same 
industry may agree to abide by certain restrictive stipulations 
covering their bidding for tenders in the Third World. Such agreements 
need not be published or even formally written. Indeed they are 
frequently seen as informal, unwritten and secret "gentlemen's 
agreements". 
In a report commissioned by the US Congress, an allegation was made 
that 55 European and Japanese firms manufacturing heavy electrical 
equipment were operating an international cartel from Switzerland under 
the name of the "International Electrical Association". 
19 The report 
asserted that the cartel had fixed prices of those equipment at 
levels higher than normal prices by about 30%. 
20 The report (which 
was edited by Dr Barbara Epstein and Dr Richard Newfarmer) mentioned 
that it based'its findings on "recently obtained IEA documents". 
21 
Cartel members were said to have "signed agreements among themselves 
that include guidelines for price-fixing agreements, mechanisms for 
arranging meetings in advance of tenders, and in certain cases, 
procedures for allocating orders among themselves". 
22 In many cases 
provisions were made whereby successful tenderers would compensate 
losers with cash payments. 
23 
} 
The cartel dates back to 1930, when 9 companies signed a price-fixing 
agreement, and by 1980, the IEA cartel covered almost $2 billion sales 
annually, most of which going to the non-communist world outside USA, 
Western Europe and Japan. 
24 
19 The London "Observer" 14 December 1980. 
20 Loc. Cit. 
21 Loc. Cit. 
22 Loc. Cit. 
23 Loc. Cit. 
24 Loc. Cit. 
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Restrictive stipulations of this nature are likely to have the consequence 
of limiting the range of options open to technology seeking enterprises 
in the Third World as well as stiffening the terms and conditions 
incorporated within such transactions. Technology items are likely 
to be more costly, packaging levels in technology transfer contracts 
are inclined to be higher and harsher and more numerous restrictive 
clauses are bound to appear in relevant contracts. The sum product of 
restrictive practices among transferor firms is thus disposed to 
making prospective transactions for transferring technology less 
commercially attractive, and thereby adversely, affecting the movement 
of technological know-how and hardware to Third World nations. 
3.1.3 Managerial Shortcomings 
Many situations exist today where the capability and willingness to 
transmit valuable technology are actually present, but certain 
factors are likely to preclude the materialization of some of these 
opportunities, to the obvious detriment of both potential transferees 
and respective technology holding enterprises. 
25" Amongst possible 
precluding factors in this regard is the problem of "managerial 
incompetence" within potential transferor firms. Different factors 
may account for the failure of some transferor firms to identify and 
utilize relevant opportunities. These factors may be classified 
according to the six major stages of project identification, planning 
and execution (figure 3.1). A brief exposition of the main managerial 
tasks during these stages is given below. This is done in accordance 
with the six stages mentioned in figure 3.1, and with the intention of 
pointing out possible managerial shortcomings. 
(a) Project Identification and Evaluation" 
The identification of opportunities for the transfer of technology is 
a prime responsibility for top and middle management in enterprises 
25 The material contained in this sub-section is a brief assessment by 
the researcher of possible faults on the part of management in transferor 
enterprises. Very broadly, this assessment is based on information and 
analysis in United Nations publications and writings in academic journals. 
General empirical support for the points raised is also furnished by 
information obtained from British exerlitives who were visited during the 
practical phase of the research. 
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possessing the actual or potential ability of supplying technology. 
Means that can be utilized to this end include advertising, entries 
in relevant directories, distribution of literature, appointment of 
agents in various regions, direct personal contacts, with potential 
customers, and participation in. trade fairs, conferences and seminars. 
Moreover, in cases where the technology supplying firm is placed in a 
position to take part in a prospective project's evaluation, an opportunity 
is often presented to the transferor to put forward his case to provide 
the whole, or part, of the transaction. This is particularly true when 
the would-be transferor is able to offer certain solidly competitive 
terms and conditions. 
(b) Negotiation and Contracting 
When a project-idea advances to the important stage of specific 
enquiries and negotiations for the supply of hardware and associated 
services, it is important for prospective technology suppliers to 
guard against certain errors or omissions which may hinder the finalization 
of the transaction. These include matters like delay in reply, 
unresponsiveness in providing required facilities or services, insistence 
on unacceptable conditions, and the demand of high remunerations and/or 
prices for products and services. 
(c) Planning and Implementation 
Although the supplier's obligations vary from case to case according to 
the nature of the contract, the tasks of the transferor are wide-ranging 
in many cases. Where the technology transfer is to be effected via the 
method of total-project contracting, the main supplier of the technology 
is normally loaded with many and varying tasks, including the construction 
of buildings, the procurement of machinery and their installation in 
the plant, the provision of basic services, and the supply of other 
necessary equipment. 
26 Delay or mistakes in such provisions can impair 
the image of the supplying contractor and thereby risk a reduction in 
the demand on his products and services in the future. 
26 A full description of the transfer method of "total-project" contracting 
is given in Section 7.1 below. 
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A major challenge that often faces firms in the developed world is the 
need to adapt the technology in order to suit the particular conditions 
of the importing country and/or enterprise. 
27 These conditions often 
relate to climate, customer tastes, availability or otherwise of human 
operational skills, and types and quantities of materials to be used 
in manufacture. It may be suggested that wide differences seem to exist 
in the readiness of suppliers and their ability to mould technologies 
in accordance with the needs of their clients. It may, on the other hand, 
be noted that transferors would be prepared to research, develop, and 
execute the desired technological modifications if the remunerations they 
demand were forthcoming. In reply, it may be retorted that these 
"remunerations" are often seen as very high or even excessive, and thus 
beyond the means of many potential transferees in the developing world. 
Based on a sample study of collaboration agreements between British and 
Indian firms, H Davies has found that in 50% of the transactions involving 
joint ventures, the transferred technology was not adjusted, while in 
the case of licensing non-adjustment was the rule in 60% of the 
transactions involved. 
28 British firms incurred expenses to adjust the 
exported technology in 41% of the cases involving joint ventures and 
19% of those involving licensing. 
29 Davies points out that a variety 
of explanations were put forward by transferors for the failure to make 
adjustments, particularly in the case of licensing agreements. 
These included the absence of alternative techniques and the failure of 
British collaborators to perceive the need for adjustment or to have 
the incentive for implementation. 30 
In the case of joint ventures, British companies displayed a higher level 
of interest in tailoring their assistance to Indian conditions, and a 
variety of changes were outlined. However, these adjustments involved 
27 A discussion of the problem of environmental differences between "North" 
and "South", and the resultant need for adapting technologies to make 
them "appropriate" in the Third World, is given in Section 3.3 below. 
28 H Davies: "Technology Transfer Through Commercial Transactions" Journal 
of Industrial Economics (December 1977) p161-175. Included in this 
study were a total of 119 such agreements finalized during the period 
1963-9. 
29 Ibid., p172 
30 Ibid., p173 
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"the use of techniques well known to the British firm and tried through 
extensive production runs, rather than the design of new techniques 
specific to the Indian situation". 
31 As regards the case of licensing, 
technological adjustments that were made had mostly been undertaken 
by the Indian side. 1 .. 
(d) Operation and Follow-up 
New projects. entering the operational phase are likely to run into 
various operational problems, such as delays in equipment maintenance, 
poor production quality, delays in procuring materials, high wastage 
levels and the like. While many of these problems may be attributed 
to local deficiences in resources and management, some may be traced 
to mistakes or omissions on the part of the technology supplier. 
It is an integral part of the transferor's role to attempt to minimize 
the scope of such mistakes and omissions in order to-preserve and 
enhance his industrial and commercial standing.. Errors of managerial 
action (or inaction)-during this period may be manifested in the form 
of delays in the supply_of spare parts and materials/components, or 
their provision in a negligent or uncaring way. An impairment to the 
commercial relationship between supplier and recipient can result 
when a'protraction occurs in the dispatch of specialist personnel for 
purposes of training or other technical services, or in the provision 
of managerial and technical advice. 
3.2 South-based Obstacles 
The focus of the foregoing discussion has been the supply-based 
impediments to the process of smooth and successful transfers of 
technology to developing nations. It must be readily conceded, 
however, that hindrances emanating within developing regions themselves 
are no less serious. It may even be suggested that this latter category 
is more harmful in frustrating the efforts to attain pre-set goals in 
this sphere. 
31 Loc. Cit. 
The distinction introduced by M Wilkins between "geographical transfer" 
and "diffusion" of technology is useful in this context. 
32 This 
implies that a "transfer"As only an initial stage that is, necessary, 
but not sufficient, for absorption (ie diffusion). Hence diffusion 
occurs only when the technology in question becomes well understood and 
widely made use of by the recipient nation. 
A pertinent categorization of the various barriers to effective 
diffusion of new technology in Third World nations is further presented 
33 by Wilkins who cites eleven such barriers, these being: 
ý, < 
(a) Demand barriers, ie insufficiency of demand for the 
product of that technology. 
(b) Capital barriers, le scarcity of risk capital for 
investment. 
(c) - Natural resources barriers, ie unavailability of 
suitable natural resources in the country comtemplating 
the receipt of that technology. 
(d) Labour-cost barriers, fe the low cost of'manpower may 
discourage the application'of a particular"technölogy. 
(e) Technologicalbarriers, ie the possible inability of local 
producers to comprehend and assimilate the incremental 
know-how. 
(f) Scale barriers, ie relative absence,,, of internal and/or 
external economies of scale, in contrast to foreign 
producers who may in large measure benefit from the existence 
of such economies. 
(g) Infrastructure barriers. These relate to the existence of 
supporting services'and/or complementary techniques which 
facilitate the introduction and use of technology. 
(h) Cultural barriers, ie the values and norms of behaviour 
which may hinder the successful utilization of technology. 
(i) Language barriers. - 
57 
32 See Section 2.3 above. 
33 M Wilkins, Op. Cit., ppl7l-2 
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(j) Priority barriers, which result from government policy or 
company decision-making. 
(k) Organizational. barriers, which are related. to the ability 
to manage the new technology in order to realize its potentials 
and attain reasonable absorption. 
While Wilkins's classification is both interesting and fairly 
comprehensive, it is possible to condense his eleven points under a 
smaller number of headings. Five major types of-problems may be seen 
to operate from the demand side to retard the flow of technology to 
Third World developing nations, as discussed in sub-sections 3.2.1 to 
3.2.5 inclusive. 
3.2.1 Lack of Capital 
The scarcity of capital seems to be one of the major problems facing 
developing countries in their willingness and drive to acquire new 
technology. This is particularly applicable in the case of the poorer 
and/or least developed countries, ie, those with low income per capita 
and relatively limited quantities of natural resources. Examples 
exist in these countries where apparently sound project ideas have run 
into awkward problems due to financial reasons. Indeed, the level of 
costs associated with the acquisition and operation of technology in 
the case of the relatively modern industries (eg petrochemicals and 
electronics) is particularly high. The obvious implication, that follows 
from this is that these countries can ill-afford embarking on industries 
requiring expensive technologies, and will thus be severely constrained 
in the pattern of their technological acquisition, both qualitatively 
and quantitatively. 
It is noteworthy, however, that developing countries have endeavoured 
to circumvent this limitation-by several means. Prominent amongst 
these have been the soliciting of economic/technical aid from developed 
countries or relevant world agencies (eg United Nations organizations), 
the franchising of transnational corporations to set up subsidiaries 
or branches, encouragement of the inflow of foreign capital, the raising 
of capital on foreign markets, as well as borrowing from foreign 
or international financial institutions. 
34 
34 Section 5.5 below containsa discussion on the role of international aid 
in facilitating the transfer of technology to Third World countries. 
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Clearly, the suitability and effectiveness of each of these methods 
vary according to the circumstance of the country in question and the 
project being contemplated, as well as significant external factors 
such as the state of international liquidity and current rates of 
interest. 
When explored prudently, however, the aforementioned means may alleviate 
the harsh realities of the financial strait-jacket facing many a Third 
World nation. Nonetheless, it needs to be recognized that limitations 
and/or misgivings are associated with each of these methods, so much 
so that at best these can do no more than relax the financial constraint 
on capital budgeting for a limited period. This has obvious consequences 
on the abilities of those countries to acquire and operate new technology. 
3.2.2 Lack of Technical Expertise 
A matter that is probably no less problematic than the previous one is 
the very serious scarcity of qualified technical and skilled personnel 
which is often witnessed in Third'World developing countries. 
35 
It is a frequent occurrence in the case of new projects in the less 
developed regions that the required qualified personnel are simply not 
available. A case in point is the initial activities'in the field of 
oil exploration and extraction in the Arab countries. Commenting on the 
burgeoning of the oil industry in 'some Arab countries, A Mustafa 
remarks that "the gap between local knowledge and skills and those 
imported to construct, operate, and supervise the implanted industry, was 
too wide to permit any interchange to take place". 
36 This state of 
non-interchange has been virtually perpetuated for several decades, 
so that very little transfer of technical know-how has actually been' 
accomplished. 
Even when the host country possesses some expert manpower, it is likely 
to be the case that they are employed within existing projects, 
and these can hardly dispose of their-services. 
35 Chapter four deals with the general problem of weak technological 
infrastructure in the Third World. In particular Sections 4.1 and 4.3 
focus respectively on technoligical dependency and the deficiencies 
besetting research and development efforts in developing countries. 
36 A Mustafa: "Impediments to the Technological Development of the Petroleum 
and Mineral Resources Sector in the Arab World" in AB Zahlan (ed): 
"Technology Transfer and Change in the Arab World" Oxford (Pergamon 1978) 
p434. 
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In addition to the problem of serious scarcity or non-availability of 
highly qualified personnel, such personnel are frequently wrongly- 
placed at certain projects or institutions. This implies that the 
marginal net benefit of those persons could be higher at the new project 
being envisaged. However, certain factors seem to act frequently in 
hindering the redistribution of technical and skilled manpower. These 
factors may be based on institutional considerations, geographical 
differences, social factors, or else be related to pay and job security. 
Even granting the lack or scarcity of expert manpower in the less 
developed countries, there is probably a more intriguing and fundamental 
problem. This concerns the process of building up nationally-based 
skills and technical knowledge, and a number of experts have advanced 
the opinion that this process is not proceeding satisfactorily in 
most developing regions. 
37 
Dealing with the cultivation and development of home-based technical 
capabilities in the oil sector within the Arab countries, A Mustafa 
contends that there exists "no correlation between the size of OAPEC's 
(Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries) oil industries and 
the intention to build up suitable national ski lls! '. 
38 This writer 
bases his conclusion on a classified study undertaken by the OAPEC's 
secretariat. The core of this study dealt with the efforts exerted 
by member countries in the field of personnel training, concentrating 
on such matters as training planning, the level of training programmes, 
the practical level of performance that could be attained by trainees, 
problems surrounding trainee motivation and aspirations, and the 
degree of utilization of qualified personnel's capabilities. 
39 
Furthermore, there is the added problem of the "brain drain" which is 
causing a loss of 30%, or over, of qualified manpower in. some developing 
countries. 
40 
37 See Chapter four below, particularly Sections 4.1,4.2 and 4.3 for a 
discussion on the state of science and technology in the Third World. 
38 A Mustafa, Op. Cit. p438 
39 Ibid., p437-8 
40 Ibid., p435 
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3.2.3 Legal and Institutional Barriers 
Numerous forms of legal and institutional barriers to the transfer of 
technology exist within the developing countries, especially when this 
matter is viewed from the angle of technology suppliers in the industrialized 
world. Many statutes, bye-laws,, and regulations dealing with technology 
transfer are often seen to have a limiting effect on the transfer 
process. 
41 For instance, some developing countries preclude the 
establishment on their soil of subsidiaries of foreign corporations, 
while many others have tight regulations concerning the remittance of 
dividends and royalties from home-based firms to foreign companies. 
Furthermore, in many countries restrictive clauses in technology 
agreements limiting the freedom of transferees are viewed with great 
suspicion by national governments. Indeed, governmental action and/or 
State legislation have in many cases made the scope for introducing 
such clauses either impossible or severely, limited. 
3.2.4 Faults in Project Selection and Planning 
For a project idea to come to fruition several major and well-identifiable 
phases have to be undergone in the process. As indicated in figure 3.1 
the right project idea has to be selected in the first instance, then a 
feasibility study has to be undertaken followed by the stages of project 
planning, negotiation, contracting and implementation. Mistakes in 
decision making duridg any of these stages may jeopardize the project 
and thus deny the country that kind of technology. Alternatively, 
less appropriate technologies may be acquired resulting thereby in a 
sub-optimal mix of technology possessed by the recipient country. 
Further light can be shed on this problem by looking at the complexity 
of the process of technology choice. Due to the availability of an 
enormous and growing body of technologies and the various restrictions 
and complications involved, decision-making regarding technology- 
choice is by all standards very difficult. 
41 Reasons put forward for State legislation and regulation of technology 
transfer are cited in Chapter five below. Also, current patterns of 
official measures in this area are given for a group of countries in 
the same Chapter. See Sections 5.1 and 5.4 respectively. 
62 
In their quest for technological know-how and hardware, Third World 
nations generally face harsh conditions and are puzzled by various 
dilemmas. Under these circumstances, it is often excessively hard 
for them to discharge successfully the essential tasks of project 
screening and planning, not to mention any accurate and comprehensive 
factor analysis and quantification. Even where the expertise of foreign 
consiul'tants is used (which is costly), there remain certain essential 
and crucial top decisions that must be taken by the respective national 
bodies/individuals. This situation has surfaced largely because of the 
developing countries' limited capabilities in decision-making, their 
shortage of financial resources, relative lack of human expertise 
and immature political and social systems. 
Figure 3.2 presents a simple diagrammatic illustration of the problem 
of technology choice in developing countries. In the process of 
industrialization many new product ideas are put forward for considera- 
tion so that a number of these have to be chosen for the purpose of 
in-depth scrutiny. Owing to the various handicaps and imperfections 
which hamper Third World countries generally, it is quite possible for 
a good new project idea to be missed or be wrongly thought of as 
basically impractical or faulty. Even when such an idea is selected 
it may be dismissed at a later stage due to faulty screening, hence 
depriving the respective country of the potentiality of acquiring 
that technology. A basic underlying cause of these possibilities is 
the lack of a sufficient number of indigenous experts to take up the 
necessary functions of selecting and screening new product-technology 
ideas, project feasibility studies, project planning and contract 
negotiations. 
An interesting case in point is the Swaraj tractor project in India, which 
was delayed because the central government authority responsible for 
financing thought it too risky. 
43 
43 VV Bhatt: "Development Perspectives: Problems1Strategy, and Policies" 
Oxford (Pergamon Press, 1980) pp93-102. 
Figure 3.2 
THE SCOPE FOR THE CHOICE OF TECHNOLOGY BY A THIRD WORLD COUNTRY42 
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"ch" Technology : Technology actually chosen and utilized by the 
developing country in question 
42 This figure is based on figure 1.1 in the following work: 
F Stewart: "Technology and Under-development" London (Macmillan 1977) p2 
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Sponsored later by the Punjab State Industrial Development Corporation 
the project proved to be a model of success. The initial idea for the 
project was put forward by the Planning Commission of the central 
government in the late 1960s, whereby an expert research group was set 
up to develop an indigenous tractor. 
44 This group performed its work 
successfully by designing a new tractor, component by component. 
After several tests and modifications the Swaraj tractor was ready for 
manufacture in 1971. However, the Planning Commission, whose membership 
had altered by that time, declined to offer the necessary financing. 
45 
Following an arduous search, the project sponsors managed to persuade the 
Punjab State Industrial Development Corporation and the Industrial 
Development Bank of India to back the project. 
46 The project began 
producing in 1974 and in 1975 was awarded the National Gold Shield, 
India's highest prize. 
47 
The above case illustrates a situation where an error of judgment may 
lead to delay in project execution. There are, in addition, other areas 
where grave damage can be consciously brought about through deliberate 
human choice and action. These areas cover in particular the two 
factors of corruption and intentional choice of inappropriate technology. 
A field study of manufacturing firms in Nigeria during 1976 has shown 
the important role played by the five undermentioned considerations in 
encouraging the importation of inappropriate technologies by developing 
countries: 
48 
(a) Relative scarcity and, high risks of used equipment. 
Older technologies, which are frequently regarded as well-suited to the 
conditions prevailing in Third World regions, are often embodied in 
second-hand equipment. Such equipment has, in many cases, proved to 
be unattractive, due essentially to the presence of some "hidden costs" 
associated with this type of equipment. The "absense of information 
and of sales, organizations responsible for what they sell were most 
frequently cited as the root problem restricting wider use of used equipment. 
44 Ibid., pp95-6 
45 Ibid., pp96-7 
46 Ibid., pp97-100 
47 Ibid., p102 
48 GC Winston: "The Appeal of Inappropriate Technologies: Self-inflicted 
Wages, Ethnic Pride and Corruption" World Development 7 (August - September 
1979) pp835-45. 
65 
In. many industries it was said to be terribly costly simply for a firm 
in Nigeria to'learn where desirable used equipment was available. 
Having once got past that, it faced an even more formidable barrier in 
the reliability of information about the condition of the used machine - 
an uncertainty compounded by the frequently one-shot nature of the 
capital transaction that discourages wholly candid representation by 
the seller". 
49 it is plainly obvious that this situation compares" 
unfavourably with new equipment which is sold under warranty and by 
firms with well-known trade names, often having branches or representatives 
in the developing country receiving the equipment. 
(b) "Self-inflicted" wages. 
Many manufacturing enterprises appear to be paying labour wages that 
are higher than can be justified by prevailing wage rates. 
50- 
Winston suggests that the reason for this practice is found-in the 
desire on the part of management and owners to preserve good 
relations 
with employees and for boosting morale, especially in the case of 
multi-national corporations who tend to be relatively more sensitive 
to their public image. Moreover, a sense of "paternity" exists within 
the sociological framework of many developing countries, which pervaded 
management thinking and behaviour. 
51 
Once determined and committed to, these high wage rates make their 
contribution in favour of relatively high labour-saving technology. 
52 
Thus, the "managers of multinational firms and large oligopolies, both 
protected from competition and motivated by some elements of personal 
status consumption, set voluntarily high wages that then became the norm 
for other firms to emulate and, to a considerable extent, the standard 
against which all other wage patterns would be judged". 
53 
(c) Old technology seen as an ethnic slur. 
Within the context of the less developed nations, many managers tend to 
see their goals away from profit-maximization or even economic efficiency. 
54 
49 Ibid., pp 837-8 
50 Ibid., p 838 
51 Ibid., p 839 
52 Loc. Cit. 
53 Loc. Cit. 
54 Ibid., p 840 
They seem more attached to power, wealth and glamour, looking at the 
technology they employ and exhibit as a reflection of these values. 
55 
As a result, modern technology seems to be a rich source of these values, 
since technology utilized is taken in many instances as an indication 
of the phase of cultural development and a pointer of the nation's 
qualities and competence in dealing with technological sophistication. 
55 
On the other hand, the utilization of old technology is viewed as a 
sign of the "people's ethnic inferiority". 
57 
(d) Bribery. 
One of the most persistent themes in Winston's survey is the "evidence 
that technology choice is frequently affected by simple straightforward 
payoffs and bribery of those making the decisions". 
58 A one high-value 
deal furnishes the desired base fora kickback. 59 The larger transaction 
usually assures both the seller and the purchase decision-maker of a 
higher pay-off per pound of transaction value than a series of small 
repeated deals. 
60 Moreover, the, greater complexity of modern technology 
coupled with the relative scarcity of its suppliers contribute to lowering 
the risks of bribe-discovery. 
61 When the employer of the decision-maker 
is the government this 62 practice seems more frequent and less risky. 
This point is exceedingly significant, because of the normal role of the 
government as the largest single purchaser of technology, while in many 
developing countries technology purchases by the government represent the 
lion's, share of that country's imports of technology. 
(e) The relative pleasantness of machines., 
, It is argued by many managers iri developing countries that labour problems 
can be reduced by lowering the size of the workforce, and this is 
probably felt more strongly in establishments operating multiple-shift 
plants. 
63 It is noticeable, moreover, that wherever a higher degree of 
mechanization is utilized, the flow of production becomes more accurately 
determined, due to "machine-pacing", thereby, enabling the firm to employ 
64 a smaller number of supervisory and technical staff. 
55 Loc. Cit. 
56 Loc. Cit. 
57 Loc. Cit. 
58 Loc. Cit. 
59 Ibid., p 871 
60 Loc. Cit. 
61 Loc. Cit. 
62 Loc. Cit. 
63 Loc. Cit. 
64 Ibid., p 842 
67 
This is especially advantageous in developing countries where the shortage 
of such staff is widely-recognized. Furthermore, a small labour force 
means less theft, 
65 
or at least less costs incurred in theft-prevention 
in a society where moral values are often blurred and sound education 
tends to be lacking, in addition to the incidence of poverty. 
3.2.5 Faults in Project Implementation and Operation 
The last class of possible errors and omissions on the part of various 
technology importing bodies in the Third World falls within the stages 
of new project implementation and operation. These faults are commonplace 
and may have two harmful consequences in this sphere. 
The first possible consequence 'of the mistakes referred to is the curtailment, 
or even eradication, of at least some of the desired benefits to be derived 
from the project in question and its embodied technology. Such an outcome 
may result from one or a combination of errors throughout the execution 
period, such as delays in the construction of buildings, faulty fixtures 
of machinery, defective plant layout, mislocation or under-spacing of plant 
services, and insufficient training of manpower. As for possible 
mistakes when the project enters the operation stage, these are again 
multi-farlous, including matters" like poor planning of equipment maintenance, 
ineffective production planning and control, and delays in procurement 
of required materials. 
The'second possible result of the faults referred to is the "negative 
carry-on effect". A situation where entrepreneurial spirits are stifled 
maybe brought about as a consequence of abortive attempts to set up 
new plants or the malfunctioning of industrial projects which are in 
existence. This is perhaps particularly relevant in the case of the 
poorer regions where capital is scarce and highly risk-sensitive. A 
further compounding factor in this connection is the relatively closed 
nature of society, which is prevalent in so many developing countries, 
where a fertile ground is nourished for gossip, unscientific thinking, 
and exaggeration of failures. 
65 Loc. Cit. 
68 
3.3 Appropriateness of Technology Transferred 
A major problem facing decision makers in the Third World concerns the 
choice of technologies that are appropriate for the circumstances of 
each acquiring country. These decisions are frequently taken against 
a background of scarce resources and other limiting factors, thus 
placing effective constraints on the process of technological choice. 
There is indeed some recognition in advanced countries for some research 
and development effort to be undertaken for the purpose of devising 
suitable technologies for developing regions. 
66 
One authority on this subject states that "new technologies, adapted 
or developed to suit the peculiar resource and factor endowments, market 
sizes, and consumption patterns and needs of poor countries, are 
required if development aspirations of the type now considered appopriate 
in the Third World are to be realised". 
67. It may thus be asserted in 
general terms that the more appropriate the technology chosen the more 
it will contribute to the aims of the society that has acquired it. 
3.3.1 Concept of "Appropriate Technology" 
VG Desai defines "appropriate technology" as that which is "best .... 
taking into account the country's particular stage of economic growth 
and social development, its development goals and resource factor 
endowments". 
68 In this writer's view, the "inappropriateness of a 
technology would arise from: 
(i) Intensive use of relatively scarce factors of production, such as 
foreign exchange. 
66 The work carried out by the London based Intermediate Technology Group 
is a case in point. See also, subsection 3.1.3 above and Section 4.3 below. 
67 GK Helleiner: "The Role of Multi-national Corporations in the Less 
Developed Countries' Trade in Technology" World Development, Vol 3 
No 4 (April 1975) p 161-2. 
68 VG Desai, International Conference on Technology Transfer in Modernizing 
Nations, Karachi November 1973. Cited in JW Garmany: "Technology and 
Employment in Developing Countries" Journal of Modern African Studies, 
16,4 (1978) p 550. 
(ii) Leaving abundant factors idle, such as local raw materials and 
skilled and unskilled labour. 
(iii) Ignoring implications of the nature of output or by-products. 
(iv) Not having a multiplier effect on or not stimulating, the 
indigenous growth of technology, thereby perpetuating technological 
dependence". 69 
Being conscious of prevalent conditions in the Third World, CG Baron 
asserts that a technology is "more appropriate for the production of 
a given product, which employs more labour, preferably at lower capital 
investment, per unit of output, and is at least reasonably competitive 
with more capital intensive techniques, in terms of unit costs of 
production, in the country in which it is to be used'?. 
7° This 
description of "appropriate technology" seems to concentrate on the 
conditions of'the least developed nations who are characteristically 
over-populated and suffer from a shortage'of job opportunities. 
Baron points out further that in order to "generate more employment 
through appropriate technological chocie", there exist certain fields 
of action which need to be emphasized via the application of relevant 
policies. He singles out four such fields of action that he believes 
are most important. These are as follows: 
71 
(a) Removal of the preference given to modern large scale projects and 
the encouragement of small scale enterprises in a variety of ways. 
In many countries "it is the large scale sector which is most encouraged 
by the customary framework of import-substituting industrialization; 
it tends to have easy access to bank loans, sometimes at preferential 
rates of interest; machinery is often free of customs duty, naturally 
favouring capital-intensity; and large scale production plants are 
frequently assisted by the monopoly position they enjoy in domestic 
markets". 
72 
69 Loc. Cit. 
70 CG Baron: "Appropriate Technology, Employment and Basic Needs in Arab 
Countries with Special Reference to the Food Industries" in AB Zahlan 
(ed): "Technology Transfer and Change in the Arab World" Oxford (Pergamon 
Press, 1978) p 386. 
71 Ibid., p 393-394. 
69 7 
72 Ibid., p 393. 
70 
(b) Measures to shift the pattern of consumer demand towards more 
appropriate products. Quoting the case of the food manufacturing 
industry, Baron is of the opinion that "the advertising of products with 
foreign brand names is rarely reflected in the nutritional quality of 
the product. Indeed it can be argued that the more refined a foodstuff, 
the less nutritious it is. Restrictions on advertising may discourage 
private foreign investors and multinational corporations from 
establishing plants to serve high- or middle-income markets rather 
than the majority of the people". 
73 
(c) Institutional steps to encourage the more efficient appraisal of 
development projects. In this connection new institutions can be 
set up in order to search for appropriate technology ideas and appraise 
them thoroughly. 
(d) Expansion of the functions of the domestic science and technology 
system in creating and adapting technology. In the long term this is 
probably the most far-reaching policy area that needs to be stressed. 
The science and technology system encompasses a number of elements, 
including "technical and scientific manpower training, research and 
development activities, and machinery manufacture". 
74 
PD Dunn, who appears to be influenced by EF Schumacher, defines 
"appropriate technology" in such a way as to emphasize the'need to 
consider the human side of the problem of technology choice in 
developing countries. He points out that "appropriate technology" is 
"concerned with all aspects of community development leading to a 
total or integrated development and hence to an improved quality of 
life for the individual members". 
75 He goes on to define the aims of 
appropriate technology thus: 
76 
(i) Provision of employment. 
0U0 Production of goods for local markets. 
(iii) Substitution of local goods for those previously imported 
and which are competitive in quality and cost. 
73 Ibid., p 394 
74 Loc. Cit. 
75 PD Dunn: "Appropriate Technology: Technology with a Human Face" 
London (Macmillan Press, 1978) p 41. 
76 Loc. Cit. 
71 
(iv) Use of local resources of labour, materials and 
finance. 
, 
(v). Provision of community services including health, 
water, sanitation, housing, roads and education. 
Summarizing the thinking on this subject, Eckaus remarks that "the use 
of any particular technology is not an end in itself. The criterion 
for an appropriate technological choice must be found in the essential 
goals and processes of, development". 
77 On this basis it would appear 
that "appropriate technology" can be defined in general terms as that 
type of technology that best serves the development strategy of the 
country. In view of the differing circumstances of Third World countries, 
it is of paramount importance for each nation to draw up their own 
strategy though it, seems that few countries are exerting the requisite 
effort in this specific direction. A country's development strategy 
must be formulated on the basis of the economic, social, and environmenal 
conditions prevailing and foreseen within the country, and the relevant 
objectives set forth. In fact the determination of appropriate 
technology is a dynamic, and flexible process, responding to varying, 
conditions and changing situations in different countries, and also at 
different times in this respect. 
3.3.2 Appropriateness of Technology Received by Developing Countries 
Economists have put forward the theory of the product cycle to explain 
the factors affecting the transfer of production technology to developing 
countries. This theory is based on the fact that firms with "technological 
leads acquired through the development of new products possess quasi- 
monopolistic positions in the production and sale of these products and 
the hypothesis that they will exploit them in a varying but predictable 
manner as the product matures". 
78 On this basis it is supposed that 
developing countries would acquire what is relevant, and perhaps appropriate, 
rather late in the product's life when dynamism has given way to 
standardization. 
77 RS Eckaus: "Appropriate Technologies For Developing Countries" 
Washington. 0C (National Academy of S_iences. 1977) p 6. Cited in 0D 
Evans: "Appropriate Technology and Its mole in Development" in 0D Evans 
and LN Adler (editors): "Appropriate Technology for Development: A 
Discussion and Case Histories" Boulder. Colorado (Westview Press, 1979) 
p 24-5. 
78 GK Helleiner, Op. Ci.., p 167. 
72 
Helleiner contends that this theory is invalidated when reference is 
made to the nature of technological transfer deals that actually take 
place between developed and developing countries. He mentions the 
following four points in support of his thesis: 
79 
(a) Quasi-monopoloy frequently endures far beyond the point of product 
maturity,, due to brand names, secret know-how, and firm-specific 
experience. 
(b) International factor flows within the firm often result in transfers 
of production location to developing countries long before the product 
has matured. 
(c) Multinational corporations often prefer to locate production 
units in developing-countriesdue to-the existence of protective 
tariffs and quotas in these countries. 
(d) The theory is based upon final products, whereas "there is 
increasing resort to the production of components and intermediate 
activities in the less-developed countries within vertically integrated 
manufacturing industries, some of which are also quite immature". 
80 
Helleiner goes on to point out-that there exist many reasons encouraging 
multinationals to concentrate on marketing production technologies that 
are capital-intensive and/or require large-scale operation, these 
including: 81 
(a) The non-existence and non-development of appropriate 
technologies. Nor are there incentives for their development 
by multinational firms in their principal markets where the 
relative price of labour continues to rise. 
(b) Factor and other prices in the less developed countries are 
"distorted so that they do not reflect local factor endowments 
or encourage labour-intensive activities or techniques". 
82 
79 Loc. Cit. Helleiner mentions in a footnote on this page (p 167) that 
the first three points that follow are Charles Cooper's, whereas the 
fourth is his. 
80 Loc. Cit. 
81 Ibid., p 167-9 
82 Ibid., p 168 
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(c) Unskilled labour "is frequently of very low productivity 
so that, while the wage rate may seem relatively low, it is 
not cheap in terms of efficiency wages". 
83 
(d) The heavy protection and "monopolistic and oligopolistic 
position typically enjoyed by the multinational firm in 
the markets of less developed countries removes any pressure 
upon it to adopt the most efficient (labour-intensive) 
technologies". 
84 
(e) Decisions of multinationals are often characterized by 
technological "fixity" in the sense of factor substitution 
inelasticity. 
-. 
85 In this regard Helleiner points out that the 
basic advantage enjoyed by multinational corporations in 
foreign markets is partly derived "from their monopoly of 
knowledge over the specific techniques which they first 
developed in home markets and which are therefore likely to 
be inappropriate". 86 
(f) The usual association of "appropriate" or "intermediate" 
technologies with small-scale production. 
(g) Shortages of ancillary skills that are often required for 
the use of labour-intensive technologies. 
(h) In the less developed countries "material inputs often 
constitute a large proportion of total costs in the 
manufacturing sector. Where they are imported they may be 
particularly costly and difficult to acquire because of 
foreign-exchange controls. In such circumstances there are 
incentives to substitute other factor inpurts for such 
materials, and capital-material substitution elasticity 
(through storage facilities which reduce spoilage, mechanized 
materials handling which reduces breakage, and electronically 
controlled equipment which mixes ingredients to the exact 
specification, et) is greater than labour-materials elasticity". 
87 
83 Loc. Cit. 
84 Loc. Cit. 
85 Loc. Cit. 
86 Loc. Cit. 
87 Ibid ., p 168-9 
(i) As multinational firms are risk-aversive, "they are reluctant 
to face the uncertainties and possible disruptions associated 
with, labour relations, in less developed countries, and 
consequently opt for capital-intensive techniques and small, 
stable work forces even if the average return is thereby 
lowered". 88 
(j) It, is believed that capital-intensive techniques may provide 
"insurance against unexpected fluctuations in demand more 
effectively than labour-intensive ones". 
89 
(k) Purchasers of technology in the less developed regions "often 
prefer to have the latest in terms of technological development 
(or "modernity") and resist the use of second-hand equipment 
even when it is economically more efficient and when the 
multinational firm is able and willing to supply it at a 
suitable price". 
90 
3.3.3 Criteria for Appropriate Technology 
N Jequier puts forward seven main considerations to be taken into 
account in evaluating the appropriateness of proposed technologies. 
Writing in general terms to encompass developed and developing 
countries alike, he maintains that "no technology, however good, can 
score high marks in the light of all (these) criteria ..... Some 
sort of balance needs to be found among the potentially relevant 
criteria". 
91 As to the nature of the seven yardsticks outlined, 
these are as follows: - 
88 Ibid., p 169 
89 Loc. Cit. 
90 Loc. Cit. 
741 
91 N Jequier: "Appropriate Technology: Some Criteria" in AS Bhalla (ed) 
"Towards a Global Action for Appropriate Technology" Oxford 
(Pergamon 
Press, 1979) p 22. 
75 
(a) "Systems-independence", ie, the degree to which the proposed 
technology "is contingent upon the availability of a wide range of 
supporting services and subsystems". 
92 Some types of technology are 
by nature more systems-independent'than others. Yet this does not 
mean that these technologies are necessarily superior or more appropriate 
than those whose successful diffusion depends upon the presence of an 
important supporting infrastructure. However, the point is pressed 
in this context "that in the innovation process the key to success 
lies not only in'the intrinsic'qualitles of a particular technology, 
but in many cases in the presence of a wide range of supporting. 
93 
services". 
(b) "Image of modernity". This point refers to the relevant 
impression concerning the proposed product/technology regarding the 
level of "newness" and technical advancement. In many cases, when the 
product/technology undei question is seen as sufficiently modern this 
acts as a powerful factor cultivating general, or at least partial, 
acceptance. Under such circumstances, the chances that the embodied 
technology is seen as appropriate are enhanced. 
However, Jequier is quick to point out that he is not advocating 
that the masses of the developing nations should "imitate the life-style 
and consumption patterns of the rich in the industrialized countries 
or of the local elites in their own country ..... One of the very 
difficult problems here is not to transpose-. from abroad new technologies 
which are both modern and appropriate, but to design locally technologies 
which are consonant with the society's culture, values and resources". 
94 
(c) Individual technology versus collective technology. Certain 
products are by their nature prone to cater for individual satisfaction 
(eg motor cars, clothings, consumer durables), while others provide a 
more "collective" service (eg railways and buses). 
92 Ibid., p5 
93 Ibid., p6 
94 Ibid., p8 
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Without any implication concerning the superiority of any of these 
two modes, this distinction "suggests that this may also be an 
important criterion in determining both the appropriateness of 'a 
technology and-the directions in which the innovation process might be 
95 
channelled"' 
(d) Cost of technology. 
96 1 There is no doubt that the prospective 
cost of a given technology is a significant factor affecting its 
likely appropriateness and possible success. This is particularly 
so in the case of those technologies that are intended for the production 
of goods/services catering for basic human needs. Needless to say that 
in calculating the cost of any technology it is necessary to take 
into account costs of items associated with the initial investment as 
well as those connected with plant operation. 
(e) Risk factor. The importance of the risk element in this 
connection is often manifested by the concerted search of the interested 
parties to tap a technology that is well-proven. In this context 
Jequier stresses the point that "the level of risk-economic, social, 
cultural, or technological-involved in any particular new technology, 
depends not only on the inherent design qualities of this technology 
(this might be called the internal risk) but also on the ways in which 
it fits into the local production system, the local culture and the 
97 
available supporting services (this might be called the external risk)". 
He maintains further that "the risk involved in an innovation increases 
not linearly with the number of new technologies involved in that 
innovation, but as the square of that number". 
98 
(f) Evolutionary capacity of technology. In order to have an 
"evolutiona ry, capacity", an appropriate technology is required in 
many cases to "evolve into a larger scale and more capital-intensive 
type of technology ..... " 
99 
95 Ibid., p9 
96 Ibid., p 10 
97 Ibid., p 14-15 
98 Ibid., p 15-16 
99 Ibid., p 18 
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When the choice of a certain technology is made for a particular purpose 
within the context of the surrounding factors it is essential that the 
chosen technology possesses the required characteristics for subsequent 
improvements in the future.. In the words of N Jequier again, it is 
paramount for "innovators in appropriate technology to think not only 
in terms of today's needs and resources, but also in terms of building 
up a system of permanent innovation in appropriate . technology". 
100 
(g) Single-purpose and multi-purpose technology. This criterion 
concerns the "range of applications of a technology". 
101 In general, 
multi-purpose technology is preferable to a single-purpose technology. 
Although the multiplicity of functions frequently results in a less 
efficient performance of each of these functions, it is often the 
case in less developed nations that the overall outcome is relatively 
less costly and consequently more efficient. 
The question needs now to be posed concerning the reasons that make a 
given technology appropriate and consequently successful within the 
setting of one region/country/area, and so inappropriate or unsuccessful 
in another. Associated with this issue is-the phenomenon of varying 
rates of "transference" and "diffusion" exhibited by various technologies. 
On the basis of historic technological development of various countries 
and modern case and sample studies, a number of factors have been 
suggested by researchers to answer these two questions. 
JJ Murphy puts forward four considerations in this connection, though 
he points out that "many factors can legitimately be considered". 
102 
The four factors elucidated by Murphy are as follows: 
103 
(a) The general rate of economic growth. It is often noticeable that 
the expansion in demand facilitates the creation of a basic 
condition where existing processes/methods of operation begin 
to show bottlenecks and other symptoms of relative inefficiency. 
Hence begins the search for new technologies, which sooner or 
later becomes intensified. 
100 Ibid., p 20 
101 Loc. Cit. 
102 JJ Murphy: "Retrospect and Prospect" in DL Spencer and A Woroniak (ed) 
"The Transfer of Technology to Developing Countries" New York (Praeger, 1967) 
p 15. 
103 Ibid., p 15-21 
(b) The availability of material resources. In this regard, a 
distinction can be made between financial resources and raw 
material resources. There is no doubt that the "appropriateness" 
and likely "success" of any proposed technology are largely 
contingent on the relative availability of the required material 
inputs as well as local financial capabilities. Murphy claims, 
however, that "scarcity of natural resources is an impediment to 
technological diffusion ... only if an absolutely necessary 
process requires a specific raw material which cannot be imported 
at a cost that would be low enough to make the end result of the 
process competitive, at least in the home market". 
104 
(c) The basic features of the in-country labour market. The size and 
resilience of the local labour force is a predominant force in the 
determination of the suitability of a proposed technology. Of 
particular importance in this context are the prevailing 
remuneration levels of labour, the skill profile of the actual and 
potential working population, expected levels of speed and ease 
associated with labour recruitment. 
(d) Government action. Many avenues exist for the government, in 
modern States, to influence the inflow (and outflow) of technology. 
Amongst these avenues are relevant policies and measures in 
the fields of financial assistance, patent protection, education 
and training, import duties, provision of information, and 
technology legislation and regulation. 
The four foregoing points dealt with the causative factors affecting 
the speed of transfer and the choice of technologies to be transferred, as 
seen by JJ Murphy. Having regard to these points, it is the researcher's 
view that there are five main characteristics of "appropriate technology" 
and any new industrial project incorporating such a technology in the 
developing countries. It needs always to be remembered, however, 
that any estimate of such "appropriateness" and possible consequent 
"success" must be set against the relevant background of the region/ 
country/area in question. Before listing these characteristics, it is 
important to point out that these points are both interrelated and 
essentially relative in nature. 
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(a) The availability of inputs locally. 
it is very rare for a given technology to require only:, local inputs. 
In our complex world, most. technologies necessitate many types of 
human and material inputs. Hence it is impossible under normal 
circumstances to ensure the availability, inside a Third World country 
of all the various types of inputs required by, the project under 
consideration, particularly with regard to industrial equipment required 
by the project. Very often certain types of raw materials and semi- 
manufactured parts have to be imported as well, and in some cases 
most of the necessary materials for operation have to be purchased 
from foreign suppliers. As:. regards human skills and capabilities 
required by the new project, some of these may need to be imported, 
if only; during pre-operational stages. 
While it is not possible normally to envisage a project which is 
totally reliant on local inputs, the technology in question should 
draw as much as possible on'such inputs. Other things being equal, 
the'more the embodying project succeeds in this respect the more it 
would contribute to socio-economic development. It is, therefore, 
possible to conclude that the major inputs that are required continuously 
for operation ought to be present locally and continue to be so in 
the foreseeable future. This refers in particular to materials required 
for manufacturing activities and human skills and abilities needed for 
operation. 
(b) Wide markets for the products. 
A major characteristic of appropriate technology is that it is utilized 
in making a product (or a group of products) for which there exists a 
reasonably wide market. The wide market enables the manufacturing 
unit to be of an economic size, by taking advantage of both internal 
and external economies of scale. This in turn facilitates the 
attainment of low levels of unit costs and prices, contributing further 
to high sales volumes at home-and abroad. The combination of relatively 
low'prices and high levels of physical production means 'a priori' a 
genuine advance on the path of socio-economic development. 
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The selected technology needs to give an adequate-financial return at 
the estimated market share of the proposed product under conditions 
of mature markets. Consideration should also be given to the possibility 
of the project operating below "normal" capacity that corresponds to 
the "estimated market share". An assessment of the proposed project 
through discounted cash flow methods is necessary in order to ensure 
its commercial viability. A rate of return on capital invested 
should be at least equal to the determined discount rate even when the 
project is assumed to operate on possible minimum capacity. 
(c) Relative cost advantage. 
An appropriate technology usually contains an element or a characteristic 
that makes it less costly in a certain aspect within the setting where 
it is employed. * This relative cost advantage makes the technology 
viable and relatively immune to new technical advances, through 
lowering unit costs and prices. A cost advantage may, for instance, 
be embodied in the abundance of a relatively cheap material or energy 
fuel necessary for the operation of that technology. Alternatively, 
labour remunerations may be low, thereby representing a cost-lowering 
factor. Other things being equal, such cost advantages can mean 
relatively low prices and high demand levels for the peoject's products. 
(d) Facilitation of concurrent and future stages of development. 
Another important feature of appropriate technology is the contribution 
to overall development strategy of the relevant country/region. This 
implies that the application of such technology should foster prevailing 
and forthcoming stages of development. 
Various avenues exist for this facilitation to take place. A given 
technology may help to provide a pool of technical skills which proves 
to be highly beneficial in establishing subsequent projects. The 
project may provide significant savings in foreign exchange, thereby 
speeding up the cycle of industrial development. The utilization of 
the technology may help to make available products that integrate vertically 
or horizontally with products of other existing or would-be establishments. 
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(e) Viability for future absorption and improvement. 
This is the last characteristic of appropriate technology, but by no 
means the least in importance. A technology that can be fully 
understood, applied, manipulated, and built on by local specialists 
is truly a suitable technology when looked upon from this major aspect. 
In fact, it is a glaring feature of the twentieth century that countries 
which lifted their status from the rank of underdevelopment to that of 
high development had chosen and applied technologies that they could 
thoroughly comprehend, adapt, and improve on. In contrast, many 
developing countries today evidently lack the drive, grasp, and 
expertise to comprehend the complexities of modern technology, not to 
mention any thorough capacity to manipulate or improve on imported 
techniques. This explains to a significant extent the frequent resort 
of nationally-owned recipient enterprises in these countries to renewing 
their licence agreements with transferor firms when these agreements 
expire. 
3.4 Comments and Conclusions 
This Chapter has classified the obstacles to successful transfers of 
technology into two principal categories. It has been shown that the 
first set emanates from the supplying end whereas the second from the 
recipient countries themselves. The suggestion has come out clearly 
in this Chapter that supply-related problems fall into three neat 
compartments, ie political and legal barriers, monopolistic and 
restrictive practices, and managerial shortcomings. As regards 
demand-connected impediments, five major types have been proposed 
by the researcher, ie scarcity of capital, insufficiency of technical 
expertise, legal and institutional barriers, faults in new-project 
screening/planning, and faults in project implementation and operation. 
While the flow of technology to the Third World is frequently obstructed 
by both supply and demand-related factors, it is probably fair to 
contend that the prime impetus to overcome these difficulties ought to 
come from the developing nations themselves. The profile of destination- 
based hindrances is truly formidable and even depressing. 
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Although the essential cause for these serious shortcomings is deep- 
rooted and comprehensive backwardness, it is imperative to state that 
these nations have no real hope in accomplishing speedy, sustainable, 
and effective transfers of technology unless and until they rise and 
face up. squarely and courageously to this enormous task. 
Several viewpoints have been expressed regarding what may constitute 
an "appropriate technology" under circumstances prevailing in Third 
World regions, despite the existence of a certain measure of consonance 
among these views. In very broad terms and in view of the wide 
differences of current conditions in developing regions, the notion of 
"appropriate technology" is defined by the researcher as referring to 
those types of know-how, techniques, and practical knowledge that best 
serve the development strategy of the country in question. 
The product cycle theory has been advanced to explain the general pattern 
of technology transfer from "North" to "South" regions. This theory 
postulates that a given technology finds its way to the Third World 
when it matures and becomes fairly standardized. Helleiner disputes 
this line of reasoning and puts forward some potent points in support 
of his thesis that present market imperfections, as well as the operational 
nature of multinational companies, can result in transferring technologies 
to the Third World long before the threshold of maturity. This 
indicates that a certain proportion of technologies that have been 
transmitted to the developing countries is unsuitable for the particular 
circumstances of the recipient nations. 
Concerning the practical bases for selecting "appropriate" technologies, 
this Chapter has mentioned two proposals, by Jequier and Murphy 
respectively. In addition, the researcher has put forward five major 
characteristics of suitable technologies, viz, local availability of 
required inputs, presence of markets, comparative cost advantage(s), 
facilitation of present and prospective stages of development, and 
prospects for future absorption and improvement of the technology in 
question. 
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It is worth noting in conclusion that what is described as "appropriate 
technology" in a given situation may in some cases require the adaptation 
of available (often imported) technology. Under certain other 
circumstances it may be necessary to develop the basic technology, or 
certain aspects of it, indigenously. In order to achieve an optimal 
(or semi-optimal) level of technological appropriateness, coupled with 
the enhancement of the probability of the embodying project's success, 
a thorough and detailed scrutiny of every aspect is necessary. A 
prime purpose of this scrutiny is to determine exactly what technological 
and ancillary elements need to be obtained from abroad, and if so, 
what modifications are deemed to be essential or desirable, if any. 
Likewise, those technological element(s) and/or aspects of the project 
that are required to be provided locally must be correctly identified, 
so that proper steps can be taken for their supply. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
TECHNOLOGICAL INFRASTRUCTURE IN 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
The success of the transfer process is considered by some writers to 
depend on the ability of Third World nations to constantly promote their 
technological expertise. UNCTAD, for example, makes the point that 
"the transfer of technology and the development of domestic technological 
capabilities are two complementary aspects of a single process". 
1 
It is added further that "perhaps the most promising way forward for a 
developing country towards the strengthening of domestic technological 
capabilities is through the encouragement of local design and engineering 
organizations". 
2 Within the present setting of many developing countries, 
these engineering establishments are frequently requested to render some 
additional services beyond the normal scope of design and engineering 
work. These include such matters as the provision of infrastructure 
facilities (eg power, water and transport) raw materials investigations, 
manpower recruitment and training programmes. 
3 
VV Bhatt points out that the principal problem hindering the develop- 
ment of Third World nations concerns the generation of a "process of 
progressive improvement of the productive power of the existing as well 
as the new sectors of the economy ... 
". 4 Bhatt maintains that this 
process has to come about through "appropriate technological changes 
and such changes in the institutional and ideological framework as are 
consistent with this process". 
5 
4.1 Significance of Infrastructure 
It is suggested by Bhatt that fruitful efforts for initiating a process 
of technological improvement must be based on a two-pronged general 
strategy, thus: 
1 UNCTAD: "Handbook on the Acquisition of Technology by Developing Countries" 
New York (United Nations, 1978) p 34. 
2 Loc. Cit. 
3 Loc. Cit. 
4VV Shatt: "On Technology Policy and Its Institutional Frame" World 
Development, 3 (September 1975) p 652. 
5 Loc. Cit. 
(a) Improvement of the "technological and organizational base 
of the traditional sector, the primary requirements for which being 
design and engineering ability". 
6 The growth of the modern sector 
is also to be encouraged, but be kept subservient to the needs of the 
traditional sector. Bhatt remarks that indigenous scientific and 
technological capability is required in order to "identify, select, and 
adapt modern technology to specific needs and to innovate on the basis of 
the growing body of scientific and technological knowledge". 
7 
This is necessary for upgrading the traditional sector and the complementary 
growth of the modern sector. 
(b) Institutional and ideological changes, so as to "promote and 
reinforce the technological strategy". 
8 In general this requires 
"confidence and pride in initiating a genuine, authentic and original 
approach to development tasks and problems - in contrast to the present 
sense of inferiority". 
9 
4.1.1 The Need for Technological Self-reliance 
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The view is expressed by UNIDO that many Third World developing countries 
suffer from "double dependence" in that "they need not only to acquire 
the elements of technical knowledge but also to import the capacity to 
use this knowledge in investment and production". 
10 It is further 
stressed that "technological dependence seriously undermines the attempts 
that might be made by a developing country to strengthen its own capacity 
for scientific research and technological development. It does so in 
two ways: it inhibits processes of 'learning-by-doing', essential for 
the development of scientific capacities; and it tends to devalue the 
activities of local scientific and technology institutions, making them 
either irrelevant or poor copies of those in the industrialized countries". 
" 
6 Ibid., p 655 
7 Loc. Cit 
8 Loc. Cit 
9 Loc. Cit 
10 UNIDO: "Technological Self-Reliance of the Developing Countries: Towards 
Operational Strategies" Vienna (United Nations, 1981) p 4. 
11 Loc. Cit. 
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Repeatedly, experience has shown that processes and products developed 
in the industrialized countries have "little relevance to the problems 
confronting many developing countries", because they are not geared to 
the satisfaction of basic human needs. 
12 Research on "problems directly 
relevant to the Third World probably accounts for little more than 1 
per cent of the total research expenditures of the industrialized 
countries". 
13 Forecasting that developing countries' payments for 
technology would rise from $1 billion in 1975 to $6 billion in 1985, 
UNIDO points out that there exist in addition to these payments, the 
indirect and hidden costs of technological dependence. Although the 
"total cost of the technological dependence of the Third World cannot be 
accurately stated, if allowance is made for the transfer of inappropriate 
technologies that undermine the development of indigenous capabilities, 
it could well be as high as $30 billion to $50 billion a year". 
14 
Both technology and consumer goods in advanced countries are, according 
to VV Bhatt, directed towards the satisfaction of "complex dynamic 
want-patterns of rich societies and are out of tune with the resource 
composition and the basic functional want-patterns of the poor countries. 
The creative absorption of this technology to suit the specific needs of 
the poor countries requires a high degree of indigenous scientific and 
technological capability, which these countries lack". 
15 VV Bhatt 
goes on to express the view that a further discriminating factor working 
against present-day developing countries is the "international demonstration 
effect". 
16 
The contention has been made that the present international economic 
system facilitates the perpetuation of technological dependence of 
Third World nations. Several elements make up this system, these including 
the industrial property system (patents and trademarks), the workings of 
monetary and capital markets, the power of multinational corporations and 
their corporate methods, as well as the structure of the international 
political system. 
17 
12 Ibid., p7 
13 Loc. Cit. See also sub-section 3.3.2 above for a discussion on the 
"appropriateness" of technologies being received by developing countries. 
14 Ibid., p5 
15 VV Bhatt, Op. Cit., p 655 
16 The term "demonstration effect" refers to the phenomenon whereby a relatively 
recent product demonstrates its practical use and attractiveness arousing in 
the process new interest and additional demand. The term is frequently 
employed in the context of Third World countries where modern goods produced 
by developed nations are observed to tempt demand for similar products. This 
desire to 'imitate' the consumption styles of rich nations may also result in 
certain repercussions related to behaviour and spending patterns of 
individuals in less developed regions. 
17 For a discussion on the nature and effect of some of these factors, 
see Section 3.1 above. 
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This point is clearly stressed by UNIDO who emphasize that "the 
international economic system is a stratified system of power relations. 
Because it has a structure that helps to determine who decides and who 
controls, it is a system of domination. Rather than reducing the 
technological dependence'of the developing countries, the international 
system actively and persistently reinforces it". 
18 A simplified schematic 
representation of the vicious circle that operates against Third World 
developing countries in this regard is presented by UNIDO (figure 4.1) 
Figure 4.1 
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Source: UNIDO: "Technological Self-Reliance of the Developing Countries: 
Towards Operational Strategies" (Development and Transfer of 
Technology Series No 15) Vienna (United Nations, 1981) p9 
18 UNIDO, Op. Cit. p9 
4.1.2 Elements of Technological Self-reliance 
Sagasti points out that the concept of "self-reliance" has in recent 
years acquired greater importance and attracted increasing attention. 
19 
He stresses, however, that owing to the inherent difficulty of defining 
this concept, it is necessary to give "operational content to the policy 
directives it implies in (each) specific area of concern". 
20 
In relation to the field of science and technology, Sagasti asserts that 
three different interpretations of "self-reliance" may be advanced, 
as follows: 21 
(a) As the capacity for autonomous decision making in matters of 
technology. Decision autonomy refers to the "capacity for defining 
technology requirements, identifying alternatives available elsewhere 
(breaking them into their components), and determining the best way to 
acquire, incorporate and absorb the technology". 
22 
In accord with this interpretation of technological self-reliance, the 
developing country requires "a cadre of professionals and technicians 
knowledgeable in each area of concern, as well as the access to information 
that must be processed to arrive at a decision". 
23 
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(b) As the combination of decision autonomy and the capacity to 
generate indepently the critical elements of technical knowledge required 
for a particular product or process. What is required here is the 
ability to "design the process or product (and its critical elements 
in particular), to define standards and specifications for the components 
to be manufactured and to assemble the components into the complete design". 
24 
This second interpretation of the notion of technological self-reliance 
requires a degree of technical knowledge and operational skills much 
higher than the first. In addition the requisite knowledge and skills 
have to be related directly to engineering design capabilities. 
19 FR Sagasti: "Technological Self-Reliance and Co-operation Among Third 
World Countries" World Development, 4 (1976) P 939 
20 Loc. Cit. 
21 Ibid., pp 939-40 
22 Ibid.. p 939 
23 Ibid., p 940 
24 Loc. Cit. 
(c) As the autonomous potential for producing within the country 
the goods and services considered essential in the development strategy. 
in this sense technological self-reliance involves "autonomy of decision 
and the possession of technical knowledge and skills, as well as the 
capacity for transforming them into goods and services". 
25 This third 
interpretation requires not only the cadres and information, but also 
the actual "means of production (engineering and managerial capabilities, 
manufacturing facilities, raw materials, etc) that would enable the 
country to do so without external sources of supply". 
26 
The cultivation of technological self-reliance is undoubtedly of paramount 
importance for the general development and well-being of Third World 
nations. Pointing out that the core problem involves the discriminate 
selection and management of foreign inputs as well as the stimulation of 
indigenous technology, UNIDO draws attention to four elements of a 
concentrated process for the build-up of this national condition. 
27 
These four elements are grouped under the following headings: 
(a) Selection and acquisition. 
Technologies chosen should be appropriate to the peculiar circumstances 
of each developing country in question. Three sets of factors should be 
"considered in determining whether a technology is appropriate, namely, 
28 development goals, resource endowments and conditions of application". 
(b) Adaptation. 
UNIDO defines "adaptation" as the "process of matching alien technologies 
to local factor endowments, social customs and values and national 
development objectives". 
29 A. given technology may need to be altered 
in order. to suit the size of local market, in-country skill profile, or 
the presence of certain material or energy resources. As effective 
adaptation requires skilled manpower with ample relevant experience, 
less developed countries are often trapped in this connection, due to 
their persistent lack of such expertise. 
25 Loc. Cit. 
26 Loc. Cit. 
27 UNIDO, Op. Cit. p 14 
28 Loc. Cit. 
29 Ibid., p 16 
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To quote UNIDO again, it is found, in general, that most developing 
countries face, a scarcity of "technological service capabilities. Such 
services range from macro-level industrial planning to micro-level project 
identification, feasibility studies, plant specifications, detailed 
engineering designs, civil construction and machinery installation, and 
the commissioning, start-up and operation of plants. The most significant 
gap, even in fairly industrialized developing countries, is in detailed 
engineering and design and in sectoral consultancy services through 
nationally owned--units". 
30 
(c) Absorption. 
The concept of "social carriers of technology" is stressed by UNIDO 
in this regard. 
31 It is pointed out that "effective absorption and 
diffusion is dependent upon the existence of a social entity or category, 
a 'social carrier', which has an interest in applying that technology". 
32 
This 'social carrier' may be an industrial enterprise, a research or 
consultancy institution, a profession, a social class, a group of 
individuals, or even one individual. A social carrier must have 
"an objective interest in choosing. and applying a. specific technology. 
This objective interest must coincide with a subjective interest, ie, 
the objective interest must be conscioulsy felt or perceived as an 
adequate goal by the carrier". 
33 A necessary condition for the continual 
process of absorbing new technologies by any Third World country is the 
presence of a base pool of "qualified engineers, and scientists, middle- 
level technicians, and skilled labour". 
34 
(d) Technology Development. 
It is believed that the capacity for developing relatively novel 
techniques is a definitive sign of a certain measure of self-reliance in 
the technological field. A national capacity to innovate is the result 
of complex relationships between available capital, skills, information, 
communication and scientific Infrastructure' . 
35 
30 Loc. Cit. 
31 Ibid., p 17. This publication cites in a footnote on this page the 
undermentioned work for advancing the notion of "social carriers" in 
the transference of technology: C Edquist and 0 Edquist: "Social Carriers 
of Science and Technology for Development" Discussion Paper 123 (Lund 
University, Research Policy Program, Sweden, October 1978). 
32 Loc. Cit. 
33 Loc. Cit. 
34 Loc. Cit. 
35 Ibid., p 18 
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Far from being a separate autonomous process, such a situation would be 
the consequence of conducive "patterns of social, economic, and cultural 
Interactions'. 
Thus, a fundamental requisite of innovation is "linkage". This notion is 
described by UNIDO as "the creation of institutional devices that 
facilitate continuous intercommunication and mutual assistance between 
representatives of the educational system, enterprises, employers, 
associations, organized labour, and development agencies". 
37 It is 
stressed further that the intention to communicate and co-operate 
"must be inculcated at national, regional and local levels and permeate 
every day thinking". 
38 
VV Bhatt suggests the establishment of Technical Consultancy Service 
Centres (TCSCs) in developing countries in order to tackle two 
complementary problems, namely the up-grading of indigenous technology and 
the adaptation of imported technology. 
39 The function of these centres 
would be to "design the machinery, processes, and products. It requires 
knowledge of initial conditions of both the production and organizational 
structures. It requires identification of current knowledge and the 
current ways in which it can be applied. It requires identification of 
specific research problems and the ways in which they can be tackled 
, within the country or abroad" 
40 
Bhatt envisages the establishment of these centres side by side with 
conventional technological research institutions. He believes that the 
fundamental role to be fulfilled by TCSCs is linking the research institutions 
with the production system of the respective developing country. In 
fact, he specifies five basic functions that need to be discharged by 
TCSCs, as follows: 
41 
36 Loc. Cit. 
37 Loc. Cit. 
38 Loc. Cit. 
39 VV Bhatt: "Development Perspectives: Problems, Strategy, and Policies" 
Oxford (Pergamon Press, 1980) p 77 
40 Loc. Cit. 
41 Loc. Cit. 
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(a) Identification of technological choice problems. 
(b) Search for the solution of problems of type (a) above 
with the assistance, where necessary, of foreign TCSCs and domestic 
and/or foreign research centres. 
(c) Creative adaptations of the solutions in (b) above to actual 
project development. 
(d) Up-grading technologies that are being utilized in the 
traditional sector of the economy. 
(e) Identification of realistic and worthwhile technological 
research problems that require the attention of local research 
institutions. 
Notwithstanding the distinction made by Bhatt in this context, it is 
possible to speak of technological research centres (TCRs) in general 
(TCSCs as well as conventional industrial research institutes). 
It could be emphasised that the establishment of these centres 
represents a cornerstone within the country's technological strategy in 
particular and its development strategy in general. These centres are 
primarily significant in focusing efforts on areas of indigenous 
technological potential and the building of technological strengths 
where the initial foundations have been laid down through the importation 
of foreign technology. 
4.2 Planning for Science and Technology 
The practice has grown in developing countries for development plans to 
be prepared periodically. A number of components usually constitute 
these plans including aspects relating to financial funding, availability 
of manpower, social services, as well as the-choice of certain projects 
to be implemented. It seems, however, that few Third World countries 
are exerting serious efforts in setting out specific plans for 
technological advancement. 
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AF Ewing mentions five countries where technology planning is undertaken, 
namely Brazil, India, Mexico, Pakistan and Venezuela. 
42 
Technology plans that are being prepared in these countries differ in 
scope but "cover similar ground: an analysis by the government authorities 
concerned of the weaknesses of existing technology policies; targets for 
increasing substantially the resources devoted both to R&D and skill 
formation, arrangements for strengthening national institutions; and 
the financing of programmes". 
43 However, it seems that these plans are 
"general in character and the indications of priority areas are so broad 
as to be of little value". 
44 The primary importance of these plans 
appear to He in the recognition of the significance of technology, 
the need for strengthening relevant institutions, and the appropriation 
of resources to indigenous technological capabilities. 
It is widely believed that the existence of an overall development 
strategy is essential within the context of Third World developing 
countries. Such a strategy needs to be comprehensive, and could thus 
be seen to encompass several components or sub-strategies. One of these 
components or sub-strategies ought to be concerned with technological 
planning. 
Ewing maintains that technology planning should have two main goals, 
as follows: 
45 
(a) The facilitation of the acquisition and adaptation of requisite 
technology for the implementation of the national development plan. 
(b) The promotion of national technological self-reliance to the 
highest possible level. 
In order to make the desired contribution towards these two aims, technology 
planning must pass through the necessary phases of preparing the ground- 
work to the delineation of aggregate strategy as well as the detailed 
determination of tactical programmes and measures. In particular this 
planning. has to be concerned with two things, these being: 
42 AF Ewing: "Science, Technology and Development" Journal of World Trade 
Law, 14 (March - April 1980) p 127. 
43 Ibid., pp 127-8 
44 Ibid., p 128 
45 Loc. Cit. 
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(a) Determination of industrial. technological. requirements during 
the forthcoming period. On the basis of the projects envisaged in 
various sectors of the economy, deductions have to be made concerning 
the needed types of technological know-how. 
(b) Determination of various methods and sources for required 
technologies. Basically, the relevant sources can be classified into 
two categories: external sources (ie from other countries) and internal 
sources. In each case the most appropriate source (or sources) need 
to be selected to enhance the sum product of tangible and intangible 
benefits.. 
4.3 The State of Technological Research in the Third World 
There is a tendency for scientific and technological research presently 
undertaken-by developing countries to be directed towards pure knowledge 
that is not significantly relevant to the production setting. As 
VV Bhatt remarks, the scientific and even technological research that 
is being done in the Third World "tends to accumulate knowledge, but 
knowledge that is not immediately applicable and to a large extent 
irrelevant to the production process. The reason is partly sociological - 
the imitation psychology of the elite - but partly it is also due to the 
lack of an integrated institutional structure, which relates the knowledge- 
gathering process to the knowledge-applications process in an interacting, 
mutually reinforcing, overall process promoting the knowledge-based 
expansion of the production system". 
46 He goes on to add that quite 
"a number of (Third World developing) countries (like Brazil, Mexico 
and India) have TRCs (Technological Research Centres) but they function 
in a vacuum and are not in a position to tackle relevant problems of the 
PS (production system); this caused both internal and external brain-drain, 
and irrelevant research". 
47 
Charles Cooper expresses a similar view concerning the state of scientific/ 
technological activity in Third World countries. He explains that local 
scientific and technical activities have been alienated from industrial 
production. 
48 An important consequence of this alienation has been that 
46 VV Bhatt: "Development Perspectives .... " Op. Cit. p 76 
47 Ibid., p 77 
48 C Cooper: "Science Policy and Technological Change in Underdeveloped 
Economies" World Development, Vol 2 No 3 (March 1974) p 59. 
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"very few pressures from the local social and economic system" have 
been exerted on scientific and technological research. 
49 
In this regard, Cooper expounds three main features which characterize 
R8D activity in Third World developing countries, these being: 
50 
(a) Heavy concentration on fundamental research, which is 
mostly located in universities. It is noted that "applied research and 
experimental development activities, which account for the larger part 
of total R&D expenditures in the advanced countries, are noticeably 
under-developed". 
51 On the basis of a relevant (though somewhat dated) 
study by OECD of the Turkish experience in scientific and technological 
planning, Cooper mentions that during the mid-1960's "a good deal more than 
half of the R&D workers in Turkey were in the universities. On average 
these university research workers spent only 10 per cent of their time in 
actual research" . 
52 Most of this research was being done for thesis 
production and it seemed that "very little of this research related to 
53 Turkish problems". 
(b) Scientists opt to orient their research in the direction of 
those problems which tend to occupy the minds of advanced-country 
researchers. In this respect, "the 'biases' in the R&D activities in 
the developing countries are symptomatic of more fundamental problems". 
54 
The study concerning the Turkish experience referred to above indicates 
that there were "virtually no research workers in Turkish private 
industry. The very small amount of research in the industrial sector 
55 
was located in the State Economic Enterprises", 
(c) A great deal of the R&D work in developing countries 
appears to be done by "individuals rather than teams". 
56 It is suggested 
that this is the outcome of a situation where "there is no social pressure 
on the scientific community", 
57 
thus giving way to the force of individual 
motivation. 
49 Loc. Cit. 
50 Loc. Cit. 
51 Loc. Cit. 
52 Ibid., p 60. The OECD study to which Cooper refers is the following: 
"Scientific Research and Technology in Relation to the Economic Development 
of Turkey" OECD Directorate for Scientific Affairs, Paris, 29, March 1967. 
DAS/SPR/67.8 (unpublished mimeograph) 
53 Loc. Cit. 
54 Ibid., p 59 
55 Ibid., p 60 
56 Ibid., p 59 
57 Loc. Cit. 
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Available evidence conveys the impression that only a small minority of 
Third World developing nations possess industrial establishments which 
have research and development units of their own, and "even these have 
a limited record and with very little horizontal transfer". 
58 
It seems 
that "whatever research takes place in developing countries is by and 
large government funded through industrial research institutes or 
universities. This expenditure, which does not exceed 0.4 per cent of 
the gross national product (GNP) of the developing countries, is often 
spent on basic rather than applied research, involving programmes not 
necessarily drawn up as a result of clearly defined industry-related 
priori ties". 
59 
While it is estimated that only 2 per cent of total world R&D 
expenditure is undertaken by Third World developing countries, it has 
been strongly suggested, with some justification, that some of this 
activity is misdirected. 
60 Moreover, a significant proportion of the 
R&D effort that exists in these countries is inevitably carried out 
by the relatively few countries which are the most advanced among this 
61 
group. 
Most developing countries have at least one research institution that 
is concerned with technological or industrial problems, while others 
have several of these institutes. As Charles Cooper makes clear, most 
developing countries possess "a nucleus of research and development 
(R & D) personnel, working in a network of institutes; there are 
technicians and engineers. Also a large number of underdeveloped 
countries have National Science Councils or similar institutions, part 
of whose function is to relate local science and technology to production - 
often with the more specific objective of generating 'appropriate 
technologies"'. 
62 
58 UNIDO, Op. Cit., p 18 
59 Loc. Cit. 
60 UNCTAD, Op. Cit. p 35 
61 Loc. Cit. 
62 C Cooper, Op. Cit., p 55 
There is no doubt, however, that the mere existence of research institutes 
does not constitute a positive reflection on the effectiveness of these 
bodies, and less so on the technological planning system as a whole. 
In fact, it is contended in some quarters that certain Third World 
countries have "too many research institutes to function in an effective 
and co-ordinated manner". 
63 Research centres that have been set up 
in developing countries have. been of. various types. However, they 
have mostly been within the categories of State-controlled, autonomous 
State-aided, or quasi-governmental institutes. 
64 There are both single- 
purpose and multi-purpose institutes and single-sector and multi-sector 
ones. 
65 Four reasons for the relative ineffectiveness of these research 
institutes within the context of Third World developing countries are 
put forward by UNIDO, these being the following: 
66 
(a) The structure of these institutes is often too ambitious, 
while executive officers lack sufficient training or experience. 
(b) Failure to assess "the applied research and development 
needs of the nation and industry prior to formulating programmes, 
67 building infrastructure, and equipping laboratories". 
(c) Operational short-comings, including "inept management, 
wrong type of staff, poor staff remuneration, and lack of 
business orientation, staff mobility, priority-based research, 
commercialization efforts, package of services to industry, 
guarantees for technology development and motivation to 
undertake contract research. "68 
(d) Weak contacts and co-ordination with industry and government, 
lack of adequate funding, and the indiscriminate importation of 
technology. 69 
63 UNIDO, Op. Cit. p 18 
64 Loc. Cit. 
65 Ibid., p 18-19 
66 Ibid., p 19 
67 Loc. Cit. 
68 Loc. Cit. 
69 Loc. Cit. 
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Turning now to the problem of resources devoted to R&D In Third World 
countries and the consequential fruits of this activity, it is noted by 
UNIDO that developing countries possess only 12.6 per cent of the global 
stock of scientists and engineers engaged in research and development, 
of which 9.4 per cent are concentrated in a few countries of Asia. 
7° 
In support of this point, UNIDO puts forward some relevant figures 
concerning the distribution of R&D manpower and relevant trade in 
machinery and transport equipment (Table 4.1) 
Table 4.1 
SELECTED INDICATORS OF TECHNOLOGICAL CAPACITIES 
INDICATORS Developed 
Market 
Economy 
Countries 
Eastern 
Europe 
(incl 
USSR) 
Developing 
Countries 
M Ly 
4- Uf NE 
QQJQ 
R&D scientists and engineers, 1973 
(percentage of world total) 55.4 32.0 1.2 9.4 2.0 
R&D expenditures, 1973 
(percentage of world total) 66.5 30.6 0.31 1.63 0.94 
Share of exports of machinery and 
transport equipment, 1976 
(percentage of world total) 86.9 9.5 0.04 2.6 0.68 
Developing country imports of 5.1 
machinery and transport equipment 
1971 (percentage of world total) 90.3 4.2 
Source: UNIDO: "Industry 2000: New Perspectives" (ID/237), Tables 7(1) 
to 7(4). Cited in UNIDO, "Technological Self-Reliance ..... " Op. Cit. P 4. 
70 Ibid., p3 
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A major handicap to the speedy utilization of research results in 
developing countries has been the inadequacy of institutional arrangements 
as well as the paucity of designing and engineering inputs needed to 
develop the process/product beyond the laboratory stage. There is a 
"chain of innovative development" that must be available in this context, 
namely laboratory-scale research, pilot-plant investigations, design- 
engineering of the commercial-scale plant, and finally fully-fledged 
commercial production. 
UNIDO depicts the process of innovation as comprising the seven phases 
of research, laboratory testing, engineering, design, proto-type, 
development testing, and industrial exploitation (figure 4.2). 
71 
Figure 4.2 
THE PROCESS OF INNOVATION 
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New 
y 
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Design 
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Development 
testing 
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Source: UNIDO: "Technological Self-Reliance .... ", Op. Cit. P 31 
71 Ibid, p 31 
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Deshmukh and Chikte see the process of innovation somewhat differently 
by concentrating on R&D activity (in the context of industrialized 
countries) while focusing on the problem of resource allocation (Figure 4.3). 
72 
Figure 4.3 
A MODEL OF THE R&D PROCESS 
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72 SD Deshmukh and SD Chikte: "A Unified Approach for Modelling and 
Analysing New Product R&0 Decisions" in BV Dean and JL Goldhar: 
"Management of Research and Innovation" Amsterdam (North-Holland Publishing 
Company 1980) p 170 
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A bird's eye view of the research and development process for a new 
product/process is provided by AG Anderson, in the form of a decision 
tree (Figure 4.4). 
73 
Figure 4.4 
PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT DECISION TREE 
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Source: NG Anderson: "From Concept to Production: A Management Approach" 
London (Taylor and Francis Ltd, 1975) p 51 
73 NG Anderson: "From Concept to Production: A Management Approach" 
London (Taylor and Francis Ltd, 1975) pp 50-51 
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Once the market requirement has been ascertained, 'a decision has to be 
taken on whether the manufacture of the product is worthwhile. 
74 If 
the answer is 'yes', then the question arises regarding the availability 
of the requisite technology. 
75 If the answer to this question is negative, 
it becomes necessary to undertake a research programme in order to 
furnish the necessary technical know-how prior to the consideration of 
any subsequent development of that knowledge. This analysis implies 
that there exists three different decision pointsat which a project 
concerning. a"proposed product or process may be fully adopted by the 
institutional structure in dealing with technology acquisition, adaptation, 
and development. These three points are those connected with undertaking 
the applied research programme, the execution of a feasibility study, 
or the point of developing the immediate fruits of the research effort. 
It is highly significant that the innovative chain is established and 
maintained in healthy order, so that research results accord with 
industrial needs and be duly and successfully transferred to industry. 
4.4 Role of Technological Research Centres 
There is little doubt thatythe existence of technological research' 
centres represents a noteworthy step in the quest of Third World 
developing countries for technological advancement and self-reliance. 
It must, however, be stressed that it is not so much the birth of these 
institutions that is wanted as the tailoring of a 'research system' 
in each country on the basis of sound and realistic assessments coupled 
with the provision of pre-requisites for their optimal functioning. 
Needless to say that the design of the research system ought to accord 
fully with the country's overall development strategy and be effectively 
integrated within national technology planning. 
James Utterback puts forward three primary objectives for TRCs in the 
developing Third World, these being: 
76 
74 Ibid., p 50 
75 Loc. Cit. 
76 JM Utterback: "The Role of Applied Research Institutes in the Transfer 
of Technology in Latin America" World Development Vol 3, No 9 (September 
1975) p 665. 
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(a) Generation and adaptation of viable industrial technology. 
(b) Long-term development of management skills, technical skills 
and communication channels. 
(c) Enhancement of industrial production in both qualitative and 
quantitative terms, as well as increasing industrial employment. 
On a more detailed and practical level, it is possible to set out five 
basic functions that could in practice be entrusted to technological 
research institutions. These are 
(a) Choice of appropriate technology for proposed projects. 
(b) Creative adaptation of proposed new industrial projects in 
order to fit them with available technical capabilities, 
resources, as well as market factors. 
(c) Continuous refinement, development and up-grading of 
, technology in the traditional sectors of the economy. 
(d) Identification of problems that require technological research. 
(e) Co-operation with counterparts in other countries (whether 
developed or developing) in order to fulfil their functions 
properly. 
A great deal of concentrated and well-directed effort is called for in 
the establishment and fruitful operation of research institutions in 
Third World countries. Apart from the necessity for a sound development 
strategy that gives birth to, and accompanies, realistic technological 
planning, it is absolutely essential that a true appreciation of the 
role of these centres by all those concerned is evolved. It Is 
particularly important to pay attention to three major aspects regarding 
these centres, these being as follows: 
104 
(a) Special isms. 
The choice of the field of specialization for each TRC ought to be 
consistent with the country's technological plans, in order to make the 
utmost possible contribution to development. Industrial sectors which 
possess a relative international or regional advantage and/or play a 
major part in the country's overall development, are well placed 
candidates for having their own specialized research centres. Each of 
these sectors (or sub-sectors) may have one or more research institutes. 
Similar reasoning can be applied to industries that are potentially 
promising but beset'by certain technological hurdles that may be overcome 
through research effort. 
(b) Resources. 
A consideration is necessary, when a TRC is proposed, of human needs in 
terms of both qualifications and numbers. Assuming that a certain 
proposed TRC appears feasible, a manpower plan is usually indispensable 
in order to cater for these needs, setting out such details as sources 
of recruitment, levels of remuneration, and training programmes. 
Consideration is also essential of non-human requirements, duly 
necessitating another plan for the provision of buildings, scientific 
equipment, materials and other requirements. 
(c) Design of operating systems. 
Various components make up the operating system of each TRC, which should 
be as effective as possible in order for the expected results to 
materialize. These components include organization structure, job 
descriptions, incentives, conditions relating to promotion, methods of 
periodic follow-up and day-to-day supervision. Working methods have 
to be determined regarding the choice of problems to be studied, the 
drawing of a plan to attack each research problem and the necessary 
controls thereon. 
4.4.1 Selection of Research Tasks 
A significant problem in the operation of research centres concerns the 
choice of tasks on which work ought to be undertaken. Due to variances 
in the circumstances surrounding the functioning of these organs, this 
problem is perhaps best tackled by each institution in its in particular 
way. However, three salient points can be raised in this regard. 
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(a) Sources of Research Ideas. 
Sources for ideas on which research may be undertaken can be broadly 
classified into two main categories: internal and external. 
The internal source is from within, while the external source represents 
ideas emanating from bodies/individuals/organizations other than the TRC 
Itself. It is highly desirable that the basic ideas which form the 
basis of research projects spring from a genuine industrial need. 
This often means (though not necessarily) that those ideas originate 
outside the research centres themselves. 
A group of 20 cases of research projects conducted by four Latin 
American institutes were studied by JM Utterback during the summer of 
1969.77 The projects were evenly divided between need-stimulated cases 
and means-stimulated cases. The results obtained from this study can be 
seen as evidence that need-stimulated projects are much more likely to 
become practically useful. Table 4.2 givesa brief summary of the 
results. Mr Utterback concludes that the Fisher probability that the 
distribution in Table 4.2 would occur by chance alone is less than 0.025. 
Table 4.2 
THE UTILIZATION OF RESEARCH RESULTS: A COMPARISON BETWEEN RESEARCH TASKS 
STIMULATED BY MARKET (Need) AND THOSE STIMULATED BY MEANS (Technology) 
(A Sample of Twenty Research Tasks) 
Number of need- Number of means- 
stimulated projects stimulated projects 
Project results in use or 
which have a tangible 93 
potential for use (75%) (25%) 
Project results not in use 17 
(12.5%) (87.5%) 
Total number of research 10 10 
projects 
Source: JM Utterback: "The Role of Applied Research Institutes in the 
Transfer of Technology in Latin America" World Development Vol 3, 
No 9 (September 1975) p. 669. 
77, Ibid., pp 665-673 
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(b) Screening Research Ideas. 
it is essential that a conscious methodology exists for the evaluation 
of all suggestions for research by the TRC concerned. This involves 
two things, namely, a definite screening procedure and a clear-cut 
criterion (or criteria) for evaluating the proposals that come forward, 
at each stage of the determined procedure. 
The screening procedure may be performed entirely within the TRC in 
question. Alternatively, it may well involve other bodies/organisations, 
such as trade associations, government departments, parent organizations 
and the like. Evaluation criteria are imperative so as to guide the 
process of selection and avoid as far as possible cases of indecision 
and personal conflicts of opinion. 
(c) Channels of Communication. 
Effective communications form an essential part of the work of TRCs. 
Since these centres occupy a significant position enabling them to 
accommodate needs of clients with existing and/or potential technologies, 
though research institutes already in existence seem to have had a 
limited degree of success in this sphere. In this context researchers 
point out that one of the most basic problems facing them is that most 
users do not have the expertise to define and clearly communicate their 
needs. 
Research projects which start on the basis of a well-defined need and 
are directed towards a specific or narrow group of clients seem more 
likely to attain the required level of practical success. This is 
conditioned by the ability of the TRC concerned to devote the requisite 
resources, side by side with other influential factors. In cases where 
there is past experience in a similar field of study, this would act 
as a strong positive item on the credit side. 
4.4.2 Structural Linkages 
Developing countries face at present the demanding task of building a 
a.: nucleus of effective links between their research centres and other 
functionally related establishments. Charles Cooper stresses the point 
that the disappointing performance of scientific and technological 
institutions in Third World countries may be explained by structural 
conditions in the underdeveloped economies" . 
78 
78 C Cooper, op. Cit. p 55 
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On the basis of relevant case studies, Cooper emphasizes that the 
problem of linking science to production "probably cannot be solved by 
'science policy' measures as they are usually conceived. This is to 
say that the problems cannot be solved simply by attempts to re-orient 
and re-organize science itself. There are important influences external 
to the 'science and technology system' that have 
,a 
critical effect on 
it, and 'science policy' institutions cannot be successful unless they 
can examine the implications of these external factors". 
79 
Two main points are raised by Cooper in order to assist in explaining 
the "weak links between science, technology and production in the 
underdeveloped economies, and also the restricted growth of this kind 
of activity", these being as follows,. 
80 
(a) Most underdeveloped countries have undergone "a process of 
'technologically-dependent industrialization - and also of 'technologically- 
dependent' development in primary sectors like mining or plantation 
agriculture". 
81 Even in cases where there exists locally some viable 
technological alternatives, Third World entrepreneurs normally show. an 
obvious preference for Western technologies. Aversion to risk may largely 
explain this tendency, as well as the desired"access to a brand-name 
or trade-mark or some other market advantage". 
82 In consequence, local 
R&D and other scientific activities "are more or less 'shut-out' of 
the productive sectors - or at least play a strictly circumscribed role". 
83 
(b) In the case of other sectors there exist frequently "organizational 
and institutional factors (ofter inherited from the 'pre-capitalist' 
economic organisation) which restrict technological innovation and 
consequently limit the role of local scientific activities". 
84 
In this context,, UNCTAD has expressed the view that a major impediment 
to the speedy utilization of research results in Third World regions is 
79 Ibid., Pp 63-4 
80 Ibid., P 57 
81 Loc. Cit. 
82 Ibid., P 58 
83 Loc. Cit. 
84 Loc. Cit. 
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"the absence or inadequacy of appropriate institutional arrangements 
and of the design and engineering inputs required to develop the process 
} 
beyond the laboratory stage. It is essential, therefore, that the 
various links in the innovative chain, namely, laboratory-scale 
research, pilot-plant investigations,. scaling up, design/engineering of, 
the commercial scale plant, production trials, etc., be established ? 
and strengthened to ensure that the research results accord with the 
85 industrial needs and that they are successfully transferred to industry". 
UNCTAD puts forward five main benefits that would accrue as a result of 
the linkage between design and engineering organizations and R&D 
Institutions, as follows: 
86 
(a) Impetus to R&D by consultancy organisations. This would 
occur through the identification of specific immediate. and long-range 
problems, and the indication of areas for the development of new 
processes and products. 
(b) Build-up of domestic technical competence by harnessing local 
, 
', 
inputs and resources to the development effort. 
(c) Promotion and commercialization of new processes or products 
emanating from research establishments. 
(d) Choice of more appropriate technologies, and "disaggregation 
of the foreign technology package". 
87 
(e) Encouragement to domestic construction and equipment manufacturing 
industry. 
4.5 Comments and Conclusions 
This Chapter has stressed that the strengthening of technological 
infrastructure is an essential part of the quest for successful 
technology-acquisition by Third World nations. Because of the continual 
need for adapting imported technologies and the allied requirement 
85 UNCTAD, Op. Cit. P 36 
86 Loc. Cit. 
87 Loc. Cit. 
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for understanding and assimilating these technologies, a certain measure 
of local technological effort is usually viewed as more than desirable. 
There is the necessity, in addition, for maintaining and improving 
presently-utilized technologies, where reliance on external sources 
would entail considerable foreign-exchange outlays as well as the slowing 
up of the paramount process of learning-by-doing. 
It has thus been suggested that both extensive and intensive technology 
planning must be regarded by the Third World as an essential ingredient 
of development planning. Available evidence seems to indicate, however, 
that few developing countries are exerting the requisite effort in this 
direction, despite the fact that most do have some measure of overall 
development strategy. Even in the case of the few countries where 
technological plans are specifically prepared, these appear to be rather 
general in character, stopping far short of the in-depth analysis and 
wealth of detail which many experts would like to see. 
The researcher believes that technology planning has two primary facets. 
The first concerns the determination of industrial technological 
requirements during the forthcoming period, while the second relates to 
considering the various possible sources and methods for acquiring the 
technologies needed. In each case, where a given technology is 
identified as worthy of acquisition, relevant choices have to be made 
regarding the method(s) to be utilized and the respective source(s) 
to be explored. 
UNIDO has pointed out that most R&D efforts in developing countried 
is government-funded, and carried out by State- or quasi-State institutes, 
with little genuine private sector research activity. Also, four causes 
were advanced by this international body for the relative ineffectiveness 
of research institutions in the developing Third World, ie, too ambitious 
structures, lack of true appraisal of national R&D needs, operational 
short-comings, and weak contacts with industry. It can be pointed out, 
moreover, that compared to their having almost three-quarters of the world 
population, developing countries account for only 12.6% of the world's 
stock of R&D scientists and engineers, and their R&D expenditures 
comprise less than 3% of the global total. 
110 
This Chapter has emphasised that any "research system" must be envisaged 
and designed on the basis of realistic assessments of pressing 
technological needs coupled with the provision of necessary pre-requisites 
for the smooth functioning of the system. J Utterback has suggested 
three primary objectives for TRCs which need to be considered in their 
design and actual functioning, that is, generation and adaptation of 
viable technology, long-term evolution of required human skills, and 
the contribution towards qualitative and quantitative enhancement of 
industrial production. On a more detailed level, the researcher suggests 
five main functions to be undertaken by TRCs, 'ie choice of appropriate 
technologies, creative adaptation of proposed projects, up-grading of 
currently used technologies, identification of problems for technological 
research, and co-operation with similar purpose external bodies. 
In addition, this Chapter has shed light on three aspects pertaining 
to the establishment and operation of TRCs, viz. choice of specialisms, 
allocation of resources, and the design of proper operating systems. 
The structural linkages between TRCs, on the one hand, and other 
Institutions within the national economy, on the other, are a major 
source of concern for experts in this field. The view has been advanced 
that inadequate institutional arrangements to link TRCs in the Third Vii!. 
World with design/engineering institutions and other bodies have a 
serious stifling effect on the total technology research set-up. 
Action is urgently needed, therefore, to strengthen and enliven the whole 
innovative chain, so as to intensify markedly the concrete returns of 
this system in every respective Third World country. 
The conclusion can be drawn, from the contents of this Chapter, that a 
highly significant relationship exists between the level of comprehen- 
siveness, sophistication, and effectiveness of any nation's R&D 
system, on the one hand, and the level of packaging attached, to technology- 
acquisition transactions, on the other. It is reasonable to expect those 
nations who possess more effectual R&D systems to be better able to 
exercise a high degree of discretion in matters relating to technology 
purchase and/or development. Potent grounds exist for supposing that 
whenever R&D efforts are more effectual in terms of much-needed and 
applicable results, decisions pertaining to methods of transfer and types 
of technology acquired would be more soundly made. That is to say, 
an RED system that is well-designed, well-run, and well-linked with 
other institutions opens the way for unpackaging foreign technology 
transfers into the country as far as feasible, in addition to 
facilitating the choice of, appropriate technologies, speedy assimilation 
of imported know-how, and the=constant generation of fruitful technological 
knowledge. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
Industrialists, economists, and political leaders in the Third World 
have for some time been'sensing the need for sound and well-balanced 
industrial development, despite the noticeable diversity in circumstances 
prevailing in different countries. Increasing attention has, in 
consequence, been directly focused on the problem of technology transfer. 
Many observers and practitioners in the field of Third World development, 
have expressed the view that unrestricted inflow of technology can cause 
serious social and economic problems which may be aggravated with the 
passage of time. 
This Chapter looks at the reasons that have been put forward to justify 
State intervention in the process of technology transfer, the different 
aspects of the State's role in this respect, and pertinent strategies 
and policies. In addition, an account is'given of relevant legislation 
and regulative provisions in a group of countries as well as the part 
played by international aid. 
An important, point tobe kept in mind is that Third World developing 
nations constitute a highly varied conglomeration. Not only do these 
nations exhibit-major variations among themselves, but significant 
differences are frequently observable within the boundaries of the 
same country. The variations among these nations extend to almost every 
aspect of the socio-economic setting, including population density, 
average per capita income, possession of natural resources, educational 
standards, technical capability, as well as the nature of the political 
system and prevalent ideology. It is, therefore, necessary to draw up 
technological legislation, devise policies, and design institutions in 
relation to current conditions in each country. On this basis, the 
most that can be done in general terms is to suggest a broad framework 
for technological legislation, policy, and institutionalization. 
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5.1 The Case for State Intervention 
Streeten has pointed out that the problem of technology transfer can be 
expressed primarily in terms of two gaps besieging the less developed 
nations, that is, "communication" gap and "suitability" gap. The 
"communication gap" refers to the phenomenon whereby "existing knowledge 
is only partly or imperfectly communicated". 
2 As for the "suitability 
gap", this is defined as "a gap in 'the development of the appropriate 
technology and of the resources devoted to the discovery of such a 
technology. "3 
The common source of these two gaps seems to be the characteristic lack 
of scientific/technological ability that is so very obvious in the less 
developed countries. This situation has given birth to the prescribed 
role that government is required to play within these countries. Indeed, 
the need for some regulation over the technology intake of Third World 
nations is a relatively popular view amongst many informed observers 
on developing world affairs. In reviewing the Brandt Report on North- 
South co-operation, S Lall expresses his full support for the contention 
that the'North ought to negotiate "fair contracts" with the South. 
4 
He points out that the justification given by the Brandt commission is 
well argued, namely "that 'when multinational corporations have at 
the outset made inequitable contracts with developing countries - 
particularly in minerals - the result has often been that the contracts 
have run into trouble ..... there is a close connection between the 
equity and stability of investments"'. 
5 
1P Streeten:. "Technology Gaps Between Rich and Poor Countries" 
Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Vol XIX No 3 (Nov 1972) 
p 217-8. 
2 Ibid., p 218 
3 Loc. Cit. 
4S Lall: "Brandt on 'Transnational Corporations Investment and the 
Sharing of Technology"' Third World Quarterly, 11 (October 1980) 
p 703. 
5 Loc. Cit. The quoted extract is from the "Report of the Independent 
Commission on International Development Issues" (Chaired by Willy 
Brandt) entitled "North-South: A Programme for Survival" 
London (Pan Books 1980) p 193. 
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5.1.1 Kaplinsky's Reasoning 
R Kaplinsky's viewpoint on this subject is that apart from historical 
considerations there exist significant factors calling for the inter- 
position of the State in the process of technology transfer. He cites 
four such reasons which have their respective impacts within the setting 
of Third World developing countries, these being 
(a) The surplus arising from the transfer may be a major source of 
taxable revenue which enables the State to operate, and finance, further 
innovations. 
(b) The foreign exchange arising from the transfer (as in the case of 
export-oriented foreign investment) may be a major source of scarce 
foreign exchange. Alternatively, the transfer itself may make demands 
on scarce foreign exchange resources and therefore be worthy of monitoring. 
(c) The absence of a national bourgeoisie - especially in economies 
which have only recently become independent, but also in socialist 
societies - may force the State to take an important entrepreneurial 
role. 
(d) The national bourgeoisie may pressure the State into conflict 
with the technology supplier, as it may require more "clout" if conflict 
is to be resolved in its favour. 
5.1.2 A Classification of Factors 
It is the researcher's view that when predominantly historical and 
political considerations are set aside, the basic argument for a State's 
role in technology transfer can be founded on three points. This 
reasoning is based on observea1 cases where technology has been sought 
and transfer attempted. The three main points in this regard are the 
following: 
6R Kaplinsky: "Accumulation and Transfer of Technology: Issues of 
Conflict and Mechanisms for the Exercise of Control" World Development, 
Vol 4, (March 1976) P 200-1. 
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w (a) Unsuitability of Technologies Transferred. 
Industrial technologies developed in advanced countries are often 
unsuitable for prevalent conditions in developing countries. This is 
largely a consequence of a basic difference in the mix of factor 
proportions between the two types of economies.? It has, therefore, been 
frequently noted that the importation of modern technology into relatively 
backward societies leads in practice to the creation of a "dual economy". 
DD Evans claims that "the dual society is characterized by a pronounced 
division between economic classes. The majority of principally rural 
citizens remain in-an income stratum that may be several times lower 
than the economic class of those employed in the foreign-technology 
based industry of the urban enclaves". 
8 Evans goes on to remark that 
in "modernizing economies, such as those of the Republic of Korea, 
Singapore, and Taiwan, governmental policy has deliberately led to a 
more equitable distribution. of. income. Such effects will not usually 
occur naturally in an industrializing economy and must be introduced by 
9 
governmental action". 
The likelihood of a more generally detrimental result of unguided 
technology intake is posed'by technology transfers effected by multi- 
national corporations, who are estimated to have been responsible for 
"approximately 80-90 per cent of'the technology transferred to the 
developing countries". 
10 
Commenting on these consequences, UNIDO is of 
the opinion that "the indiscriminate extension of the technologies and 
the productive systems employed by transnationals into the Third World 
has resulted in much destruction of traditional technologies as well 
as social problems. It has been clear that the development fostered 
by transnationals, especially those involved in consumer goods industries, 
is not always responsive to social needs, particularly those of the poor. 
7 For a discussion on the concept and criteria of "appropriate technology" 
see Section 3.3 above. 
8DD Evans: "Appropriate Technology and Its Role in Development" in 
D0 Evans and LN Ad ]e r(editors): "Appropriate Technology for 
Development: A Discussion and Case Histories" Boulder, Colorado 
(Westview Press 1979) p 29. 
9 Loc. Cit. 
10 UNIDO: "Technological Self-Reliance of the Developing Countries: 
Towards Operational Strategies" (Development and Transfer of Technology 
Series No 15) Vienna (UNIDO, 1981) P 5. 
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Because of their necessity to continually expand and grow, trans- 
nationals must have an increasing number of responsive buyers. Since 
their capacity to sell largely determines their profits, they must 
inevitably produce for, those who can afford rather than'those in 
need". 
11 
It is thus obvious that sound technology planning by the State entails 
and encompasses the practice of selecting suitable techniques for each 
proposed technology project. Such planning lays the foundations for 
the evolution of new techniques suited to that country's circumstances. 
Present choices have an impact on the availability of future funds for 
investment, and the ability to choose, utilize and assimilate future 
techniques depends on the country's pool of technical and managerial 
expertise which is built up largely on past experience in the selection 
and application of technology. 
(b) Overcoming Technological Dependence. 
It has frequently been observed that Third World enterprises often , 
seek technologies in "packages", thereby demanding simultaneously all, 
or most, of the constituent and associated elements of the technology 
their require. This has the consequence of under-utilizing local 
technological and associated skills, and may well lead to the inhibition 
of any effort to augment and intensify these skills. Discouragement 
and displacement of any viable R&D activity in industry might also ensue, 
as a result of over-reliance on technology-transferors in advanced 
countries. 
Third World enterprises are repeatedly prompted to enter into collaboration 
contracts with transferors in the developed world in a comprehensive 
fashion and on, a long term basis, in order to minimize business risks. 
These contracts take various forms, including total-project contracting, 
licensing, and joint ventures. While it may be advantageous for the 
local enterprise to rely on foreign technology suppliers in this manner, 
such dependence can be undesirable from a social viewpoint and might 
be detrimental in the long run. 
11 Loc. Cit. 
Certain contemporary practices by multi-national corporations are 
also considered by. some writers as providing further leverage to the 
case for effective State regulation. On the basis of a study of the 
role and practices of, Japanese multi-nationals,, F B Weinstein states 
that "because MNCs in certain important respects inhibit the process 
of building viable indigenous institutions and even contribute to the 
perpetuation of soft states, they may do more to impede than to 
stimulate development, at least in the softer Third World states". 
12 
Having studied the prevailing positions of many Japan-based MNCs and 
conducted interviews with national business executives and government 
officials, Weinstein states. that,. "MNCs provide a disincentive to 
make a serious effort to curb, corruption and. improve the performance 
of the bureaucracy. Since the principal asset of many local partners 
and government officials is, their ability to assist foreigners in 
handling local bureaucracy, a more efficient and less corrupt 
administrative structure would eliminate their main role". 
13 A major 
point that comes out clearly in Weinstein's article is that this 
situation has contributed materially to the continuation of a de facto 
condition where little, if any, realistic transfer of technology was 
taking place in the Southeast Asian countries which he studied 
(with 
the probable exception of Singapore). 
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On paper, the governments of these countries have introduced a number 
of measures designed to diffuse and enhance the benefits of technological 
know-how and professional skills possessed by foreign firms operating 
in those countries. These include provisions regarding local content of 
manufactured products, the proportion of native employees within the 
total enterprise workforce, the foreign-national mix in company equity, 
and incentives for the development of the most needy areas within the country. 
It Is Weinstein's contention, however, that the true value of these 
measures has been disappointingly small. Quite simply this is due to the 
perpetuation of the state of underdevelopment, resulting in no small 
measure from the particular interests, inclinations, and practices of 
foreign corporations. 
12 
13 
FB Weinstein: "Multinational Corporations and The Third World: The 
Case of Japan and Southeast Asia" International Organization, Vol 30, 
No 3, (1976), P 373. 
Ibid., P 398. 
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Among the specialist writers who have come out strongly for technological 
unpackaging Is S Lall. Commenting on the Brandt Report (viz. "North-South: 
A Programme for Survival"), he notes that the "need to 'unpackage' foreign 
Investment-is .... well argued. The development of local technological, 
managerial and other capabilities requires a strong stimulus from the 
government, and part of this stimulus Involves cutting off too easy an 
access to foreign technology and skills". 
14 He goes on to suggest 
that among'Third World developing countries,. India possesses the "most 
advancedwand, diversified indigenous (industrial) base". 
15 Lall makes 
this assertion on the supposition-that "the exports of technology by 
developing countries (in the form of turnkey industrial projects, 
engineering consultancy, direct investment and licensing) are taken as 
an index of their comparative technological development ..... India has 
managed to foster a tremendous 'learning' process in various industrial 
(particularly capital goods) sectors ... We may trace India's lead 
precisely to its policy of 'unpackaging' foreign investment and technology 
and simultaneously forcing the pace of local efforts to assimilate 
and develop technologies". 
16 
The crux of this argument is that it is preferable in many cases to 
use local technical capabilities to some degree - even if these are 
relatively crude and inefficient. It is thought that such a policy can 
be rationalized by the expected long-term benefits of enabling these 
services to flourish and gradually become more efficient. Reflecting 
on the Indian experience of fostering home-based technologies and related 
services, Lall remarks that there "have been significant costs, of course: 
in several areas Indian industry is uncompetitive and backward. But 
there also have been significant benefits, which show themselves in 
exports of technology and India's relative independence in generating 
local technology". 17 
The problem remains, however, of locating the appropriate watershed 
between long-term requirements, on the_ond hand, and medium/short-term 
needs and costs, on the other. 
14 S Lall. Op. Cit. P 703. 
15 Loc. Cit. 
16 Ibid., P 703-4. 
17 Ibid., P 704. 
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In essence the issue concerns the methodology. of evaluation. That is, 
each constituent factor in a'given situation needs tobe spelled out 
in 
detail and evaluated"on°the basis of common denominators. The object 
is to calculate the sum value of every possible alternative, where each 
of these represents a proposed mix of home-based and foreign elements 
in the overall technology package that is needed. If such a methodology 
could be devised, it would be possible to determine in the case of each 
proposed project (or industry for that matter) whether the supposed 
long-term advantages"of, indigenity will counterbalance short-run 
costs, and if so what is the optimum (or near-optimum) extent of this 
required indigenousness. It is possible that this type of analysis 
may give way to the fixation of trade-off points between long-term 
benefits and short-term expediencies in the case of each project under 
consideration. 
(c) Presence of Market Imperfections. 
It is widely believed that developing nations often enter into 
technology, transfer transactions under imperfect conditions, where the 
bargaining advantage is usually possessed by the technology supplier. 
The source of this imperfection is frequently the nature. of the 
technology market, where there is often a small number of sellers(or even 
one seller) for, each type of technology whereas the number of prospective 
buyers is normally quite large. 
It is a rare occurrence for the Third World technology buyer to possess 
a sufficient magnitude of technical knowledge to enable him to develop 
(or even acquire in a piecemeal fashion) the particular technology that 
he requires. In addition, these buyers are frequently hampered by 
various financial, legal, and commercial, weaknesses. Yoshio Ohara, a 
Japanese expert in thie field, remarks-that in "cases where there is a 
technological gap between parties to any International licensing agreement 
and cross-licensing is not expected, a foreign licensor tends to Impose 
unfair terms on a domestic licensee". 
18 
18 Yoshio Ohara: "Japanese Regulation of Technology Imports" Journal of 
World Trade Law, 15 (Jan-Feb 1981) P 84. 
120 
Another prominent researcher in this field, SJ Patel, takes up much 
the same stance as Ohara. It is Patel's. thesis that there exists 
real costs borne by Third World developing countries that are "not 
easily perceived". 
19 These are over and above. what may be termed as .. 
"direct and indirect" costs of technology transfers, which are much more 
susceptible to. calculation or estimation. These "not easily perceived" 
costs "result, from: - 
(i) Limitations imposed in transfer arrangements. 
(ii) The transfer of wrong or inappropriate technology. 
(iii) Inadequate or delayed transfer. 
(iv) The 'non-transfer' of technology. 
(v) The long-term influence of imported technology on deflecting 
national policies away from a sound development of local 
technological capabilities". 
20 
Many transferors in the developed world seem to aim at excessive levels 
of profitability, and attempt to protect their competitive positions by 
certain strategies and tactics. Ostensibly, these involve a process 
of prudent selection of the most rewarding technologies to transfer 
as well as choices relating to country, market, time and transferee. 
In addition, transferors usually endeavour to place certain restrictions 
on the technology buyer. This is often fulfilled via the insertion of 
various restrictive clauses in the technology transfer contract. 
Table 5.1 gives an example of the types of restrictive clauses imposed 
by technology suppliers. It is based on an analysis of 2200 technology 
transfer contracts proposed for registration in Mexico (out of 4244 
submitted for registration) 'during the period from 29th January 1973 
to 31st May 1975. The data is mentioned here owing to the relatively 
comprehensive coverage it presents in connection with the restrictive 
provisions referred to. 
19 SJ Patel: "The Technological Dependence of Developing Countries" The 
Journal of Modern African Studies, 12,1 (1974) P 12. 
20 Loc. Cit. 
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Table 5.1 
BREAKDOWN OF VIOLATIONS OF THE LAW ON TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER IN MEXICO 
BY 2200 PROPOSED CONTRACTS EXAMINED FOR REGISTRATION DURING THE PERIOD 
29th JANUARY 1973 to 31st MAY 1975. 
TYPES OF VIOLATION 
NUMBER OF SHARE OF 
CONTRACTS TOTAL (%) 
1) Involving technologies freely available in the 
country 5 0.23 
2) Payment not commensurate with the value of 
technology or constituting an excessive 
burden on the country's economy 494 22.5 
3) Interference with the management of the 
transferee enterprise 68 3.1 
4) Obliging transferee to grant back transferor 
patents,. trade marks, improvements, etc. 129 5.8 
5) Limiting transferee's R&D activity 103 4.7 
6) Obligation to acquire, from transferor 
equipment, parts, raw materials, etc 67 3.1 
7) Restricting exports, contrary to Mexico's 
interests: 
a) Total prohibition of exports 105 
4.8 
b) Restrictions on geographical areas 31 1.4 
8) Prohibiting the use of complementary 
technologies 20 0.9 
9) Obligation to sell licensed products to 
the supplier company only 6 0.3 
10) Calling for permanent employment of personnel 
appointed by transferor 4 0.2 
11) Limiting production volume or imposing 
sales prices on licensed products 210 9.6 
12) Obligating recipient parties to sign 
exclusive sales contracts with transferor 7 0.3 
13) Establishing excessively long-terms of 
duration of contracts. 261 11.9 
a) Obligatory period exceeding 10 years 105 4.8 
b) Excessive period under 10 years 33 1.5 
c) Obligations to transferee exceeding 10 yrs 123 5.6 
14) Calling for contract disputes to be submitted 
to the jurisdiction of foreign tribunals 124 5.7 
Source: UNIDO, "Development and Transfer of Technology Series No l: 
National Approaches to the Acquisition of Technology" 
(United Nations, New York 1977) P 45. 
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5.2 Aspects of the State's Role in Technology Transfer 
Despite the existence of wide-ranging differences among Third World 
developing countries, it is both necessary and desirable to consider 
the various aspects of the State's role in technology intake. Certain 
basic elements of this role are more or less common to most developing 
countries, whereas others are more specific to a given group of 
countries. 
Very broadly, six interrelated areas of possible governmental action 
may be cited, thus:. 
(a) Provision of Records. 
One of the undisputed facts of present-day governmental administration 
is the requirement for accurate, up-to-date, and comprehensive records. 
With the advent of technology transfer as one of the principal concerns 
of government policy and action the need for records has become self- 
evident. Hence it has been widely accepted that the availability of 
complete and accurate records covering technology transfer contracts is 
an important pre-requisite for policy-setting and official regulation. 
Such records are beneficial for statistical purposes as well as, for 
purposes of analytical research and decision-making in other areas, such 
as exchange control, budgeting, and planning. 
(b) Elimination of Unfair Clauses. 
A major source of concern for many Third World governments has been the 
insertion of what they consider as "unfair" or "inequitable" provisions 
in agreements purporting to transfer technologies to their countries. It 
is claimed that such provisions can be detrimental to the national 
interests of those developing countries. Above all else, the perceived 
detriment may be deemed to outweigh the gross benefits derived from 
those contracts. Alternatively (or in addition) some stipulations 
may be significantly harmful to the interests of the national party 
signing the contract, especially when. the matter is viewed on a medium/ 
long term basis. 
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(c) Identification of Other Opportunities. 
A notice of registration of a contract prior to its endorsement opens the 
way for identify'] 'other opportunities for supplying the same, or 
similar, technology on more"favourable terms. Due to imperfect knowledge 
on the part of prospective transferees, other possible avenues for 
purchasing the technology may initially be overlooked. It has certainly 
been asserted in some instances that the required technology sought by 
the recipient party was available within the developing country itself, 
or alternatively could be procured from other potential sellers who 
attach to their'transactions a more favourable set of terms and conditions. 
(See Table 5.1 above). 
Certain underlying factors seem to be apparent at present, with the 
resultant effect of raising the degree of imperfection in the technology 
supply market. These include the growth of governmental bilateral and 
regional agreements, the rise of some developing countries as exporters 
of certain technologies, and the variances among technology suppliers 
as to capabilities, terms and conditions. 
(d) Rejection of Unacceptable Contracts. 
It may be`argued that governments ought to'have'the power to refuse 
the registration of contracts which äre envisaged to be unacceptable 
on grounds of national policy and/or security. Where this argument is 
conceded, it becomes'imperative for prospective contracts to be submitted 
to the relevant government department for appraisal. 
(e) Project Screening. 
It may be pointed out that many developing-country projects have proved 
to be unsuccessful, or at least less successful than had previously 
been estimated. For instance, Third World, countries are seldom thought 
to be well-suited as a testing ground,. for new products or processes. 
Hence, the establishment of, a new project involving a process. that . 
is 
only in the early stages of development entails substantial risks. 
21 
21 It is generally thought that the last 20% of the sequence of R&D 
activity is normally the most difficult and risky, so that it is 
necessary for developing countries to select those technologies which 
have been commercially proven. 
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Moreover, it is imperative to check the viabil ity of the proposed project 
regarding technical and financial matters to ensure its capability to 
make proper use of (and adapt and develop, if required) the technology 
in question. In fact, a comprehensive check may need to be undertaken 
concerning the general feasibility of the proposed project, including 
its commercial profitability. It is, thus, essential to secure the 
availability of raw materials, intermediaries, components, as well as 
qualified personnel and adequate financial resources. 
(f) Development of Indigenous Technology. 
Not least in importance is the vital part that is required of the State 
to play in encouraging, protecting, and sponsoring local technological 
effort. The inflow-of-, foreign technology needs to be conditioned, both 
qualitatively and quantitatively, on-the basis of fundamental technology 
planning. Consideration of home-based technological provision ought 
to occupy a position of paramount importance-within the. general framework 
of technological planning. 
5.3 Relevant Strategies and Policies 
Owing to transparent differences in the circumstances of the various 
countries in the Third World, a broad strategy that, may be ideal for one 
Third World developing country may be quite unsuitable or even detrimental 
to another. National strategies and policy measures have to be spelled 
out in the case of each country on the basis of its unique circumstances. 
For instance, a national strategy that is suitable to a large, industrial- 
izing, and well populated country, may need to be different from that of 
a small and unindustrialized nation. 
S Lall makes a strong case for small nationsýto pursue "'open door' policies 
towards foreign investors in order to promote their industrial and export 
development". 22 He cites Singapore as a case in point, maintaining that 
"nearly 90 per cent of its exports originate in enterprises owned or 
controlled by foreigners. Despite its relatively high wage costs (it is 
the richest country in East Asia after Japan) it has managed to attract 
22 S Lall, Op. Cit., P 704. 
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and retain TNC (le Trans-National Corporations) investments; it has 
even induced them to upgrade the skill content of their activities 
there and to move out the-simplest kind of offshore processing activities". 
23 
Lall adds that Singapore is not alone. A number of 'other countries 
are attempting to follow an export-led, TNC-dependent development 
strategy. Some are more successful than others, depending on their 
infrastructure, geographical location, skill levels, wages and, most 
important of all, political and economic stability. ' A number of large 
countries are managing to combine both import-substituting and export- 
promoting strategies by marking out certain locations for free-trade 
zones where TNCs can operate at will". 
24 
It is, 'however, necessary to make it plain that some experts in this 
field have their doubts over Lall's recommendation for an 'open door' 
policy in the case of certain Third World countries. The objections of 
this group of writers are based on their conceived notion of the inherent 
weaknesses of Third World nations in the present global setting, 
particularly with regard to the role and-practices of multi national 
corporations. 
Franklin Weinstein contends that the Third World's "lack of information 
about opportunities and techniques is a small part of the burden which 
underdevelopment imposes on-poor countries in their dealings with MNCs". 
25 
After describing those countries which tend to operate an 'open door' 
policy and impose little regulation on multi-national companies as 
'soft states', Weinstein goes on to press the point that "a basic problem 
resides in the softness of underdeveloped states, which renders 
ineffectual regulations intended to control MNCs. Because MNCs in 
certain important respects inhibit the process of building viable 
indigenous institutions and even contribute to the perpetuation of soft 
states, they may do more to impede than to stimulate development, at 
26 least in the softer Third World states". 
23 Loc. Cit. 
24 Loc. Cit. 
25 F6 Weinstein, Op. Cit. P373. 
26 Loc. Cit. 
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Socialist countries of East Asia have for many years been actively 
following policies to block, or at least severely curtail, the scope 
for foreign investment. ' This group of countries includes China, North 
Korea, Mongolia, Vietnam (previously North Vietnam) as well as Kampuchea 
and Laos. 
27 A prime objective of the political leaders in these countries 
has been the promotion of "national capabilities for scientific and 
technological development", 
28 
notably in the case of China, North 
Korea and North Vietnam. 
There is another set of countries where Increasing attention has been 
paid to development and planning, though these countries exhibit a 
myriad of varying socio-political systems. They comprise countries 
like India, Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Sudan, Libya, Algeria, Iran, Guinea 
and Cuba. It is apparent that the State in these countries has 
purported to strengthen the machinery for national planning, exercise 
a high level of control over-the dispensation of foreign currency and 
the importation of goods and services, as well as the drastic limitation 
of the area within which external enterprises are allowed to operate 
in the country. In addition, some active steps have been taken in these 
countries "towards 'unpackaging' foreign investments and the transfer of 
29 
technology". 
Patel suggests that Third World developing countries which possess a 
relatively developed and institutionalized planning machine, coupled with 
requisite provisions for controlling foreign technology and/or capital, 
account for some 80 per cent of the population of the Third World; their 
share of the industrial output is even greater - around 95 per cent of 
the total. Thus they constitute not only the dominant practice at 
present, but the foretaste of what other developing countries will 
undoubtedly do in the not-too-distant future". 
30 
On the basis of the general strategy adopted by the country's government, 
derivative policies need to be formulated and implemented. 
27 In recent years, China has been pursuing a more liberal policy towards 
foreign investment in general, and technology transfer in particular. 
28 SJ Patel, Op. Cit. P 16. 
29 Loc. Cit. 
30 Loc. Cit. 
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In this respect, a diversity of policy measures have been introduced 
by Third World governments with the intention of enhancing the process 
of gradual absorption of foreign technology. Other policies and 
actions have been adopted in order to reduce the outflow of scarce hard 
currency, provide for a degree of national control over technology- 
importing enterprises, and the utilization of native technical know-how 
and services. 
In this connection, the State has been called upon to take an active 
part in encouraging/fostering the establishment and operation of technical 
research centres with the aim of generating and/or adapting industrial 
technology. It is thought that a major factor here is the very limited 
amount of worthwhile research effort that is carried out by private 
3 
establishments within those regions. 
1 
Three types of State action are proposed by UNCTAD in this regard, 
these being: 32 
(a) Creation of institutions and the provision of finance to assist 
the development of domestic technology. 
(b) Supporting the activities directed towards the adaptation and 
improvement of imported technology. 
(c) Formulation of a science and technology policy "which is made 
known to both prospective foreign suppliers of technology and 
prospective domestic innovators. The science and technology policy 
must be integrated into the general framework of development 
planning, which is scarcely the practice at present'. '. 
33 
31 UNCTAD: "Major Issues Arising From the Transfer of Technology to 
Developing Countries" New York (United Nations, 1975) P 37. 
32 Loc. Cit., 
33 Loc. Cit. 
128 
5.4 State Legislation and Regulation of Technology Transfer 
Since the Second World War developing countries have made various 
attempts to deal with problems associated with the importation of foreign 
technology and/or capital. As Patel points out in his paper, these 
endeavours have been illustrated through "the adoption of special 
laws, regulations, executive policies, administrative directives, 
general guidelines, and so on. These actions have often covered a wide 
field, including industrial property (specifically patent) laws, 
regulations dealing with foreign investment, foreign exchange, import 
controls, and the implementation of development plans. Understandably 
this mosaic of regulatory provisions and the machinery for their 
administration have not always proved very successful. Most of these 
measures have been taken on an ad hoc basis. Their implementation is 
usually handed over to separate ministries and agencies, which frequently 
operate in a spirit of total non-communication with each other". 
34 
In order to show the'main streams of opinion in this field, light will 
now be shed on attempts at official regulation in selected developing 
countries. In the main, these countries are in Asia and Latin America. 
As regards Africa, very little legislation and regulation seem to have 
been attempted, despite the existence of certain exceptions notably 
those of Egypt, Algeria and Guinea. A somewhat detailed account is 
given in the case of Mexico and India (in view of the relative 
sophistication of these two countries in this respect), whereas a 
brief and general exposition is given for a further group of eleven 
countries. 
5.4.1 Mexico 
In 1972, "the Law on the Registration of the Transfer of Technology and 
the Use and Exploitation of Patents and Trade Marks was enacted in Mexico. 
35 
34 SJ Patel, Op. Cit. P14 
35 UNIDO: "National- Approaches to the Acquisition of Technology" New 
York (United Nations, 1977) P 31-2. 
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This law established a National Registry of. Technology Transfer with 
the power to evaluate and-vet contractual transactions relating to 
technology transfer involving Mexican establishments. Amongst Third 
World developing countries, the approach adopted by Mexico is one of 
the most comprehensive and significant. It is also designed to suit 
the particular circumstances of that country as regards its stage of 
development, endowments of natural resources, its geographical location 
as well as its socio-political system. 
It is on this basis that the Mexican experience in dealing, with the inflow 
of foreign technology deserves some study. The provisions of the Law on 
the Registration of the Transfer of Technology referred to above furnish 
the required principles for assessing proposed contracts for the 
acquisition of technology and final adjudication in cases where this 
is necessary. The main relevant items in the Mexican Law pertaining 
to the evaluation of technology contracts set out the three following 
criteria: 
36 
(1) Effects on the position of the balance of payments. 
(2) Effects on the pattern and size of employment. 
(3) The harnessing of national technological capabilities. 
Article 7 of the above-mentioned Law contains 14 clauses dealing with 
restrictive practices that must be, eliminated from contracts before 
they can be registered. The most important provisions of this Article 
are the following: 
37 
(1) The prohibition of a contract that sets an excessive price for the 
technology supplied, or impose a, heavy burden on the Mexican economy. 
A careful techno-economic evaluation of the clauses contained in each 
contract is undertaken by the Registration department. 
(2) Stipulations in contracts imposing minimum royalty payments on the 
licensee are not permitted, save in exceptional circumstances. 
36 Loc. Cit. 
37 Ibid., Pp 33-44. 
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(3) Contractual provisionsIlimiting the field of use`of a patent in 
an unjustified manner cannot be accepted. 
(4) When the object of the contract covers technical know-how that 
the licensee could assimilate directly (such as formulations, drawings, 
and specifications) payments on a continuous basis are not acceptable 
in principle. 
(5) Regarding the know-how incorporated in drawings, formulae, 
operations and specifications, no limitations are normally permitted, 
other than those concerning confidentiality. 
(6) In the case of non-patented know-how, no restrictions on the 
transferee are allowed at'the end of the contract. 
(7) in cases where the transferor undertakes to supply the basic 
engineering and process technology, he must guarantee both effective 
normal plant capacity and product quality. 
(8) Where there exist provisions in the contract for continuing 
technical assistance, there must be clear definitions of such services 
to be rendered by the technology supplier and the payments for them, the 
time span in furnishing the pre-operational services, and the technical 
capability of the technology buyer. 
(9) if managerial services'are offered to the transferee, these must 
be well determined, the relevant responsibilities of the foreign 
party should be clear, and the payments therefore should be commensurate 
with the expected benefits of the recipient party. Under these 
circumstances, the transferor needs to provide training for the recipient's 
staff, so as to enable them gradually to assume the relevant functions. 
(10) A clause in the agreement allowing the transferor to regulate the 
transferee or to interfere in his managerial decisions is forbidden. 
(11) No contract can be registered if it obliges the transferee to 
grant back to the supplier the patents, trade marks, innovations, or 
improvements he has made under the contract. 
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(12) Clauses that limit or discourage RSD activity on the part of the 
transferee are not acceptable. 
(13) No obligation can be borne by the recipient party to purchase 
equipment, tools, parts, or raw materials from a particular supplier. 
(14) Any restriction on the national party concerning the export of 
goods or services in a way that violates the national interest 
is 
prohibited. 
(15) No provision can be made excluding the use of complementary 
technology. 
(16) Contracts which require the transferee to sell his goods only to 
the transferor cannot be registered. 
(17) No obligation can be accepted by the national party to employ 
permanently personnel chosen by the other party. 
(18) Contracts may not contain provisions limiting output or imposing 
sale or resale prices of goods by the transferee. 
(19) Contracts which oblige the national party to enter an exclusive 
sales or representation contract with the transferor are forbidden. 
(20) Long terms of enforcement are not admissable. Ten years is normally 
considered a long enough period. 
(21) No provisions are allowed in the contracts that call for disputes 
to be submitted to the jurisdiction of foreign courts. 
(22) The Law provides that violations of certain clauses may be permitted 
by the Registrar if he is convinced that the contract is of special 
interest to the country. 
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During the initial two years when the above Law was put into effect 
(29th January 1973 to 31st May 1975), 4244 contracts were submitted 
for registration. Of these 2200 were examined from the legal, economic 
and technical points of view, so much so that 1600 were finally approved 
38 
for registration whereas 600 were rejected. 
An important number of the contracts which were originally rejected 
by the Registry had been revised. Renegotiations of contracts had 
taken place, and the Registry participated in the revision of many 
contracts at three stages: 
39 
(1) Before the contracts had been officially submitted. 
(2) After submission, but before a final decision had been reached. 
(3) After a contract had been denied registration. 
5.4.2. India 
In 1951, the Industries (Development and Regulations) Act was passed 
which subjected the importation of technology to considerable government 
regulation. 
40 The Indian experience in this sphere ranks as one of the 
earliest and most significant in the Third World, and will, therefore, 
be given some prominence in the current exposition. 
In 1968 the Indian government published guidelines to assist industrialists 
in this regard, aiming primarily to limit the inflow of technology to 
purely essential cases while simultaneously motivating and harnessing 
home-based technology and associative technical know-how. 
Amongst the most significant of the official guidelines referred to are 
the following: 41 
The specification of certain industries where no foreign collaboration 
would be permitted. Ostensibly, these industries were deemed to possess 
the requisite ingredients for technological self-reliance. Accordingly 
it was thought correct and proper to cut them off from foreign technology. 
38 Ibid., P 44-45 
39 Ibid., P 46 
40 Ibid., P 47 
41 Ibid., P 47-8 
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(2) Certain industries were chosen where only technical collaboration 
would be considered. 
(3) A number of other industries were chosen where financial as well 
as technical collaboration would be considered. 
(4) The normal maximum duration of licence agreements is five years. 
(5) Foreign trade marks are not to be used for sales in India. 
(6) Clauses that provide for minimum royalty payments will not be 
permitted. 
(7) Royalty payments will be based on the value 
of production ex-works 
minus value of imported components, and will be subject to tax. 
(8) Clauses in agreements prohibiting the national party from exporting 
will not be accepted, save in certain exceptional circumstances. 
(9) Provision needs to be made for sub-licensing know-how to other 
Indian enterprises on terms that are mutually agreeable to the parties 
concerned. 
(10) Exemptions can be made for projects envisaging substantial exports. 
(11) The government encourages the inclusion of a suitable "favoured 
licensee" clause in the agreement. This term is commonly understood 
to mean that the licensee is entitled to the best terms that had ever 
been granted, or shall be granted, by the licensor to any other party 
in the world. 
(12) The purchase of engineering designing and consultancy services 
should be confined to registered Indian establishments, except for 
services which are not so available. 
(13) Proposals for the purchase of foreign technology must be accompanied 
by proposals regarding the programme of further development and improvement 
of technology in the relevant field. 
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(14) It is desirable that approved/registered Indian engineering design 
and consultancy organizations should be associated right from the start 
in any evlauation, selection, or negotiation conducted for the purchase 
of technology. 
(15) It is desirable that inquiries to foreign parties should be made 
on the basis of separate quotations for technology, on the one 
hand, and 
design/consultancy services, on the other hand, always on the proviso 
that such technology and/or services are not already available in India. 
The Indian government adopts a selective approach to the inflow of 
foreign technology. Inward flow of technology is not usually permitted 
to non-essential or non-priority sectors, except when there Is a strong 
prospect of high levels of exports. The Foreign Investment Board is 
headed by the Secretary of the Department of Economic Affairs and 
includes top officials of the Ministries of Industrial Development, 
Company Affairs and Production, Director General of Technical Development, 
the Department of Science and Technology, Council of Science and 
Industrial Research, and the Planning Commission. 
42 
In addition, there is an autonomous institution, financed by the 
government, called the "Indian Investment Centre", which provides 
information and assistance to entrepreneurs in-the course of obtaining 
technology from abroad. 
It is noteworthy that State regulation, of'technology transfer in India 
has resulted in certain significant consequences that can be summarized 
in the following points: 
43 
(1) Prospective transferees have been strengthened in their bargaining 
position vis-a-vis foreign technology suppliers. 
(2) Clauses in technology contracts that are restrictive have been 
largely avoided. 
(3) Transferees have been highly encouraged to assimilate new technologies 
due to the normal 5-year limitation imposed on contracts involving 
foreign collaboration. 
42 Ibid., P47-51 
43 Ibid., P48-51. 
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(4) The check on the level of running royalties has often resulted 
in high initial lump-sum payments. 
(5) A low percentage of the approved technology contracts are extended 
after the initial period, as such extensions are not encouraged. 
These extensions are allowed only when the Indian party has not had 
enough time to assimilate the relevant technology. 
5.4.3 Other Selected Countries 
Only two major developing countries have so far been included in this 
survey of legislation, policies, and regulations relating to technology 
transfer transactions in the Third World. Numerous otherScountries 
have introduced a myriad of measures touching upon this subject. 
While most developing countries had introduced some type of procedure 
for dealing with incoming foreign capital and/or know-how, a notably 
large number of these nations have since the beginning of the 1960's 
up-dated their regulatory provisions and come up with certain novel 
stipulations and mechanisms of control. In fact, most Third World 
developing countries do have at the present time some sort of government 
policy and regulation, albeit something very brief and rather vague in 
many cases. 
It is possible here to identify six forms in which relevant State action 
may occur. These aspects vary in their generality, and may co-exist 
more or less jointly within the boundaries of any one country. As to 
the nature of these measures, the following brief list is intended to 
expound each of them: 
(1) General Scrutiny. 
In the case of some countries, transactions involving the importation 
of technology to the country need to be assessed for the sake of determining 
their contribution to the country's development, in general, and also to 
the particular industry for which the technology is intended. It is 
necessary for this evaluation to be based on the general socio-economic 
background of the nation concerned as well as the particular circumstances 
relating to the industry, the technology, and the provisions of the 
proposed deal. 
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(2) Financial Control. 
A prime purpose of this type of control is to ensure compliance with 
currency and exchange regulations. It is also the case in many 
instances that the relevant government department requires the necessary 
information in order to enforce the State's fiscal policy particularly 
as regards taxation. 
(3) Restraint on Restrictive Clauses. 
The governments of most Third World nations take the view that contractual 
provisions restricting the national party ought to be eliminated from 
technology-importing transactions. They usually visualize only a 
severely limited scope for allowing these stipulations in situations 
where they are deemed to be absolutely essential. 
(4) Enhancement of "Knock-on" Effects. 
One of the possible intentions of State legislation and regulation has 
been to augment the beneficial impact of imported technology and/or 
capital. Effort is often exerted by the State in the direction of 
increasing the country's exports, reducing unemployment, the utilization 
of indigenous natural resources and up-grading the level of expertise 
possessed by nationals of the country. 
(5) Clarification of Transferor's Obligations. 
Pressure by the government is often brought to bear on the foreign party 
to give certain relevant undertakings. Guidelines and regulations 
occasionally stipulate that the transferor ought, wherever practicable 
and relevant, guarantee product quality and protect the national party 
against third party claims and infringement. 
(6) Other Stipulations. 
Various other stipulations are sometimes included in State legislation 
and/or regulations. It is often the case that any contractual items 
granting jurisdiction to foreign courts are considered unacceptable. 
Mr 7 
In some countries trade mark contracts are ruled out save in very 
exceptional circumstances, whereas in several instances some rather 
rigid conditions have been laid down pertaining to the duration of 
licensing contracts or the level of royalty payments made by the 
national party. 
Table 5.2 presents a summary of various enactments and regulatory 
provisions that have been introduced by a selected group of developing 
countries in the Third World. While this table is by no means exhaustive, 
it purports to indicate the general lines of thinking in the Third World 
especially in the case of the more industrializing nations. 
5.5 International Aid and Technology Transfer 
The phenomenon of "aid" has become one of the most notable features of the 
present international scene. Representing an annual sum of some $25 to 
$35 billion in recent years, aid has become a sensitive and major issue in 
international politics. 44 In this regard, Third World governments can 
adopt various policies and actions in order to secure aid and utilize 
it for the purpose of technology acquisition. Due to the existence of a 
variety of sources of aid, it is imperative for the government of any 
aid-seeking nation to approach the appropriate source for each project/need, 
at the right time, for the right amount. 
As the vast majority of assistance Is channelled through State agencies in 
recipient countries, official policies and actions are profoundly significant 
in shaping the contribution of international aid to technological advancement 
in developing regions. In the case of certain world/multinational institutions 
(eg IMF), the size of each country's contribution (ie quota) to the 
institution's central fund influences the amount of assistance that the 
respective country can obtain from that source. Also, the nature and 
strength of the political relationship between a developing country and the 
respective donor country is bound to affect the flow of aid from the latter 
to the former. Moreover, it is often possible for the aid-receiving country 
to exercise some discretion in determining the proportion of technology- 
related aid within the overall aid package offered by a given donor 
government/organ. 
44 The level of aid noted here represents the amount of official assistance 
rendered by developed market-economy countries, thus excluding aid provided 
by the Soviet bloc. See Table 5.3 below. 
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This Section will consequently discuss the various sources of aid available 
to developing countries, and indicate the mjaor factors to be considered 
by a Third World government when attempting to secure assistance. 
5.5.1 Nature and Volume of Aid 
Little and Clifford define, "aid" as the "value of, the subsidy implicit 
in the total flow of resources". This would include grants of convertible 
. currency, but "loans contain only an element of aid" 
45 
Elsewhere, these two authors refer to the somewhat different concept of 
"total real aid" which they define, as "the real cost of all actions. by 
governments and individuals in rich countries that are intended to raise 
incomes in poor countries'. '. 
46 It is obvious that this new definition 
refers essentially to "economic aid". A broadly similar definition is 
provided by A Rix who points out. that foreign aid "involves a movement of 
resources from one country to another in a way designed to assist the 
latter's development". 47 
lt can thus be pointed out that "economic aid" refers to the practice of 
transferring human or material resources to any country on concessionary 
terms and in a manner that contributes towards the development process 
in that country. Thus, financial grants designated towards meeting the 
costs of new, projects would be-regarded as economic aid, and so would 
loans or credits made available on terms deemed as concessionary when 
compared with prevailing market terms. Moreover, aid can be in the form 
of the provision of manpower, of various skills or professional expertise, 
required by the host country if this Is done on specially favourable terms. 
a 
It is possible to distinguish between "technology-related" aid and "non- 
technology-related" aid. An essential feature of the first type is that it 
conveys technology to the recipient party, whether this is in the form of 
hardware, software, or human knowledge and expertise. For instance, a debt 
granted on concessionary terms and earmarked for the establishment of a 
specific industrial project embodying a given type of technology will fall 
within this group. So would a technical assistance agreement involving the 
training of the developing country's nationals in the field of industrial RED. 
45 IMD Little and JM Clifford: "International Aid" London (George Allen 
and Unwin 1965) P 13. 
46' Ibid., P 51. 
47 A Rix: "Japan's Economic Aid", London (Croom Helm Ltd, 1980) P 14. 
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I 
Various schemes exist, at the present time, involving the offer of 
technical know-how and/or the secondment of technical experts on specially 
favourable terms. Some of these schemes are administered by international 
bodies (eg the UN), while others are adopted by multi-lateral country 
groupings (eg the Commonwealth). Moreover, bilateral assistance agreements 
between two countries often contain provisions for the supply of technical 
know-how/patents/expert manpower to the less developed nation. Yet, 
taking account of the urgent need of many poor countries for technology, 
it is questionable whether the proportion of technology-related assistance 
to the grand total of aid is high enough. 
As regards non-technology-related aid, this is free of any technological 
content. Many examples of such technology-free aid can be cited, including 
the supply of grain at favourable terms, the offer of medical staff without 
charging the recipient country, the full cost, and special low interest loans 
designated to the construction of certain roads, bridges or dams. ' 
Table 5.3 sets out some data relating to the volume of aid provided by 
developed market-economy countries over the period 1970-80 inclusive. 
It is obvious from this table that the volume of official development 
assistance rose from $6712 m in 1970 to $26031 m in 1980, ie by 287.8%. 
While the overall rise in the volume of aid during this decade may appear 
impressive, the effect of inflation would have neutralized much of the 
increment in money terms. In addition, no information seems to exist 
on the precise contribution of this aid towards the acquisition of 
technology by recipient nations. 
It may, however, be hypothesised that the proportion of aid that has been 
devoted to the importation of technology is not sufficiently high. In 
large measure, this is probably due to the need for directing aid for the 
build-up of basic infrastructure, particularly in view of rapidly expanding 
population in those regions. A further complicating factor is the level of 
service payments on previous loans which are bound to absorb a certain 
proportion of the inflows of foreign exchange to those countries. 
Whatever may, be the factors that induce donors to justify their assistance, 
one fact is quite clear: there are at present many countries and organizations 
which provide aid to developing countries. Three main sources of aid can 
thus be identified, ie World bodies, multi-country institutions, and bilateral 
agreements at governmental level. 
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Table 5.3 
NET FINANCIAL OUTFLOWS FROM DEVELOPED MARKET ECONOMY COUNTRIES 
TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
TYPES OF 
ASSISTANCE. 
YEARS (FIGURES IN MILLIONS OF US $) 
1970 1975 1978 1979 1980 
% Rise 
1970-8 
(a) Official Development 6712 13580 19825 21966 26031 287.8 
Assistance 
1. Bilateral 5575 9802 12945 15460 16881 202.8 
2. To Multi-lateral 
Institutions 1137 3778 '6880 6506 9150 704.7 
(b) Other Official Flows 1111 3029 4572 2287 5303 377.3 
1. Bilateral 708 2825 4415 2531 5410 664.1 
2. To Multi-lateral 
Institutions 403 204 157 -244 -107 -126.6 
(c) Private Capital 6258 20617 40633 43262 35405 465.8 
1. Bilateral 5784 18064 38405 41176 33936 486.7 
I. Direct Investment 3249 9802 10062 11415 8234 153.4 
il. Portfolio Investmen t 
and Other 603 4416 19336 21195 14093 2237.1 
Ill. Guaranteed Private 
Export Credits 1932 3846 9006 8566 11609 500.9 
2. Multi-lateral 
Portfolio 
Investments 474 2553 2228 2086 1469 209.9 
TOTAL 14080 37227 65030 67515 66739 374.0 
Source: "UN Statistical Yearbook 1981", New York (United Nations, 1983) 
p 463. 
Notes to Table 5.3 
(1) This publication'defines "Official Development Assistance" as 
"that part of official flow ..... which 
is expressly intended for the 
economic and social development of developing countries, and which 
in its 
financial terms is concessional in character". A threshold of 25 per 
cent grant element applies to all commitments signed after 1 January 
1973. 
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(2) The "grant element" is calculated as the face value of a loan less the 
discounted cost to the recipient of the flow of future service payments. 
The discount rate used is 10 per cent. 
(3) The information on flows is provided on a "net" basis, ie amortisation 
payments of loans and repatriation of capital are deducted 
from gross flows 
to arrive at net flows. Also deducted are contributions 
by developing 
countries to the multi-lateral institutions. However, factor 
income 
payments (interest payments, profits, and the like) made 
by the developing 
countries are not deducted. Also, reverse flows of capital originating 
with residents of developing countries are not taken into account. 
r 
5.5.2 United Nations Aid 
The UN Charter states that the UN is to promote "higher standards of 
living, füll employment and conditions of economic and social progress 
and development". 
48 During the two decades following the establishment 
of the UN inr1945, the General Assembly passed a number of resolutions 
which laid the solid foundations for the Organization's wide-ranging concern 
for aid and development. By the 1970's the UN was catering for two types 
of assistance directed towards the economic and technological development 
of the Third World, ie technical assistance and financial aid. 
(a) UN Technical Assistance. 
Technical assistance in pursuit. of economic development may be rendered on 
the condition that a relevant request is made by the government of that 
country and provided that the respective government does as much work as 
possible in order to define the nature and scope of the problem. 
43 
48 Article 55 of the UN Charter. Cited in U Kirdar: "The Structure of United 
Nations Economic Aid to Underdeveloped Countries" The Hague, (Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1966) P9 (Footnote 1) 
49 Kirdar, Op. Cit., P 21. 
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Prior to the provision of such assistance, an agreement is drafted and 
signed setting out the obligations of each of the respective country and 
the UN. 
UN technical assistance can be classified into four types, thus: 
50 
(1) Specialist Advice. 
(2) Personnel Training, through training courses, fellowships, 
and scholarships for higher study. 
(3) Technical information, through demonstration and exhibitions 
(4) Equipment for instruction, demonstration and research. 
At present, the main thrust of the UN's technical assistance effort 
is 
channelled through the Un Development Programme 
(UNDP), which works 
closely with the governments of the aid-receiving countries. 
51 This body 
was formed in 1965 through a merger of the UN Special Fund and the UN 
Expanded Programme for Technical Assistance. 
52 Development projects to be 
sponsored are chosen by the government in question in consultation with 
the Programme. Due regard is given to the country's particular circumstances, 
as well as development strategies and policy guidelines as set out by each 
government. 
53 
About 60% of the total cost of UNDP -sponsored activities is furnished by 
the developing countries themselves through the provision of national 
personnel, buildings and facilities, and locally available supplies and 
services. 
54 The remaining 40% is financed by UNDP from its own resources 
and those of its sister organizations. 
55 Expenditures from both of these 
sources in 1980 came to over $1.5 billion, of which $677.6 million was 
provided by the UN through the Programme. 
56 
50 Ibid., P 18-19 
51 UN Development Programme: "The Overall Picture" An undated pamphlet 
issued by UNOP, P1 
52 Loc. Cit. 
53 Ibid., P4 
54 Ibid., P2 
55 Loc. Cit 
56 Loc. Cit. 
. -im:. 
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Over 90% of all UNDP-supported projects are implemented by the UN specialized 
agencies in co-operation with the relevant Third World governments. 57 The 
main UN agencies involved in this work are as follows: 
- UN Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) 
- Food and Agriculture Organization of-the UN (FAO) 
- UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) 
I 
- World Health Organization (WHO) 
- UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 
- International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) 
- UN Centre for Transnational Corporations (UNCTC) 
- Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) 
- Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) 
- International Labour Organization (ILO) 
(b) UN Financial Aid. 
While UNDP is the principal vehicle for grant funding, UN loans are made 
available mainly by the twin bodies of the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund. These two bodies were established in 1946 as a direct result 
of the Bretton Woods Conference of 1944. 
(1) The World Bank. 
At the present time, the Bank is composed of three institutions, these being 
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the 
International Finance Corporation (IFC), and the International Development 
Association (IDA). 
Loans by IBRD have, in the main, been granted to countries at more advanced 
stages of economic and social growth. The interest rate charged by the 
Bank "is calculated in accordance with a guideline related to Its cost 
of borrowing". 58 Bank loans "generally have a grace period of five years 
and repayable over 20 years or less". 59 The Bank's Charter stipulates 
that "it must lend only for productive purposes and must stimulate 
economic growth in the developing countries where it lends". 60 
57 Ibid., P5 
58 The World Bank: "Annual Report 1981" P3 
59 . Loc. Cit. 
60 Loc. Cit. 
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In 1981, total loan disbursement by IBRD came to $5063 million, involving 
61 
the approval of 140 operations in 50 countries. 
The first Article of the Charter establishing the IFC states that the aim 
of that Corporation is to "further economic development by encouraging 
the growth of productive private enterprise in member countries, particularly 
in the less developed areas62 This organization does not limit itself 
to making loans to venture projects, but also undertakes equity Investment. 
63 
Moreover; the IFC is charged with the responsibility of being a "clearing 
house" for investment opportunities, via the direction of foreign and 
domestic private capital and entrepreneurial`abilities'for the available 
productive possibilities in the developing areas. 
64 The Corporation does 
not seek host-state guarantees for its loans or investments, and its 
funds are essentially designated for the private sector provided that the 
project involves'the establishment, expansion or improvement of`a 
productive and profitable enterprise. 
65 The Corporation has, in practice, 
concentrated its investments within the industrial sector, including 
manufacturing, processing and mining. In 1981, gross investment by IFC 
to 
66 
talled'$811 milllen', covering 56 projects in 34 countries. 
The International Development Association came into being and began 
operating in 1960.67 The first of the Articles of Agreement which originated 
the IDA states that it is established "to promote economic development, 
increase productivity and thus raise standards of living in the less 
developed areas of the world included within the Association's membership, 
in particular by providing finance to meet their important developmental 
requirements on terms which are more flexible and bear less heavily on the 
balance of payments than those of conventional loans" 
68 IDA's assistance 
is mainly directed towards those countries with an annual per capita gross 
national product of less than $681 (in 1979 dollars). 
69 The terms of 
IDA credits, which are made to governments only, are 10 year grace periods, 
50 year maturities, and no interest. 
70 In 1981, IDA made credit 
disbursements to the tune of $1878 million for 106 approved projects in 
40 different countries. 
71 
61 Ibid., P 10 
62 Kirdar, Op. Cit. P 178 
63 Ibid., P 179 
64 Loc. Cit. 
65 Loc. Cit. 
66 IFC Annual Report 1981, P6 
67 U Kirdar, Op. Cit., P 261 
68 Loc. Cit. 
69 World Bank Annual Report 1981, P3 
70 Loc. Cit. 
71 Ibid., P 10 
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(2) International Monetary'Fund. 
Article (I) of the Agreement setting up the IMF makes it the primary 
purpose of this body to facilitate the development of productive resources 
of all its members.,, . 
The same Article also asserts that assistance, should 
be made available to overcome balance-of-payments problems. In pursuit 
of these aims, the Fund provides specialist advice to member States and 
offers financial assistance to them by selling them foreign currencies. 
This has frequently enabled developing countries to finance their 
purchases of foreign machinery, equipment, and materials. 
The exchange transactions conducted by the Fund have the ultimate effect 
of making these currency purchases "de facto" loans. This is due to the 
obligation borne by the purchasing country, under the rules of the Fund, 
to repurchase its currency that it had paid in lieu of the foreign currency 
it obtained. Thus, the Agreement insists that a country purchasing another 
member's currency for its own must, within, a specific period, purchase its 
currency by paying gold or some convertible currency. However, it is 
possible for this "repurchasing" stipulation tobe waived, wholly or 
partly, if another member country purchases-the first borrower's national 
currency that has been deposited with the Fund. 
5.5.3 Multilateral and Bilateral Aid 
As noted earlier, three main sources of aid exist in, the present world 
setting, ie, UN bodies,, multilateral organizations, and bilateral agreements. 
Having given a bird's-eye view of the nature of the first source, attention 
will now be directed to a brief discussion of the other two. 
(a) Multilateral, Aid 
Most multilateral bodies have some provision for assisting their member 
countries and/or other nations whom they consider to be in need. Hence, 
brief comments shall be made here regarding the role of certain multi- 
lateral bodies in rendering assistance. 
Under Article 131 of the Treaty of Rome, the non-European countries and 
territories which had special relations with member countries were brought 
into association with the EEC. The avowed purpose of this association was 
to promote the economic and social development of these countries and 
territories. On this basis, an EEC Development Fund was subsequently 
established in 1959, to which EEC members paid their contributions. 
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When OECD was established in 1960, one of its declared alms was the 
promotion of policies designed to contribute to sound economic expansion 
in non-member countries. In pursuit of this objective, the Development 
Assistance Committee was set up, charged with discussing methods of 
assistance to non-member developing nations and the effectiveness of 
such assistance. 
The British Commonwealth provides an interesting case of a multi-country 
grouping with a rather heterogeneous membership profile, where assistance 
is rendered by the more developed countries to the less developed ones. 
A modest programme of technical co-operation is operated by the Common- 
wealth through its Fund for Technical Co-operation which was set up in 
1971, with the UK and Canada providing the major sources of financial 
support. 
72 
The Commonwealth Fund referred to is comprised of three rather distinct 
programmes of assistance. The first is the "General Technical Assistance 
Programme", which "provides from within the Commonwealth the professional, 
technical, and managerial expertise requested by developing member countries 
to meet their specific manpower needs". 
73 Apart from the secondment of 
experts in various fields, this programme concerns itself with "projects 
leading to the identification and establishment of new industries". 
74 
The second scheme is that concerned with "education and training", where 
the focus is on training nationals. of the less developed member States/ 
territories. Such training is mostly carried out within the more developed 
countries which happen to be in the same broad geographical region. 
75 
The third scheme is called the "Export Market Development Programme"., 
Set up in 1972, this Programme is directed towards the improvement of 
export performance of member countries, especially the less developed ones. 
76 
Activities in this-area include the provision of technical assistance in 
such fields as packaging and labelling for export, export documentation, 
setting up export promotion institutions, standardization, and quality 
control. 
77 Moreover, market surveys are commissioned for products with 
export potential. 
78 
72 AG Tasker: "The Commonwealth Fund for Technical Co-operation: A Unique 
Mechanism for Mutual Assistance" Journal of the Royal Society of Arts, 
126 (Jan 1978) P 94-5 
73 Ibid., P 96 
74 Loc. Cit. 
75 Loc. Cit. 
76 Ibid., P 99 
77 Loc. Cit. 
78 Loc. Cit. 
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(b) Bilateral Aid 
f 
Bilateral agreements on governmental level have provided a significant 
vehicle for channelling aid to the Third World. Numerous such agreements 
exist at present, catering for a variety of requirements by the developing 
countries. Quite-frequently, bilateral agreements between developed and 
developing,, countries involve the secondment of experts, the advancement of 
concessionary loans, outright financial grants, subsidized provisions of 
foodstuffs and medicines, as well as the establishment of new industrial 
projects and the-supply of machinery and know-how on favourable terms. 
Brief remarks shall now be made regarding the evolution of institutions 
and policies dealing with aid in five major countries, ie, United States, 
Britain, West, Germany, Japan and the Soviet Union. 
(1) US Aid 
On the international scale, the annual aid programme of the USA is 
highly significant. This is due principally to the sheer size of 
this programme, since it represents an important proportion of 
total World aid to the developing regions. During the last war, 
the US Government began making advances to Latin American Countries 
for the purpose of establishing basic industries in order to stimulate 
development and substitute for importation. 
The years following the end of the war saw the USA becoming involved 
in high levels of spending for reconstruction and relief, mainly in 
Europe and Asia. As Little and Clifford point out, "since roughly 
the beginning of the Marshall Plan, the idea of aid for development 
of poor countries, as a logical extension of economic aid for the 
reconstruction of war-damaged economies, and military aid for meeting 
immediate danger to friendly countries, has taken root" in the USA. 
79 
In 1961, the Agency for International Development was set up, 
thereby consolidating non-military aid under one umbrella. 
(2) British Aid 
During the 1940's and 1950's, the British aid effort was mainly focused 
on the colonies. However, a measure of assistance was made available 
during the 1950's to newly independent States in the Commonwealth, 
79 Little and Clifford, Op. Cit., P 24 
150 
by the extension of funds provided to the Export Credit Guarantee 
Department. This extension covered loans to developing nations within 
the Commonwealth for the purchase'of capital goods (or the set up of 
new projects)'that participated in the'development process of those 
countries. The goods purchased were to be British and interest paid 
was charged at commercial rates. As British colonies had mostly 
gained independence from the"beginning of the 1950's onwards, it 
became necessary for British ties with these newly independent 
nations to be preserved. This gave way to the growth of British 
aid during the 1960's and 1970's. 
The Ministry of Overseas Development was established in 1964 in 
order to assume overall responsibility for aid and development 
matters. This Ministry was dissolved when the Conservative Party 
took office in 1970, but was re-established by Labour when returned 
in 1974. Following the change of government in 1979, the Ministry 
was replaced by an Overseas Development Administration as part of 
the Foreign and Commonwelath Office. The greater part of UK 
bilateral aid is tied to procurement in the'UK, and British 
contributions to multilateral institutions also enable British firms 
to compete for lucrative contracts. Apart from specific typing of 
aid to British goods, it is generally expected that the aid instrument 
fulfils a significant role in Britain's trade promotion efforts. 
(3) West German Aid 
During the. latter half of the 1950's, West Germany entered the league 
of Western donor States. A Ministry for Economic Co-operation was 
set up for the purpose of administering aid to other nations, 
and the amounts of aid granted expanded remarkably. It is noteworthy 
that the vast majority of German aid is granted bilaterally. More 
significantly, it seems that German aid policy is characterized by 
relative clarity. Little and'Clifford point out' that German aid 
is based on the premise that it "should promote indigenous private 
enterprise, ' and from this there stems rules such that grant aid 
is appropriate only'for technical assistance, that financial aid 
should be on a project'basis and used either for revenue-earning 
projects at commercial rates of interest'or for infrastructure 
investment at subsidized rates of interest". 
80 
80 Ibid., P 43 
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(4) Japanese Aid 
As in the case of West Germany, Japan became noticeably involved in 
aiding other nations during the second half of the 1950's. 
Japanese aid is essentially in the form of grants and credits, 
generally tied to Japanese goods and services. When Japan began 
offering aid to her neighbours in Asia, she was effectively passing 
through a phase of reconstruction and development. However, it may 
be argued that the initial and subsequent steps taken in this direction 
paved the way for the development of Japanese 'trade and political 
links with post-war Asia. 
81 A Rix expresses the view that those 
aid efforts encouraged "export of heavy plant and equipment and 
helped to assure stable supplies of resources and raw materials" so 
essential to the growing Japanese economy. 
82 
Since its inception, Japanese aid has been increasing steadily, 
while a number of institutions and state agencies have sprung up 
to deal with the problems of aid-giving. In 1974, the Japan Inter- 
national Co-operation Agency was established in order to manage 
Japan's technical aid programme and to undertake some development 
funding. Prior to that, the Asian Development Fund was set up in 
1957 but was soon to be replaced in 1960 by the Overseas Economic 
Co-operation Fund. This Fund provides development loans to overseas 
territories. Early in the 1950's the Export-Import Bank of Japan 
opened its doors in 1952 for the purpose of assisting exporters 
and encouraging private investment overseas. 
(5) Soviet Aid 
Up to the mid-1950's, Soviet economic aid was very limited. Such 
assistance as was provided had been "largely directed to the People's 
Republic of China, North Korea, and Outer Mongolia". 
83 Since then, 
the USSR has entered into economic co-operation agreements with a 
fairly large number of developing countries of the Third World. 
The execution of important industrial projects and other large-scale 
establishments isa dominant feature of Soviet economic aid to the 
Third World. Frequently, the relevant protocol enables the assistance- 
receiving country to obtain "soft" rouble loans for the purpose of 
purchasing Soviet equipment, ' machinery and materials. 
81 A Rix., Op. Cit., P 11 
82 Loc. Cit. 
83 Kirdar, Op. Cit., P 288 
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Also, Soviet technical assistance in the form of secondment of 
experts has been forthcoming as a result of official bilateral 
agreements. 
84 
5.6 Comments and Conclusions 
This Chapter began by considering 1the 
case for State; intervention in the 
process of technology-acquisition within the context of Third World 
countries. The researcher has suggested three, main. factors which may 
justify the intervention. of the State in this process, viz., unsuitability 
of technologies transferred, overcoming technological dependence, 
and the presence of market imperfections. Also, six interrelated areas 
of possible governmental action have been suggested in this connection. 
These pertain to the provision of records, elimination of unfair clauses, 
identification of other transfer opportunities, rejection of unacceptable 
contracts,. project screening, and development of indigenous technology. 
It has been shown that a number of basic issues arise during the process 
of formulating overall development strategy, and. derivative technology 
strategy, for any Third World nation. ý,. Among these issues are the problems 
of choice-between import-substitution or export-dependent industrialization, 
the restriction or, otherwise of the level of. packagi=ng accompanying the 
inflow oftechnology, and whether to single, out certain industrial 
sectors for special attention in the development effort. and provision of., 
technology. There is, moreover, the problem of whether to allow foreign 
firms to invest in the country, the channels through which, this Invest- 
ment may be conveyed, and the restrictions, if any, that are required 
on such investments. Each of these major problems needs a careful 
scrutiny, so that the appropriate decision can be taken by the top 
planning authorities in the respective country. 
It is noteworthy that the more industrializing nations in the Third World 
have generally. been those who have paid more attention to the intricacies 
of technology transference. Mexico, in Latin America, and India, in Asia, 
have the most far-reaching legislation and regulation in this sphere among 
the myriad practices and outlooks seen in developing regions. Other 
Latin American countries who have introduced measures to deal with the 
inflow of technology/capital include Argentina, Brazil, and the Andean 
countries. The more important Asian nations having similar provisions 
include Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Philippines and Thailand. 
84 B Caplan: "Soviet Economy: Trade and Aid for the Third World" The Banker, 
131 (July 1981) P 39 
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It is possible to remark here that different patterns of State orientation 
towards the problem of technology-transfer are discernible in the Third 
World. The three major aspects of this orientation problem relate to 
the attitude towards the role of foreign firms, technological research, 
and detailed government regulation of technology transfer contracts. 
The researcher is of the opinion that a truly integrated approach in 
this regard must endeavour to attack all three related segments. 
The procurement of external aid is bound to influence official decisions 
within all three major aspects of the State role mentioned above. It 
can thus be asserted that well-informed and appropriate government decisions 
regarding the use of various sources of aid may contribute noticeably 
towards the process of successful technology transfer as well as 
strengthening the country's technological profile. On this basis, a 
powerful case can be made for tapping all possible avenues for assistance 
with due regard to pre-determined development strategy, technology 
policy, and other relevant policies and circumstances. 
It needs to be conceded, however, that at best foreign aid can only 
alleviate the stringent limits faced by developing countries in their 
quest to industrialize and obtain new technology. With the exception of 
UN assistance, most bilateral or multi-country aid programmes are 
conditioned by political and/or trade considerations, so much so that 
something has to be given by the recipient in exchange for the concessions 
granted in its favour. It is possible, however, for astute Third World 
governments to make use of possible aid avenues to the obvious advantage 
of their nations' development and prosperity. While it can easily be 
recognized that this astuteness is hard to find, it is possible to envisage 
the appropriate elements of the right approach to the problem, thus: 
(a) Selection of projects to be executed during the coming period, 
and sequencing these in order of priority. 
(b) Determination of the technologies required for each of these 
respective projects, as well as the method of execution and desirable 
packaging level for every proposed project. 
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(c) Determination of the availability of material and human resources 
inside the country, and the shortfall that needs to be met through foreign 
assistance in order to execute these projects. 
(d) Approaching each aid-giving body/government with the most suitable 
project proposal, together with the necessary details such as feasibility 
studies, time schedules, guarantees, etc. 
It must be admitted straightway that these four major stages are very 
much intermingled with one another. That is to say, a number of decisions 
have to be taken at almost the same time. It is thus clear that optimal 
linking between project choice, design and execution, on the one hand, 
and aid tapping and procurement, on the other, can be a very complex task. 
The point has to be conceded, however, that Third World nations needing 
aid have to endeavour to achieve this linking to the best of their abilities 
and resources. 
PART II 
METHODS OF TECHNOLOGY 
TRANSFER 
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CHAPTER SIX 
4 '. 
LEVELS OF PACKAGING IN TRANSFER TRANSACTIONS 
This Chapter is concerned with the notion of "packaging" in transactions 
involving the transfer of technology, and the associated issue of 
categorizing technology transfer methods. The two topics are closely 
connected in the sense that any method that is employed for transmitting 
technology maybe fitted into a certain level of packaging. 
6.1 Categorization of Transfer Methods 
Various means exist for the conveyance of practical technological know- 
how from the industrialized nations to developing Third World regions. 
While these means may be employed singly or jointly depending on the 
precise circumstances of each separate-case, the search for the appropriate 
mean(s) has to be made within'a group of methods that are potentially 
available for that particular case. Consequently, whenever a transfer of 
technology is contemplated, only some of the multitude of possible methods` 
can be seriously considered in that particular situation. 
Straube categorizes possible transfer methods into two principal groupings. 
l 
He describes the first group as the "open-gallery" type, where the 
required technology is supplied "free or at minimal cost". 
Z On the 
other hand, he refers to the second group as the "closed-gallery" type, 
in which case the technology is paid for rather heavily. 
3 
These two classes of methods correspond, albeit in a very broad sense, to 
the basic classification of technology-transfer mechanisms into "unpackaged" 
and "packaged" types. An essential feature of the methods comprising the 
first category is their relative cheapness. In addition, these methods 
are characterized by their crucial requirement for concentrated effort 
on the part of the recipient in the transfer process. 
1W Straube: "How to Obtain Foreign Technology at Minimum Cost, or Free" 
in MJ Cetron and HF Davidson (eds): "Industrial Technology Transfer" 
Leyden (Noordhoff, 1977) P 390 
2 Loc. Cit. 
3 Loc. Cit. 
By contrast, transfer methods associated with a relatively high level of 
packaging are comparatively costly, thereby falling basically within the 
"closed-gallery" type. Also, in the case of highly packaged methods 
the transferor is charged with the primary responsibility of co-ordinating 
various parts of the project during the execution stage, so that little 
(if any) effort is required from the transferee in this regard. 
6.1.1 UNCTAD's Classification 
15 
A relevant UNCTAD publication classifies transactions involving international 
flows of technology into three main types, as follows: 
4 
(a) Simple Direct Transactions. 
In this case the transaction embodying the channelling of technology can 
be described as "package-free". Wherever necessary the complete deal 
is broken up into a number of smaller elements, where the price of each 
one of these is ascertained directly. Furthermore the prospective buyer 
of the technology would in this case attempt to procure each element at 
the best possible price and other terms and conditions, resulting frequently 
in having more than one technology vendor. Under these circumstances, 
"the premium that a supplying firm can get for its technological advantages 
is usually constrained by the presence of competitors offering near 
substitutes, or by threat of new entrants". 
5 
(b) Process-package Transactions. 
Supplying firms are here "able to market 'systems' rather than just 
components in various situations. The most widely known is where the 
managerial and engineering skills needed to put together the process 
are very specialized (and where scale economies are important). But 
there are others. For example, some machinery supplying firms use a 
major innovation in a particular component to package a whole process". 
6 
It is pointed out further that "process packaging" can also develop in 
markets which are "dominated by a very few large diversified component 
manufacturers, or conversely where very small component firms, with 
limited resources for marketing, predominate and find it advantageous 
4 UNCTAD: "Handbook on the Acquisition of Technology by Developing Countries" 
New York (United Nations, 1978) P6 
5 Loc. Cit. 
6 Loc. Cit. 
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to sell their output on exclusive contract to contractor firms". 
7 
(c) Project-package Transactions. 
In this case the supplier undertakes to provide the required technology 
as embodied in the whole project. All basic and ancillary functions 
associated with the various stages of project implementation are undertaken 
by the technology transferor. Very frequently the transferor firm is 
additionally charged with some significant operational duties, such as 
training, equipment maintenance, or overall management. 
6.1.2 Wilkins's Classification 
Another writer on the subject, M Wilkins, suggests two basic types of 
means for the transference of technology, namely export-oriented 
channels and import-oriented ones. Wilkins then proceeds to sub-divide 
each of these two types into four methods, each of which is both parallel 
and complementary to its counterpart in the other category. When viewed 
from a slightly different angle the resultant eight methods can be seen 
as four pairs, each involving an export aspect duly integrating with an 
importation element, the four pairs thus beingt8 
(a) Export and import of capital goods. 
(b) Export and import of patents. 
(c) Provision and receipt of technical assistance. 
(d) Direct foreign investment. 
Wilkins points out, however, that there exist other methods for the 
transference of technology. These include the employment of foreign 
experts by the recipient enterprise, personal contacts and visits made 
by interested firms in the developing countries to plants and exhibitions 
in other parts of the world. Expressed in Wilkins's own words, these 
other methods may be tapped for the purpose of technology transfer when 
an "employee of the technologically-advanced firm ..... leaves 
it and 
travels abroad, taking with him technological information or proficiency ..... 
7 Loc. Cit. 
8M Wilkins: "The Role of Private Business in the International Diffusion 
of Technology" Journal of Economic History, Vol XXXIV, No 1 (March 1974) 
Pp 166-7 
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A technologically advanced, company may open its plant to visiting foreign 
technicians, who see processes they can imitate in their homelands. 
A firm may sell or exhibit its products domestically, ywhich 
products 
may be seen by foreigners, who may reproduce the innovations in their 
own countries. A man may conduct industrial espionage in a plant of a 
technologically-advanced company and then transmit the secrets across 
the border. In each of. these cases, technological, transfer occurs, but 
the technologically advanced private firm is, essentially 
passive". 
9 
These methods may be significant singly, or, in association with other 
means in effecting a technology transfer. It can be seen, therefore, 
that the basic, classification of four pairs (ie eight types) advanced by 
Wilkins is not exhaustive. 
6.1.3 Patel's Classification 
A clear and interesting classification of eight categories of channels 
for transferring technology to developing countries is put forward by 
S Patel. Stressing that these methods may be invoked either solely or 
10 
in combination, Patel expounds these eight types as follows: 
(a) The flow of books, journals, and other published , 
Information. 
(b) The movement of people between countries, including immigration, 
study visits and other travel. 
(c) Knowledge of goods', produced elsehwhere. 
(d) Training of students, technical staff and the employment of external 
experts. 
(e) Exchange of data and personnel through technical co-operation 
programmes. 
ý, 
(f) Import of machinery, equipment, and related literature. 
(g) Agreements on patents, licensing and know-how. 
(h) Direct foreign investment and operation. 
9 Ibid., P 168 
10 SJ Patel: "The Technological Dependence of Developing Countries" The 
Journal of Modern African Studies, 12,1 (1974) P5 
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6.1.4 A Proposed Classification 
It is apparent from the previous sub-sections that there is some scope 
for extending and refining present classifications of transfer methods 
by means of a new categorization which is comprehensive, clear, and 
systematic. Looking at the various means of technology transfer 
individually, thirteen distinct methods can be identified as set out 
in Figure 6.1. The sequential order of these methods corresponds in 
broad terms to the degree of packaging that is exhibited by each of them. 
A basic assumption underlying this classification is that each of these 
methods can be invoked by itself to effect the requisite transfer. In 
practice, however, the methods put forward in Figure 6.1 are not mutually 
exclusive of one another, since they may be made use of jointly under the 
umbrella of a single transfer transaction, so much so that it is possible 
to envisage a myriad of possible combinations of methods. In fact it is 
frequently the case in practice for a new project, contemplated within the 
context of a Third World country, to require the simultaneous utilization 
of more than one of the methods mentioned. 
In some cases the technology seeking enterprise endeavours to acquire 
the technology through a collection of means, such as the employment of 
foreign experts, ad hoc purchases of machinery and obtaining specific 
expert technical advice from foreign consultants. Another possible 
alternative is for the technology transfer deal to contain elements of a 
"trade-mark" contract in addition to a "know-how" contract. 
6.2 The Element of Packaging in Transfer Transactions 
Available literature on the subject of technology transfer contains 
occasional reference to the notion of "packaging" in transactions relating 
to the sale or acquisition of technology, although no systematic attempt 
seems to have been made to dwell in depth on this concept. Consequently, 
the remaining pages of this Chapter analyse the idea of packaging and 
relate this to the classification of transfer methods that has previously 
been proposed. 
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6.2.1 A Definition of ! 'Packaging" 
In the context of technology transfer transactions, "packaging" may be 
defined as referring to the degree of comprehensiveness in the provision 
by the principal technology supplier of the basic and ancillary components 
of the technology being transferred. Thus the notion of "packaging" 
denotes the level of comprehensiveness, or totality, in the provision. of 
the relevant technology by the transferor. When this level of 
comprehensiveness"is broad the associated degree of"packaging in the 
transfer is said to be high, and vice versa. 
It is noticeable that the above definition distinguishes between basic 
and ancillary elements of any technology provision. Moreover, the 
definition directs attention to a link between the determination of the 
packaging level and the presence or otherwise of these various elements 
in the respective deal. It is thus imperative that these elements are 
clearly identified. Classified into two major types, - 'a total of eleven 
elements can be mentioned in this context, as follows: 
(a) Basic Elements', namely: 
(1) Industrial property rights. Technology transfer often involves 
the licensing of patents and/or trademarks to be utilized by the transferee 
within the manufacturing activity in question. 
(2) Hardware. Three types of hardware can be supplied by the 
transferor-as part of the transfer deal, these being machinery, tools, 
and other pieces of installed hardware. As a general rule, the machinery 
supplied actually embodies the technology which largely enables the 
transferee to manufacture the respective products. 
(3) Software. This element may include important components of 
technology in the form of drawings, specifications, operating manuals 
and the like. 
(4) Personnel training. The transferor may be charged with the task 
of providing the necessary training of personnel to perform the skilled 
and semi-skilled jobs required on the shop floor. Training of personnel 
for other occupations higher up in the organization hierarchy may also 
be undertaken. 
ONU* 
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(5) Technical services. In addition to the foregoing, there exist 
a number of services that are technical in nature and which may be 
provided by the transferor. These comprise such services as product 
design, engineering work, future technical guidance and the choice of 
materials. 
(b) Ancillary Elements, these including: 
(1) Buildings. In. certain cases the transferor undertakes the 
construction of buildings required for the project. As regards the 
design of these buildings, it is necessary for the technology recipient 
to specify them in detail, often on expert advice. Even in cases where 
the transferor is charged with the responsibility of building design, 
such design has to be approved by the transferee prior to construction 
(2) Energy. Means for rendering the energy-required by the project 
are sometimes chosen by the transferor, at the request of the technology 
recipient. Advice by the transferor may also be complemented by entrusting 
him with executory tasks to make the necessary arrangements for such 
provisions of energy. 
(3) Maintenance. In cases where the machinery is complex, the 
transferor is often asked to undertake the provision of maintenance 
services when the project becomes operational. 
(4) Spare parts. As the supply of spare parts often presents a 
problem to the transferee when the project begins to operate, it is 
sometimes made the responsibility of the transferor to undertake this 
supply. 
(5) Materials. In some cases it is agreed that the materials 
required for operating the plant shall be supplied by the transferor. 
The relevant undertaking may be comprehensive to provide all types of 
materials required. Alternatively, it may be partial, in that it concerns 
certain types of the materials needed for operation. 
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(6) Management. Under certain circumstances, the transferor 
undertakes the management of the enterprise under a so-called "management 
contract" that would be in force in these cases. Very often, only the 
top management team, comprising general management and departmental 
heads and possibly their deputies, is provided by the transferor under this 
arrangement. However, in some rather special cases this provision goes 
further to middle and even lower management. 
6.2.2 Levels of Packaging in Technology Transfer Transactions 
It is clear now*that the'various methods of technology transfer-are 
associated with differing degrees of packaging. This is in addition 
to the fact that the aforementioned methods are frequently employed in 
a joint fashion so as to be linked to one another. Five main levels of 
packaging can be distinguished in this context, so that each level 
corresponds to the utilization of a given method, or one of a set of 
methods, in effectuating the transfer desired. 
(a) Ultra-packaged Transfers. 
In this case the transferor undertakes all the basic elements of the 
transfer (wherever, they are relevant) in addition to at least three of 
the ancillary elements. Thus the transferor provides all types of hardware 
and software required by the project, trains operating personnel, grants 
the use of industrial property rights (if any exist), and renders the 
associated technical services. In addition the transferor is normally 
charged with such duties as the construction of buildings, designing and 
executing the necessary provisions of energy, and some other basic 
services for the would-be project. Moreover, the technology supplier 
is sometimes asked to render certain significant services when the 
project enters the operational stage, like enterprise management (in a 
line and/or staff capacity), maintenance, and the supply of materials and 
spare parts. . 
Concerning ownership it is noted that, such ultra-packaged transfers are 
often associated with foreign ownership. However, while foreign ownership 
may be complete or partial, it is by no means the case that foreign 
ownership is inevitable wherever the transfer is effected in an ultra- 
packaged manner. 
Three major patterns of ownership of manufacturing enterprises in the 
developing countries can be identified, namely complete national ownership, 
joint ventures, and complete foreign ownership (figure 6.2). Ultra- 
packaged transfers are often, though not always, accompanied by ownership 
patterns of the second and third types. 
Figure 6.2 
TYPES OF OWNERSHIP OF TECHNOLOGY RECEIVING ESTABLISHMENTS IN THE 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES OF THE THIRD WORLD 
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It is apparent, therefore, that this first level of packaging entails 
essentially the use of the method of total-project contracting. However, 
it is necessary to realize that there exist several variants of this method, 
as there is room for variance in several aspects concerning the project, 
including ownership, the existence (or otherwise) and multiplicity of 
industrial property rights, the extent of personnel training, types of 
technical services offered and duration of each, and the diversity and 
comprehensiveness of operational services. 
(b) Highly-packaged Transfers 
In this case all the basic elements of technology will be present in the 
transfer (wherever these elements exist). There is, in addition, the 
possibility of up to two ancillary elements being associated with the 
transfer. Unlike the preceding case, this level of packaging definitely 
excludes the possibility of the transfer comprising three or more of the 
ancillary elements of the technology. The elements which are not provided 
in the course of the'main transfer deal are normally ancillary in nature. 
These are usually provided internally within the developing country ' 
Itself, or alternatively they may be obtained externally from sources which 
are independent from the major technology-supplier. 
On this basis it can be seen that this level of packaging is essentially 
the transfer method of total process contracting. Variations can occur 
as to the existence (or otherwise) and multiplicity of industrial property 
rights,, the extent of personnel training, types of technical services 
offered and the duration of each, and the existence (or otherwise) of 
operational services and their types. As regards ownership it is likely 
that the enterprise takes the form of joint venture or a wholly nationally 
owned firm. 
(c) Medium-packaged Transfers 
Next on the scale is the level of medium-packaging. This covers three 
or four basic elements of transfer and possibly also up to two of the 
ancillary elements. Excluded, however, is the possibility of the presence 
of all basic elements required for the transfer or more than two ancillary 
elements. What is normally present in such transfer deals is the provision 
of hardwar', software, and industrial property rights (if any). 
Concerning personnel training and technical services these are either 
non-existent in medium-packaged transfers or exist on a limited scale. 
As for the ancillary elements of the transfer it is possible for some of 
them to be associated with these transfers within narrow limits. 
Medium-packaged transfers comprise essentially three types of technology 
transfer methods, so that whenever any one of these is used as the chief 
method of transfer, packaging can be said to be of the medium variety. 
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The three methods referred to are respectively major-process contracting, 
no= 
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know-how and patent contracts, and know-how contracts. As for ownership, 
the project is usually nationally owned with the possibility of a joint 
venture. Limited operational services are catered for by the major 
transferor in some cases. These services may comprise plant maintenance, 
secondment of managerial and/or technical staff, product design, and the 
supply of materials and spare parts. 
(d) Low-packaged Transfers 
In very general terms, the, major technology supplier provides in this 
case something ranging between one- and two-thirds of the basic elements 
of the technology under question to the transferee. Very broadly, this 
implies that the major supplier does not render more than three of 
the basic elements, when such a supply is viewed in a real and effective 
connotation. These often, but not always. refer to the first three of 
the basic elements previously mentioned. Transfers which fall under this 
heading are those employing principally one of the three methods of 
patent-contracting, trademark contracts, or franchising. 
Each of the three methods mentioned may be employed with the possibility 
of a number of variations. These variations relate to matters like the 
undertaking and diversity of personnel training, technical services, 
maintenance, provision of spare parts, materials supply and operational 
management. Ownership of recipient enterprises in these cases usually 
rests with national bodies or individuals. 
(e) Package-free Transfers 
Transfers which are package-free are those characterized by the limited 
channelling of basic elements of the technology under question through 
the principal transferor. In general terms this means that the major 
technology supplier presents one or two of the basic elements, no more. 
Some of the ancillary elements may also be supplied with the basic 
elements, but such a supply will be highly restricted in'scope and 'variety. 
Transfers which come under this heading usually embrace one, or a multiple 
of, contracts/endeavours involving the following six methods of technology 
transfer: 
(1) Engineering services contracts 
(2) Technical consultancy contracts 
(3) Machinery supplies 
(4) Employment of foreign experts 
(5) Technical publications 
(6) Personal contacts 
Enterprises which employ package-free methods of transfer are usually 
nationally owned by the developing country in question. 
6.3 Relevant Factors in Determining Transfer Packaging 
waft 
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Available literature on the topic of transferring technology to developing 
countries has dwelt in varying degrees on certain aspects of this large 
and complex problem. Amongst these aspects are the problems hampering 
the transmission of technology, the role of multi-national corporations, 
the part played by the State in Third World regions, the choice of appropriate 
techniques for developing countries' industrial enterprises, costs of 
technology transfers, and possibilities for legislation or regulation on 
national, regional, and international levels. 
11 
The area concerning the nature and significance of "packaging" in technology 
transfer transactions has remained largely distant from relevant in-depth 
research. Hence the contribution of this research in analysing this 
concept, and then examining it empirically. 
6.3.1 Characteristics of Various Levels of Packaging 
in order to set out the basic hypotheses of this research it is proposed 
to assess the probable characteristics of each packaging level in technology 
transfer deals. An attempt is made in Tables . 
6.1 and 6.2 to identify 
the technical and economic characteristics of each of the five levels of 
packaging. 
11 Part One of this thesis has dealt with these subjects. See Chapters 3, 
4 and 5 as well as Section 2.4 above. 
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Figure 6.3 
A CLASSIFICATION OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER METHODS ACCORDING 
TO THE LEVEL OF PACKAGING ASSOCIATED WITH EACH 
Levels of Packaging 
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Table 6.1 sets out the technical characteristic factors and the hypothetical 
circumstantial characteristics associated with each of the five levels of 
packaging previously mentioned. Table 6.2 presents the economic character- 
istics on parallel lines. 
In both tables the description of each packaging level associated with 
each factor is made on the assumption of the constancy of other factors. 
6.3.2 Relevant Factors in the Choice of Packaging Levels 
On the basis of the points raised in Tables 6.1 and 6.2 it is possible 
to suggest hypothetically the following four major factors in the determination 
of the level of packaging in technology transfer transactions: 
(a) The recipient country's state of development. 
A general relationship is likely to exist between the degree of packaging 
associated with any technology transfer deal and the state of overall 
development achieved by the recipient country. The more developed the 
country (especially in the industrial field) the more applicable would 
probably be the methods characterised by "unpackaging". In contrast, it 
is often seen that the least-developed countries resort to the more 
highly packaged methods of transfer owing to their pronounced shortage of 
relevant human resources and paucity of underlying services and facilities. 
(b) Sophistication of technology. 
On the assumption that other things are equal, it is perhaps fair to 
assert that the more sophisticated technologies are usually supplied in 
the form of the more packaged deals. Three reasons account for this. 
The first is the wish of the supplier, who normally prefers the packaged 
deal when there is substantial demand for his product/service, especially 
when he possesses a measure of monopolistic advantage. The second reason 
is inherent in the difficulties encountered by the recipient enterprise 
in tapping relatively independent (unpackaged) methods of technology 
transfer, whereas the third is related to the need for integrating the 
total operational system and guaranteeing its performance level. 
Table 6.1 
TECHNICAL CHARACTERISTICS ASSOCIATED WITH VARIOUS LEVELS 
OF PACKAGING IN TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
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Table 6.2 
ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS ASSOCIATED WITH VARIOUS LEVELS 
OF PACKAGING IN TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
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(c) Financial considerations. 
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The third major aspect of this problem concerns financial arrangements. 
The packaged forms of technology transfer normally require a 
large outlay 
in hard currency. Unpackaged technology transfer methods, on the other 
hand, can help to reduce the foreign currency cost of the project. 
A number of reasons explain this difference. These include the possibility 
in the case of unpackaged methods of utilizing local services 
(eg engineering 
design and labour training), the purchase of certain locally-made equipment 
(eg furniture and tools), and the employment of local personnel as far as 
possible during the various stages of project implementation and operation. 
It. Is possible to generalise, therefore, that the more financially 
capable are the sponsors of. the project, the easier it would be for them 
to_enter into more packaged deals. 
Another point that is worthy of mention here is foreign aid. Developing 
countries often receive technical/financial aid from developed countries 
or specialised agencies or institutions. This aid often enables 
developing 
countries to set up new industrial projects, with certain conditions being 
attached to the relevant agreements. It is quite possible, for. instance, 
for bilateral agreements to specify a certain level of packaging to accompany 
the supply of technology by the donor country. , 
(d) Other factors. 
There exist a host of other factors which may have a role to play in this 
matter. These can in the main be classified briefly under the following 
four sub-headings: 
(1) Time. As the level of urgency associated with the project may 
vary, so would the suitability of the various possible methods of 
technology transfer. For instance, total-project contracting may be 
preferred when it is thought that this would accelerate the execution of 
the project, particularly when speed of completion occupies a high priority. 
(2) Risk-and uncertainty. This is probably another significant 
factor, since different levels of risk and uncertainty are attached to 
different methods. In broad terms, this element is reduced whenever the 
more packaged methods are employed. This is based on the stipulation that 
these packaged deals are well worked out and the contractor well chosen. 
On the other hand, a project that is executed via unpackaged methods is 
usually burdened by a number of risks/uncertainties. These may concern 
the supply of machinery, the performance of the workforce, the level of 
operational maintenance and other matters. 
homm" 
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(3) Inter-country relationships. It is highly probable that an 
influence is exerted by the nature of trade/diplomatic/political relationships 
between the recipient country and possible supplying countries. When a 
trade/technological bilateral agreement between a pair of countries 
exists, this may encourage or facilitate one form or another of technology 
transfer. A good commercial standing attained by some establishments in 
the supplying countries would have a positive impact in favour of adopting 
certain technology transfer methods, and so would the provision of certain 
facilities to the technology buyers, such as credit facilities, long-term 
guarantees, and an easy-access information pool. 
(4) Project characteristics. Certain characteristics of the 
proposed project can influence the choice of the most appropriate method. 
These include such matters as project size, the sources of energy to be 
tapped, the variety of products to be manufactured, and even perhaps the 
proposed location of the project. For example, when the project is of a 
very large size, it can be highly difficult in certain cases to utilize 
the highly unpackaged methods. On the other hand, when the proposed 
project is small, unpackaged methods become feasible. 
6.4 Comments and Conclusions 
This Chapter began by outlining four different classifications of transfer 
methods from the literature on the subject. It is the researcher's opinion, 
however, that these classifications exhibit certain defects, by way of 
non-exhaustiveness, duplication, or lack of clear qualitative characterization. 
A thirteen point classification is, therefore, proposed, where the respective 
methods show a general descendent pattern in the level of packaging 
associated with each of them. The possibility exists, however, for some 
of these methods to be employed in conjunction with one another within 
the confines of a single project. 
The concept of "packaging" was defined in this Chapter, and five levels 
of packaging in transfer transactions were introduced on that basis. Also, 
a number of relevant technical and economic characteristics of the five 
packaging levels were suggested, and consequently some hypotheses have 
been put forward to explain how the level of packaging can be determined 
in practice. It is suggested for instance, that ultra-packaged transfers 
are likely to be associated with modern and/or automated processes, the 
necessity of complex and comprehensive training, heavy and large-scale 
projects, and existence of effectively held patents and know-how secrets. 
It remains to be seen, however, whether any of the proposed hypotheses can 
be proved as significant and, if so, to what extent. 
Riig 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 1, 
ULTRA- AND HIGHLY-PACKAGED TRANSFER METHODS 
A comprehensive classification was presented in the previous Chapter for 
the various means of channelling technology, whereby thirteen transfer 
methods were identified. While it was pointed out that some latitude 
existed for-utilizing those methods in a complementary fashion, 
it was 
stressed that each one of the methods referred to was associated with 
a given level of packaging. Five packaging levels were proposed, and the 
linkage between this scale and the various transfer methods was elaborated. 
This Chapter and the next are devoted to the-study of the whole range of 
technology transfer methods. Each method is elucidated and then evaluated. 
While the present. Chapter_. is focused on ultra-and highly-packaged methods 
of technology transfer, it is the task of the following one to explore 
the other remaining channels., , 
7.1 Total Project, Contracting 
As has been indicated-previously this method is associated with the- 
highest possible level of packaging, and is thus ranked as the essential 
method utilized whenever it is desired to adopt an ultra-packaged level in 
project execution. While a number of variants of this method do exist 
in practice, the essential feature of "total. project" contracting is that 
the whole project is envisaged, planned, negotiated, and executed as one 
integrated task. 
UNCTAD refers to transfers of this type as "project package" transactions 
where "the process and the engineering and contracting needed ... comes as 
a package, but is in turn part of a bigger package, containing equity 
participation by the supplier, and/or various types of continuing control 
over management, as well as agreements on the supply of materials, inputs 
and technical assistance". 
' It must, however, be stressed that foreign 
equity participation is not a necessary accompaniment to the use of this 
method, nor indeed, any type of "management contract" or "provision agreements' 
1 UNCTAD: "Handbook on the Acquisition of Technology by Developing Countries" 
New York (United Nations, 1978) P5 
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for the supply of materials/components or rendering technical" assistance. 
These are possibilities of extra facilities which may be made available 
by the main project-contractor at the request of the technology receiving 
enterprise. Such possibilities illustrate the existing variants of this 
basic method. 
Although developing countries. often have recourse to total project 
contracting in executing relatively large technology projects, size is, 
in fact, immaterial in considering the chief characteristics of this 
method. Because the project is contemplated as one complete task, the 
relevant agreement-. needs to stipulate that the supplier undertakes all 
aspects of project implementation on the basis of the details laid down. 
Other terms and conditions in connection with the project in question must 
also be spelled out clearly. These include the choice-of production 
methods, completion dates, contract value and payment scheduling, project 
location and other pertinent matters. 
The primary tasks borne by the main contractor normally encompass the 
construction of buildings, supply and installation of machinery together 
with associated patents and trademarks, arrangements for provision of 
requisite project services, product design, personnel training and 
associated supply of software requirements. In many cases the terms of 
the contract also charge the main technology transferor with the responsibility 
of designing the administrative system and/or offering additional services. 
Practical industrial terminology frequently refers to this type of contract 
as a "turn-key" contract, as the purchaser receives the project complete 
with its "key". 
Tasks related to the design of the administrative system may include such 
matters as the set up of the organization chart, determination of Job- 
descriptions and specifications, record-keeping methods, office layout, 
communication techniques and working methods. Other related services 
may include the selection of production methods, determination of manpower 
requirements and the choice of plant location. 
It often occurs in practice that the project's link with the technology 
supplier does not end with the completion of the project. 
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In particular, this link may continue in the form of a "management contract" 
or a "technical services contract"., While it is a normal practice for 
such operational links to be formulated with the firm which undertook 
the establishment of the project, this need not be the case under all 
circumstances. 
7.1.1 Significance of Subcontracting 
It is perhaps significant to point out in this context that the main 
technology supplier, need not himself execute every aspect of the contract, 
as he is usually empowered by the terms of the contract to sub-contract 
the execution of the requisite tasks to others, so much so that very 
few total-project contractors avoid sub-contracting and fulfil directly 
all their contractual obligations. In fact the prevalence of subcontracting 
in the execution of technology transfer contracts is at present distinctly 
evident, having resulted from the steady and uninterrupted growth of 
international sub-contracting over the last few decades. 
Dimitri Germidis points out that sub-contracting arrangements can take 
many forms and be motivated by a number of different factors. 
2 He 
distinguishes between three types of sub-contracting on the basis of 
"comparative advantage sought by the main contractor as well as to the 
regularity of the orders". 3 The three types are as follows: 
4 
(a) Speciality Sub-contracting. 
This is a case where there is a semi-permanent relationship between the 
main contractor and his sub-contractor, in so far as the execution of a 
certain class of work is concerned. This type of situation often arises 
as a result of a run of previously satisfactory commercial collaborations 
and where the sub-contractor possesses specialized machinery and other 
equipment and/or has developed specialized technologies, with or without 
the assistance of the main contractor. 
20 Germidis: "International Sub-contracting and the Transfer of Technology 
to LOCs" in A6 Zahlan (editor): "Technology Transfer and Change in the 
Arab World" Oxford (Pergamon Press, 1978) P 175 
3 Loc. Cit. 
4 Loc. Cit. 
(b) Economic or Cost Saving Sub-contracting. 
The prime motive behind sub-contracting in these instances is to lower 
the costs of executing the project. The clear implication here is that 
the sub-contractor's remunerations for performing the relevant tasks/ 
services are lower than the costs which would otherwise be incurred by 
the main project contractor. 
(c) Complementary Sub-contracting. 
This form of sub-contracting is used when the main contractor's resources 
and/or production capacity are insufficient in relation to the sheer size 
of the project and the time-span for its completion. 
7.1.2 Link with Ownership of Recipient Enterprise 
it is noticeable that the method of total project contracting is often 
associated with foreign ownership. When a branch or a subsidiary of a 
foreign firm is being set up for the first time within a Third World 
developing country, the project is frequently executed by this method, 
whereby the role of the main contractor is assumed by the parent corporation 
or some other firm that is associated with it in some way. Furthermore, 
total project contracting is seen to be employed in many cases where the 
new enterprise being set up is a joint venture, particularly when the 
foreign equity stake is relatively high (eg 35% or over). 
On the basis of the foregoing remarks it is possible to imagine three 
different patterns of ownership for the new enterprise whenever total 
project contracting is utilized as the technology transferring method, 
these being as follows: 
5 
(a) National ownership. 
In this case the project is completely owned by the host country. The 
enterprise to which the project belongs may be State-owned, privately-owned 
or be characterized by a mixed State-private ownership. 
5 Figure 6.2 above gave a general sketch of the main and derivative types 
of ownership displayed by various technology receiving enterprises in the 
Third World. 
(b) Foreign ownership. ° 
This implies that the project is owned by, a subsidiary of a foreign- , 
company, or alternatively it may simply be a branch of the foreign firm. 
In some cases two or more companies participate in the share capital of 
the new entity. 
Western firms often elect to set up subsidiaries in other regions in order 
to reduce operating and distribution costs and/or by-pass import barriers 
that are frequently imposed by other countries. In the case of relatively 
recent products and/or production processes involving modern technological 
breakthroughs possessed by large multinational corporations, the foreign- 
owned establishment is, usually looked upon by the host country as an 
unavoidable concomitant of the required transfer. Alternatively, a 
significant degree of foreign ownership would be the least that makes the 
deal acceptable to the tranferor under these circumstances, -thereby making 
the project a "joint venture". This type of situation arises quite often 
in industrial sectors associated with a high rate of technological progress 
and heavy spending on research and development, such as the case of_ the 
electronics industry and the manufacture of modern pharmaceuticals. . 
(c) Joint venture. - 
In this case, the project is owned partly by foreign companies/individuals 
and partly by national bodies/individuals/the host State. In spite of the 
fact that multinational corporations are mostly unwilling to enter into 
joint ventures as minority partners, the number of joint ventures with 
minority foreign holdings has grown rapidly in recent decades. 
Various factors have contributed to this trend, including the desire of 
foreign companies to by-pass import barriers, in addition to the growing 
practice in developing countries for legislation and government regulation 
to limit and control foreign capital investment especially when foreign- 
majority-equity participation is envisaged. Moreover, joint ventures can 
help to spread the risks and bring to bear the strengths, knowledge, and 
capabilities of both sides in a co-ordinated manner. 
Predominance of any form of ownership patterns among technology receiving 
enterprises within a Third World country is largely dependent on that 
country's economic, social and political circumstances. 
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It has been suggested, for instance, that nationally owned industrial 
enterprises tend to be commonplace in the case of the more industrializing 
nations in the Third World. In contrast the least developing countries 
are deemed to have little choice but to acquiesce to, the prevalence 
of foreign owned or joint venture enterprises in their manufacturing 
industry. 
On the basis of a sample study conducted in the early part of the 1970's 
in connection with technology transfer projects, UNCTAD suggests in one 
of its publications that "in the more industrially developed (Third 
World) countries like Yugoslavia, India and the Republic of Korea, the 
proportion of foreign majority owned enterprises with a technology contract 
is found to be relatively small, while such enterprises are of greater 
significance in the least developed countries like Cyprus, Ethiopia, etc". 
6 
It needs to be stressed, however, that. the results of the UNCTAD survey 
(Table 7.1) cannot be regarded as conclusive evidence that a relationship 
exists between the country's state of development and the ownership profile 
of its industrial enterprises. 
7 For one thing the figures and reasoning 
presented in this case advance no clear yardstick for measuring a country's 
overall level of progress in development. In addition, governmental policy 
and regulations are bound to influence the ownership patterns of that 
country's industrial enterprises. For example Yugoslavia is a socialist 
country with a centrally-planned economy while in India and South Korea 
there is a large measure of State direction and regulation over the inflow 
of foreign technology and capital. Other factors may be influential in 
shaping the ownership patterns of industrial enterprises in any given 
country, including the extent of scarcity of investment funds, the country's 
geographical location, and the availability of natural resources. 
7.2 Total Process Contracting 
This method follows the previous one in the degree of "packaging" involved. 
The essential difference between the two is that "total process contracting" 
is basically concerned with the supply of the technological hardcore 
6 UNCTAD: "Major Issues Arising From the Transfer of Technology to Developing 
Countries" New York (United Nations, 1975) P 10. 
7 The UNCTAD survey covered a total of 5138 manufacturing enterprises 
distributed among the nine Third World countries mentioned in Table 7.1 
Loc. Cit. 
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Table 7.1 
OWNERSHIP CHARACTERISTICS OF TECHNOLOGY RECEIVING ENTERPRISES IN 
SELECTED DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
(Results. of a 
'sample 
survey by UNCTAD in early 1970's) 
Country 
MANUFACTURING ENTERPRISE RECEIVING FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY 
Percentage of Percentage of Percentage of 
enterprises with enterprises with wholly nationally 
majority foreign-, minority foreign- owned enterprises 
held equity held equity 
c%) i%) c%) 
Cyprus 48 44 8 
Columbia 45 12 43 
Brazil 36 N. A. 64 
Sri Lanka. 29 42 29 
Peru 27 19 54 
Republic of 13 N. A. 87 Korea . 
Pakistan 12 8 79 
India' 3 12 85 
Yugoslavia - 5 95 
Source: UNCTAD: "Major Issues Arising From the Transfer of Technology 
to Developing Countries" New York (United Nations, 1975) P 11 
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required for the project. This "technological hardcore" Is normally 
embodied in the various production facilities of the project. Total 
process contracts usually exclude building construction, utility provisions, 
and services related to the design of the administrative system., The 
essential characteristic of this method is that it concentrates on the 
provision in a packaged form of the machinery and other equipment needed, 
together with the services associated with this provision. 
As the exact nature, types, and number, of machinery and other equipment 
supplied differ from case to case, so do the services that are correspond- 
ingly rendered. These services normally comprise engineering works, 
plant layout, personnel training, in addition to some manpower planning, 
operational technical assistance, and product design. 
The "packaging" feature of this method is displayed by the characteristic 
that it. entails. the supply of all plant hardware and software required 
by one main technology supplier. This supplier also undertakes certain 
relevant services that need to be discharged in association with the 
equipment. As this method enables the contractor to render an integrated 
production system, -it 
is perhaps significant that even the most advanced 
of developing countries have had recourse to this method to a greater 
or lesser extent. Where for instance the managerial and engineering 
skills required are very specialized and/or there exist some significant 
economies of scale in the relevant field, process contracting may become 
a feasible and practical alternative. 
7.3 An Evaluation 
The two major methods outlined above have been utilized widely by 
developing countries in the execution of projects within various industrial 
sectors. Though this is very evident in the case of large scale and 
relatively complex modern technology projects, the two methods are by 
no means confined to such projects. Being generally characterized by 
ultra-to-high levels of packaging the variants of these methods possess 
some merits as well as certain negative aspects. 
_,. 
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7.3.1 Merits of Total Project/Process Contracting 
Most observers and experts would concede that there exist in the real 
world certain sets of circumstances which would make it advantageous 
from the developing country's angle to employ one variant or another of 
the two methods referred to. The utilization of these methods is 
frequently associated with foreign ownership (either total or partial). 
of the transferee enterprise, while in many cases the enterprise itself 
is established and/or owned by a multinational firm. 
In weighing the contribution of direct foreign 
, 
investment,., which is 
repeatedly accompanied by total project or process contracting, M Wilkins 
suggests six types of benefits that may accrue in these cases, as follows: 
(a) There is "a physical (geographical) transfer. Beyond that, the 
products made and the processes used abroad are there to be imitated within 
the host nation". 
9 
(b) Host nation workers and managers "gain knowledge of products and 
processes. The training may be on the job, in the corporation's home 
operations, at local educational institutions supported by the company, or 
at foreign universities. 
10 
(c) If the activity of the international enterprise is "a joint venture, 
foreign technology is brought under partial host nation ownership"; 
11 
(d) Local suppliers of the direct foreign investor "frequently obtain 
12 
significant technological assistance". 
(e) If technology is "broadly defined to encompass marketing experience 
(including the servicing of complex products), technology is often 
13 transferred to dealers and distributors". 
8M Wilkins: "The Role of Private Business in the International Diffusion of 
Technology" Journal of Economic History, Vol XXXIV No 1 (March 1974) Pp 177-8. 
9 Ibid., P 177 
10 Loc. Cit. 
11 Ibid., P 178 
12 Loc. Cit. 
13 Loc. Cit. 
(f) The multinational corporation "acts to transfer technology by paying 
taxes and offering employment in the host nation, -which actions create 
capital resources and demands there". 
14 
It is the researcher's view that the merits of these two basic methods (and 
their two corresponding packaging levels) can be dealt with adequately 
and comprehensively under the following three main headings: 
(a) Expert Implementation., 
On the assumption that the project or process contractor is well chosen, 
it is probable that expert knowledge will be brought to bear in the 
implementation of the project. As this normally ensures the correct 
execution of each stage of the project, the likely outcome is a contribution 
towards a reasonable level of plant efficiency when operations begin. A 
supporting point here is that a world-wide contractor can ill-afford damage 
to his professional standing and hence would. presumably endeavour to 
execute the project in such a way to be certain of a reasonably good 
standard. 
Identifying the method of total project contracting with the sale of 
"turnkey" projects, S Gee expresses the view that "turnkey plants are 
preferred by countries where only a limited technical and Industrial 
Infrastructure exists because the plants, when supported with the necessary 
training and technical assistance, afford a quick and efficient method for 
building manufacturing capabilities and a national industrial base". 
15 
it has at times occurred in practice that the methods of project and 
process contracting are seen virtually as the only available avenues for 
the acquisition of technology by some developing nations, due to the 
monopolistic position held by the technology supplier(s) and/or the 
relative technological, weakness of the developing country in question. 
Moreover these methods are frequently regarded as the most effective, 
and even cost-efficient, in the case of industrial sectors characterised 
by sophisticated technology, particularly when this is twinned with the 
paucity or absence of local managerial and technical'skills. 
14 Loc. Cit. 
15 S, Gee: "Technology Transfer, Innovation and International Competitiveness" 
New York (John Wiley and Sons, 1981) P 33 
18 
Under certain circumstances, a developing country may be pushed towards 
the adoption of project-or process -contracting even when that country had 
attained a fair magnitude of industrial. growth. UNCTAD's Secretariat 
suggests, in the "Handbook" previously referred to, that three types of 
circumstances exist where Third World transferees may be virtually driven 
to the adoption of project or. process contracting despite the existance, 
in principle at. least, of other less packaged methods of transfer. 
16 
The circumstances, which may operate jointly or individually in this 
direction, are the following: 
(1) When the supplying firm has appropriated a major technological 
innovation which enables it to disregard the constraining influence of 
its competitors. This is particularly the case where there are in 
addition significant economies of scale and/or important barriers to entry 
17 
to that industrial field. ;, * -. 
(2) When external conditions restrict competition between suppliers, 
eg when new investments are financed. by tied aid which obliges the purchaser 
of the technology to buy in a packaged, form from the donor country. 
18 
(3) Where the market for the relevant technology is dominated by a 
few giant firms that are capable of achieving a certain degree of 
geographical division of. the world market. 
19 
(b) Speedy Execution of Project.. 
It is possible that the utilization of one of the variants of these two 
methods will save time in project execution, provided again that the 
contractor is well chosen. This advantage is based largely on the assumption 
that the contractor is well-experienced in planning and executing this type 
of project. Associated with this point is the likelihood that the 
principal contractor is able to select his contractors diligently, in 
addition to the probability that he would employ highly skilled and 
experienced personnel,. 
16 UNCTAD: "Handbook-on the Acquisition ... " Op. Cit., P6 
17 Loc. Cit. 
18 Loc. Cit. 
19 Loc. Cit. 
(c) Access to a Problem Solving Source. 
An advantage that can be of a decisive value in many cases is the access 
to a source that can be valuable when an industrial problem occurs, 
especially a technical one. New plants in developing countries are 
prone to run into difficulties, these being numerous and diverse in 
their nature., Machine bottlenecks, unavailability of spare parts, 
scarcity of certain human skills, high running costs, and product improve- 
ments are among the most pressing of these problems. There is no doubt 
that the availability of a high-standing technology supplier can assist 
enterprise management in finding solutions to such difficulties, with the 
least possible effort, time, and disruption to production. 
The readiness of this problem-solving source is duly manifest when the new 
project is owned wholly or partly by a large strongly-based foreign 
enterprise such as a multinational corporation. It is, in fact, pointed 
out by some that total project contracting when associated with foreign 
ownership can lead to effective transfers of technology. In this context, 
S Gee writes that "foreign direct investments are effective channels 
for technology transfer because the equity interest in the ..... subsidiary 
by the parent firm constitutes a powerful economic incentive to ensure 
that the transfer proceeds efficiently and effectively". 
20 
Another writer on this topic expresses the view that "the most successful 
examples of the rapid transfer of technology are found in the activities 
of the subsidiaries, which are established by Western firms in underdeveloped 
countries. In such cases, often it has been possible, even in backward 
countries and within a few years, not only to establish a modern industry 
but also to make it operate effectively". 
21 
A helpful phrase in the technology transfer contract is a stipulation 
enabling the new project to obtain the required technical services through 
the transferor. In a study of 119 technological collaboration agreements 
between British and Indian firms during 1963-69, H Davies made a comparison 
between licensing and joint ventures as regards the provision of technical 
assistance by British transferors (table 7.2). 
22 
20 S Gee, Op. Cit. P 32. 
21 I Svennilson: "The Strategy of Transfer" in DL Spencer and A Woroniak: 
"The Transfer of Technology to Developing Countries" New York (Frederick 
A Praeger, 1967) P 179. 
22 H Davies: "Technology Transfer Through Commercial Transactions" Journal 
of Industrial Economics (December 1977) Pp 169-170. 
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It is obvious that the method of joint venture stands out as more effective 
in this respect, since it helps in no small measure to assure the technology 
recipient of the availability of a competent source for advice and "trouble- 
shooting". 
ý'ý 
Table 7.2 
PROVISION OF ASSISTANCE BY TRANSFEROR FIRMS IN 119 COLLABORATION 
AGREEMENTS BETWEEN BRITISH AND INDIAN FIRMS (1963-1969) 
Types of Assistance Provided by Technology Supplier Licensing Joint 
(% of Ventures 
Agreements) (% of 
Agreements) 
yt '. 
Designs, specifications and drawings 86 91 
Examples of the product 53 76 
Components, intermediates 51 61 
Plant 26 78 
Managers 5 28 
Plant-level personnel 15 48 
Source: H Davies: "Technology Transfer 
Through Commercial Transactions "Journal of Industrial 
Economics (December 1977) P 169. 
7.3.2 Drawbacks of Total Project/Process Contractin 
Opposed to the abovementioned advantages of these two methods, there 
exist definite drawbacks that need to be well recognized. These can be 
summed up under four basic points, which are likely to be true even if 
the proviso concerning the sound choice of project/process contractor 
remains. 
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(a) High cost. 
These two methods are generally seen as costly means of acquiring 
technology, and this would probably be even more true whenever the 
recipient firm is nationally owned. When a new plant belonging to a 
nationally owned enterprise is to be established, it is often cheaper 
to break up the whole deal into several smaller transactions. The 
observation has been made in this connection that project or process 
contracting tends to reduce competition in technology markets owing 
to the tendency to "concentrate sales of equipment, design etc in the 
hands of a. comparatively few contractor firms. In some industries a very 
23 
small number of major contractors dominate the international market". 
Two factors may encourage major contractors to push up their price levels. 
The first is the relative inelasticity of demand for their services, 
especially when they are leading specialists in the field. This usually 
results from the fact that these technology suppliers enjoy monopolistic 
advantages. The second reason is that these contractors may be using the 
technology in their own production. This necessarily means that they 
look upon would-be industrial establishments as depriving them of certain 
markets.. This latter factor in cost-pushing may, however, be largely 
invalidated in the presence of actual competition among technology suppliers 
within the relevant field. In particular, there may be among potential- 
suppliers those who sell the technology in the form of their products as 
opposed to being embodied in production. 
There is an additional point which needs to be raised in connection with 
the true level of costs borne by developing nations wherever total project 
or process is utilized. It is often contended that the declared visible 
costs associated with these technology transfer methods do not represent 
the whole sphere of relevant costs that ought to be considered. 
The "direct costs" are seen by some observers to "constitute a small part 
of the total cost" asserts UNCTAD's, Secretariat. 
24 
This point is elaborated by the emphasis that "technology suppliers, 
particularly when technology becomes associated with direct foreign 
investment as in the case of the oil industry, prefer to take their returns 
23 UNCTAD: "Handbook ..... " Op. Cit. P 6. 
24 UNCTAD Secretariat: "Possible Mechanisms for the Transfer and Development 
of Technology" in AB Zahlen (Ed): "Technology Transfer and Change in the 
Arab World" Oxford (Pergamon Press, 1978) P 116. 
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through transfer prices and a host of other tacit or indirect means in 
order to minimize their global tax liability. For these reasons we 
would expect the cost of technology to be very much larger than seems 
visible on the surface". 
25 
(b) Poor harnessing of local expertise. 
Ultra or high degrees of packaging in project execution often entail the 
employment of foreign personnel for the performance of the more technical 
tasks required for project implementation. This usually permeates most 
functions required for project execution and, very often, this situation 
largely continues after the entry of the project into the operational 
stage. While it is possible to argue that this usually results in a 
better implemented and soundly operated project, it is also likely to 
imply lost opportunities for local personnel to acquire useful practical 
experience through "learning-by-doing". 
UNCTAD's Secretariat points out that local technological capability has 
been hampered through the inhibition of "the important learning-by-doing 
process which is regarded as essential for the development of local skills 
needed for setting up and operating industrial units. The learning-by- 
doing process has often been seriously hampered by the insistence of 
foreign technology suppliers to use their own rather than local engineering 
and contracting firms at various stages of the project. Domestic firms 
have not been much different and have shown strong preference for foreign 
engineers and contractors; they have been unwilling or overtly cautious 
about using local expertise which they usually seem to regard as inadequately 
experienced" . 
26 Writing on technology transfers that are embodied in 
the establishment of American-owned enterprises, S Gee remarks that 
"from the standpoint of'the recipient country, foreign direct investments 
are not very desirable because of the limited ability to learn and absorb 
the technology and management skills in the case where the parent US firm 
retains complete ownership of the subsidiary". 
27 
25 Loc. Cit. 
26 Ibid., P 119 
27 S Gee, Op. Cit., Pp 32-3 
(c) Possible perpetuation of dependence. 
This can be caused primarily' through restrictive clauses contained in 
the relevant contracts. Restrictive clauses often delimit the freedom 
of technology recipient enterprises in their purchases of required 
materials, confining such purchases wholly or largely via the technology 
supplier. Other limitations that may give rise to dependency concern such 
matters as personnel training, management methods, the supply of spare 
parts, maintenance services, product improvement and diversification, and 
technical development. 
In the course of assessing the nature and impact of technological dependence, 
UNCTAD has pointed out that in the case of many Third World countries 
this dependence has led to a "structure of productive activity which has 
tended to make R and D activities of domestic firms and institutions 
either irrelevant or a poor imitation of advanced country institutions. 
This tendency has at times been exacerbated by the practice of foreign 
technology suppliers (notably transnational corporations) placing various 
types of restrictions on R and D in developing countries. Thus we find 
several exmaples where technology contracts have either totally prohibited, 
or prescribed limitations on, domestic firms undertaking their own 
research, including the badly needed 'adaptive-type' research. Such 
practices have been among the major disincentives to local research". 
28 
(d) Other drawbacks. 
The various points that have been put forward by writers on this subject 
suggest the existence of other possible disadvantages of project and 
process contracting. In the aforementioned UNCTAD paper, it is argued 
that wherever technology transfers are channelled through foreign-owned 
subsidiaries a "loss of control over critical decisions affecting the 
national economy" can result. 
29 Although countries can and do impose 
some restrictions on the activities of foreign subsidiaries, "such firms 
(ie multinational corporations), by the very fact that they have equity and 
management control, are able to exercise considerable influence over the 
main economic variables. Decisions concerning investment, employment, 
pricing, profit remittances, sources of inputs and market outlets may 
thus be made outside the country, invariably in accordance with the private 
, global objectives of the transnational system'ý 
30 
28 UNCTAD Secretariat: "Possible Mechanisms ..... " Op. Cit., P 119. 
29 Ibid., P 117. 
30 Loc. Cit. 
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It is further stressed that "so long as countries remain technologically 
dependent, external control will continue to be exercised in ways that do 
31 
not necessitate outright or even majority foreign ownership". 
After citing the case of ARAMCO, where ownership passed to Saudi Arabia 
but effective control remained with the same US companies, the UNCTAD 
Secretariat goes on to advance the view that "much depends on who takes 
management decisions; who controls the marketing and distribution channels; 
the degree of oligopoly in the market for technology; and the type of 
clauses found in technology contracts. Even in the case of a domestic 
firm with no foreign equity or foreign management, the power of independent 
decision making - at least in certain areas - of local owners and managers 
may be taken out of their hands through restrictive clauses in technology 
contracts". 
32 
7.4 Comments and Conclusions - 
The focus of this Chapter has centred on the first two methods of technology 
transfer. These methods have been described and critically analysed, 
despite the fact that several practical variants exist in the case of 
both methods. 
The fundamental characteristic of total project contracting is that the 
project is conceived of and implemented as one integrated and complete 
task. Agreement is reached between the two sides whereby the project 
contractor undertakes the supply of all the basic elements of the 
technology. In addition, the transferor is charged with the provision of 
some of, or even all, the required ancillary aspects of the project 
and its requisite technology. It is in this sphere that possible avenues 
can be diagnosed for varying the exact details wherever the initial 
decision to employ this method has been taken. 
aa 
While it is customary for the utilization of this method to imply that 
the transferor is made responsible for the construction of buildings and 
provision of required plant energy, three points need to be clarified 
in this context. These are as follows: 
31 Ibid., P 118 
32 Loc. Cit. 
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(a) Building construction and/or provision of plant energy are by no 
means essential ingredients of this method. 
(b) Any of four other ancillary elements may be made part of the 
contractor's obligations, either in lieu of the aforementioned two or 
in addition to them. 
(c) It is normally expected that this method implies commissioning the 
transferor with certain ancillary aspects of the technology project, 
where the number of these aspects typically ranges between a minimum of 
-ca and a maximum of six. 
In contrast to total project contracting, the total process contract is 
centred around the integrated supply of the technological hardcore of the 
project as represented by its requisite production facilities. - The 
contractor is here normally requested to render all the basic technological 
elements of the project whenever they apply. While a maximum of two- 
subsidiary elements may be part of the overall contract to be executed 
by the transferor, the construction of buildings is mostly excluded from 
the list of contractor's duties. Indeed, it is possible that the transferor 
in this case undertakes none of the supportive elements associated with 
the technology project in question. 
It can be said in conclusion that whatever may be the potential or actual 
drawbacks of total project/process contracting, certain circumstances 
do exist at present where a given variant of these methods becomes either 
desirable or-unavoidable. Once the decision is taken in principle to 
make use of such a variant, effort must be directed towards working out 
the various necessary details so as to enhance benefits to maximum and 
check harmful aspects to minimum. Needless to say that the top decisions 
that need to be taken by the sponsoring body are far from easy. 
Having set sights on a certain technology project, critical judgements 
need to be made regarding the basic method to be utilized and the exact 
details that need to accompany the chosen method. The overriding 
objectives must remain, throughout, that possible benefits to the national 
economy need to be maximized, the likelihood of the project's success 
enhanced, and the sum of pertinent costs (tangible and intangible; short-, 
medium-, and long-term) must be kept to minimum. 
CHAPTER EIGHT 
OTHER METHODS OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERENCE 
This Chapter is a description of the remaining eleven transfer methods 
which are grouped under three packaging levels, ie medium, low, and 
package-free transfers.. 
8.1 Major Process Contracting 
This method consists of the provision by the supplier of some (but not 
all) of the prospective project's requirements of basic elements of the 
technology. ' While it frequently happens here that the transferor 
supplies some of the transferee's hardware needs, it is often the case 
that the technology supplier is charged with rendering this equipment 
and certain associated services in an integrated manner for one (or more) 
production department(s) within the plant. The production department 
supplied may be a complete or partial product line, or alternatively a 
functional unit encompassing a given type of machinery. 
It is normal in these cases for the technology recipient to request the 
provision of all relevant software alongside the supply, installation, 
and commissioning of the hardware. Relevant elements making up the 
software usually include operating instructions, maintenance manuals, 
material and energy, requirements, and programming sets (if needed). 
Services that can be made available under these circumstances comprise 
plant engineering, equipment layout, training of operatives, and post-operatio 
maintenance. 
There are certain conditions which are likely to furnish the requisite 
basis for the adoption of this method in acquiring technology by Third 
World enterprises. Where, for instance, a sizeable expansion is intended 
by a fairly well-established industrial firm, major process contracting 
may be contemplated in the case of certain sections of the new plant, 
particularly those which are deemed to prove more technically exacting for 
local personnel. In some cases, this method may be regarded as relatively 
speedy and involving a low risk element even when local engineers and 
technicians could perform the necessary tasks associated with the purchased 
equipment. It is, moreover, conceivable in some industrial sectors that 
this method is virtually dictated on potential transferees due to the 
existence of crucial and tightly-held patent(s) and/or technical secrets 
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in certain segments along the product's process chain. 
What needs to be recognised is that this is a medium packaged transfer 
method signifying a compromise between ultra and highly packaged methods, 
on the one hand, and low packaged and package-free methods, on the 
other. Whenever the adoption of any transfer method(s) within any of 
these other groups is deemed either impossible or undesirable in the 
particular circumstances of the prospective project, the possibility of 
the transfer being accomplished through major process contracting comes 
distinctly to the fore. 
8.2 Patent and Know-how Contracting 
The fourth and fifth methods that can be utilized in technology transfer 
are respectively contracts involving the exploitation of patents and 
those related to the use of industrial know-how. The prime justification 
for considering these two methods under one major heading is the interrelation- 
ship that exists between them. Quite often they go together for practical 
reasons. Indeed it is a frequent occurrence that a transferor firm 
develops the relevant know-how in support of a certain patent. As 
Wilkins makes clear in this regard, it is often true that "the product, 
or the description in the patent, or mere drawings and instructions, are 
inadequate for transfers of technology; men are needed to carry, explain 
and facilitate the introduction of the new processes or products. The 
private firm can provide the institutional framework whereby these men 
can transfer technology". 
' 
Were the recipient Third World enterprise to obtain a "bare" patent 
licence, this would in many instances be insufficient to produce a 
marketable product. 
It is strongly contended by some experts in this field that the possession 
of patents has been relegated to a position of peripheral importance in 
the present setting of international transfers of technology. 
1M Wilkins: "The Role of Private Business in the International Diffusion 
of Technology" Journal of Economic History, Vol XXXIV No 1 (March 1974) 
P 176. 
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Market power and marketing techniques are seen as providing the real basis 
for strength on the global level. S Lall claims that "the importance of 
marketing (advertising, product differentiation, etc) in securing market 
power has grown enormously vis-a-vis the role of technology. The 
existence of this source of market power is in fact the essential 
condition for multinationalization... Even in a highly innovative 
industry, like pharmaceuticals, the essence of market power and high 
Z 
profits lies not so much in the patenting system as in marketing techniques". 
Lall stresses the point that the incidence of patenting is "fairly narrow, 
and is important only in chemicals, electrical (especially electronic) 
products, mechanical engineering and artificial fibres - all 'high 
technology' industries as defined by the percentage of R and D in total 
expenditures. The contradictions arise from the fact that, despite the 
theoretical significance of granting patent protection to private innovation, 
(i) a very large proportion of patents actually taken out seem to be 
unimportant for innovative activity in the industries concerned; and 9 
(ii) a large amount of research activity goes on in industries which 
do not go in much for patenting (high technology industries like aircraft 
and automobiles, and low technology industries like detergents, food 
3 
products and other consumer-oriented industries)". 
In a concluding remark 
as a subsidiary device 
structures, with the 1 
patents in some cases, 
know-how and marketing 
this writer asserts that "patents emerge very much 
for supporting strongly oligopolistic market 
: ading firms co-operating with each other in exchanging 
and using patents together with their secret 
in others to keep competition out". 
4 
This general theme is supported by UNIDO in one of its publications, 
where the point is made that the potential transferee in a developing 
country "does not place high value on rights obtainable from a patent 
licence because of the small role that such rights play in his country and 
the uncertainty as to how national laws will protect patent grants or 
2S Lall: "The Patent System and the Transfer of Technology to Less Developed 
Countries" Journal of World Trade Law, 10 (Jan-Feb 1976) Pp 7-8. 
3 "Ibid., P8 
4 Loc. Cit. 
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operate in the event of patent disputes". 
5 Consequently, the licensee's 
predominant need is usually to have access to technological know-how. ; `' 
8.2.1 Nature of Patent Contracts 
A "patent contract" confers on the recipient the right to utilize a 
certain patented knowledge for industrial purposes. What constitutes 
a "patent" is usually defined by statute, though patent legislation 
obviously differs from one country to another regarding such terms as 
duration, rights and scope. In drafting the patent agreement, the 
patentor is usually compensated financially-through the payments of 
running royalties, fixed sums, or a mixture of both. The privileges 
and duties of each party need to be spelled out within the relevant 
contract. 
8.2.2 Nature of Know-how. Contracts 
A "know-how" contract is supposed to-involve passing knowledge to the 
transferee and offering him the necessary guidance regarding technical 
matters within a-certain industrial field. The aim of this transaction 
is to enable the know-how purchaser to utilize it in such a way as to 
produce a given product or a group of products having regard to certain 
quality and cost standards. 
It is not absolutely clear how "know-how" can be precisely and legally 
defined, though the nature and content of the relevant know-how is 
presumed to be established in each agreement. In large measure, this 
ambiguity surrounding the notion of "know-how" is due to the absence of 
legal protection and the consequent lack of a relevant legal definition. 
Commenting on this problem, UNIDO remarks that for a know-how to be valuable 
and thus marketable "a substantial portion of the information is held in 
secret, which gives its possessor some technical and/or marketing 
advantage over those using information that is not secret. Like the 
patent, ownership can be ascribed to know-how. However, the owner of 
know-how, unlike the owner of a patent, has no legal recourse to prevent 
third parties from developing and employing the substance of the 
unpatented know-how". 
6' 
5 UNIDO: "Guidelines for Evaluation of Transfer of Technology Agreements" 
New York (United Nations 1979), P 9. 
6 Ibid., P 11. 
After pointing out that the four constituents of a know-how are "utility, 
novelty, confidentiality, and value" it is stressed by UNIDO in this 
context that "the latter two impose on the licensee a complex of obligations. 
Apart from compensation and legal-administrative matters, these obligations 
dominate much of the material in a know-how agreement". 
7 
It is from this 
angle that the licensor usually demands secrecy over his know-how, at 
least for a defined period. 
Industrial establishments possessing technological know-how had frequently 
sought in the past to regard their know-how as "trade secrets". 
In UNIDO's words a "trade secret" is "considered in most laws as 
constituting any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information used 
in one's business that gives the owner an opportunity to obtain advantage 
over competitors that do not know or use it". 
8 In most countries, 
legislation or common law have recognised trade secrets and afforded them 
some protection. However, in order for a know-how to be-licensed, it 
needs to have a practical industrial utility, be held wholly or partly 
in secret, and also possessed legitimately by a would-be transferor. 
International transfers of technical know-how usually cover a wide scope 
of practical knowledge and valuable experience. This is'clearly reflected 
by the contents of the relevant agreement which covers in many cases 
several major technical aspects. Amongst those aspects that could be 
noted here are detailed production methods, product design, relevant 
technical specifications, and choice of materials and components to be 
utilized in production. It is also not uncommon for these transactions 
to involve other services and facilities made available by the transferor 
in such fields as training, maintenance, and marketing. Numerous 
technical documents are normally passed from the transferor to the 
transferee, like drawings, blueprints, operation sheets, and work 
instructions. As regards forms of payment to suppliers in the case of 
know-how contracts they are similar to those of patents. 
Several Third World oil producing countries have turned to the method of 
know-how contracting as part of their search for substitute arrangements 
to conventional concession-type contracts with the oil companies. 
7 Ibid., P 12. 
8 Loc. Cit. 
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It is also not difficult to identify instances where individual developing 
countries have sought technical assistance on an ad hoc basis from 
specialized firms and contractors. 
HS Zakariya puts forward several cases where attempts to acquire petroleum 
technology by Third World nations have been pursued through relevant know- 
how agreements. He mentions the four-year contract concluded in summer 
1981 between India's Oil and Natural Gas Commission and the French oil 
concern CFP for the development of the Bombay High and other nearby off- 
shore oil fields. 
9 This contract calls for "full development of Bombay 
High using advanced techniques of reservoir management so that its (then) 
current production of 8.4m metric t/yr could be boosted to more than 19m 
metric t/yr in 1985". 
10 Zakariya mentions another example in this context 
involving the Venezuelan state oil enterprise PDV who negotiated a similar 
deal with CFP in 1981, whereby CFP would "provide assistance to PDV in such 
matters as the Venezuelan LPG projects, seismic work, development of -certain 
oil fields and secondary recovery 
8.2.3 Evaluation of Patent and Know-how Contracts 
Technology transfer deals-involving'patents and/or know-how form the normal 
substance of techmology licence agreements among industrial firms and other 
concerned establishments in the developed world. Developing countries can 
be considered as relative newcomers to the field, though those countries 
possessing comparatively good infrastructures have become increasingly 
interested in this type of technolgy transfer contracting. Where local 
entrepreneurs feel able to put together the envisaged project on the basis 
of the patent and/or, know-how content acquired through these contracts, one, 
or both, of these methods become highly practical' and relevant means of 
technology transfer. In cases where alternative methods of implementation 
are to be found only within ultra or highly packaged categories, the 
adoption of these methods becomes beneficial to the recipient nation by 
enhancing the process of learning by doing. 
The desire to enter into these transactions is often shared by many potential 
transferors in the developed countries. A know-how and/or patent agreement 
usually enables the supplier to reap good returns in the form of royalties, 
9HS Zakariya: "Transfer of Technology under Petroleum Development Contracts" 
Journal of World Trade Law, Vol 16 (1982) Pp 217-8 
10 Ibid., P 218 
11 Loc. Cit. 
In addition to opening, up the possibility in many cases for profitable 
sales of materials/components, equipment and spare parts, and technical 
and managerial services. Technology transferors may be able to attain 
these advantages while largely averting the risks, uncertainties, and 
restrictions associated with that particular venture. It can indeed be 
argued that under certain conditions the transferor firm will benefit from 
the expertise of the nationals who manage the enterprise on the basis of 
their experience and knowledge of local conditions. 
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From the viewpoint of Third World developing nations there exist two 
possible dangers when utilizing these avenues to acquire technology. The 
first concerns, the possible adoption of a needlessly high level of packag- 
ing in effectuating the transfer. Many western firms decidedly prefer 
these comprehensive transactions while, at the same time, the number of 
potential transferees looking favourably at such transactions seems to be 
quite large. In cases where agreements of this kind are endorsed, the 
technology recipient is made to rely on the patent and/or know-how holder 
for matters like the supply of equipment/machinery/materials/components, 
the provision of engineering services, or product design. These stipulations 
normally raise the costs of the deal and hinder the process of technological 
development of the host country, particularly when the services contracted 
for can be reasonably provided within the host country. 
in fact the situation can be notably damaging when the transferor is 
charged with the provision of services that can be equally well catered for 
locally. After noting the relative decline of the importance of patented 
knowledge, S Lall suggests several reasons for the continued interest of 
western firms in patent holding. Amongst these reasons is the considera- 
tion of patents as a 'monopolistic device to strengthen marketing/know- 
how market power by an especially strong and predatory leader in an 
oligopoly. This. is illustrated by the case of Xerox in the recent US 
investigations; and it may also be true of pharmeceuticals in LDCs 
(least developing countries), where patents do not really add to the MNCs' 
effective control of the markets but help to prevent potential threats by 
local or other foreign firms". 
12 
12 S Lall, Op. Cit. P9 
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The second danger which may accompany patent and/or know-how' contracting is 
the possible insertion of restrictive clauses' and other harsh terms in the 
contract. Restrictive cal uses circumvent the transferee's activities 
relating to matters like market areas, 'future expansions, ' sub-licensing, 
product improvements and pricing. Moreover, the transferee may be' 
obliged, for various reasons, to pay high royalties/fees or agree to'a 
long period of contract validity. 
8.3 Trade-mark and Franchise Contracting 
In this section, an attempt is made'to expound and assess trade-mark and 
franchise contracts. These two transfer methods are discussed under one 
section due to the existence of some significant similarities between them. 
8.3.1 Nature of Trade-mark Contracts 
UNIDO defines trade-marks as "distinctive visual and sometimes aural devices, 
words or emblems (symbols), or a combination of them, that a firm applies 
to the goods it trades in, or to the services it performs, to indicate to 
the public that they are the firm's goods or services". 
13 The trade-mark 
contract confers upon the recipient enterprise the right to produce the 
same product as the technology transferor, using the same trade-mark to 
label the article. As 'E W Hayden remarks, the granting of trade-mark rights 
is "typically provided under'the explicit provision that the product be 
manufactured in accordance with technical information and'production methods 
prescribed by the supplier. ` Obviously of paramount concern here is the 
western firm's desire to protect its product reputation". 
14 Many enterprises 
in developing countries wish to avail themselves of foreign trade-marks 
which have established their"market standing. 
In contrast to the case of know-how, there exist "distinct statutes in 
nearly every country that govern the ownership, registration and use of 
trade-marks". 15 In comparable similarity to patents, the trade-mark "con- 
stitutes aproperty right. In some countries, its ownership is established 
or confirmed only when the trade-mark registering authority, established 
by the government, accepts the registration of a trade-mark (after'an 
13 UNIDO, Op. Cit., P 34 
14 EW Hayden: "US Corporate Experience in Transferring Industrial Technology 
to the Soviet Bloc" in MJ Cetron &HF Davidson (ed. ): "Industrial 
Technology Transfer" Leyden (Noordhoff, 1977) P 265. 
15 UNIDO, Op. Cit., P 34 
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examination procedure prescribed by law) in the name of a person or a firm. 
In other countries ownership is established by first use'. 
16 Nonetheless, 
trade-marks are not seen as licensable property in some countries, since 
legislative bodies sometimes'take the view that "the transfer of the right 
of use of the trade-mark to another party is not possible without the con- 
current transfer of the goodwill of the firm". 
17 Where trade-marks are 
licensable and a trade-mark transaction is struck, it is fairly common for 
the licensor to demand supervisory rights in order to ensure product quality. 
In fact such supervision is`legally binding in some countries. 
It is frequently the case that the trade-mark agreement is accompanied by 
a know-how contract, in order to furnish the required technological basis 
for the recipient enterprise. For it is in the interest of all parties 
concerned that the product bears the same specifications as that of the 
parent company, or at least resembles it closely. Even where there is no 
explicit technical know-how contract supplementing the trade-mark agreement, 
it is usually possible to find relevant provisions within the contract deal- 
ing with technical aspects. Payment by the transferee may be through run- 
ning royalties, fixed sums, or 'a mixture of both. 
8.3.2 Nature of Franchise Contracts ` 
The "franchise" deal permits the licensee to produce a certain product or 
render a given service that is intimately associated with the operations of 
the licensor. In this case the licensee will operate within a defined 
territory, conform to a certain level of quality or service, and receive 
technical guidance from the licensor. All these matters, together with 
other details, need to be spelled out fully within the text of the contract. 
Concerning payments, stipulations are usually made in these contracts as to 
the rights and obligations of the respective parties. 
The franchise contract is often employed in cases where the maintenance of 
the franchisor's high-reputation is considered vital. As UNIDO makes clear 
in this connection "franchising is a distribution system rather than a 
production system. It permits an agreed-upon uniform method of marketing 
a product or performing a service". 
18 Apart from technical guidance, the 
franchisor frequently undertakes to train the franchisee in certain 
administrative fields, such as inventory planning and control, pricing, and 
16 Loc. Cit. 
17 Loc. Cit. 
18 Ibid., P 37 
accounting. On the other hand, certain duties and controls are usually 
imposed by the franchisor in order to protect his trade on service mark. 
Comparing the franchise with the trade-mark contract, a few salient points 
arise. The first is that the trade-mark contract is aimed particularly 
at exploiting a certain trade name/sign. Whereas the purpose of the trade- 
mark is usually to manufacture a product, that of the franchise is not 
necessarily so. The franchise. can be in connection, with a service, or a 
group of services, such as maintenance. As for technical guidance, 
co-operation, and inter-party services, both types can involve a certain 
degree of these dealings. 
8.3.3 Evaluation of Trade-marks and Franchise Contracts 
While there must be certain circumstances where a trade-mark or a franchise 
contract can contribute beneficially to the successful process of 
technology acquisition by a Third World country, it is possible to detect 
some probable shortcomings resulting from the adoption of these two 
methods. One criticism that may be levelled against these two types of 
contracts is that the cost to developing countries may be in excess of 
their benefits. This would probably hold true when the novel know-how 
content is small and/or the net returns to the transferor excessive. It 
can in general be expected that a detriment to the host country's interest 
occurs when one or a combination of the following circumstances prevails: 
(a) The price/royalty paid by the recipient enterprise is unduly high 
when the matter is viewed in the light of comparable world standards. 
(b) The contract period is too lengthy. 
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(c) The licensee is subjected to serious and unfair restraints in comparison 
with the nature of the business activity. 
(d) The technological content of the transaction is very small or 
negligible. 
8.4 Package-free Methods of Technology Transfer 
Six other methods for transferring technology will be described and 
evaluated in this section. Though differing widely in nature and detailed 
characteristics, the general feature common to all these methods is the 
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absence of any packaging content. They are often employed in conjunction Eý 
with one another and in a-supportive manner, so as to accomplish the 
desired transfer. For instance, a particular technology transfer may be 
effected via the utilization of an engineering services agreement and the 
purchase of relevant machinery. 
In practice; these methods are frequently made use of in an ancillary 
capacity, where the major role in the transfer process is fulfilled by other 
means. S Thebaud remarks in this context that "transfers of technology 
may be complemented by the scientific and technical literature, educational 
programmes, technical meetings, consultations with experts, personal contacts 
and, in particular contacts between supplier and client". 
19 Nevertheless, 
it is possible for any of the six under-mentioned methods to be utilized on 
its own to effect a given technology transfer, especially when this transfer 
is on a small scale and does not belong to the class of relatively complex 
or sophisticated technology. 
An attempt to describe these methods is made in the first six subsections 
that follow, while the last subsection contains an evaluation of the methods 
in question. 
8.4.1 Engineering Services Agreements 
Industrial establishments in developing countries frequently choose to 
acquire specialist engineering services from industrial firms or other 
establishments in developed countries. The services which may be acquired 
are quite diverse, ranging from the choice of machinery and product design 
to the design of the whole production system. Except when the supplier of 
engineering services is charged with the provision of materials and 
machinery his "inputs are basically informational and managerial. Informa- 
tional inputs include layouts, lists and specifications of equipment, 
product literature and sales aids, while managerial inputs include providing 
expert services-training the recipient's personnel in production management, 
co-ordinating supplies with plant erection and the like". 
20 
19 S Thebaud: "An Evaluation of Technology Transfer in Underdeveloped 
Countries" in MJ Cetron &HF Davidson (ed. ): "Industrial Technology 
Transfer" Leyden (Noordhoff, 1977) P 402 
20 UNIDO , Op. Cit., P5 
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The typical engineering services agreement is a short-term contract listing 
the technical work that the supplier of engineering services has agreed to 
perform. No extensive restraints are usually placed on the recipient by the 
supplier. Even when significant technical know-how is employed in the 
course of executing the agreement the obligations borne by the local 
enterprise pertain basically to confidentiality rather than right of use. 
It is a common situation that the engineering firm is, chanoed with designing 
(and possibly constructing) the basic plant with' the transferee disclosing 
to the engineering firm the technical know-how acquired from the transferor. 
In such cases transferor firms are often operating companies without the 
facilities or readily available personnel for executing overseas engineering 
projects. 
New or would-be. industrial establishments in developing countries can 
obtain requisite engineering-services from specialist agencies or operating 
firms in the industrialized countries, while other tasks pertaining to 
project execution are undertaken either indigenously or contracted out to 
other foreign firms. Under certain circumstances the sponsoring body 
decides to break up the implementation of the project into several well 
identified parts, so that engineering services can be carried out by a 
specific firm whereas other contractors are charged with fulfilling other 
constituents of the same project. 
8.4.2 Technical Consultancy Agreements 
This form of technology transfer is similar, to some degree, to the previous 
one. The important point of'similarity is that both methods involve the 
rendering of technological services by a specialized firm to industrial 
enterprises in developing countries. Neither of these two methods entail 
the passage of hardware from the respective transferor to the transferee, 
though the possibility of exchanging relevant software items does 
exist. 
A significant aspect of divergence is that the previous method is confined 
to engineering services, whilst the present one is more general. In additio 
the technical consultancy method has the characeristic of being advisory in 
nature, as top management may accept or decline the counsel thus submitted. 
The supplier of technical advice has only a professional responsibility 
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in guaranteeing a standard of "care, skill and diligence" to characterize 
his recommendations. In contrast, the supplier of engineering services 
21 
normally has specific duties to fulfil certain specialized types of work 
by way of actual implementation of the project. 
Specialist technical consultants are plentiful and they can advise industrial 
firms on various technical aspects. These include the type of product to 
be produced, choice of materials/components for production and their sources, 
avenues for securing expert manpower, training opportunities for personnel, 
suppliers of machinery and equipment, marketing estimates and forecasts, 
and other matters. 
Managers and sponsors of existing or would be manufacturing enterprises in 
the Third World have made use of this method as a basic means of effecting 
required transfers in many cases. It must, however, be stressed that the 
relevant industrial sectors, where an organic use of this method has been 
made, are not characterized by a high degree of sophistication or technical 
complexity, making it thus possible for the developing country in question 
to rely primarily, or to a great extent, on this method. Examples of manu- 
facturing activities which are pertinent in this respect are cement manufac- 
ture, timber products, metal cans, and certain assembly operations. 
In some cases, western transferor firms, whether utilizing the technology 
in question or having it embodied in their final products, do not have all 
the required expertise to install a manufacturing plant. Under these 
circumstances such firms may either refrain from undertaking major transfer 
contracts, or else do so in association with engineering and/or technical 
consultancy organizations. In some cases these organizations act as sub- 
contractors to the main technology suppliers, while in others they operate 
in a relatively separate and independent capacity. 
The value of the technical consultancy agreement lies in the extent of 
both depth and width of experience possessed by the consultant within the 
specific industrial area. He may become a comprehensive, convenient, and 
single source of advice and assistance, thereby enabling his client to 
establish and develop his manufacturing units rapidly and economically. 
21 : Ibid. P6 
i 
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Some contracts for consultancy services are of short-term duration, while 
others may be medium or long-term. Wilkins remarks in this context that 
"technical assistance from abroad may be requested by - sought out by - 
host nation companies, be effectively utilized, and serve as a highly viable 
means of both technological transfer and diffusion. It may be particular 
or general, informal or formal, short-term or long-term". 
22 
Technical consultancy agreements' have increasingly come to the fore since 
the end of the Second Vorld War. Their value has been particularly 
apparent in the case of the more industrialized countries when seeking to 
acquire technical know-how from advanced nations. Wilkins makes the point 
that "perhaps the most impressive (and successful) technical assistance 
accords have been between Japanese and western firms in the'post-World War M. . 
11 years. My- point here is simply that often domestic - receiving - firms 
took the initiative in obtaining technological assistance from abroad and 
that this type of initiative should be tested as possibly one of the most 
effective forms of international technological diffusion. I might suggest 
that the reason for its effectiveness was that when this occurred there was 
, 
an existing private business structure, an agency, that could absorb the =ä s 
technology". 
23 ;., 
Gee also supports the role of technical consultancy in technology transfer- 
ence. He maintains that "consultancy firms are playing an ever more 
important role in transferring technology from the industrialized to develop- 
ing countries. Their expertise is diagnostic in being able to provide to 
developing countries the evaluational and judgmental skills necessary in 
analysing problems, determining technological needs, accessing the 
repositories of technology available in the industrial world, and providing 
the marketing and management skills that underpin all ventures". 
24 
It has been noted, however, by some observers that this method often has 
the disadvantage of "being discontinuous and... (does) not contribute to the 
creation of a local scientific and technical infrastructure. One might 
also point out that the information given by these experts may be biased in 
favour of the interest of the institution or firm for which they work". 
25 
22 M Wilkins, Op. Cit., P 182 ! 
23 Ibid. P 185 
24 S Gee: "Technology Transfer, `Innovation, and International Competitiveness" 
New York (John Wiley & Sons, 1981) P 36 
25 S Thebaud, Op. Cit. P 402 
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8.4.3 Employment of Foreign Experts 
Firms in developing countries have very frequently employed foreign experts 
as a means of filling important gaps in their manpower requirements. In 
particular, this has occurred in the case of skills and specializations that 
are rare' and intricate. The more professional and highly qualified expatriates 
have frequently been employed in tasks associated with product/process innova- 
tion, modernization, and development. Occupations of this nature are to be 
found in such fields as research and development, maintenance, plant layout, 
product design, choice of machinery and equipment, the selection of materials/ 
components for production, and personnel training. 
It is well known for instance that many Briton's have for decades been 
ready to render their service to national and foreign-based enterprises 
operating in the Third World. J S. Fforde is quoted by Wilkins to have 
described how British nationals "of the technical managerial type" went 
to the Indian subcontinent and Latin America for "career service". 
26 They 
usually go there to work for a certain business, but would soon find them- 
selves "recruited by one enterprise after another (in jute manufacture, 
cotton spinning and weaving, paper manufacture, flour milling, and light 
engineering) as 'a type of efficiency expert"'. 
27 
To a large degree, the employment of foreign experts can save plants in 
developing countries from the unwelcome situation of technical dependence 
and consequent high'costs that accompany certain other forms of technology 
transfer (e. g. project contracting, patent contracting, or know-how 
contracting). Empirical observations have confirmed that the employment 
of foreign experts has proved to be a useful means of technology transfer 
in setting up small and medium sized industrial establishments, especially 
in the case of relatively standard technology industries such as food 
processing and some engineering industries. 
State-owned oil concerns in the Third World have made use of this method 
within the context of their drive to lessen their dependence on the oil 
multi-nationals. Various schemes have been devised and put into effect 
to enable oil producing countries to undertake by themselves the required 
activities in relation to oil exploration, extraction and processing. To 
achieve this aim, a large number of government-level bilateral, regional, 
26 M Wilkins, Op. Cit., P 183 Also footnote 60 on the same page. 
27 Loc. Cit. 
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and multi-lateral protocols have been promulgated. Almost invariably 
these agreements embody the dispatch of experts to the respective oil 
producing country for such purposes as training, operational management, 
and scientific analysis and experimentation. A number of Third World oil 
states have entered into respective co-operation agreements with other 
developing countries, while, at the same-time, valuable assistance has 
been channelled from UN organs to-these Third World nations. 
28 
8.4.4 Machinery Supplies 
Another method that has been utilized increasingly by firms in developing 
countries is the purchase of required machinery on an "ad hoc" basis. 
Machinery and other equipment are normally required by new industrial 
establishments or by existing firms when they expand or modernize their 
plants. 
The origins of this method as. a means of transferring technology can be 
traced as far back as the early years of the 19th century. Available 
evidence suggests that this was the dominant mode of transfer among contem- 
porary industrializing nations during the nineteenth and early part of the 
twentieth centuries. This endeavour was prompted by the desire of local 
entrepreneurs in the United States and Western Europe to produce in substitu- 
tion for imports. As Wilkins remarks in this connection, "from available 
information, it is clear that one aspect of technological diffusion in the 
nineteenth century lay in the significant import substitution in the United 
States and Western Europe. There is substantial evidence that in certain 
products, American firms, for example, rapidly substituted locally-produced 
goods for imports. Likewise, in the late nineteenth century, when British 
shoe manufacturers met American competition, they replicated US methods to 
meet competition". 
29 Regarding the latter point, Wilkins illustrates that 
"the British started (then) to import American shoe-making machinery to 
obtain the appropriate technological processes". 
30 
28 HS Zakariya, Op. Cit., Pp 218-220 
29 M Wilkins, Op. Cit., P 180 
30 Loc. Cit., footnote 48 
7, } 
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In fact, the supply of machinery stands out as, a, necessary occurrence that 
normally takes place in any process, of technology acquisition by any 
industrial enterprise. .A supply of machinery may, take place 
by itself, 
thereby emerging as the essential method employed to effect the transfer 
in these cases. This occurs when the supply of, equipment is considered 
sufficient for operational purposes, particularly in standard technology, 
industries like textiles, cement, paper, printing, and food-processing.,, - 
The comparatively uncomplicated nature of technology, in these industries 
is coupled to the relative absence of proprietary techniques/processes. 
Gee expresses the view that the export of technology intensive products 
(by advanced nations) is the most common form by which technology is trans- 
ferred overseas. In terms of dollar-volume, the sale of technology 
intensive products represents the dominant mode of technology transfer". 
31 
The level-of industrial development that has been achieved, by the develop- 
ing country in'question is likely to, represent a fundamental determinant 4 
of the possibility and scope of exploiting this method of transfer in a 
primary capacity. -0n 
the other hand, it is quite possible for this method ` 
to be combined with any of a, number of other methods in bringing about the 
transfer required (e. g. the employment of foreign experts or the purchase 
of foreign engineering services). In the context of evaluating this 
method, S Gee remarks that "it is not a very efficient method because the 
key technological content generally i, s, difficult to extract and often 
32 
constitutues but a small proportion of the overall product". He goes on 
to point out further that "detailed design know-how, manufacturing technolo- 
gier, and trade secrets are generally unavailable even with the most astute 
reverse-engineering expertise. Even with detailed operational and 
maintenance manuals, developing insight into the design know-how and, 
manufacturing techniques behind the product is generally a very difficult 
33 
task", 
Apart from the purchase of machinery for the set-up or expansion of 
industrial projects in, developing countries, there exists a separate avenue 
for the transfer of technology through this method., A single piece of 
equipment may be bought where an "emulation" or "imitation" process sub- 
sequently ensues. For instance, there are some indications in recent years 
31 S Gee, Op. Cit., P 34 
32 Loc. Cit. 
33 Ibid., P 35 
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of such a process actually occuring in the case of Japanese - Chinese flow 
of technology. Basing his remarks on information obtained during his visit 
to Japan, J Baranson points out that "Japanese'firms have noted that the 
Chinese have purchased a relatively large number of single sample equipment 
without any follow-on orders. Many of these firms are now reluctant to 
send 'high technology' items on this basis. A recurrent Japanese visitor 
to the Canton Fair has observed continued improvement each year in Chinese 
machine tools and he attributes'some of these improvements to copying 
Japanese prototypes". 
34 
Various means can be utilized to effect machinery purchasesrby establishments 
in developing countries. Among these are public invitations for tenders, 
enquiries lodged with pre-selected suppliers and subsequent correspondence 
and negotiations with them, and personal visits by suppliers or purchasers 
to each other. The ability to make an accurate choice of the necessary 
machinery and other equipment and the successful conclusion of their pro- 
curement, installation, and operation are important measures of the firm's 
maturity and the performance of'its management, particularly when the new 
project is large and/or complex in nature. 
8.4.5 Technical Publications 
Numerous technical publications are issued by various institutions in 
developed countries. These often contain information relating to modern 
technological break-throughs or existing technological knowledge. Some- 
times, a brief reference is-made to such knowledge in the literature, but 
in other cases relevant details are explained, or at least some main 
features are spelled out. Interested parties in developing countries can 
under certain conditions make use'of these publications. In many instances 
these serve'to arouse an initial interest in the technology under considera- 
tion, so that other steps in the appropriate direction may follow. 
Universities and research institutions in the developed world normally 
issue technical periodicals. Patent offices publish patent gazettes listing 
new patent registration while giving some details pertaining to each 
recognized patent. Some specialist. associations and chambers of commerce/ 
34 J Baranson: "People's Republic of China's Purchases of Industrial Plants 
from Japan" in MJ Cetron &HF Davidson (ed. ): "Industrial Technology 
Transfer" Leyden [Noordhoff, 1977) P 252 
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Industry also publish technical newsletters orjournals that can be use- 
ful in this regard. - In the case of the chemical industry it is claimed 
that the "leading publications are 'Chemical Week', 'Chemical and Engineering 
News', 'Chemical Marketing News', and the 'Journal of Commerce"'. 
35 
8.4.6 Personal Contacts 
As a means of technology transmission these interchanges can be very 
significant, even when they are viewed as supplementary to other methods in 
this field. Visits to developing countries by personnel working with firms 
marketing industrial equipment/engineering services, consultancy firms, or 
interested government agencies can be useful in this direction. Similar 
visits made by Third World personnel to developed countries are also 
important, and so are personal contacts among those who are directly involved 
with technology acquisition within the developing, countries themselves. 
Conferences, seminars, associations and committees which bring together 
technology-minded people from varous nations are also beneficial in this 
regard. 
Company personnel "travelling on business and representatives of companies 
posted to other countries often obtain important information concerning new 
technology. If a company is seriously interested in licensing technology, 
it may send its technical personnel to visit the particular firm that owns 
the technology" to seek additional information. 
36 Similarly, visitors from 
"other companies-may also be an important source of information". 
37 
Reflecting on this-method of transfer and basing his comments on the 
American experience. in exporting technology, S Gee expresses the view that 
the "additional, non-commercial avenues... contribute to the technology flow 
from the United States. For example, government to government agreements 
between the United States and other countries are commonly employed to 
exchange technical information or to conduct co-operative R&D projects. 
The agreements cover a host of subjects such as energy, environmental 
38 
protection, and national defence". Gee continues this exposition by 
35 UNIDO: "National Approaches to the Acquisition of Technology" New York 
(United Nations, 1977) P 15 
36 Loc. Cit. 
37 Loc. Cit. 
38 S Gee, Op. Cit., P 36 
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pointing out that "participation in international meetings is another 
method by which scientific and technical information is exchanged with other 
countries. International meetings also serve as a convenient forum for 
developing contacts'with colleagues in other countries, and they generally 
are an important means for establishing additional information sources in 
the participant's field of specialization. The United States is usually 
39 
well represented in international meetings and conferences". 
To illustrate the importance of personal contacts in the transfer process, 
it may be noted here that China has been devoting a special attention to 
this method in her wish to acquire' foreign technology. As J Baranson 
explains, Chinese teams "visiting Japan... consist of from anywhere between 
8 and 45 members and stay from 4 to 6 weeks. During that time they visit 
as many as a hundred plants". 
40 He goes on, the "Chinese are principally 
concerned with collecting technical information and, do not place any orders 
while in Japan. -These visits add significant dimension to paper learning 
upon which-isolated Chinese technicians have had to rely heavily in the 
past. This includes observation of equipment in operation and related 
41 
aspects of production organization and management". 
8.4.7 Evaluation of Package-free Transfer-Methods 
Six different means of technology transfer have been described under the 
heading of "package-free" methods. For the most part, these channels are 
used when the developing country concerned has achieved a fair degree of 
advancement in industrial progress. Such a state of medium development is 
particularly required in the case of-relatively large-scale and/or modern 
technology projects, in order for these package-free methods of transfer 
to be feasible. 
Apart from their positive impact on the process of gaining experience for 
' all those concerned with technology acquisition and utilization, these 
methods do usually have the accompaniment of lowering the total initial cost 
of the project. There is further the added advantage of boosting morale 
and building up national self-confidence. 
39 Loc. Cit. 
40 J Baranson, Op. Cit., P 252 
41 Loc. Cit. 
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There are nonetheless certain drawbacks which may come about as a result 
of utilizing these methods even if we assume that pertinent technology 
needs have been correctly identified. These possible shortcomings can be 
classified under four main headings, thus: 
(1) Protraction of project implementation. Delays in execution may 
occur owing to the relative inexperience of project sponsors, managers, 
engineers, and other personnel. 
(2) Faulty project design. Once again, due to insufficient experience 
the "sense of proportion" in the overall design of the project may leave 
something to be desired. Quite apart from the possibility of major 
technical blunders, mistakes or omissions may arise in the more "artistic" 
aspects of project design, such as machines and men spacing, choice of 
handling apparatus,, provisions for energy power, adequacy of employee- 
services, and the suitability of shopfloor working conditions like lighting, 
ventilation, humidity, and temperature. Whenever these matters do not 
receive the attention they deserve the surfacing of operational problems 
becomes all the more likely. 
(3) Operational problems. It is no exaggeration to state that most 
Third World countries face a serious shortage of qualified managerial/ 
supervisory staff of skilled operatives needed to man the variety of 
managerial, supervisory and technical posts which are essential for the 
functioning of modern manufacturing plants. The consequence of this 
shortage is manifested in the recurrence of operational problems in the 
case of newly-established projects, such as those relating to equipment 
maintenance, inventory planning and-control, material wastage rates, 
quality control and others. It is likely that these problems become all 
the more acute and widespread when the new project is not linked in someway 
to a competent technology transferor, particularly when the project in 
question is large and/or embodies relatively advanced technology. 
(4) Costs of unpackaging. UNCTAD has pointed out that the possibility 
exists, in practice for unpackaging to result in higher net costs than other- 
wise, due largely to inflated prices charged by suppliers. 
42 It is 
42 UNCTAD: "Handbook on the Acquisition of Technology by Developping Countries" 
New York (United Nations, 1978) P 33 
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particularly likely for this to occur when the project sponsors are 
inexperienced and unaware of the nature, scope, and value of the services/ 
goods they require. Moreover, when the project is intended to meet a 
tight specification "the guarantee of quality, or of time limit, will not 
be forthcoming from the supplier unless the whole package is accepted". 
43 
There is also the problem of balancing the possible immediate high costs of 
unpackaging against "longer-run but hard to measure gains if the business 
of unpackaging is learnt, this in turn making it possible to mix foreign 
and local technology, to say nothing of mixing other foreign and local 
inputs". 44 
8.5 Comments and Conclusions 
An attempt has been made in this chapter to describe and evaluate the eleven 
transfer methods not covered by the previous chapter. These methods vary 
from being medium packaged to package-free. As the benefits and drawbacks 
associated with these methods differ widely, there is clearly a given set 
of circumstances that can be regarded as conducive to the adoption of each 
method. Decision-makers must, therefore, attempt to select the most 
appropriate method(s) to effect the requisite transfer in each case. For 
instance, certain situations are expected to be favourable to the employ- 
ment of major-process contracting, e. g. where a soundly placed and well- 
established Third World enterprise is committed to a major expansion, 
particularly if speed is paramount. In general, therefore, it is possible 
to expect that whenever a medium-packaged transfer method is deemed to be 
the best answer to the problem, this method would warrant serious considera- 
tion. However, it is necessary for interested enterprises in developing 
countries to guard themselves against certain possible dangers when making 
use of the various methods outlined in this chapter, such as over-reliance 
on the prospective transferor and acceptance of unreasonably restrictive 
clauses and other harsh terms requested by the technology supplier. 
There can be no doubt, therefore, that the choice of the most appropriate 
method for a particular transfer and the optimal determination of other 
relevant details is a very demanding task. In tackling these hard 
decisions the sponsoring authority can be guided by some general principles, 
43 Loc. Cit. 
44 Loc. Cit. 
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but a decidedly high level of informed judgment is unquestionably needed, 
especially where the technology in question is relatively modern or complex 
and/or the embodying project's size is large. The primary aim must always 
be-to secure the technology at the lowest possible overall cost, raise the 
probability of the project's success, and enrich the implied contribution 
towards the process of gaining experience in the national economy. 
PART III 
INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AND TRANSFER 
OF TECHNOLOGY IN IRAQ 
28 
CHAPTER NINE 
9` 
THE PATTERN OF INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT IN IRAQ 
Official independence was achieved by Iraq in 1932 and a national government 
was formed in that year, even though a nucleus of governmental administration 
had been gradually put together previously during the British mandate over 
the country. On obtaining independence, Iraq covered an area of 438,317 
square kilometers with a population of 3.38 million in 1934, rising to 4.816 
million in 1947, and 6.299 million in 1957. By 1965, Iraq's population had 
risen to 8.047 million, increasing to 11.124 million in 1975 and 13.2 
million in 1980. 
During the quarter of a century from independence until 1958, Iraq 
pursued a general economic and social policy,, that was characterized by 
limited central planning. The State's. actual role in the process of 
industrial development was confined to overall economic direction, 
although there were some notable exceptions where.. the State had actively 
intervened. For instance, a few major plants (eg oil refineries and 
cement-making projects) were founded by the government with the intention 
of selling them to the public when they became well established and 
commercially viable. 
The pace of industrial development during this period was slow. A 
number of nationally owned industrial projects in the private sector 
were set up during this period, but these were viewed as insufficient 
for tapping the country's potential and meeting the growth rates which 
had been hoped for. Consequently ,, foreign enterprises were provided with 
certain incentives to invest in the country, particularly when such 
investment was directed towards the establishment of the relatively 
large or medium-sized types. of industrial projects. 
A greater emphasis on central planning became obvious after 1958. This 
emphasis continued, and even increased, throughout the 1960's and 1970's. 
Major nationalization laws were passed in 1964 and 1972, and the machinery 
of central planning was greatly enlarged and strengthened. Increasingly, 
the State acquired a dominant role within the industrial sector, becoming 
the most important producer and investor in the country. 
219 
All major sectors of the economy experienced high rates of investment 
expenditure , due largely to the increasingly enhanced position of the 
State in the economy. Substantial appropriations of investment funds 
were made by the State to the industrial sector during these two decades, 
thereby underpinning a process of high rates of growth in all branches 
of industry. 
9.1 Economic Growth in the 1970's 
A remarkable rate of growth occurred in the Iraqi economy during the 
1970's. Between 1970 and 1978, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) grew 
from ID 1139.8 m to ID 6838.2 m (Table 9.1). This represents a rise of 
almost 500% over the period. Although population increased by over 2.5 
million during this span, a fairly impressive advance had been recorded 
by per capita GDP. In 1970, per capita GDP, was ID 120.0 reaching 
ID 554.7 by 1978, a rise of 362.3% over the period. 
The figures mentioned above are all expressed in current prices. When 
'constant prices are made use of, the increases referred to remain high, 
though the amounts of increment become smaller. It is thus clear from 
Table 9.2 that over the 8-year period 1970-1978, GDP rose from 
ID 2618.8 m to ID 5762.7 m in constant 1975 prices, indicating an overall 
advance of 120% as compared with the previously cited figure of 500% which 
does not take account of inflation. 
The respective importance of the three major economic sectors is analysed in 
Table 9.3. Over this period the productive, sector represented an average of almost 
78% of Iraqi GDP. This sector is composed of three major elements, le 
oil, industry and agriculture. It is important to note, however, that oil 
occupies a position of foremost importance not merely within the productive 
sector but in the whole economy, though no official figures are published 
as regards its exact share of GDP. 
It is possible, however, to estimate the relative position of the oil 
sector on the basis of available statistics. In 1978, the total value of 
Iraqi exports stood at $11067 million (Table 9.4 ). Assuming an exchange 
rate of three dollars to the Iraqi dinar, this sum would be equivalent 
to ID 3689 m. In that year, the country's non-oil exports amounted 
to about ID 63 million, thus giving an estimated value of Iraq's 
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Table 9.1 
GROWTH OF GDP AND PER CAPITA GDP IN IRAQ, 1970-78 (CURRENT PRICES) 
Year 
GDP 
Value (ID m) 
% rise 
on previous 
year 
Per Capita GDP 
Value (ID )% rise 
on previous 
year 
1970 1139.8 - 120.0 - 
1971 1315.0 15.4 134.0 11.7 
1972 1327.1 0.9 130.9 -2.3 
1973 1512.1 13.9 144.4 10.3 
1974 3331.5 120.3 307.4 112.9 
1975 3904.0 17.2 349.0 13.5 
1976 5113.8 31.0 442.1 26.7 
1977 5593.4 9.4 - 459.6 4.0 
1978 6838.2 22.3 554.7 20.7 
Source: "Annual Abstract of Statistics" 1978, 
published by the Central Statistical 
Organization (Ministry of Planning, 
Baghdad/Iraq) p 133. 
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oil exports of around ID 3626 m. This figure represents 
62.9% of Iraqi GDP in 1978. However, this latter percentage is bound 
to be raised when two other considerations are taken into account, 
namely the value of oil and gas consumed inside the country and the 
value added by the country's oil and gas processing industry. It is 
thus reasonable, to expect the share of the oil and gas sector to 
represent some 60% to 65% of total Iraqi GDP. 
Consequently, it can be stated that oil is by far the most influential 
single sector within the Iraqi economy. As can be noted from table 9.2, 
the output value of the productive sector was boosted by 23.4% in 1973 
when a significant jump occurred in the price of oil. Indeed, Iraq 
was able to reap the benefits of the oil price rises in 1970,1971, 
1973 and 1979, whereupon increasing investment allocations were made 
during the 1970's in all sectors of the economy. 
Table 9.4 lists the respective dollar values of Iraqi exports and imports 
In selected years over the period 1950-1980. It is obvious from this 
table that between 1970 and 1980 Iraq's exports leapt forward from 
$1100 m to $26429 m, a jump of 2303%. For imports, the corresponding 
increase from 1970 to 1978 amounted to 728%. 
From 1971 onwards, crude oil represented over 90% of the annual value of 
Iraq's exports. In addition to the increase in the price of oil during 
this period, two other important developments within the oil sector had 
their significant impact on the Iraqi economy. These two developments 
related to the nationalization of foreign oil interests and the growth 
in oil output. Nationalization laws were issued in 1972,1973 and 1975, 
so that by the latter year no trace remained of the concession-type 
contracts-in the Iraqi oil sector. Gradually, the State super-imposed 
its authority over the foreign companies, so much so that by 1975 this 
sector was fully State-owned and under national management. Moreover, 
the Iraqi National Oil Company, a government-owned enterprise, was able 
to embark on the first phase of its production programme In 1972 from 
new oil fields, which were operated quite independently from the foreign 
concerns. 
1 The figure for Iraq's non-oil exports in 1978 was obtained from the 
"Annual Abstract of Statistics" of 1978, published by the Iraqi 
Central Statistical Organization, p 167 
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Table 9.4 
IRAQI EXPORTS AND IMPORTS IN SELECTED YEARS DURING 1950-1980 ($ m) 
i 
Years Exports (FOB) imports (CIF) 
1950 N. A. 105 
1955 519 272 
1960 654 389 
1965 882 455 
1970 1100 509 
1973 1955 894 
1974 6603 2371 
1975 8297 4215 
1976 9271 3897 
1977 9651 4480 
1978 11067 4213 
1979 21502 N. A. 
1980 26429 N. A. 
Source: "United Nations Statistical Yearbook" 
p 
1979/80 Pages 446-7 
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The sum product of the events referred to in the oil sector meant that 
the State kept receiving large annual increments in its oil revenues 
throughout the decade of the 1970's. Consequently, increasing allocations 
were made each year to execute new projects and expand existing ones in 
various economic sectors. While ID 116.5 million was devoted by the 
central government for investment projects in the financial year 1970, 
by 1979 the figure had risen to ID 3283, a leap of 2717.3%. 
Table 9.5 presents the relevant figures pertaining to planned investments 
by the State during the period 1970-79. The investment allocation for 
each year is distributed among the major economic sectors of the economy. 
It is apparent from table 9.5 that industry's share of State investment 
allocations rose from 24% in 1970 to over 40% in 1977. This indicates 
that increasing official attention was being directed towards the 
development and expansion of the industrial sector during that period. 
It must, however, be stressed that figures relating to investment in' 
the oil sector are likely to have been included within those of 
"industry". While no official statistics are published on oil investments, 
it is known that these were quite sizeable during the period in question. 
It may thus be supposed that during the period 1974-77, non-oil 
investment in industry was very broadly similar to those of agriculture. 
9.2 Structure and Growth of Iraqi Industry 
During most of the 1950's the industrial sector received only minor 
attention from the State. Starting from the assumption that Iraq was 
primarily an agricultural country, the government of the day chose to 
devote the bulk of investment resources to agriculture, construction and 
services. However, with the advent of the 1960's a larger share of 
investment funds began to flow to various branches of the industrial 
sector. 
9.2.1 Industrial Development in the 1960's 
Some fairly large industrial projects were planned and Implemented by 
the central government during the 1960's. A number of these projects 
came under the umbrella of the two State protocols signed by Iraq with 
the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, inasmuch as Soviet and Czech technical 
collaboration and equipment were forthcoming for the purpose of executing 
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these projects. These two protocols provided for the establishment of 
several fairly large manufacturing projects in the country. 
2 Among the 
most prominent projects executed by the Soviet Union in this way were the 
following three: 
(a) Electrical Equipment Plant in Baghdad. 
(b) Glass Plant in Ramadi. 
(c) Pharmaceutical Plant in Samara. 
During the 1960's, certain enactments were passed and administrative 
decisions taken in order to protect local industry from foreign competition, 
and provide sufficient incentives to Iraqi entrepreneurs. By 1965, the total 
number of nationally-owned industrial establishments reached 1914.3 Of 
these, 923 were of the small-type variety with a combined investment of 
ID 3.7 million, whereas the number of medium-sized undertakings was 739 with 
a total investment of ID 7.9 million. 
4 The remaining 252 industrial firms 
were classified as large with a total investment of ID 18.8 million. 
5 
Moreover, there were five foreign-owned industrial concerns, three of which 
were in the oil sector with an overall investment of ID 113 million. 
6 
A highly significant addition to the State-owned industrial sector was made 
in 1964, when 30 important industrial companies were nationalized, 
together with all banks. and insurance companies operating in the country. 
From the mid-1960's onwards, the principle had been established that the 
public sector was to play the dominant role in Iraqi industry. Indeed, 
since that time official policy has placed some major constraints on the 
private industrial sector: qualitative, relating to goods that may be 
produced, as well as quantitative. Consequently, the discernible profile 
of, Iraqi industry during the decade of the 1970's was characterized by 
three main features, as listed below: 
2 Soviet technical assistance to"Iraq in the form of executing large 
industrial projects was in line with overall Soviet policy on external 
aid whereby emphasis was placed on the implementation of relatively 
large projects in Third World regions (see subsection 5.5.3 above). 
3 "The Economy of Iraq: Development and Perspectives 1958-1976-1980" 
Ministry of Information - Republic of Iraq (printed in Spain, 1977) p 70. 
4 Loc Cit. 
5 Loc Cit. 
6 Loc Cit. 
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(a) The number of public sector firms was relatively small, while the number 
of private establishments was large (table 9.10 below). ''' 
(b) In most'branches of Iraqi industry, public sector firms were dominant 
vis-a-vis private firms, in terms of number of employees, size and value of 
output, and net capital employed. 
(c) Public sector firms tended to be more prominent in the heavier and/or 
capital intensive sectors, such as mining, oil refining, and basic metal 
industries. 
As compared with previous'development plans, the change of emphasis in the 
sectoral allocation of investment funds was very clear in the Five Year 
Economic Plan of 1965-9. In this plan, total allocations for the central 
government sector amounted to ID (668) million. 
7 Some ID 641 million 
were allocated to the'economic sectors, and the rest to other purposes. 
e 
Funds designated to the industrial sector totalled ID 187.9 million, 
representing 28% of overall investment funds in the Plan. 
9 Agriculture 
was assigned ID 173.6 million in the Plan, accounting for 26% of the 
total, whereas the corresponding percentages for transport and communication, 
and buildings and services were 16.5% and 20.2% respectively. 
10 
9.2.2 Industrial Development in 1970's 
After the July 1968 revolution, increasing emphasis was placed on expanding 
and modernizing Iraqi industry. High levels of annual investments in this 
sector were made possible by both governmental orientation towards this 
sector, and ever expanding cash resources principally due to increasing 
oil revenues. The government of the day declared its intention to give the 
industrial sector top priority. On that basis, a number of significant 
decisions were taken in this sphere, namely: 
11 
(a) Priority was to be given to the industrial sector, with the aim of 
developing all branches of industry that already existed. Moreover, many 
projects which were started before the change of government were to be 
accelerated and completed. as soon as possible. 
7 Ibid, P 71 
8 Lac Cit. 
9 Lac Cit. 
10 Lac Cit. 
11 Ibid. P 72 
(b) New projects that were considered complementary to the then existing 
ones were to be studied, and if considered feasible, planned and implemented. 
(c) Establishment of additional industries that depended mainly on 
locally available raw materials, as well as those whose output could be 
marketed abroad. 
(d) The State was becoming gradually orientated towards the setting up of 
the heavier types of industry. 
During the 1970's, investment in industry rose sharply and continuously, 
and so did the value and volume of industrial output. Table 9.6 gives 
the annual percentage growth in the amount of investment for each economic 
sector over the period 1970-77, in addition to the proportions of each 
sector's allocation. out of total investment funds. It is clear that out of 
the four main economic sectors, industry (including oil) enjoyed the 
highest level of average increase in investment allocations. The simple 
average rise for industry during 1970-77 was 88% pa whereas those for 
agriculture, transport and communications, and building and services, were 
L respectively 73% pa, 74% pa and 83% pa. 
It is also clear that industry's share of investment funds expanded 
appreciably over this period, from 24% to 40.6%, a rise of 69.2%. 
In contrast, the corresponding share of agriculture fell by 31.7%, 
'whereas those of transport and communication and buildings and services 
.: advanced by 13% and 38.4% respectively. 
All in all, by 1977 industry held 
the leading position in investment allocations vis-a-vis the other four 
main sectors, a position which it had not enjoyed in 1970. This is borne 
, out 
by the overall advance in industry's allocations over the period which 
is 3350% in comparison with 1292.5% for agriculture, 2198% for transport 
and communications, 2730.8% for building and services, and 833.7% for other 
sectors. 
Table 9.7 presents some key indicators concerning the growth of Iraqi 
industry during the four crucial years in the middle of the 1970's decade. 
Three measures are employed to assess the overall changes which this sector 
had undergone, viz. number of industrial firms, number of employees, and 
value of output. 
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Table 9.7 
ANNUAL CHANGES IN SELECTED INDUSTRIAL INDICATORS IN IRAQ 
1973-77 (OIL EXTRACTION EXCEPTED) 
73 74 
YEARS 
75 76 77 
A Large and Medium-sized Firms 
(1) Number, of firms 1275, 1241 1349 1479 1548 
(2) Number of employees ('000) 120.7 123.96 134.6 142.7 150.1 
(3) Value of Output (IDm) 292.11 351.73 436.43 589.90 721.78 
B Small Firms 
(1) Number of firms 26377 26332 39275 37669 41719 
(2) Number of employees ('000) 59.88 58.77 101.99 85.46 95.80 
(3) Value of Output (IDm) 85.88 93.62 278.30 218.98 300.82 
C All Firms 
(1) Number of firms 27652 27573 40624 39148 43267 
(2) tumber of employees ('000) 180.58 182.73 236.59 228.16 245.9 
(3) Value of Output (IDm) 377.99 445.35 714.73 808.88 1022.6 
Source: "Annual Abstract of Statistics" 1978. 
Published by the Central Statistical Organisation 
(Ministry of Planning, Baghdad-Iraq) Pages 19 and 117. 
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Table 9.8 is based on the figures contained in table 9.7, whereby the 
percentage change in each. year over the previous one is calculated for the 
three indicators stated. As in table 9.7, figures for large and medium 
establishments are separated from those pertaining to small firms, and 
then both parts are added together in the third section of the table. 
It is obvious from table 9.8 that the overall picture is one of steady 
growth, despite some rather isolated reverses. In particular, total 
industrial output had advanced uninterruptedly in each year, thereby 
yielding an overall rise of 170.5% over the whole period. It is also clear 
that the combined output of large and medium firms witnessed steady 
expansion with an annual percentage rise in the region of 20-35 percent. 
As regards the output of small industrial firms, this had shown some wide 
fluctuations, including a rise of 197.3% in 1975 and a 21.3% fall in 
1976. 
The general structure of Iraqi industry at the end of 1977 is presented 
in table 9.9. Excepting oil extraction, eleven industrial sectors are 
looked at in this table. For each of these, three important figures are 
given, ie number of firms in that group, number of permanent employees, 
and value of output. Also given are the percentages expressing the shares 
of each of the industrial sectors out of relevant total figures, as well 
as average output value per employee. 
It is apparent from this table that in terms of value of output, three 
industries account for over 62% of the country's non-oil industrial production. 
These are food, drink and tobacco (30%); textiles, clothing and leather 
products (about 17%); manufactured metal products, machinery and equipment 
(15.3%). These three industries are followed by two others, namely, 
chemicals, oil products and plastics (about 14%) and non-metallic mineral 
products (about 8%). It is obvious, therefore, that the five industries 
just mentioned produce over 84% of total indsutrial non-oil output. 
It is worth noting here that the total value of industrial output in 1977 
(le ID 1022.591 m) represents 18.3% of GDP in that year, as compared with 
an estimated 60-64% accounted for by oil-extraction. 
When the relative importance of each industrial sector is viewed against 
the criterion of the number of people who are permanently employed in that 
sector, the same five industries top the list. However, the sequential 
order of these five industries is somewhat different this time. 
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Table 9.8 
PROPORTIONAL INCREMENTS IN SELECTED INDUSTRIAL INDICATORS IN IRAQ 
1974-77 (OIL EXTRACTION EXCEPTED). 
ANNUAL I 
1974 
NCREASE ON 
1975 
PREVIOUS 
1976 
YEAR (%) 
1977 
A Large and Medium Firms 
(1) Number of firms -2.7 8.7 9.6 4.7 
(2) Number of employees 2.7 8.6 6.0 5.2 
(3) Value of Output 20.4 24.1 35.2 22.4 
B Small Firms 
(1) Number of firms -0.2 49.2 -4.1 10.8 
(2) Number of employees -1.9 73.5 716.2 12.1 
(3) Value of Output 9.0 197.3 -21.3 37.4 
C All Firms 
(1) Number of firms -0.2 47.3 -3.6 10.5- 
(2) Number of employees 1.2 29.5 -3.6' 7.8 
(3) Value of Output 17.8 60.5 13.2 26.4 
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Table 9.9 
GENERAL STRUCTURE OF IRAQI INDUSTRY IN 1977 
(OIL EXTRACTION EXCEPTED)- 
INDUSTRIAL FIRMS IN PERMANENT VALUE OF VALUE OF 
GROUPS GROUP EMPLOYEES OUTPUT OUTPUT 
Number °6 of Average % of IDm % of 
PER 
EMPLOYEE 
Total Number Total Total 
('000) (ID 1000 
Mining & Quarrying 38 0.1 2.893 1.5 10.256 1.0 3.5 
Food, Drink & 5074 11.8 48.650 25.0 308.774 30.2 6.3 Tobacco 
Textiles, Clothing, ' 10959 25.3 45.933 23.6 172.697 16.9 3.8 Leather 
Wood Products & 5500 12.7 5.516 2.8 39.263 3.8 7.1 Furniture 
Paper, Paper Products , 349 0.8 6.818 3.5 28.388 2.8. 4.2 Printing, Publishing 
Chemicals, Oil 417 1.0 16.846 8.6 142.909 14.0 8.5 Products, Plastics 
Non-metallic Mineral 1527 3.5 29.939 15.4 79.372 7.8 2.7 Products 
Basic Metal l negli- 0.243 0.1 2.865 0.3 11.8 
Industries gible 
Manufactured Metal 
Products, Machinery, 3672 8.5 21.773 11.2 156.598 15.3 7.2 
Equipment 
Other Manufacturing 2398 5.5 1.060 0.5 39.303 3.8 37.1 Industries 
Repair & Industrial 13332 30.8 15.319 7.8 42.176 4.1 2.8 Services 
TOTAL 43267 100.00 194.990 100.00 1022.591 100.00 
Source: "Annual Abstract of Statistics" 1978 
published by the Central Statistical Organization 
(Ministry of Planning - Baghdad/Iraq) 
Pages 92,93,102,103,118,119,121 
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The first and second positions are occupied by the same industries, viz. 
food, drink and tobacco (about, 25%); textiles, clothing and leather products 
(about 24%). The other three are respectively non-metallic mineral products 
(15%), manufactured metal products, machinery and equipment (11%), and 
chemicals, oil products and plastics (about 9%). The combined proportion 
represented by these five industrial sections is again close to 84% of 
total industrial employment in the country. 
Table 9.10 has been prepared to illustrate the relative significance of 
each of the two main ownership patterns in Iraqi industry. It is clear 
that, numerically, privately owned firms outnumber public sector ones in 
all but two of the eleven sections under consideration. It is also plain 
that in the case of the nine sectors where private firms exceed public 
ones, the former constitute 89% or more of the total number of firms. 
When the level of employment is considered, a mixed profile emerges of the 
patterns of ownership. Clear dominance by the public sector is illustrated 
in six industries where the percentage of those employed by public sector 
enterprises exceeds 52%" These are mining and quarrying; food, drink and 
tobacco; textiles, clothing and leather products; paper, paper products, 
printing and publishing; chemicals, oil products and plastics; and basic 
metal industries. It is also obvious that the private sector provided most 
of the job opportunities in the other five industrial sectors, the relevant 
percentages being notably high in the case of wood products and furniture 
(87.3%) and other manufacturing industries (100%). In general, however, 
the combined public sector has provided more employment than the private 
sector, with the relevant percentages being 54.2% and 45.8% respectively. 
In terms of output, the public sector again occupies a predominant position 
in six industries, ie mining and quarrying; food, drink and tobacco; 
paper, paper products, printing and publishing; chemicals, oil products 
and plastics; non-metallic mineral products; and basic metal industries. 
It is noticeable that this list is similar to the corresponding group of 
-prominent public sector industries on the basis of employment, with the 
exception of textiles, clothing and leather which is replaced under the 
present criterion by non-metallic mineral products. Once again, the combined 
output of public sector firms surpasses that of the private sector though 
by a smaller margin. It is possible to conclude, therefore, that the 
public sector in industry occupies the first place vis-a-vis the private 
sector, in terms of both employment and value of output. Notwithstanding 
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this, private sector firms are much more numerous in nine out of the eleven 
industrial sections. 
It is noteworthy, however, ' that average output per employee in the private 
sector is higher than that of the public sector. As can be ascertained 
from the table, the total output value of public firms was 'ID 521.525 m in 
1977, whereas total employees numbered 105730 in the same year, thus 
resulting in average output per employee of ID 4933. The corresponding 
output and employee figures for the private sector were ID 501.066 m and 
89260 respectively, yielding an average of ID 5614. This indicates that 
productivity per employee was higher in the private sector by some 14%. 
It needs to be pointed out, though, that the prices of many public sector 
products had been kept artifically low for political and social reasons. 
Also, the public sector had in general focused on fields of activity 
judged by private investors as rather risky and demanding in terms of 
financial capital. 
9.3 Comments and Conclusions 
Limited central planning was a main feature of government policy prior to 
1958, and achievements in industrial development during that epoch were 
for the most part restricted in both scope and size. During the 1960's 
and 1970's, however, increasing attention was being directed towards central 
planning, and the domain of public sector industry experienced continual 
enlargements in absolute terms. Also, the ever-expending State-owned 
sector became larger and larger at the expense of both the national private 
sector and, particularly, the foreign sector. 
By the end of 1970's, the State had come to possess the lion's share as 
the country's foremost producer, employer and investor. Increasing funds 
were allocated for investment in various branches of the economy, with 
the industrial sector receiving top priority during the 1970's. High 
rates of growth in both GDP and per capita GDP were accomplished within 
that time-span, due mostly to some phenomenal increments in oil revenues 
as well as substantial investment allocations. 
Steady progress in the country's industrial output was achieved during the 
crucial years of the 1970's decade. Between 1973 and 1977, the overall 
advance in the value of industrial production amounted to 170.5%. The 
corresponding increases in industrial employment and the number of industrial 
 1ý111ýIý 
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firms over those key years were 36.2% and 56.5% respectively. 
The qualitative structure of Iraqi industry in 1977 reveals in no uncertain 
terms the dominance of three industrial groupings, which together accounted 
for 62% of total industrial production. Namely, the three industries are 
food, drink, and tobacco; textiles, clothing and leather; manufactured 
metal products, machinery and equipment. The first two of these industries 
together with non-metallic mineral products employed about 64% of total 
industrial manpower. 
In nine out of eleven industrial sectors, the number of private establishments 
in 1977 was°farigreater than public sector firms. However in terms of 
both employment and value of output, most industries were dominated by 
State owned enterprises. Additionally, over half of both total employment 
and value of production were catered for by the public sector. 
Y ., 
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CHAPTER TEN 
THE PATTERN OF IRAQI IMPORTS OF TECHNOLOGY PRODUCTS. 
It was pointed out in the previous Chapter that Iraq have always had 
a strong agricultural base, whereby various oriental vegetables and 
fruits have been produced in fairly large quantities. With the discovery 
of oil, however, the seeds were sown for a gradual transformation of the 
national economy and a notable expansion in the country's imports. 
Indeed, a general relationship appears to have been established between 
the country's oil revenues and the size of the imports' bill. 
Increasingly, also, oil revenues have been diverted to the purpose of 
importing various technology items. 
Oil production started in Iraq in 1928 and rose steadily thereafter. 
Daily production was around one million barrels per day in 1960, rising 
to 2.3 million in 1976 and 2.6 million in 1978. By 1979 Iraq's oil 
exports were hovering around the 3 million mark, making the country the 
world's second largest crude oil exporter, after Saudi Arabia. Prior 
to the Second World War, the economic impact of the oil sector was not 
strong}but the relative importance of that sector became more pronounced 
as years went by. During the years immediately following the Second 
World War and the 1950's, oil represented a major activity within the 
Iraqi economy, while in the 1960's and 1970's the oil sector became 
dominant. Significant underlying factors played their role In this 
evolution of the overwhelming dominance of the oil sector, including the 
tapping of an increasing number of oil wells in the country, the rise in 
the price of oil (especially in the 1970's) and the relatively poor 
performance of other sectors of the economy, particularly agriculture. 
The agricultural sector has for many years been plagued by problems of 
sdinity, the migration of rural inhabitants and inadequate drainage 
systems. Despite the appropriation of large investment funds for this 
sector during the 1960's and 1970's, the country has generally increased 
its dependence on imported farm products, particularly meat and poultry. 
For instance, in the first three years of the 1976-80 development plan, 
agriculture received 17% of total development expenditure, but the cost 
of food imports remained at a very high level, representing around 
one-third of the total annual import bill in some years. 
10.1 Growth of Iraqi Imports in the 1970's 
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From independence in 1932 up to the 1950's, Iraqi imports were composed 
predominantly of light manufactured consumer goods, though they also 
included certain types of agricultural produce and limited amounts of 
capital goods. As for exports, these were primarily agricultural products. 
Since the 1950's, however, a fairly distinct trend became apparent. The 
proportion of capital goods within the total value of imports began to 
increase appreciably, indicating that the process of industrialization 
was gathering momentum during the 1950's and 1960's. 
By the 1970's, Iraq possessed a fairly wide cross-section of industrial 
enterprises. Apart from oil-related industries, there were those in the 
fields of food and drink processing, building materials manufacturing, 
cigarette making, textiles, chemicals, furniture, shoemaking, jewellery, 
and various metal manufactures. Since the early 1970's, greater emphasis 
has been placed on industrial development, and there now exists a fairly 
large number of medium-sized and large industrial plants, with others 
under construction. These include, among others, a truck assembly plant, 
a pharmaceuticals plant,. a paper making plant, a fertilizer plant, various 
spinning and weaving establishments, an electrical apparatus making 
factory, agriculture implements manufacturing, in addition to two newly 
established complexes for iron and steel making, and petrochemicals. 
10.1.1 Significance of Oil Revenues 
The Iraqi drive for industrial development has been made possible via 
the availability of high and almost constantly increasing oil revenues. 
Out of a total export value of ID 6334 in 1979, ID 6288 (ie over 99%) 
came from crude oil exporting. Between 1969 and 1980, the State oil 
revenue increased from $483 million to $26500 million, a rise of 5386% 
Table 10.1 gives a chronological overview of the annual growth in oil 
revenues during the period 1969-80. During this period, the simple 
average rise in these annual revenues was about 61%. 
10.1.2 Pre-eminence of the Public Sector 
Since the beginning of the 1970's, the State has effectively enhanced 
its control of the national economy, and more than three-quarters of GNP 
is now accounted for by the public sector. 
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Table 10.1 
IRAQ'S OIL REVENUES (1969=1980) US $ MILLIONS 
Year Oil Revenues % Rise on Previous Year 
1969 483 - 
1970 521 - 7.9 
1971 340 -34.7 
1972 575 69.1 
1973 1900* 230.4 
1974 6000* 215.8 
1975 8000* 33.3 
1976 8500* 6.3 
1977 9500* 11.8 
1978 11600*, 22.1 
1979 21200* 82.8 
1980 26500* 25.0 
Average 7926.6 60.9 
Source: Europa: 'The Middle East and North Africa 1981-82' 
Europa Publications Ltd 1981 p'437 
* Estimates 
Output of the oil sector, which is totally owned by the State, constitutes 
around 60% of GNP, and state organizations own all the heavier type of 
industries in addition to a large number of other establishments in 
medium and light industries. In addition, the bulk of the country's 
imports are handled by the State, and, through the Industrial Bank, the 
State possesses large shareholdings in companies operating within the 
"mixed" sector of the economy. 
It is possible-to hypothesize that this public sector dominance has 
contributed materially to the industrialization process and the importation 
of capital goods into the country. Large surplus revenues, coupled with a 
concerted dedication for industrial development on the part of the State, 
have had a far-reaching impact on the country's incoming trade. in 
engineering products in general, and technology embodying goods in 
particular. 
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Table 10.2 contains some relevant figures regarding the value of imports 
effected by the three main sectors of the Iraqi economy, which are 
classified according to the type of associative ownership, le public, 
private, and foreign-owned establishments. It is clear from this table 
that the public sector's share of the import bill received a noticeable 
boost during this 9-year period. The proportion of imports effectuated 
by this sector rose from about 59% in 1970 to almost 93% in 1975, then 
falling somewhat to settle at 88% in 1978, thereby averaging 83.7% over 
those years. It needs to be pointed out, however, that this general 
advance is at least partly due to the sheer horizontal expansion of the 
State-owned sector, through commencing new activities and nationalization 
of a number of foreign and nationally-owned business concerns. 
It is also obvious from table 10.2 that the increase in the proportion of 
public-sector imports during the 1970's had been allied with a corresponding 
decrease in the respective shares of the other two main sectors. While 
the private sector began the decade with a 33.8% share, this was down to 
11.7% by 1978. The down-turn in the foreign sector's proportion was 
even more stark, where in 1978 this sector accounted for a mere 0.1%. 
Over this period, the value of imports kept rising from year to year 
with only three minor exceptions in 1972,1976, and 1978. Whilst the total 
imports' figure was ID 181.651 m in 1970, it advanced to ID 1244.05 m 
by 1978, representing thereby a percentage increase of 585% over the 
period. The average annual rise works out at nearly 65%. 
10.2 Iraqi Imports of Technology Products in the 1970's 
The remarkable expansion in Iraq's imports was accompanied by a clearly 
discernible advance in imports of engineering products during the 1960's 
and 1970's. As table 10.3 shows, the proportion of engineering products 
within total imports was generally rising during the period 1966-1978. 
Engineering products accounted for 31.8% of total imports in 1966, rising 
to 39.5% in 1970,66.2% in 1975 and 75.2% in 1978. 
Table 10.4 gives some relevant details concerning Iraqi imports of engineering 
products during the period 1966-80, classified into three principal 
categories, viz, non-electrical machinery, electrical machinery and 
transport equipment. 
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VALUES OF IRAQI IMPORTS BY MAIN OWNERSHIP - CLASSIFIED SECTORS (1970-78) 
YEARS State-owned 
Establish- 
ments 
Value % of 
(ID m) Total 
Private 
Mixed 
Establishments 
Value % of 
(ID m) Total 
Foreign-owned 
Establish- 
ments 
Value, % of 
(ID m) Total 
Grand 
Total 
(ID m) 
1970 106.665 58.8 61.411 33.8 13.575 7.4 181.651 
1971 199.495 80.5 42.315 17.1 6.060 2.4 247.870 
1972 193.479 82.4 37.945 16.2 3.256 1.4 234.680 
1973 225.844 83.5 35.440 13.1 9.033 3.4 270.317 
1974 695.365 89.9 64.450 8.3 13.617 1.8 773.432 
1975 1322.127 92.7 94.868 6.6 9.863 0.7 1426.858 
1976 1021.675 88.8 126.651 11.0 2.572 0.2 1150.898 
1977 1170.264 88.4 151.084 11.4 1.805 0.2 1323.153 
1978 1097.607 88.2 145.124 11.7 1.320 0.1 1244.051 
v. 670.280 83.7 84.365 14.4 6.789 1.9 761.434 
Source: "Annual Abstract of Statistics" 1978, published by the Central 
Statistical Organization (Ministry of Planning - Baghdad/Iraq) P167 
Table 10.3 
TOTAL VALUES OF IRAQI IMPORTS AND IMPORTS OF ENGINEERING PRODUCTS (1966-78) 
YEARS Total Value 
of Imports 
($ m) C. I. F. 
Imports of Engineering Products 
Value ($ m) % of Total 
F. O. B. Imports 
1966 493 156.9 31.8 
1967 423 123.2 29.1 
1968 404 NA NA 
1969 440 191.8 43.6 
1970 509 201.3 39.5 
1971 694 260.7 37.6 
1972 713 360.9 50.6 
1973 894 418.8 46.8 
1974 2371 1077.1 45.4 
1975 4215 2792.0 66.2 
1976 3897 2880.1 73.9 
1977 4480 2662.5 59.4 
1978 4213 3168.5 75.2 
Sources: (1) UN Statistical Yearbook 1979/80 (table 136) p 446; 
1973 (table 143) p 400 
(2) Bulletin of Statistics on World Trade in Engineering 
Products (United Nations) 1966-80. 
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Table 10.4 
IRAQI IMPORTS OF ENGINEERING PRODUCTS DURING 1966-80 IN MILLIONS 
OF US DOLLARS (F. O. B. ) 
YEARS Total Value 
of 
Engineering 
Products 
(4) 
Non- 
Electrical 
Machinery 
% of 
Value Total 
Electrical 
Machinery 
% of 
Value Total 
Transport 
Equipment 
% of 
Value Total 
1966 156.9 58.4 37.2 35.8 22.8 58.2 37.1 
1967 123.2 63.0 51.1 23.0 18.7 32.5 26.4 
1969 191.8 114.2 59.5 24.6 12.8 50.7 26.4 
1970 201.3 94.0 46.7 34.3 17.0 47.8 23.7 
1971 '260.7 133.4 51.2 33.6 12.9 81.2 31.1 
1972 360.9 165.7 45.9 47.8 13.2 142.4 39.5 
1973 418.8 191.6 45.7 66.5 15.9 156.7 37.4 
1974 1077.1 427.6 39.7 162.5 15.1 477.2 44.3 
1975 2792.0 1182.4 42.3 346.0 12.4 1246.5 44.6 
1976 2880.1 1132.1 39.3 449.1 15.6 1193.0 41.4 
1977 2662.5 1370.6 51.5 540.9 20.3 594.4 22.3 
1978 3168.5 1447.2 45.7 712.5 22.5 809.7 25.6 
1979 4156.9 1909.7 45.9 855.4 20.6 1328.7 32.0 
(1) (2) (3) 
1980 6005.1 2645.9 44.1 1012.3 16.9 2188.3 36.4 
(1) (2) (3) 
Average 1746.8 781.1 46.1 310.3 16.9 600.5 33.4 
Source: Bulletin of Statistics on World Trade in Engineering Products 
(United Nations) 1966-80. 
Notes: (1) A change of classification occurred in 1979. This figure 
is the sum of five figures under the new arrangement. These 
are respectively "power-generating machinery", "special industrial 
machinery", "metal working machinery", "general-industrial 
machinery", and'bffice machinery". 
(2) This figure is the sum for "telecommunications and sound-recording 
equipment" and "electrical machinery". 
(3) This figure is the sum of "road vehicles" and "other transport 
equipment". 
(4) It is easily verfiable that the three constituents of the 
total figure for engineering products do not add up exactly. 
The "total" figure is slightly more than the sum of the three 
other figures. However, the difference is small. 
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It is clear from this table that the order of importance of these three 
main constituents is firstly non-electrical machinery, secondly transport 
equipment, and thirdly electrical machinery. The first type represented 
an average of 46.1% during the period under consideration, the second 
33.4%, and the third 16.9%. 
In table 10.5 the respective values of imports of technology goods and 
manufacturing technology products are given for the period 1966-1980. 
The table contains the relevant percentages representing imports of 
technology products as a proportion of total imports of engineering 
products, and also those of manufacturing technology products out of 
total technology imports. 
1 It appears that in both cases there had been 
no dramatic change in these proportions during the years under consideration. 
The average percentage of technology imports to the value of engineering 
products was 55.7% during this span, whereas that of manufacturing 
technology products to technology products 26.6%. 
10.3 British Exports of Technology Products to Irag2 
British exports to Iraq are mainly engineering products, including tools 
and machinery of various types. This has been particularly evident during 
the 1960's and 1970's. In general, Iraqi imports of engineering products 
from Great Britain had been rising almost each year, but this rise had 
not kept pace with the overall advance of Iraq's imports of engineering 
products. In fact, it can be seen from table 10.6 that a clear 
decline in Britain's share of Iraq's imports of engineering products had 
set in since the middle of the 1960's. The British share fell almost 
steadily from 27.4% in 1964 to 6.0% in 1980, representing a simple 
average percentage of 11.6% p. a. during the period. 
Throughout this period, Britain's exports of these goods to Iraq had 
risen from $28.1 million in 1964 to $362.5 million in 1980 (a rise of 1190%). 
Big though this rise is, it is small in comparison with the huge increment 
in the value of Iraq's total imports of engineering products. These 
moved progressively from $102.7 million in 1964 to $6005.1 million in 
1980 (an advance of 5747h). 
1 The two terms "technology products" and "manufacturing technology products" 
are defined briefly in Notes (1) and (2) to table 10.5. The constituent 
products comprising each of these two groups are given in Appendices1 to 4 
at the end of this Chapter. 
2 This Section is devoted to the study of trade in technology items from 
Britain to Iraq, because of the emphasis of the empirical part of the 
research on UK-to-Iraq transfers of technology. 
Table 10.5 
IRAQI IMPORTS OF ENGINEERING PRODUCTS, TECHNOLOGY PRODUCTS' 
AND MANUFACTURING TECHNOLOGY PRODUCTS 
(2) 
1964-80 
MILLIONS OF US DOLLARS (F. O. B. ) 
YEARS Imports of 
Engineering 
Products 
Imports of Technology 
Products 
? of total Values Engineering 
Products 
Imports of Manufacturinc 
Technology Products 
% of total Values Technology 
Products 
1964 102.7 NA NA NA NA 
1966 156.9 75.8 48.3 19.8 26.1 
1967 123.2 74.5 60.5 28.2 37.9 
1969 191.8 121.6 63.4 22.0 18.1 
1970 201.3 113.6 56.4 36.3 32.0 
1971 260.7 152.7 58.6 32.2 21.1 
1972 360.9 196.3 54.4 49.5 25.2 
1973 418.8 235.3 56.2 48.5 20.6 
1974 1077.1 520.2 48.3 110.2 21.2 
1975 2792.0 1332.7 47.7 440.1 33.0 
1976 2880.1 1408.4 48.9 475.3 33.7 
1977 2662.5 1701.7 63.9 587.6 34.5 
1978 3168.5 1828.5 57.7 369.2 20.2 
1979 4156.9 2505.9 60.3 643.0 25.7 
1980 6005.1 3292.3 54.8 748.2 22.7 
Average 1637.2 968.5 55.7 257.9 26.6 
Notes: (1) "Technology Products" are taken to include sixteen different 
types of machinery and equipment that are utilized mainly in 
manufacturing industry, agriculture, power generation and 
distribution, and office administration. See column headings 
in Appendices 1 and 2 at the end of this Chapter. 
(2) "Manufacturing Technology Products" are taken to include 
thirteen different types of machinery and equipment that are 
used to produce manufactured products. See column headings 
in Appendices 3 and 4 at the end of this Chapter. 
Source: Bulletin of Statistics on World Trade in Engineering 
Products 1964-80. 
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Table 10.6 
BRITISH EXPORTS & IRAQI IMPORTS OF ENGINEERING PRODUCTS 1964-1980 
(F. O. B. ) 
YEAR 
Total Iraqi 
Imports of 
Engineering 
Products 
($ m) 
Iraqi Imports of . Engineering Products 
from UK 
Value ($ý m) % of total 
UK Exports of Engineer- 
ing Products 
Value ($ m) % of Exports 
to Iraq 
1964 102.7 28.1 27.4 5112.5 0.55 
1966 156.9 41.9 26.7 6099.9 0.69 
1967 123.2 26.0 21.1, 5813.0 0.45 
1969 191.8 24.4 12.7 7090.5 0.34 
1970 201.3 26.8 13.3 7922.9 0.34 
1971 260.7 3Q. 5 11.7 9416.3 0.32 
1972 360.9 38.6 10.7 10030.4 0.38 
1973 418.8 33.0 7.9 11706.5 0.28 
1974 1077.1 64.9 6.0 14195.8 0.46 
1975 2792.0 185.7 6.7 18236.4 1.02 
1976 2880.1 153.9 5.3 18175.3 0.85 
1977 2662.5 158.8 6,0 21542.0 0.74 
1978 3168.5 232.1 7.3 26431.6 0.88 
1979 4156.9 215.5 5.2 31384.9 0.69 
1980 6005.1 362.5 6.0 39558.8 0.92 
Average 1637.2 108.2 11.6 15514.4 0.594 
Source: Bulletin of Statistics on World Trade in Engineering Products 
1964 -1980 
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It may be argued that the relatively poor performance of British exports 
to Iraq can be largely explained by the general performance of British 
exports of engineering products during this period. Britain's market 
share of total exports of engineering products by developed market 
economy countries fell from 16% in 1963 to 10% In 1970, and to less than 
8% by 1977.3 In addition, Iraqi imports of these products advanced 
enormously during this period, so that the growth in British exports 
could not approach that of Iraqi imports. 
Averaging $15514.4 m per annum, total British exports of engineering 
products increased from $5112.5 m in 1964 to $39558.8 m in 1980 
(a 673.8% rise),. 
4 
-It. is evident that the 
level of increase in Iraq's 
imports of engineering products is over eight and a half times this 
figure. The relative decline in Britain's role, as a world exporter of 
engineering products, coupled with the enormous leap In Iraq's imports 
meant that in practice Britain could not preserve its share of Iraq's 
rapidly expanding market (table 10.7). 
It may, in fact, be noticed from the last column in table 10.6 that 
Iraq's importance as a market for British goods has not lessened during 
the period. Indeed, it can be seen to have risen to some extent. 
The ratio of exports to Iraq out of total British exports of engineering 
products averaged 0.56% during the three years 1964,1966 and 1967. 
In contrast, this average was 0.83% during the three years 1978,1979 
and 1980. 
10.3.1 Product Distribution of UK-to-Iraq Technology Trade 
When the various product-types of British technology exports to Iraq are 
examined, a general pattern of gradual change emerges. In the case of 
each product-type, the value of British exports to Iraq has advanced in 
absolute terms. Yet the relative importance of the UK as a supplier 
of those products has fallen back in each and every case. 
Appendix 10.1 presents some figures relating to Iraqi imports and British 
exports to Iraq for each of the sixteen types of technology products during 
the period 1964-1980. 
3MR Hill: "East-West Trade, Industrial Co-operation, and Technology 
Transfer" (Gower, 1983) P 180. 
4 Table 10.6, column 5 
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Table 10.7 
SOURCES OF IRAQI IMPORTS OF ENGINEERING. PRODUCTS ($m F. O. B. ) ýa 
1970,1975,1980 
Exporting Countries 1970 1975 1980 
(a) UK: Value ($ m) 26.8 185.7 362.5 
° of total 13.3% 6.7% 6.0% 
(b) USA: Value ($ m) 13.1 148.9 374.0 
% of total 6.5% - 5.3% 6.2% 
(c) USSR: Value ($ m) 33.2 191.0 305.9 
% of total 16.5% 6.8% 5.1% 
(d) France: Value ($ m) 13.7 229.5 545.0 
% of total 6.8% 8.2% 9.1% 
(e) Federal Republic of Germany: 
Value ($ m) 9.0 877.8 1335.7 
% of total 4.5% 31.4% 22.2% 
(f) Japan: Value ($ m) 4.8 307.3 1292.2 
% of total 2.4% 11.0% 21.5% 
(g) Other Countries: Value ($ m) 100.7 851.8 1789.8 
% of total 50.0% 30.6% 29.9% 
Grand Total ($ m) 201.3 2792.0 6005.1 
Source: Bulletin of Statistics on World Trade in Engineering Products, 
1970,1975,1980. 
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The figures, representing the ratio of imports from UK to total Iraqi 
imports is calculated for each year and the arithmetic average Is 
subsequently found for the whole period. Product groups with high average 
percentages include electro-mechanical hand-tools (37.1%), office 
equipment (27%), electric furnaces (24.4%), power generating machinery 
(23.7%), and measuring apparatus (23.4%). 
Appendix 10.2 looks at Iraqi imports of technology products from the 
angle of their significance to Britain. For each of the sixteen product 
groups, total British exports are given coupled with the value of Iraqi 
imports, for years within the period 1964-1980. Taking these two figures 
for each year, the proportion of exports to Iraq out of total British 
exports of that product group is first found, and subsequently the average 
percentage for the whole period is calculated. In assessing the 
importance of the Iraqi market with respect to each product group, it 
transpires that relatively high average percentages are recorded for 
metal working machinery (1.5%), equipment for electricity distribution (1.3%), 
automotive electrical equipment (1.3%), electrical power machinery (0.8%), 
and electric furnaces (0.8%). 
10.3.2 Pattern of UK-to-Iraq Trade in Manufacturing Technology Products 
Appendix 10.3 gives the relevant figures concerning Iraqi imports of 
manufacturing technology products as well as UK exports of these 
products to Iraq, during the period 1964 - 1980. For each year, the 
ratio of imports from UK to total imports of that product group is 
calculated. Then the average percentage is found for each product 
group over the whole period. The highest average percentages are recorded 
for packaging machinery (L0.3%), printing machinery (19.6%), textile and 
leather machinery 04%), mineral processing machinery (I2.7%), paper and pulp 
machinery (10.5%), and mechanical handling equipment (10.3%). 
In Appendix 10.4, figures relating to Iraqi imports and British exports 
of the various manufacturing technology products are presented. The 
percentage of British exports to Iraq out of total exports is found for 
each product and each year. The period average for every product is 
also recorded, so as to express the overall relative importance of the 
Iraqi market in the case of each product group. The product groups which 
stand out in this respect are respectively mineral processing machinery 
(1.3%), packaging machinery (1.0%), refrigerating equipment (0.9$), 
food processing machinery (0.7%), and dairy-farm equipment (0.7%). 
NNW. 
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10.3.3 Relative Commercial Significance of Various Manufacturing 
Technology Products 
In table 10.8ýthe total value of Iraqi Imports for each type of manufacturing 
technology product is given for the 15-year period 1964 - 1980 (excepting 
1965 and 1968). The average annual figure is then found and the percentage 
is calculated for each product group. This percentage expresses the 
proportion of the average annual figure of the relevant product group to 
the total average figure. The relative significance of each of these 
product groups is viewed via the respective Iraqi importation figure 
pertaining to each. On this basis, the order of importance of the various 
types of manufacturing technology products under question is as follows: 
(1) Mechanical handling equipment 
(2) Textile and leather machinery 
(3) Mineral processing machinery 
(4) Metal working machinery 
(5) Printing machinery 
(6) Food processing machinery 
(7) Refrigerating equipment 
(8) Packaging machinery 
(9) Other heating and cooling equipment 
(10) Paper and pulp machinery 
(11) Industrial furnaces, stokers, and ovens. 
(12) Dairy-farm equipment 
(13) Glass-working machinery 
10.4 Comments and Conclusions 
The rapid expansion of the Iraqi public sector during the 1970's had 
been closely allied with three notable developments in the country's 
Imports. In the first place, the total value of imports advanced 
steadily during the decade. Secondly, a highly significant advance had 
been forthcoming in the public sector's share of overall imports. 
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Table 10.8 
RELATIVE SIGNIFICANCE OF VARIOUS PRODUCT GROUPS IN IRAQI IMPORTS 
OF MANUFACTURING TECHNOLOGY FROM UK 
Types of Manufacturing 
Technology Products 
Total Imports 
During 1964 - 
1980 (15 years) 
in $ million 
(F. O. B. ) 
(1) 
Average 
Annual Figure 
of Importation 
$ million 
% of Grand 
Total of 
Manufacturing 
Technology 
Imports by 
Iraq from UK 
Dairy farm Equipment 2.7 0.18 1.26 
Metal working machinery 22.0 1.47 10.32 
Textile and leather machinery 33.6 2.24 15.73 
Paper and pulp machinery 4.1 0.27 1.90 
Printing machinery 14.4 0.96 6.74 
Food-processing machinery 13.6 0.91 6.39 
Mineral processing machinery 27.4(2) 2.11 14.82 
Glass working machinery 0.3(2) 0.02 0.14 
Industrial furnaces, stokers, (2) 
ovens 2.5 0.19 1.33 
Refrigerating Equipment 11.4 0.76 5.34 
Other Heating and Co-Equipment 7.2(2) 0.55 3.86 
Mechanical Hand-Equipment 57.3 3.83 26.90 
Packaging Equipment 9.7(2) 0.75 5.27 
GRAND TOTAL 14.24 100.00 
Notes: (1) During this 17-year period, the respective figures for 1965 
and 1968 have not been included, so that each figure representing 
a certain product group is the sum of fifteen yearly values. 
(2) Figure excludes 1979 and 1980 because of non-availability. 
Hence in these cases only thirteen years are included. 
Source: Bulletin of Statistics on World Trade in Engineering Products 
1964-80. 
Thirdly, Iraq had been devoting an increasing share of the imports' 
bill to engineering products. During this period, the three main 
constituents of imports of engineering products were, in order of 
importance, non-electrical machinery, transport equipment, and electrical 
machinery. 
As regards the proportion of technology products out of total engineering 
products, no clear trend can be detected for the period 1964--980, 
with the average percentage over this span being 55.7%. Likewise, the 
yearly proportions expressing the levels of imports of manufacturing 
technology products within total imports of technology products display no 
great variations over this period, with the average figure settling at 
26.66%. 
Looking at British exports of engineering products as a proportion of 
Iraq's imports of these products, Britain's share in this regard had 
been falling almost constantly, from 27.4% in 1964 to 6.0% in 1980. 
Paradoxically, however, the share of the Iraqi market in total British 
engineering exports had been generally increasing over this period, 
from 0.55% in 1964 to 0.92% in 1980. The moral of these statistics is 
that Britain had not been able to preserve her relative position in a 
vastly expanding market. Concerning the values of British exports to Iraq 
of the various types of technology products, a comprehensive pattern of 
expansion in absolute terms is clearly visible. However, when these 
exports are compared to corresponding values of Iraqi imports, the 
reverse profile is presented. 
Finally, an attempt was made in this Chapter to arrive at a list expressing 
the relative importance and position of each of the thirteen manufacturing 
product groups within the context of Britain's exports to Iraq. 
The 15. year imports' value effected by Iraq was first found with respect 
to each product type, and then a simple yearly average was calculated. 
On the basis of these averages, the relevant percentage out of the total 
figure was found for each product group, which resulted in a list headed 
by five main groups, namely, mechanical handling equipment, textile and 
leather machinery, mineral processing machinery, metal working machinery, 
and printing machinery. 
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APPENDIX 10.1 
Source: Bulletin of Statistics on World Trade in Engineering 
Products (United Nations) 1964 - 1980. 
NOTES 
(1) Due to the change in classification that occurred in the Bulletin 
from 1979 onwards, "Technology goods" have been taken to include the 
items mentioned below: 
(a) Power Generating Machinery 
(b) Special Industrial Machinery 
(c) Metal Working Machinery 
(d) General Industrial Machinery 
(e) Office Machinery, Automatic Data Processing 
(f) Electrical Machinery. 
On this basis three items are excluded, these being: 
"Telecommunications and Sound Recording", "Road Vehicles", and 
"Other Transport Equipment". 
The respective figure for "Technology Goods" imported by Iraq during 
1979 and 1980 are thus as follows: 
1979 $2505.9 m 
1980 $3292.3 m 
(2) The arithmatic mean for the percentage column is calculated by 
taking into account only those years where Iraq had actually imported 
that product type and where the figures are available during the 
period under consideration. This rule is adhered to in Appendix 10.3 
as well. 
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APPENDIX 10.3 
Source: UN Bulletin of Statistics on World Trade in Engineering 
Products 1964 - 1980. 
NOTE : 
Due to the change in classification, the total figure for 
manufacturing technology products for the two years 1979 and 
1980 is the sum of those mentioned in the table plus that for 
"Other Special Industrial Machinery". 
From the Bulletin the two figures for 1979 and 1980 in respect 
of this item are $215.1 m and $259.2 m in that order. 
On this basis the two total values of manufacturing technology 
products imported by Iraq during these two years are as follows: 
(a) 1979 $643.0 m 
(b) 1980 $748.2 m 
c 
O 
fc 
MQ 
Z 
G. 
0 
Co C3 
i 4 
co 
z 
H 
H U 
0 
a 
C, 0 
a 
0 z 
V 
C, 
z 
U 
w 
z 
a 
z 
w 
0 
N 
0 
z 
H 
or a 
H 
Z 
W 
H 
0 
w 
ö 
w 
9 a 0 ca 
a 
w 0 
z 0 H 
a a H 
ie4oJ ;o bE II N LU Cr) O N 0 N OD Cr) 00 N 11 to OD 0) t 
U 04 S4, IOdxa jo % O O O O O O O ; O O O O N O 
z 
ca Xfj wo-z3 bE. zj N Cr) r4 0 . -I r1 N O CO in CO cn In 
ý*? al s4jod ca O O O O O O 
4 O '-1 r1 O 
ä v 
f=1 co LU co c0 O OD OO N G) C) M N 00 N 
8 
U 4i OdXi 
V -q M In Iv (0 
C- ý 
N 0 . LO E O xri 
. -i -I N N 
jEaAZ jO bujI N N N rI N U) Cr) Cr) Cr) r-I ct OD N lD CO LO 
0-4 S4. IOdxa jo ý, ' O O O O O O O O O r1 r1 O O O O O 
yfl WoJJ be. zI i rl . -4 '-i N OD Cr) Cr) U) G) co ýi LN 0) N 
ä 04 S4. lodxa ö ö ö ö 0 ö ö ö cv ý z 
ct Cr) Q Cr) N l" U) Cr) LO O In L) In 0 OD 
ä O S4. IOdXa 
' 
c; 
UCI 
00 
LO 
OD 
Ili 
N 
S 
0; 
co 
O 
r-1 
Lo 
0 
N 
r-1 
rl q 
co 
OD 
O 
OD 
N 
00 
tý 
LU 
N 
N 
Cr) 
rl 
. 
}Oy }1! 1 jE rl r1 rl ri r-1 r1 r-4 N Cr) ct 
TE! lOy jO bE2j 0 0 V N 0 0 0 r') ºn N N ct Cr) C') 
O4 s! ljoc ca jO ; Y, O O O O O O O O O O O 
4 O O O O 
Xn woli biejj O O N 4 O -I O O .4 V LU 'I N Uf) 0 
ä a 04 s4sodxg ö ö ö ö ö ö ö ö 
ö ö ö 
ri 
ö ö ö 
W x 9! 1. IOdxa C0 
M N 01 '-I co O LO cl, O co 
U 
xn ZElo. 
Q) 
Cr) 
In 
Cr) 
OD 
V 
ct 
LU 
I 
S 
N r-I Cr) N 
In 
0 
Cr) 
N 
co 
(; ) 
O 
co 
r-1 
4 
rl r 
OD 
C'i 
r-I N 
ZE4oy jo bBSj N Cr) Q r-I . -4 Cr) N Cr) N (O 00 In to ct LO If) 
04 S! Iaodx2l 30 % ö ö ö ö ö ö ö ö ö ö ö ö ö 
H 
d 
N xn wo. JJ bE. II V In LU ct ct O CO C) N N N Cr) '. U 'ü L 
,b ä Oý S! IOdxa O Cr fh O O r4 N '-1 rl M .T N N N V; 
H 
5ý. s4aodxa 
O O S 
00 
O 
co 
O 
O 
O 
00 
I 
Cr) (0 
Cl! 
(D 
r-l 
N 
Q) 
9 
N 
Cr) 
Cr) 
S 
r1 
11 
N 
l*- >C U $f TErtOJ1 
O 
C') 
ct 
N U') N IC) O) N l- OD 0 Cr) OD -1 N U) 
N N N Cr) M co q q U) O LU ct LU O O 
tE: loy 3o bEzj -I r+ . -4 P4 
Cr) LU I Un C! N m Cl 
04 slsodxa Jo % ö ö ö ö ö ö O O O 0 0 0 O 0 0 
ö 
Z Nfl Wos3 bESj r-4 P4 N N N co N . -I Q q OD P4 co N OD 
~ 04 S4. IOdx2l O O O O O O O O O N rý N ct LU Cr) ö ä 
.a I-1 S . IOdX 
O co co to 1, N 00 N N . -I O lG N t- co 
d 
E-4 
x 
U jjn ZE4O1 
O 
00 
(0 
p 
P4 
ý 
Cr) 
O 
co 
N 
co 
0) 
N 
co 
In 
co 
N 'd' 
c 
co 
N 
lf) 
1 
(0 
U) 
OD (0 
4 r -I ý i N N N N Cr) r V V Co 
TE4oZ 3o bE, zj 0 0 0 O 0 0 0 0 LU P4 N O) r1 N 0 S 
o! Z sI. zodxa JO % O o o O C; O o O v P4 "4 
o 
14 
Xfl WOJJ bE. xI 
o4 s4aodxa 
O 
ö 
O 
ö 
0 
ö 
0 
ö 
0 
ö 
0 
ö 
O 
Ö 
O 
ö 
N 
4 
M 
O 
N 
O 
N 
Ö 
N 
Ö 
M 
Ö 
M 
Ö 
Ow S.. Iodxa Cr) l*1 [N CO Cr) C) N In c0 N . -1 c) LU N N 
H 
d 
a 
d 
Nfl TE4Oy Q) ct c7 OD O 
1- I 
O; N 
rl 
ý 
'-1 
OD 
N 
OD 
N 
N 
. -1 
Cr) 
N 
00 
'-1 
LU 
N 
O) 
N 
r 
d0 
SUV2A o ý 
f7 
OD 
OD 
OD 
5 
OD 
O) 
OD 
O 
N r-1 N 
N 
IN 
M 
C- 
cf 
N 
LO 
N 
CO 
tN 
Ný 
IN 
CO 
N 
0) 
N 
p 
OJ 
- -- 2 63 
O 
co 
Cl 
cD 
01 
C7 
N 
U 
O 
a 
c, 
O 
o z 
cx 
vW 
Oz 
.r 
w E' 
AV 
2a c. 
aZ 
O 
O 
n. 
Z. 
H 
H 
CY 
z 
N 
0 
x 
w 
bd 
0ý 
00 
C 
w 
a 
y 
aý a aý 
0 
a 
w 
0 
z 
0 H 
a a 
H z 
t of Jo boaj O q O M G) co O c0 U) N O to N x 
0 
O! Z s4. IOdx$ JO %, O O O O O O r-I O O M N f4 N P4 
C7 ý+ ý }fl uwosj bssj O rl O 'I 
d U) M M 'I tf) "T CO 
Z Z 
(s 1 04 s4. I6dx$ O O O O O O O O O N H H N 
Z 
U 
Ü 
S . IOdx 
O OJ O) N In c0 00 ý7 H O N [N H d ¢ 
6 
ß. xn IE: vO. L 
(0 
N 
U) 
CV 
N 
N 
LN 
M 
U) 
V 
N 
U) 
Q) 
q 
C) 
V 
00 
U) 
to 
N 
U) 
[N 
M 
CD 
M 
0 
Z Z 
I oy Jo bESI rý In M V M M co cf M co co co r1 N co to 
O! V S.. zodxg Jo % O O ö 
ö ö ö (S CS (S 
ö ö 
ri ri 
4 ö 
wosý bssj 
N V N 
0 
N CD a0 O H U) 
v 
O) 
r 
N 
i 
't 
N 
Cl) 
O 
N 
v 
c7 o4 sq. Jodxa 
0 0 H r-4 D u t 
C) 
z - 
pr [N rl O co rl M CD Co CD (D co 0 LO Q) N 
V 
s4. ZOdXý 
U) M N 10 N M O) U) CD CD O rl CD M 11 
I 
W }IIi ZEwZ 0 H 
, 
NI 
q 
0 N N 
N CD 
U) 
IU) 
T(0 
CD 
MW 0 
ZE40Z 3o b2. Ij N M N M - . -1 'Ct N GC) O to 0) '7 
04 s! z. zodxg JO % Ö Ö Ö o ö ö o ö o O Ö O 
X x 
cif W 
al sýsodxg 
r1 N N N N rl N l- O l- O 
O N 
d d 
z z o N z z 
ä 
O SýIOdX3 
N O o0 [ý N 0ý a0 ý ý ý ý N d d 
Ö U xn ZEýOZ 
00 
V 
(M 
N 
C\J 
N CND tU) -4 (D 
r, - 
co 000 N 
U 
(D ` ` 
-4 ý Z Z 
'-1 H N N 
tBlOZ 3o bE. II co c0 N t0 j m M M O M CO 0 0) N V C) 
0 04 S! Ijodx$ jo % O O O O 'O O N O 
H 
Qw' )f wo. z3 E. 1I Un co M O O v ca 
04 S4, iodxa o C) C) o C) o 0 C) o -I N M 
= H S! lSOdXg q* Co a) rý N rl- N Iq :T Co q N V 
W xn TE401 H H H 
rß-4 
N 
N co cDD 
U) 
ED . 
S O 
H ll 
U) 
N 
z ZBgoy jo bssj O O O O LO O O co O co CD to >C >C 
Iq 0 
O. sýsodxg jo % 0 0 0 0 ri 0 0 0 0 
0 ä 0 H C; 
Xn wos3 baij O O O O N O O '-1 O M co U, . -1 o 0 04 s4. zodxa ö ö ö ö ö ö ö ö ö ö ö ö H z z 
Z 
14 
P S4. IOdx3 CO O N (O N N . -1 -I M M 0) 
H W - xn t0 M O 4 U) CD N ; N M ct (O O 
Z Z 
r c c 
C! C! H 
o4 s! lsodxg JO % 0 0 ö ö ö ö ö ö ö 0 0 0 , -+ 
>t ö 
äI ? III wos3 be. iI O O O O O O O O O O O O M M I 
H 
o. s-4sodxg ö O ö ö ö 0 ö ö O ö ö ö o 
z z 
N 
p 
Ü 
s! xodxa O C) IN (+') CO H N N [N rl M CD 
C7 Xn IE401 t0 l0 lý O Cz H N 8 N 
Z z 
H H ( N 
Te4oy Jo bs. xl Z' 00 C co N H C) In 00 M M co M M 
04 s4. iodxa jo % r-i 
ö ö ö v r+ 
ri ri r-+ 
z g fl waz3 be. ij .4 M H M v co N C) N co 0 C) 
N a o4 sýsodxa O ö ö ö ö ö ö m N ri m z 
¢ 
a 
oý 
w H 
W 
Z O 
Ü 
s.. Iodx$ 
N V H O c0 O) M tN O o) c) 
¢ ¢ 
. 
ýs ä 
jri jg4O f, 
co 
N 
(D 
M 
C7 
M 
co 
M 
co 
U7 r-1 S 
11 
N 
M 
co 
(J 
14 
H 
N 
M of 
N 
t- z z 
N N 
SUM 
C 
cD 
(O 
cD 
N 
(0 
0) 
(0 
O 
tom 
H 
N 
N 
tom 
M 
N 
11 
N 
U) 
tN 
(O 
IN 
N 
IN 
co 
S 
C1 
N p 
O 
. - [ c0 
0 Co rn 
v 
a) 
m 
U 
'O 
O 
P. 
to 
aý 
aý 
00 
4) 
'd 
cd 
i4 
H 
b 
L-f 
0 
3 
0 
N 
U 
J. ) 
N 
c0 
O 
4) 
z Z) 
1) U 
iý 
O 
0 
2 
CHAPTER ELEVEN 
TRANSFER AND DEVELOPMENT OF TECHNOLOGY IN THE 
STATE OWNED INDUSTRIAL SECTOR IN-IRAQ- 
The previous two Chapters have shown that the 1970's experienced a 
noticeable advance in the economic role of the State in Iraq. By the 
end of that decade, the public sector had attained a prominent position 
in every major economic aspect, including industrial output and employment, 
investment allocations, and external trade. Notable accomplishments in 
the field of expanding the State-owned industrial sector were apparent at 
that time, being both a cause and effect of the enhancement of the State's 
role in society as a whole, and within industry and foreign trade in 
particular. 
Scores of new industrial projects were set up by the State during the 
1970's. These covered a wide variety of industrial sectors, though 
primary emphasis was placed on relatively light and medium consumer- 
product industries, particularly during the first half of the decade. 
A relatively high proportion of those projects could be classed as 
"repeat projects" in the sense that similar plants had been set up 
previously. Due largely to this factor, it can be argued with hindsight 
that the "novel technological gain" accomplished by the country as a 
result of industrial expansion and development in the 1970's was not 
particularly significant. 
Quite apart from the recurrent nature of some of the projects executed, 
there were other factors which played their part in holding up the rate 
of technological advancement within Iraqi manufacturing Industry in 
general, and the industrial public sector in particular. Two factors 
were specially important in this regard, namely the tendency for heavy 
reliance on highly packaged forms of transfer and the weakness of national 
research and development efforts. These and other relevant points will 
be expanded and elaborated in the course of this Chapter. 
The primary focus of this Chapter is directed towards State-owned 
manufacturing industry within the civilian part of the economy. However, 
brief and/or occasional reference is made to other segments of Iraqi 
industry. In particular, the Chapter contains a limited coverage of the 
transfer process in the oil sector, electricity generation and distribution 
and mineral extraction. It is the researcher's belief that this coverage 
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is relevant in view of the interrelationships that exist in practice 
between the different major sections of Iraqi industry. Moreover, among 
the 32 case studies in the empirical part of the research, six fall 
within the oil sector while another two relate to military establishments. 
Also, one case involves the generation of electrical power, and another 
one the extraction and processing of phosphate. 
11.1 Project Appraisal, Selection and Execution 
Investment decisions by State-owned industrial firms normally have to go 
through a series of steps before they can finally be approved and implemented. 
All capital project proposals have to be submitted by the sponsoring 
establishment to the parent State Organization. 
Apart from the State Organization for Industrial Design and Construction 
(SOIDAC), six productive State Organizations exist within the Ministry of 
Industry and Minerals (MIM) and the Ministry of Light Industries (MLI). 
Listed below are the present respective attachments to these two ministries 
of the six productive State Organizations as well as SOIDAC and the 
State Organization for Electricity: 1 
(a) Ministry of Industry and Minerals (MIM) 
(1) State Organization for Industrial Design and Construction (SOIDAC). 
2 
(2) State Organization for Electricity (SOE), with five main 
establishments (ie operating firms). 
i3) State Organization for Chemical Industries, with seven main 
establishments. 
(4) State Organization for Minerals, with four main establishments. 
1 This information relates to end-1982 and has been obtained from the 
following sources: 
(i) "Working Paper of the Industrial Sector 1983". An unpublished pap.. r 
prepared by the Ministry of Industry and Minerals and the Ministry 
Light Industries, Baghdad-Iraq. Pp 20-28,32-48,84-88,94-101. 
(This document is in Arabic). 
(ii)"Ten years of Industrial Progress". A Special Issue of the "Industry 
Journal" published by the Department of Public Relations, Ministry of 
Industry and Minerals, Baghdad-Iraq, 1978. P 7. (This document is in 
Arabic). 
(iii) "IRAQ: Departments and State Organizations". A brief directory published 
by the Board of Trade, 1983, Sections 6-7. 
2A list of the main constituent parts of SOIDAC will be given in the 
second section of this Chapter. 
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ý5) State Organization for Engineering Industries, 
with ten main establishments. 
(b). Ministry of Light Industries (MLI) 
(1) State Organization for Construction Industries, with 
eleven main establishments. ' 
(2) State Organization for Food Industries, with nine 
main establishments. 
(3) State Organization for Textile Industries, with thirteen 
main establishments. 
The procedure followed for approving major industrial projects in the 
public sector is more lengthy than in the case of small projects. It 
is necessary, therefore, to look at each of these two cases separately. 
11.1.1 Flow Pattern of Proposals for Major Industrial Projects 
The practice has been established since 1958 for five year plans to be 
prepared periodically, each of these plans including a number of proposed 
projects in each main sector of the Iraqi economy. Throughout the 1960's 
and 1970's high and increasing proportions of development projects were 
to be found in various branches of industry. The practice has also grown 
since the second half of the 1970's for annual development plans to be 
prepared on the basis of the respective five year plan and actual achieve- 
ments attained, as well as practical problems encountered. Major project 
proposals are generally characterized by being related to "new lines of 
production or economic activity, having inter-sectoral implications, 
requiring sizeable investment finance, or having policy implications". 
3 
Industrial projects contained in any development plan can be split into 
two main groups, ie major new projects to be set up for the first time, 
and extensions to industrial establishments which had already been in 
operation. The latter type could again be divided into two sub-types, 
viz, extensions at current locations of activity, and those to be effected 
at other locations. 
3 UNCTAD: "Transfer and Development of Technology in Iraq". A report 
submitted by an UNCTAD special mission to the Iraqi Government 1978. p 28. 
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In the majority of cases, project proposals emanate from operating 
concerns and other government agencies or departments. 
4 Instances exist, 
however, where project ideas have been put forward either by, outside 
bodies (eg consultants) or government officials who hold relatively high 
5 
positions in the State's hierarchy (eg Ministers or planning experts). 
It is possible in this context to categorize the multitude of project 
proposals which find their way to the system into four main classes. 
(a) Extensions of present production capacities. These occur in cases 
where it is felt that present resources cannot cope with forecast 
levels of demand. 
(b) Improvements on present products, le adding new improved versions 
of existing products, or alternatively discarding present products 
in favour of new specifications. 
(c), Addition of, related products. This often happens. under circumstances 
where the operating project possesses certain vantage points that 
may usefully be exploited in producing other articles, eg availability 
of by-products, idle machine time, versatile labour force, excess 
building space, or accumulation of in-house cash resources. 
(d) Production of new goods. From the qualitative aspect, this is the 
most radical of all four types of ideas. Such proposals frequently 
entail the setting up of a major new project which would have-the 
status of a separate State Establishment. 
A proposal originating from an industrial establishment, has normally to 
be submitted to its parent State Organization, accompanied by "a 
preliminary note describing the proposal, its relevance with regard to the 
objects of the (development) plan, prima facie feasibility, approximate 
financial resources required for its implementation and possible benefits 
expected to arise from it. "6 
4 Loc. Cit. 
5 Loc. Cit. 
6 Loc. Cit. 
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It is then the duty of the State Organization to examine-the. proposal, 
either through its own staff or by outside consultants. 
7 If, this 
evaluation proves positive, the proposal would then be forwarded to the 
respective Minister together with the pertinent recommendations. 
8 
Project proposals which gain the Minister's stamp of approval are- 
referred in turn to the Ministry of Planning, where primary responsibility 
rests for the preparation of both five year and annual development programmes. 
Specialist departments had been formed within the Planning Ministry, so that 
all project proposals dispatched by MIM, MLI, and the Ministry of Oil 
are normally channelled to the "Industrial Department" for the purpose 
of expert evaluation, which is normally more detailed than anything done 
hitherto., 
With respect to each proposed project a feasibility study is carried out 
covering principally the technical and economic aspects of the proposal, 
to check, enlarge, and finalize the details and recommendations that had 
accompanied the proposal . 
9, In some cases the Planning Ministry 
commissions the study to a consultancy firm, either in lieu of or in, 
addition to its own appraisal. 
The evaluation which emerges, as a result of this latest study is then 
forwarded to the Steering Committee of the Planning Board for approval. 
10 
This Committee-is. empowered to approve certain types of projects, 
particularly follow-up or auxiliary projects that are small in size. 
11 
All other projects have to be incorporated, ` together with the Committee's 
recommendations, in a memorandum forwarded to the Planning Board for 
final decision. 12 The Steering Committee is headed by 'the Minister of 
Planning, whereas the Planning Board is an inter-ministerial committee 
chaired by the President or Vice-President of the Republic, and includes 
several Ministers as members. 
13 
7 Loc. Cit. 
8 Loc. Cit. 
9 Ibid., p 20 
10 Loc. Cit. 
11 Ibid., p 28 
12 Loc. Cit. 
13 Ibid., p 20 
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Following the approval of the Steering Committee and/or Planning Board, 
the project is listed in the overall five year plan and/or the periodic 
annual investment plan. In the case of most manufacturing projects, 
MIM or MLI are authorized to implement the project, whereas oil related 
projects are executed by the'Ministry of Oil. The executive Ministry 
undertakes the functions of detailed feasibility study, design, engineering/ 
consultancy arrangements and choice of technology. 
14 The respective 
executive'Ministry is also authorized to conclude the necessary contractual 
agreements for the acquisition of technology as well as monitoring the 
discharge by the supplier of relevant guarantees and training duties, 
if any. 
15 
Proposed industrial projects which fall within the domain of MIM or MLI 
are occasionally implemented by the State Establishment where the project 
idea originated in the first place. This is particularly the case when 
a relatively small or medium sized expansionary project is involved and/ 
or the extension-is planned to take place near a present operative plant. 
With respect to most other non-oil industrial projects, execution is 
entrusted to the State Organization for Industrial Design and Construction 
(SOIDAC). 16 In the case of oil related projects, the State Organization 
for Oil Projects (SOOP) is the responsible body for undertaking the 
requisite tasks connected with implementation. 
17 
11.1.2 Flow Pattern of Proposals for Small Industrial Projects 
Proposals for small industrial projects are those involving mainly small 
scale modernization or expansion on operating establishments. As a 
general rule, these projects do not involve new lines of production, and 
require limited financial resources which are covered from internal 
resources of the respective Establishment or State Organization. 
18 
The bulk of small project proposals emerge from the State Establishments 
within MAI, MIM, and the Ministry of Oil. Subsequent to the deliberation 
and finalization of each proposal within the relevant State Establishment, 
the proposal is forwarded to the parent State Organization. If approved, 
the project idea is then dispatched to the respective Minister for 
final sanctioning. In most cases the Minister's decision is final, though 
14 Ibid., p 28 
15 Ibid., p 29 
16 Loc. Cit. 
17 Loc. Cit. 
18 Ibid., p 28 
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the endorsement of the Planning Ministry's Steering Committee is required 
under certain circumstances. 
It is a normal procedure for small project-proposals to be appraised 
both within the State Establishment where they originate and higher up 
the Ministry's hierarchy. In most cases the second appraisal is carried 
out at the Ministry's head office where a central unit exists for the 
purpose of project evaluation. Probable levels of costs and revenues 
are assessed in the course of these studies, as well as matters relating 
to social considerations, technological aspects, and manpower requirements. 
On final approval of a project proposal, requisite funds need to be 
allocated, either from the central government or the respective Establish- 
ment's accumulated profits. As regards authority for the project's 
implementation, this is usually delegated by the Minister to the sponsoring 
Establishment. When the expansionary project is medium in size and/or 
located at a point distant from sister plant(s), SOIDAC is commissioned 
with its fulfilment, while the parallel executive body in the oil sector 
is SOOP. Authority for project implementation normally involves the 
choice of technology, basic and detailed project design, choice of 
contractors, and supervision over project execution. 
11.1.3 Features of Technology Transfer in the Public Sector 
The practice has been established since the mid 1970's for major 
industrial projects in the public sector to be executed via the method 
of total project contracting. Typically, the gross investment required 
in any of these projects varies between a few million and ten million 
Iraqi dinars, but in some cases the cost is much higher. 
UNCTAD's special mission to Iraq considered that this practice had given 
rise to "a policy of technology transfer in a highly packaged form of 
turn-key and product guarantee investment projects, in the hope that this 
would accelerate diversification and growth of the ecomomy. '1.19 
The final report of this mission adds further that "as a result of this 
policy, packaged transfers often include detailed feasibility reports; 
19 Ibid., p 29 
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basic design, detailed design, engineering; process know-how; supply of 
machinery, equipment and instruments; surveys, selection of site, erection 
of plant and civil works; commissioning and operation for limited periods 
as part of the guarantees; provision of expert personnel and training of 
Iraqi personnel; guaranteed supply of spares, components and intermediates; 
technical servicing and provision of any other technological inputs as 
might be required in the operation of plants". 
20 Also, foreign consultants 
21 
are sometimes commissioned to supervise project implementation. 
This policy of primary reliance on highly packaged forms of transfer may 
be beneficial to Iraq in "drawing heavily on the existing stock of technology, 
thus attempting to bridge the technological gap at an accelerated pace, 
modernizing and diversifying its production structures, Investing oil 
resources in its own growth process and laying the foundations for future 
development .... ". 
Z? 
There is, however, an opposite argument which concentrates on the possible 
drawbacks of highly packaged forms of transfer. Four such drawbacks 
may be pinpointed in this regard: 
23 
(a) Likelihood that tendering for large contracts is confined to large 
specialized corporations, whereby the scope of competition among possible 
suppliers is curtailed. 
(b) High costs of project implementation, due to the absence of detailed 
costing and negotiation with respect to each main aspect of the project. 
(c) Tendency to perpetuate technological dependence of the recipient 
project, through "supply and services" clauses in the relevant contracts 
which 
_tend 
to provide local management with an easy solution to many 
operational problems. 
(d) By-passing local sources of technology, thereby inhibiting domestic 
capabilities and retarding the process of endogenous experience accumulation. 
The UNCTAD mission notes that the leap in the country's oil revenues 
had been a mixed blessing. They point out that in "the early 1970's - 
20 Ibid., p 30 
21 Loc. Cit. 
22 Loc. Cit. 
23 Loc. Cit. 
272 
prior to major oil price rises - efforts were under way to mobilize 
Iraqi scientific, engineering and technical manpower to identify projects, 
prepare detailed feasibility reports, undertake as far as possible and 
participate in design, consultancy and project implementation activities. 
This approach was largely abandoned a little later - when financial 
resources became more plentiful - under the apprehension that the 
technological base and capacity was too narrow to be spread over a wide 
variety of investment projects at all levels of their implementation and 
operation. 
24 
Available evidence indicates that the level of packaging adopted in the 
execution of small projects is generally lower than in the case of larger 
projects. This is based on the observation that many small projects 
in the public sector are implemented through package-free, low, or medium 
packaged transfer means. Methods that are frequently employed in those 
instances are ad hoc machinery supplies, engineering services contracts, 
technical consultancy contracts, and major process contracting. 
The term used in Iraq to refer to the adoption of package-free as well as 
medium and low packaged transfer methods is "direct implementation" of 
projects. In practice, this is taken to indicate that the sponsoring 
body enters into separate contracts with different parties for the 
construction of buildings, supply of machinery and equipment, and 
occasionally also for the provision of certain services and/or executory 
tasks of specialist nature. The obvious implication here is that the 
project is implemented by a number of contractors who are independent 
from one another. In such cases, the sponsoring body assumes the role of 
co-ordinator and overall supervisor, as well as the direct fulfilment of 
certain executory tasks such as the installation of machinery or training 
of personnel. 
11.2 State Organization for Industrial Design and Construction (SOIDAC) 
The General Directorate for Industrial Design and Construction was set 
up in 1959, with the purpose of Implementing industrial projects in the 
country. 
25 
24 Ibid., p'29 
25 "Working Paper .... ", Op. Cit. p 105 
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The Directorate was elevated to the status of a "State Organization". In 
1970, whereupon the General Directorate for Industrial Buildings was also 
appended to the newly formed Organization. The functions of SOIDAC, as 
set out in the relevant legislation in 1970, were to perform pertinent 
studies concerning industrial sectors and detailed evaluations of proposed 
industrial projects, as well as planning the execution of proposed 
projects that are referred to it. 
26 
SOIDAC was also made responsible 
for supervising the execution of those projects; designing impending 
ones; preparation of tender documents, assessment of bids received, and 
submitting final recommendations, with respect to the selection of the 
most appropriate contractor(s) for each project. 
27 
Moreover, it was plain 
from the wording of that enactment that SOIDAC was expected to develop 
its manpower and managerial framework in order to enhance its own ability 
to execute as many projects as possible without recourse to the methods 
of total project or total process contracting. 
28 
By 1978, SOIDAC had a staff of around 1000 people, including workmen, 
technicians, engineers and managers. 
29 In 1982, the Organization had 
ten principal departments, as follows: 
30 
(a) Project Evaluation Department 
(b) Design Department 
(c) Projects Department 
(d) Organization and Methods Department 
(e) Administrative Affairs Department 
(f). Legal Department 
(g) Finance Department 
(h) Purchases and Storage Department 
26 "Ten Years of .... " Op. Cit. p 105 
27 Loc. Cit. 
28 Loc. Cit. 
29 Ibid., p 106 
30 "Working Paper ..... " Op. Cit. P 105 
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(I) State Establishment for Direct Industrial-Implementation 
(j) State Establishment for Industrial Housing 
11.2.1 SOIDAC's Experience in Project Execution 
SOIDAC has been responsible for discharging the vast majority of non- 
oil industrial projects throughout the period 1970-1982.31 During this 
span,. a total of 158 industrial and allied projects were implemented, 
either directly by SOIDAC or executed by contractors under its supervision. 
32 
Another 45 projects were under construction by the end of 1982.33 
An overall view of the types of projects executed by SOIDAC during the 
twelve year span 1970-1982, as well as those being implemented in 1982, 
is given in table 11.1. 
A comprehensive and classified list of industrial projects executed 
by SOIDAC during the 1970's is given in Appendix 11.1, while table 11.2 
summarises the quantitative and cost aspects of the 98 projects mentioned 
in that Appendix. Table 11.3, on the other hand, presents information 
relating to semi-industrial projects, ie those which provided basic 
services to industrial establishments. 
It is plain from table 11.2 that construction material projects top the 
list in terms of the number of projects executed (ie about 37% of total), 
while food, drink, and tobacco projects occupy second place (25%), with 
chemical, rubber and plastic projects coming third in succession. 
These three main types account for over 73% of the number of projects 
executed. However, in terms of actual expenditure, shares of the various 
industrial sectors are rather different, with chemical, rubber and plastic 
projects ranking in first position (46%), followed by construction 
materials (18%) and paper and wood products (11%). The combined proportion 
of these three sectors exceeds 75% of the grand total cost of all industrial 
projects during that period. 
31 Ibid., p 106 
32 Loc. Cit. 
33 Loc. Cit. 
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PROJECTS EXECUTED BY SOIDAC DURING 1970-1982 AND THOSE BEING 
IMPLEMENTED IN 1982 
TYPES 
OF 
PROJECTS 
IMPLEMENTED 
1970-1962 
Number 
% of 
Total 
BEING 
IMPLEMENTED 
IN 1982 
Number 
% of 
Total 
TOTAL 
Number 
% of 
Total 
(1) Construction materials 55 34.8 27 60.0 82 40.4 
(2) Food, drink, tobacco 25 15.8 7 15.5 32 15.8 
(3) Textiles and clothing 10 6.4 3 6.7 13 6.4 
(4) Electrical products 
and Electricity 8 5.1 - - 8 3.9 
(5) Chemicals and Petro- 
chemicals 13 8.2 4 8.9 17 8.4 
(6) Engineering and 
metal products 19 12.0 3 6.7 22 10.8 
(7) Housing 19 12.0 1 2.2 20 9.9 
(8) Miscellaneous 9 5.7 - - 9 4.4 
Total 1 158 1 100.0 45 
i 
100.0 
i 
203 
i 
100.0 
i 
Source: "Working Paper of the Industrial Sector 1983", Op. Cit., p 110. 
Table 11.2 
SUMMARY OF PROJECTS EXECUTED UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF SOIDAC 1970-1978 
INDUSTRIAL 
SECTOR 
NUMBER OF 
PROJECTS 
Number Total 
GRAND TOTAL 
COST 
ID'000 Tota% 
AVERAGE 
COST OF 
PROJECT 
(ID'000) 
(A) Food, Drink, Tobacco 24 24.5 54222 4.0 2259.3 
(B) Textiles and Clothing 8 8.2 87132 6.4 10891.5 
(C) Paper & Wood products 6 6.1 152687 11.2 25447.8 
(D) Chemical, Rubber and 
Plastic Products 12 12.2 626380 46.1 52198.3 
(E) Construction and Glass 
Products 36 36.7 245920 18.1 6831.1 
(F) Engineering and 
Electrical Products 7 7.2 46638 3.4 6662.6 
(G) Basic Metal and 
Mineral Products 5 5.1 147100* 10.8 36775* 
Total 98 100.0 1360079 100.0 
*This figure relates to four projects, as the investment outlay of the fifth project is not known. - 
Source: "Ten Years of Industrial Progress", Op. Cit. pp 106-122 
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Table 11.3 
SUMMARY OF BASIC SERVICE PROJECTS EXECUTED UNDER THE 
SUPERVISION OF SOIDAC 1970-1978 
TYPES OF BASIC SERVICE PROJECTS NUMBER % OF TOTAL NUMBER 
(1) Water Supply 7 20.0 
(2) Electrical Generation and 
Linking 10 28.6 
(3) Industrial Training Centres 6 17.1 
(4) Industrial Housing 7 20.0 
(5) Industrial Buildings 5 14.3 
Total 35 100.0 
Source: "Ten Years of Industrial Progress", Op. Cit., p 106-122 
11.2.2 Growth Pattern in SOIDAC's Budget and Employment 
It is clear from table 11.4 that budget allocations for the purpose of 
executing various types of industrial and allied projects grew from 
ID 35.6 million in-1970 to ID 266.1 million in 1981, a rise of 647% 
over the period. Table 11.4 also illustrates that the level of attain- 
ment of financial expenditure targets improved during this period. 
Whilst the average attainment percentage in the three year span 1970, 
1971,1972 was 46% the corresponding average for 1979,1980,1981 
reached 74%. 
A basic element in SOIDAC's expansion during the 1970's was the concurrent 
and almost constant enlargement of its imports'. programme, which was 
focused on purchases of machinery, equipment and other requirements for 
project execution. 
77 ii 
Table 11.4 
SOIDAC'S BUDGET ALLOCATIONS AND ACTUAL EXPENDITURES 1970-1981 
YEAR BUDGET 
ALLOCATIONS 
(ID m) 
ACTUAL 
EXPENDITURES 
(ID m) 
RATIO OF ACTUAL 
EXPENDITURE TO 
BUDGET ALLOCATIONS 
1970 35.6 5.7 16% 
1971 30.8 17.9 58% 
1972 13.9 9.0 65% 
1973 33.7 38.1 113% 
1974 162.1 90.1 56% 
1975 193.9 114.4 59% 
1976 280.4 193.4 69% 
1977 372.7 187.7 50% 
1978 334.5 217.0 65% 
1979 315.0 275.8 88% 
1980 374.9 173.3 46% 
1981 266.1 240.3 90% 
Source: "Working Paper of the Industrial Sector" Op. Cit. p 111-112 
While the organization's imports' bill was ID 8 million in 1970, the 
corresponding figure in 1977 was ID 125.92 m. 
34 In 1980, SOIDAC's 
import budget reached ID 134.666 m, and in 1982 ID 134.5 m. 
35 
Over the period 1970-82, therefore, the increase in the Organization's 
imports represented a jump of 1581%. 
Another major element of growth is displayed by the level of employment. 
It is plain from table 11.5 that the Organization's total manpower increased 
constantly from 142 in 1971 to a peak of 881 in 1977, a rise of 520%. 
Fluctuations were witnessed thereafter, so that by 1982 SOIDAC's personnel 
roll had shrunk to 635, a fall of 28% on the 1977 figure. It is noticeable 
from this table that the proportion of technical staff among employees 
during this span averaged 41.4% of total workforce. Also, the annual size 
of SOIDAC's three main groups of employees averaged 241,186 and 165 
for technical staff, managerial and clerical personnel, and workmen respectively 
34 Ibid., p 112-3 
35 Ibid., p 113 
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Table 11.5 
PROFILE OF SOIDAC'S EMPLOYEES 1971-1982 
YEARS TECHNICAL 
STAFF 
% of Number Total 
MANAGERIAL 
& CLERICAL 
% of, ,, Number Total 
WORKMEN 
% of Number Total 
TOTAL 
1971 41 28.9 66 46.5 35 24.6 142 
1972 166 48.5 109 31.9 67 19.6 342 
1973 190 51.5 105 28.5 74 20.0 369 
1974 230 50.7 112 24.7 112 24.6 454 
1975 276 46.0 148 27.7 176 26.3 600 
1976 326 51.3 177 27.8 133 20.9 636 
1977 348 39.5 237 26.9 296 33.6 881 
1978 265 33.4 250 31.5 279 35.1 794 
1979 273 33.8 261 32.3 273 33.9 807 
1980 274 33.2 283 34.3 269 32.5 826 
1981 250 39.9 241 38.4 136 21.7 627 
1982 257 40.5 247 38.9 131 20.6 635 
Average 241 41.4 1971-1982 186 32.5 165 26.1 593 
Source: "Working Paper of the Industrial Sector" Op. Cit. p 115 
11.2.3 Appraisal of SOIDAC's Contribution to Technology Acquisition 
Ir is clear from the available figures and information that this Organization 
has gained some valuable experience in the field of implementing public 
sector projects and acquiring foreign technology. Although heavy reliance 
had been placed on engaging foreign firms in project execution, some 
effort began to be directed by the late 1970's towards so-called "direct 
implementation". Hence, an "Implementation Department" was set up during 
this period, and subsequently promoted to the rank of a "State Establishment" 
on Ist January 1981.36 
36 Ibid., p 115 
r., 2 79 
The new enterprise became known as the "State Establishment for Direct 
Industrial Implementation". A number of industrial and allied projects 
had been implemented directly either by this Establishment or its 
forerunner, including civil engineering works and water supply units 
in addition'to machinery and equipment installations. 
37 During the two 
year span 1981=1982, a total of 18 projects and works were completed and 
handed over to operating firms, while another 9 were on their way to 
being so transferred. 
38 Work on a further 18 projects was still being 
carried out by the end of 1982.39 A budget allocation of ID 1.718 million 
to this Establishment was made in 1981 whereas actual expenditure reached 
ID 0.706 million, ie 41% of allocations. 
40 The allocation in 1982 was 
ID 2.391 million, while actual spending reached ID 1.488 million, ie 
62% of allocations. 
41 
It is relevant, at this point, to put forward the basic question as to 
how far SOIDAC has been successful in achieving pertinent national 
objectives in its field of operation. These objectives may be perceived 
as the need for executing industrial projects with least possible costs 
and time; while endeavouring to enhance their operational quality In 
addition to augmenting the embodied technological contribution to the 
country's industrial base. In appraising SOIDAC's efforts and accomplish- 
ments, 8 main remarks may be made in this connection, as follows: - 
(a) The Organization was charged with executing a comparatively large 
number of industrial projects during the 1970's, and particularly after 
1973. Also, these projects exhibited a notable degree of variety in 
size, product range, and embodied technology despite the repetitive nature 
of many of them. 
(b) The expansion in the Organization's activity placed a heavy strain 
on its human resources, which were very limited in both'qualitative and 
quantitative terms. 
42 
(c) The method of total project contracting was utilized increasingly 
during the 1970's, so as to cope with a heavy work load and relatively 
short completion periods for most projects. 
43 
37 Ibid., p, 116 
38 Loc. Cit. 
39 Loc. Cit. 
40 Ibid., p 117 
41 Loc. Cit. 
42 Ibid., p 124 
43 Loc. Cit. 
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(d) Detailed feasibility studies of prospective projects have been 
deficient in certain significant aspects, especially as regards strategic 
matters, social considerations and the transfer of additional technology 
into the country. 44 It is possible to assert, further, that most of 
SOIDAC's feasibility studies lacked in-depth treatment of technological 
aspects, marketing analysis, and due consideration of , alternative 
material inputs. 
45 
(e) SOIDAC faced a wide array of problems in executing projects through 
direct implementation, ie medium, low, free-packaged transfer methods. 
Evidence suggests that SOIDAC "had not been able to achieve any worthwhile 
benefits here in terms'of time or costs, in addition to the poor qualitative 
standard of most of these projects". 
46 
(f) The Organization's means of monitoring progress in project execution 
were out-dated and largely ineffective. 
47 In fact, most employees had 
not received any serious training in this field and were incapable of 
using modern project control techniques. 
48 This had obvious adverse 
effects'on the speed of discovering deviations and the timings of corrective 
action. 
49 
(g) No serious attempts seem to have been made in the area of following 
up the operational performance of executed projects. 
so Such follow-ups 
could be usefully informative and conducive to more successful implementation 
patterns of subsequent projects. 
51 
(h) Evidence suggests that present documentation methods employed by 
SOIDAC leave much to be desired. The idea has, therefore, been put 
forward that more advanced techniques need to be employed in this field 
and a specialized "information bank" should be set up and linked with 
counter-part institutions abroad. 
52 Such a development within SOIDAC 
could contribute greatly to the enrichment of its detailed feasibility 
studies as well as the refinement of its choice of appropriate executory 
method(s) under each set of circumstances. 
44 Ibid., p 306 
45 Loc. Cit. 
46 Ibid., p 125 
47 Loc. Cit. 
48 Loc. Cit. 
49 Loc. Cit. 
50 Ibid., p 306 
51 Loc. Cit. 
52 Loc. Cit. 
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11.3. Other Transfer Related Industrial-Bodies 
Although SOIDAC may be considered as the main institution connected with 
the importation-of technology to Iraq, 'it needs to be recognized that 
many other Iraqi institutions are occasionally involved in this process. 
The object of this section is to consider the part played by other industrial 
concerns in this area, so that an explanation of the role of research and 
consultancy organizations in the country may subsequently be presented. 
It must first be pointed out that operating industrial establishments 
are associated with the process of technology-acquisition whenever they 
execute their own projects. It happens at times that State Establishments 
make proposals for expansion or modernization which they are able and 
willing to execute themselves. Two main factors can be regarded as 
instrumental in determining both the capacity. and readiness of the 
proposing, Establishment to undertake project implementation. In order 
of importance, these two factors are: 
(a) Availability of managerial and technical capability. In circumstances 
where the relevant Establishment has adequate excess time and enough 
accumulated expertise among its managers and technical personnel, it is 
frequently felt that the Establishment in question should be entrusted 
with the new project's execution. 
(b) Location, size, and complexity of the project. Whenever the new 
project is planned to be adjacent to existent plant, then this may 
ceteris paribus encourage execution by the sponsoring Establishment, 
and vice versa. Also, if the proposed project is small in size and/or 
similar in technological characteristics to present plant, a strong 
inclination will develop towards execution by the promoting enterprise. 
Notwithstanding cases where new projects are executed by promoting State 
Establishments, the role of four different State Organizations nees to be 
noted and explained in this connection. Respectively, these four 
Organizations are concerned with oil projects, drug manufacturing and 
importation, electricity generation and distribution, and mineral 
production. 
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11.3.1 State Organization for Oil Projects (SOOP) 
This organization performs a similar role to SOIDAC within the oil 
sector. It undertakes the planning and execution of oil projects, 
such as refineries, pipelines and terminals. 
53 
UNCTAD's report states that this Organization had around 300 engineers 
A certain amount of basic in 1977, of whom 50 were highly specialised 
54 
design is undertaken by SOOP, but the staff is largely engaged in 
supervisory functions and monitoring contracts and projects. 
55 The three 
operating Establishments in this Organization are the following: 
56 
(1) State 'Establishment for Designing Oil Projects. 
(2) State Establishment for Oil Construction. 
(3) State Establishment for Supervision of Construction. 
It is noteworthy that SOOP has been able to develop a 
reasonable degree of expertise in its field. UNCTAD's special 
mission point out in their report that within the oil 
sector, "Iraq has developed expertise for the selection of technologies, 
tendering and negotiation of contracts, supervision of their implementation, 
and basic design capabilities. The capacity for detailed design and 
engineering, though still weak, is being improved. This is of critical 
importance in view of the major investment projects being envisaged in 
this sector. The weakest link in the chain is the availability of 
equipment, instruments and refinery hardware, where there is almost 
total reliance on imports. "57 
11.3.2 State Organization for Drugs and Medical Supplies (SODAMS) 
This Is part of the Ministry of Health, its main function being the 
provision of adequate supplies of drugs and other medical supplies to 
various private and State owned establishments within the medical sector. 
53 UNCTAD, Op. Cit. p 34 
54 Loc. Cit. 
55 Loc. Cit. 
56 "IRAQ: Departments and State Organizations". Op. Cit. Section 10, pp 2-3 
57 UNCTAD, Op. Cit. p 21 
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Certain types of drugs are manufactured locally by the State Establishment 
for Drug Manufacturing which is a constituent of this Organization. Two 
other Establishments operate under the umbrella of this State Organization, 
namely the General Directorate for the Importation and Distribution of 
Drugs, and the General Directorate of Medical Appliances and Supplies. 
58 
SODAMS determines its own specifications for certain categories of drugs. 
59 
kýY 
This is done largely on the basis of local requirements while taking into 
account international specifications and those prevailing in certain Y1 
developed countries, especially the United States and Great Britain. 
60 
At present, a large part of drug manufacturing is concentrated on the 
formulation and packaging of semi-finished and finished drugs. 
61 
Some limited experimentation, trials, and research are also being 
undertaken by this Organization, in order to improve and widen existing 
product range., 
62 
11.3.3 State Organization for'Electricity (SOE) 
Five principal establishments form the main body of SOE. Three of these 
focus their operations on the generation, transformation and distribution 
of electricity, while the other two are concerned with the study, planning 
and execution of new projects. These two latter Establishments are 
the following: 
(a) General Directorate for Small Projects and Rural Electrification, 
whose main functions include the determination of technical specifications 
and detailed requirements of small and rural projects as well as the 
implementation of these projects. 
63 This Establishment is empowered to 
enter into contracts with outside bodies in order to fulfil its defined 
tasks. 64 
Since its foundation in 1975 and until 1982, a total of 128 secondary stations 
of various capacities were constructed by this Establishment. 
65 Another 
47 stations were expanded during this period, in addition to laying 21000 
kilometers of feeding lines. 
66 
58 "IRAQ: Departments .... " Op. Cit. Section 4, p1 59 UNCTAD, Op. Cit. p 36 
60 Loc. Cit. 
61 Loc. Cit. 
62 Loc. Cit. 
63 "Working Paper .... " Op. Cit. p 100 
64 Loc. Cit. 
65 Ibid., p 100-1 
66 Loc. Cit. 
234 
(b) General Directorate for Major Electrical Projects. The main task 
of this Establishment is the design, detailed determination of requisite 
needs, and supervision of large impending projects. 
67 It has the authority 
to invite firms to submit tenders for projects as well as the study of 
bids that are lodged with, it and the submission of relevant recommendations 
to the President of the State Organization. 
68 With an average number 
of 257 employees in 1982, this Establishment is moreover charged with 
supervising the execution of these projects by outside contractors. 
69 
Table 11.6 gives a summary of the works implemented by this Directorate 
during the period 1976-1982 as well as those in progress at the end of. 
1982. 
5 ?' 
Table 11.6 
PROJECTS DESIGNED AND SUPERVISED BY THE GENERAL DIRECTORATE FOR 
MAJOR ELECTRICAL PROJECTS 1976-1982 
DESCRIPTION MEASURING 
UNIT 
WORKS 
EXECUTED 
1976-1982 
WORKS IN 
PROGRESS 
end-1982 
(1) Steam Generation Stations Mega Watts 1800 1860 
(2) Gas Generation Stations Mega Watts 1270 - 
(3) Hydro Generation Stations Mega Watts 400 240 
(4) Secondary Stations (132 K. V. ) Number 100 76 
(5) Secondary Stations (400 K. V. ) Number 9 3 
(6) Transporting Lines (132 K. V. ) Kilometer 5436 4006 
(7) Transporting Lines (400 K. V. ) Kilometer 4250 1030 
(8) Cables (132 K. V. ) , Meter 212100 280800 
Source: "Working Paper of the Industrial Sector 1983" p 102 
11.3.4 State Organization for Minerals (SOM) 
The Iraqi National Company for Minerals (INCOM) was first set up in 
1969 as part of the Ministry of Oil. 
70 In 1974, this body's managerial 
attachment was transferred to the Ministry of Industry which was then 
renamed as the "Ministry of Industry'and Minerals". 
71 In 1975, INCOM 
was upgraded to the rank of a "State Organization" and became known as 
the "State Organization for Minerals". 72 
67 Ibid., p 101 
68 Loc. Cit. 
69 Ibid., p 101-2 
70 Ibid., p 84 
71 Loc. Cit. 
72 Loc. Cit. 
ý" 
ýý 
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By the end of 1982, SOM had five operating Establishments. as follows:. 
(a) State Establishment for Sulphur. This was established back. in 1969 
and began producing sulphur from its mines, In Northern Iraq, during the 
final weeks of 1972.3 The value of this Establishment's output In the 
financial year 1973-1974 was ID 7.9 million, rising to ID 17 million. in 
1980 and ID 23.1 million in 1982.74 A number of complementary processing 
units have been installed so-as to produce certain sulphur based products. 
75 
The most important of these manufacturing units were those for making 
76 
agricultural sulphur and sulphuric acid. The sulphur extraction mines 
together with the processing complex were the subject of a bilateral 
technical co-operation agreement with Poland in 1969. 
(b) State Establishment for Construction Materials. This was set up 
in 1975 when it had three factory units for the production of sand, 
gravel, and building stones in addition to a quarry for silica sand. 
77 
During the period 1975-1982, a notable programme of expansion was under- 
taken by this Establishment, so much so that a total of 42 factories 
belonged to it by the end of 1982.78 A number of additional units 
were also being installed at that time. 
79 
(c) State Establishment for Phosphate. Set up in 1976, this body was 
charged with the duty of supervising the execution of the major phosphate 
project in Al - Qaim. 
80 This project involves the mining of phosphate 
deposits as well as the production of phosphatic fertilizers. 
81 Trial 
proudction began at the various units by the end of 1982 in anticipation 
of fully fledged operation in 1983.82 
(d) State Establishment for Salts, which was set up in 1980, though 
actual production does not seem to have begun yet. 
73 Loc. Cit. 
74 Ibid ., p 84-5 
75 Loc. Cit. 
76 Loc. Cit. 
77 Ibid ., p 85 
78 Loc. Cit. 
79 Loc. Cit. 
80 Ibid ., p 87 
81 Loc. Cit. 
82 Loc. Cit. 
(e) General Directorate for Geological Surveys and Mineral Exploration. 
This is an old-established institution, being in existence prior to the 
formation of INCOM. 
83 , Among the present tasks of this Directorate are 
the preparation of reports and relevant information connected with basic 
geological maps for many industrial, construction, and irrigation 
projects; provision of geological and chemical laboratory services to 
industrial projects; exploration and appraisal of required ore deposits 
for industrial concerns, particularly construction material industries. 
84 
11.4 Technological Research and Development 
Public sector organizations purporting to carry out technological' research 
in the country may be grouped into two basic categories: operating 
industrial firms and non-industrial bodies. While indigenous R S. D 
activity had in the past been largely neglected, there are some signs at 
present that a new orientation towards this area Is slowly emerging. 
During the 1970's, R&D programmes in the Iraqi public sector had in 
general been given a rather low position among national development 
priorities, and even more so in terms of actual expenditure allocations. 
However, present evidence suggests that more attention and resources are 
being moved in this direction during the current decade. 
11.4.1 Technological Research by Industrial Establishments 
In 1982, there were 32 R&D units within the various manufacturing 
Establishments operating, under the umbrellas, of the six State Organizations 
attached to MIM and MLI., As table 11.7 shows, the percentage of industrial 
establishments possessing such units varies from one Organization to 
another. Available evidence tends to indicate, however, that these R&D 
units have not been particularly active within the overall process of 
industrial development in the country. 
A 
Although development plans for 1968-1980 had, very broadly, set out 
general objectives and policies for R&D activity in the country, these 
had not been translated into specific and practical objectives for each 
R&D unit, although some progress was achieved in the field of devising 
solutions to some bottlenecks and occasionally tackling certain types 
of technicaliproblems. 
85 In fact, until 1981 formal R&D units were 
83 Ibid. p 86 
84 Loc. Cit. 
85 Ibid., p 234 
'. i 
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absent from the organization chart of most public sector Industrial firms, ? 1ý 
so much so-that any traces of R&D activity in most firms were to be 
found on a very limited scale within such departments as "technical 
6 
affairs , "quality control", or 
"design and technology". 
Table 11.7 
R&D UNITS WITHIN INDUSTRIAL STATE ORGANIZATIONS BELONGING TO MIM & MLI 
IN IRAQ (end-1982) 
pa, 
STATE ORGANIZATION NUMBER OF 
STATE 
ESTABLISHMENTS 
NUMBER OF R&D 
UNITS WITHIN 
STATE 
ESTABLISHMENTS 
% OF R&D 
UNITS TO NUMBER 
OF STATE 
ESTABLISHMENTS 
Textiles 13 7 54 
Food 9 9 100 
Construction 11 4 36 
Engineering 8 6 75 
Chemical 5 4 80 
Minerals 5 2 40 
Total 51 32 
Source: "Working Paper of the Industrial Sector 1983", Op. Cit. p 235 
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By the end of 1982, the number of R&D employees in the six aforementioned 
State Organizations reached a total of 105 people (table 11.8). It is 
not certain, however, that these personnel were devoted entirely to R&D 
activity. In fact, the reverse appears to be true, in that most RSD 
employees had seemingly other duties which occupied at least part of 
working time, even though no firm documented evidence exists so far 
regarding the proportion of time spent by these people on RSD tasks, 
or indeed the level of their expertise. 
87 To confound matters further, 
it seems that some employees who were not officially working on R&D took 
part occasionally in activities associated with this function. 
88 
86 Loc. Cit 
87 Ibid., p 236 
88 Loc. Cit. 
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Table 11.8 
R&D PERSONNEL IN INDUSTRIAL STATE ORGANIZATIONS IN IRAQ (end-1982) . '' 
STATE 
ORGANIZATIONS 
FINAL ACADEMIC QUALIFICATION 
B. Sc in 
Engineering M. Sc Ph. D 
or Science 
TOTAL 
Construction 5 3 2 10 
Engineering 20 - 2 22 
Chemical 10 1 1 12 
Food 35 - - 35 
Textiles 15 - 3 18 
Minerals 6 - 2 8 
Total 91 4 10 105 
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Source: "Working Paper of the Industrial Sector 1983", Op. Cit. p 237 
Since the beginning of 1982, research programmes began to be prepared for 
the various R&D units, despite the fact that these programmes have 
failed to constitute an integrated R&D plan to attack given major 
problems in manufacturing industry. 
89 The programmes referred to have, 
very broadly, been related to the following areas: 
90 s,, + 
(a) Solving bottlenecks and technical difficulties. 
aý. 9. 
(b) Shortening and adjustment of product processing sequences. 
(c) Improvements in product specifications and designs. 
I= ;, 
(d) Selection of alternative materials that can be proved to be more 
economic. 
(e) Preparation of technological requirements needed for prospective 
products. 
89 Ibid. p 237 
90 Ibid. p 238 
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(f) Enhancement of job performance. 
(g) Reduction of waste and loss. 
Very scant evidence can be advanced regarding the number and scope of 
achievements within the aforementioned areas of R&D effort. This is 
due in large measure to the absence in the past (particularly in 1970's) 
of a clear and comprehensive notion as to what constitutes an R&D 
activity. In particular, no distinct separation had apparently been made 
between R&D activity proper, on the one hand, and special studies/ 
reports on the other. 
91 Moreover, it seems that a number of technical 
breakthroughs or achievements had emanated, during the 1970's, from 
various technical departments within State Establishments. 
92 
During the period 1968-1981 inclusive, a total of 110 researches and 
studies were mentioned by industrial State Organizations in their annual 
reports. 
93 The number varied widely from one Organization to another, 
eg one in the case of construction and 40 in food industries 
94 This 
serves to indicate perhaps that the definition of this activity-differed 
from one. State Organization to another, and no information exists regarding 
the number of patents registered by State Organizations. It seems, 
however, that increasing attention is at present being directed towards 
registering technical innovations and making proper use of them. The 
point. has been made that "some progress has in fact been made in this 
sphere, though the unavailability of suitable laboratory and other required 
facilities in most State Establishments had led in some cases to contracting 
out development work with foreign establishments. "95 
The comparative neglect of R&D activity is also noticeable in Budget 
allocations by State Establishments during the 1970's. During the period 
1971-1980, most of these Establishments had no separate allocations in 
their budgets for R&D activity. 
96 It is estimated, however, that a 
total of ID 1.9 million was allocated for R&D activity by public sector 
establishments over this period97 which is a far cry from corresponding 
expenditures on foreign technology goods and services. 
91 Loc. Cit. 
92 Loc. Cit. 
93 Loc. Cit. 
94 Loc. Cit. 
95 Ibid. p 239 
96 Loc. Cit. 
97 Loc. Cit. 
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In fact, this figure represents 0: 05% of total Investment in the industrial 
public sector during that period. 
98 This percentage "is low when compared 
to corresponding ratios in the industrialized countries and some of the 
more advanced developing nations, where these are known to vary mostly in 
the region of 2- 15%11.99 Even the aforementioned level of financial 
allocation was not fully effectuated, since it has been estimated that 
only something like ID 1.2 million had actually been spent. 
100 
11.4.2 Technological Research by Other Bodies 
Restricted. amounts of relevant R&D activity have-been carried out by 
non-industrial institutions in Iraq. In the main, these are the 
universities, consultancy centres, and the Foundation of Scientific 
Research. Available evidence indicates, however, that none of these 
institutions had been involved in substantial research leading to the 
continual development of new and appropriate technologies. Nor has there 
been large scale and solid efforts on the path of harnessing local capabilities 
in order to unpackage and/or adapt foreign technology inflows. Neverthe- 
less, certain efforts have been made-in this direction, though past and 
present indications tend to convey a profile of a highly constrained 
measure of success. 
(a) The Universities. Iraq has at present seven universities, four of 
which are located in Baghdad, while the three others are respectively 
j 
in Mosul, Basra, and Arbil. One of the four Baghdad based universities 
is a military university, 
101 
while another one is earmarked for 
technological studies. The other five universities are more comprehensive 
In nature, structure and methods, exhibiting thereby a number of significant 
similarities to Western style universities. . 
`: 
Most Iraqi universities are relatively recent in origin with very limited 
academic and technical staff in comparison with their respective student 
populations. This is very evident in the case of engineering and 
technological areas of learning, particularly in the case of the Universities 
In Arbil, Basrah, Mosul as well as the Baghdad based Mustansirlya University. 
98 Loc. Cit. 
99 Loc. Cit. 
100 Loc. Cit. 
101 This university is attached to the Ministry of Defence. There are five 
other colleges of higher learning in the military sector, which are 
similarly linked to the Defence Ministry. One of these colleges is 
devoted specifically for engineering studies, ie, The Military Technical 
College in Baghdad. The other four are specialized in the fields of basic 
military learning, navy, air force, and advanced staff studies. 
F; i 
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Some limited capabilities for technological and engineering research 
exist at the other two, ie Baghdad and Technological Universities. 
a small number of relevant research projects have Since the late 1970's , 
been conducted at these two Universities for the benefit of certain 
industrial firms. Some of these seem to have been undertaken jointly 
between the academic department concerned and the respective industrial 
establishment. 102 
(b) Consultancy Centres. A few institutions exist within the framework 
of the Iraqi public sector which engage in pertinent research, design, 
or advisory activities. Whilst the actual contribution of these bodies 
in the field of rationalizing technology intake and/or development has 
been peripheral, they have the potential to play an increasingly significant 
role in the future. Three of these institutions are singled out here ä 
for a brief exposition. 
Y. 1q 
l. i 
In the first place, there is the National Centre for Engineering and 
Architectural Consultancy, which is attached to the Ministry of Planning. 
The Centre carries out design functions for civil engineering projects as 
well as industrial units. 
103 Although present indications convey the 
impression that this body has not been instrumental in the area of +,! c 
developing and/or unpackaging technologies, it is possible for it to 
t ;ý 
evolve in this direction. 
Secondly, there is the National Centre for Consultancy and Managerial 
104 
training Which again is linked to the ministry of rianning. - ine 
Centre was originally set up by the Ministry of Industry with the 
assistance of the International Labour Organization. It presently 
contains a production engineering section, which is specialized In 
providing consultancy and training services to industrial enterprises 
on production and engineering problems. 
Last but not least, we have the Specialized Centre for Engineering Studies. 
This was set up in 1972, and has been attached to the State Organization 
for Engineering Industries since 1975. The services of this Centre are 
directed towards engineering Industries in the country, through raising 
technological efficiency and offering technical support to relevant 
establishments in order to enhance the qualitative level of Iraqi 
engineering products. 
105 
102 "Working Paper ... " Op. Cit., p 340 103 UNCTAD, Op. Cit. p 34 
104 Ibid., p 35 
105 "Working Paper """" Op. Cit., p 66 
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To achieve these aims, the Centre carries out technical and economic 
feasibility studies for proposed projects in the engineering field. 
106 
It also endeavours to improve designs of existent products, innovate 
new products, and develop production technologies. 
107 The Centre possesses 
the required expertise and facilities for designing and making moulds 
and certain other types of production equipment. 
108 It is also prepared 
to contribute towards developing new machinery and materials as well as 
providing documentary and informational services within its field. 
109 
Since its establishment and up to the beginning of 1983, the Centre had 
run 20 training courses in which over 400 participants took part. 
110 
Moreover, it had conducted 9 major researches, 2 of which obtained the 
status of registered patents. 
ill Furthermore, the Centre submitted 26 
special studies for the benefit of various industrial concerns and some 
Arab organizations. 
112 A number of feasibility studies were also carried 
out in connection with engineering projects, in addition to the provision 
of consultancy services on specific problems pertaining to manufacturing, 
quality control, system design, and specialized directories. 
113 As a 
result, Centre personnel were able to put forward 14 different designs 
during this period and make a 
'number 
of industrial equipment. 
114 
It is noteworthy that at the beginning of the year 1983, this Centre 
had a total of 57 personnel possessing engineering or science degrees 
of B. Sc level or over. 
115 Of this number, 5 had Ph. D degrees, while the 
rest had a B. Sc or equivalent qualification. 
116 
(c) Foundation of Scientific Research (FSR). This was first set up in 
1963 as a "Council for Scientific Research" in order to organize, promote, 
and co-ordinate scientific research activities for development purposes. 
117 
After being expanded, the Council is now a "Foundation" being attached to 
the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research. The current 
aims of FSR relate to undertaking basic and applied research projects, 
106 Loc. Cit. 
107 Loc. Cit. 
108 Loc. Cit. 
109 Loc. Cit. 
110 Loc. Cit. 
111 Loc. Cit. 
112 Loc. Cit. 
113 Ibid., p 66-7 
114 Ibid., p 67 
115 Ibid., p 237 
116 Loc. Cit. 
117 UNCTAD, Op. Cit., p 15 
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particularly those relating to industry, agriculture, health, atomic 
energy and mineral resources. 
118 Among the most significant terms 
of reference of FSR are the following four: 
119 
(a) Formulation of proposals for national science policy. 
(b) Preparation of national plans for research programmes. 
(c) Co-ordination of research work in the country and facilitating its 
execution. 
(d) Promotion, evaluation and follow-up of basic and applied research 
programmes. 
It seems, however, that no firm and conclusive evidence exists to confirm 
the actual role of FSR in the field of effective planning and co-ordination 
of aggregate research effort in the country. Nonetheless, some policies 
and measures have been taken by this agency on the road to attaining 
its objectives. 
Thus, financial grants are offered by FSR to researchers, in addition to 
the organization of scientific conferences. This body also provides relevant 
advice to different economic sectors as well as scientific information to 
researchers, while maintaining links with similar establishments abroad. 
1-70 
Most important of all, FSR has set up within its sphere several research 
centres dealing with specific areas. By 1975, the Foundation had 7 
specialized Centres, ie Biological Research Centre, Agricultural Research 
Centre, Building Research Centre, Petroleum Research Institute, Palm 
and Dates Research Centre, Natural Resources Institute and the Scientific 
Documentation Centre. 121 
The 2 most significant of these Centres for industrial purposes are the 
Building and Petroleum Research Centres. The first undertakes various 
studies on specifications of local building materials and iron used in 
concrete reinforcement as well as the provision of engineering publications 
118 Loc. Cit. 
119 National Resources Section/Science and Technology Division of Economic 
Commission for West Asia: "The Status of Science and Technology in the 
Western Asia Region" in AB Zahlan (ed): "Technology Transfer and Change 
in the Arab World" Oxford (Pergamon Press. 1978) p 66. 
120 Loc. Cit. 
121 Loc. Cit. 
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for use by construction engineers in designing and preparation of panels 
H, 
rll'' 
of prefabricated buildings. 
122 Other activities undertaken by this 
Centre include research on various cement materials and cementation, 
in addition to consultancy services to the brick and limestone industries, 
the use of agro-waste, and low cost housing. 
123 In 1977, the Centre 
had a staff of 75 with 22 qualified engineers. 
124 
With respect to the other industry related Centre, the Petroleum 
Research Institute, this provides consultancy to various government 
departments in the fields of oil and gas. 
125 Moreover, pertinent 
studies are carried out by the Centre in connection with a number of 
aspects pertaining to oil refining and the manufacturing of oil products. 
126 
The Centre was initiated with UNESCO's co-operation and in association 
with the Institut Francais du Petrole (IFP) of France, with a staff of 
100 in 1977, of whom 50 to 60 were scientists. 
127 
The growth of FSR since its inception in 1963 points towards increasing I, 
concern by the State to make science and technology an instrument for 
socio-economic progress. 
128 This concern is reflected in the noticeable 
escalation in budget appropriations to this body. While in 1965 FSR's 
budget was ID 0.11 million, by 1975 the figure was in the order of 
ID 1.8 million, all funding being provided by the Government. 
129 
In 1975, FSR employed 270 scientists and engineers, while another 125 
were technicians and auxiliary personnel. 
130 
11.5 Comments and Conclusions , 
<< 
This Chapter has shown that the State-owned industrial-sector in Iraq 
has within it 2 principal vehicles for the acquisition of foreign 
technology, namely SOIDAC (for manufacturing industry) and SOOP (for 
the oil sector). Other State Organizations and Establishments within the 
framework of the 3 Ministries of Industry and Minerals, Light Industries, 
and Oil are also involved occasionally in this endeavour. 
122 UNCTAD, Op. Cit., p 66 
123 Loc. Cit. sýf 
124 Loc. Cit. 
125 Loc. Cit. 
126 Loc. Cit. 
127 Loc. Cit. 
128 Ibid., p 16 
129 Loc. Cit. 
130 Loc. Cit. 
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In the case of non-oil projects, the execution of proposed projects is 
sometimes undertaken by the sponsoring Establishment itself, particularly 
when the project is small in size, uncomplicated in nature, or adjacent 
to sister plant(s). Whatever may be the authority vested with the 
implementation of the new project, it is usually empowered to prepare 
{ 
relevant detailed. feasibility studies and designs, enter into engineering/ 
consultancy arrangements, choose requisite technology, select transfer 
methods, and choose transferors as well as supervise them. 
The practice has grown in Iraq for most medium and large projects to be 
executed via the method of total project contracting. While it was 
thought that this method would speed up the process of industrialization 
in the country, there is little doubt that certain significant drawbacks 
have resulted from heavy reliance on foreign contractors. In the main, 
these drawbacks have appeared in the form of high project costs and 
perpetuation of the state of technological dependence of the country. 
Although unpackaged forms of transfer have received increasing attention 
since the final years of the 1970's, no indications exist as yet that 
remarkable strides have been accomplished in this area. Available evidence 
indicates, however, that more success has been attained in this sphere by 
the oil sector than the mainstream of public sector manufacturing 
industry. Moreover, the older and more experienced manufacturing firms 
have on the whole been more prepared and capable at executing their own 
projects than other establishments. 
There is no doubt that Iraq has for some time possessed an educational 
and industrial base that may be regarded as comparatively developed by 
Third World and Arab standards. In large measure, this has been due to 
the country's independence at an early stage coupled with the presence of 
natural wealth. It is unfortunate , however, that the country's 
strength in this field had not (at least until the beginning of the 1980's) 
been translated into concrete and worthwhile results in terms of home-based 
6'! 
technological achievements. Neither industrial establishments nor any 
other institutions had embarked on any solid and well planned programmes 
of industrial R&D. Very limited progress was attained by way of R&D 
results, and these were rather haphazard and resulted essentially from 
individual dedication rather than managerial excellence. 
9t 
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It is thus clear that there is a pressing need for a new industrial 
strategy that concentrates on making full use of present technological ! 
knowledge with aview towards understanding, developing, and adapting 
the present technological base. More resources have to be directed 
towards R&D programmes, and much more time and effort ought to be 
devoted for devising these programmes. It is equally important that 
unpackaging of foreign technology intakes should in future become the 
order of the day, just as packaging was in the 1970's. And, it is 
paramount that local scientific, technological, and managerial capabilities 
should become deeply involved, at every stage and level, in this process 
of unpackaging and technological upgrading. 
297 
3 
APPENDIX 11.1 - INDUSTRIAL PROJECTS EXECUTED UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF SOIDAC 1970-1978 
INDUSTRIAL SECTOR NATURE OF NATURE OF PLANNED INVESTMENT YEAR # ¬ 
11 PROJECT TITLE PROJECT PRODUCT(S) PRODUCTION COST OF OF 
ý 
CAPACITY PROJECT COMPLET IO"'s , (ID'OOO) 
(A) FOOD DRINK 
(I) Fluid Sugar extension at fluid sugar 5000 tons P. O. 100 1974 
in Karbala existent location 
(2) Animal Feed extension at yeast 4800 tons p. a. 1000 1976 
Project In Maysan existent location 
(3) Dairy Products extension at milk; yogurt; Ice 6000 tons milk 2100 1976 
In Mosul new location cream; thick cream; 1800 tons yogurt 
cheese 900 tons Ice cream 
300 tons thick cream 
150 tons cheese p. a. 
(4) Canned Tomatoes extension at canned tomatoes 5000 ton s p. a. 935 1976 
In Baquoba new location 
(5) Additional Boiler extension at steam power 100 tons steam p. h. 400 1977 
at Sugar Plant in existent location 
Maysan 
(6) Liquorice Powder extension at liquorice powder 1800 tons liquorice 1800 1977 a 
Plant In Azlziya new location powder p. a. ? "' 
(7) Dried Onions Plant extension at dried onions 1250 tons p. a. 800 1976 
in Baquoba new location 
(8) Tomato Paste in extension at tomato paste 3500 tons p. a. 466 1971 
Numanlya new location 
(9) Expansion of Sugar extension at sugar; dry yeast; 42000 tons sugar 5100 1971 
Plant in Mosul existent location animal feed 200-300 tons yeast 
15000 tons animal feed P. O. 
(10) Canned Fruits in extension at tomato paste; dried 3600 tons tomato paste 2250 1977 
Duhook existent location fruits; juices; jams; 1000 tons dried fruits 
canned fruits 1200 tons juices 
600 tons jams 
1500 tons canned fruits P. O. 
(II) Tornato Paste in extension at tomato paste 2200 tons P. O. 1681 1977 
Salad new location ? ý+ >> 
(12) Canned Vegetables extension at canned vegetables and 42 million cans 740 1976-7 
and Metal Cans in existent location meat; metal cans 10 million cans of 
Baquoba vegetables and meat p. a. 
(1)) Arbil Tobacco extension at cigarettes 3 billion cigarettes p. a. 2800 1973 
Plant existent location 
(14) Date-Extract Fluid extension at fluid sugar extracted 30000 tons fluid sugar p. a. 7500 1980* 
Sugar Project in new location from dates 
Hindlys 
(IS) Dried Baby Milk extension at dried baby milk 12000 tons dried baby 7000 1979* 
Project In existent location (various types) milk p. a. 
Abu-Ghraib 
(16) Southern Dairy extensions at milk; yogurt; thick 6000 tons milk 4250 1980* 
Project (three new locations cream; cheese 1500 tons yogurt 
plants and seven 990 tons thick cream 
milk gathering 
' 
600 tons cheese P. O. 
t unl ts) t ý 
(17) Vegetable Protein extension at date-extract 5000 tons yeast p. a. 3750 1980* ?' 
Project in Souk new location vegetable protein 
AI"Shiyokh 
(18) Canned Fruits extension at wine 1150000 bottles wine 2900 1978 
In Harter new location grape concentrate 1500 tons grape concentrate 
preserved fruits 1500 tons preserved fruits 
jams 1000 tons jams p. a. 
(19) Baby Food in extension at canned baby foods 2000 tons canned baby 2770 1980* ?,; 
Salad new location (various types) foods P. O. 
(20) Alcoholic Products extension at alcoholic and soft 2 million litres P. O. 2740 1979* 
Project In Khalls new location drink (various types) 
(21) Cornflour and extension at cornflour; dextrin; 1000 tons dextrin 1900 1979* 
Dextrin Plant In new location animal feed 6400 tons cornflour P. O. Hashimiya 
s" 
4? 
DJSTRIAL SECTOR NATURE OF NATURE OF PLANNED INVESTMENT YEAR 
PROJECT TITLE PROJECT PRODUCT(S) PRODUCTION COST OF OF 
CAPACITY PROJECT COMPLETION 
(ID'000) 
) Tomato Paste Plant extension at tomato paste 1320 tons p. a. 250 1978 
In Numanlys new location 
I) Tomato Juice Plant extension at tomato juice 5000 tons p. a. 190 1978 
In Numanlya new location 
Date-Extract extension at vinegar 5000 tons p. a. 800 1978 
Vinegar Plant In new location 
NuMnlya 
TEXTILES AND 
CLOTH NG-- 
fine Textile major new project silk textiles 45660000 yards p. s. 9000 1970 
Plant in Hilla 
JI Synthetic Silk major new project synthetic silk yarns 3000 tons yarns 12800 1971 
Project In Hindlya and fibres 5500 fibres p. a. 
ill Expansion of Textile extension at cotton textiles 13.55 m yards cotton 4250 1973 
Plant in Mosul existent location cotton yarns textiles 
363 tons yarns p. a. 
Q Spinning and Weav- major new project worsted textiles 1 million length metres 9750 1980 
Ing Plant In Arbil (pure and mixed) p. a. 
S) Spinning and Weav- major new project woolen textiles I million length metres 13552 1979 
Ing Plant In blankets of textiles 
K+sirlys yarns 450000 blankets 
250 tons worsted yarns p. a. 
4) Textile Manufact- major new plant textiles; yarns 160000 square metres 1530 1978* 
uring Plant in textiles 
Cuhook 86 tons yarns p. a. 
7) Klfrl Project for extension at cleansed wool and 250 tons yarns 1000 1978 
good Cleaning and new location yarns 165 tons cleansed wood 
Spinning p. a. 
Cotton Spinning & major new plant pure cotton and mixed 45 million square metres 35250 1979 
weaving Project textiles; cotton yarns pure cotton and mixed 
In Qadislys textiles 
350 tons cotton yarns p. a. 
PAPER AND WOOD 
S i 
II) Paper Making major new project various types of 40800 tons paper 24482 1971 
Project in Basrah paper; pulp (various types) 
21000 tons pulp p. a. 
IjI Expansion of extension at various types of 29000 paper 45830 1971 
Paper Plant existent location paper; pulp (various types) 
107000 tons pulp p. a. 
13) tationary Project extension at ordinary school note- 100 million ordinary note 6250 1917 
In $aghdad new location books; paper files; books 
plastic files; metal- 6 million other notebooks 
bound notebooks and files p. a. 
MPaper Plant In major new plant pulp; wrapping paper; 39000 tons pulp; 70000 1979' 
M+ysan carton paper; 40000 tons wrapping paper 
carton egg-trays 22000 tons carton paper 
33 million egg-holding 
trays p. a. 
S) Pressed Wood Project major new plant pressed fibre plates 1800 tons pressed fibre 5800 1918° 
In Abu-Sikhair plates P. O. 
') Pals-Fibres Project extension at wooden fibres 1200 tons wooden fibres 325 1980 
In Hindlya new location P. S. 
I C11CHICAL RUBBER 
AN U 
1) C1emical Fertilizer major new project ammonium sulphate; 138000 tons ammonium 12000 1971 
Plant No I urea; sulphuric acid; sulphate 
ammonia 52000 tons urea 
108500 tons sulphuric acid 
68000 ammonia p. a. 
Che. ica I Fertilizer extension at urea 420000 tons urea p. a. 33000 1977 
Plant No 2 
ft- 
existent location 
)1 Calcium Oxide Plant major new project calcium oxide 30000 tons p. s. 430 1976 
In Hamam AI -AIII 
ai 
ý. 
' 
iý 
INDUSTRIAL SECTOR NATURE OF NATURE OF PLANNED INVESTMENT YEAR 
I PROJECT TITLE PROJECT PRODUCT(S) PRODUCTION COST OF OF {ýI 
CAPACITY PROJECT COMPLET IUp 
(ID'OOO) ; 
(4) Automobile Tyres major new project automobile tyres and 300000 automobile tyres 13250 1977 i 
$ Rubber Tubes rubber tubes and rubber tubes p. a. 
Project In Diyanlya 
(5) Cycle Tyres and extension at cycle tyres and 432000 sets of tyres and 1300 1977 
Rubber Tubes new location rubber tubes tubes for bicycles p. a. 
Project in Kufa 
(6) Plastic Pipes major new project plastic pipes 12000 tons plastic pipes 3710 1975 
Project in P. a. 
Baghdad 
(7) Plastic Pipes in major new project plastic pipes 10000 tons plastic pipes 8600 1978 
Maysan p. a. 
(8) Sodium Silicate new project sodium silicate 6000 sodium silicate 90 1974 
Plant in Ramada p. a. 
(9) Petrochemical major new project plastic products 150000 tons p. a. 333000 1980* 
Complex No I in 
Khur Al -Zubair 
(10) Chemical Fertilizer major new project urea I million tons of urea p. a. 200000 1979 I 
Plant No 3 In Khur 
AI-Zubair 
(11) Plastic Sacks major new project plastic sacks (various 50 million sacks p. a. 8700 1980 
in Tlkkreet types and sizes) 
(12) Plastic Sacks In major new project plastic sacks (various 50 million sacks p. a. 12300 1980* 
Qurnah types and sizes) 
(E) CONSTRUCTION AND 
GLASS PRODUCTS 
(I) Cement Plant in major new project clinker 200000 tons p. a. 4110 1975 
Falouja 
(2) 30 July Brick extension at bricks 60 million bricks p. a. 3000 1976 
Plant In Baghdad new location 
(3) Cement Plant major new project cement 200000 tons cement p. a. 4900 1974 
In Kufa Not 
(4) Glass Making major new project window glass 9050 tons window glass 6750 1972 
yr 
Plant In Ramadi glass bottles 8951 tons glass tubes 
glass plates 3467 tons household plates 
medical glass bottles 1396 medical glass tubes pa. 
(5) Concrete Pillars major new project concrete pillars 20000 tons concrete pillars 400 1973 
Project In Baghdad p, a, 
(6) Concrete Pillars extension at concrete pillars 20000 tons concrete pillars 1700 1976 
In Badoush new location p. a, 
(7) Concrete Pillars In extension at concrete pillars 20000 tons concrete pillars 1800 1976 
Basrah new location P. a. 
ý; "". 
(8) Expansion of expansion at cement 120000 tons cement p. a. 1700 1973 F,, 
Sarjinar Cement 'existent location 
Plant 
(9) Asbestos Sheets- expansion at asbestos sheets 13500 tons asbestos sheets 175 1974 
Project In Baghdad existent location P. a. 
(10) 14 July Brick extension at bricks 30 million bricks P. S. 1105 1974 
Plant in Baghdad new location 
(11) Brick Plant extension at bricks 40 million bricks p. a. 650 1976 in Basrah new location 
(12) Brick Plant extension at bricks 20 million bricks p, a, 460 1975 In Mosul new location 
(13) Brick Plant extension at bricks 30 million bricks p. a. 930 1974 
in Babll new location 
(14) Cement Plant major new project cement 2 million tons cement P. a" 76000 1978 
in Kufa No 2 
(IS) Cement Plant major new project cement 500000 tons cement p. a. 17000 1977 
in Badoush 
(16) Extension of Cement expansion at cement 400000 tons p. a. 7600 1977 
Plant in Falouja existent location 
(17) white Cement Plant major new project white cement 100000 tons white cement 12000 1977 
in Falouja p. a. 
INDUSTRIAL SECTOR NATURE OF NATURE OF PLANNED INVESTMENT YEAR 
S PROJECT TITLE PROJECT PRODUCT(S) PRODUCTION COST OF OF ýIz 
CAPACITY PROJECT COMPLET ION 
(ID'OOO) 
(II) Brick Plant extension at bricks 60 million bricks p. a. 4000 1977 
in Arbil new location ßf; '1 
(19) Brick Plant extension at bricks 60 million bricks p. a. 4000 1977 
In Kerkuk new location 
(20) Brick Plant extension at bricks 60 million bricks p. a. 4000 1977 
in Dlyala new location 
(21) Brick Plant extension at bricks 120 million bricks p. a. 8000 1977 
in Amarah new location 
(22) Brick Plant extension at bricks 60 million bricks p. a. 4500 1977 
in Mahaweel new location 
(2)) Brick Plant extension at bricks 60 million bricks p. a. 4500 1977 
In Waslt new location 
(24) Brick Plant extension at bricks 60 million bricks p. a. 4500 1977 
In Nasiriya new location 
(25) Brick Plant extension at bricks 60 million bricks p. s. 4500 1978 
In Najaf new location 
" 
(26) Brick Plant extension at bricks 60 million bricks p. a. 4500 1978 
i 
In Qadisiya new location 
(27) Brick Plant extension at bricks 60 million bricks p. a. 4500 1979* 
in Al-Muthana new location 
(20) Brick Plant extension at bricks 30 million bricks p. a. 2000 1978 
r 
In Maysan new location !' 
(29) Brick Plant extension at bricks 30 million bricks p. a. 1770 1979* 
In Karbala new location 
(30) Cement Plant major new plant cement 500000 tons cement p. a. 17000 1978* 
In Haman Al-Alil F' k 
(31) Brick Plant extension at bricks 30 million bricks p. a. 2000 1979* 
In Thi-Qar new location 
(32) Light Concrete extension at light concrete blocks 156000 cubic meters of 3650 1979* 
Project in Basrah new location and ceilings light concrete p. a. 
(1)) Southern Cement major new plant cement 500000 tons cement P. S. 18000 1979* 
Plant 
(31) Glass Plant No 2 extension at glass tubes and 60000 tons of glass tubes 8300 1979* 
In Ramada existent location containers and containers p. a. ' ßi 
(35) Ceramics Plant extension at ceramic tiles 16000 tons ceramic tiles 3070 1978* 
In Ramada existent location p. a. 
(36) Asbestos Pipes major new project asbestos pipes 20000 tons asbestos pipes 2850 1980* 
In Kerkuk p. a. 
(f) ENGINEERING AND 
ELECTRICW-PMUCTS 
(1 ) Electric Meter major new plant electric meters 200000 electric meters p. a. 4650 1978 
Plant in Diyala 
(2) Electric Iron major new project electric irons 150000 electric Irons p. a. 1150 1978 
Plant In Dlyala 
O) Electric Lamps extension at bulbs; fluorescents; 13.6 million bulbs 3388 1975 
Project In Tail new location coloured lamps 2.2 million fluorescents 
2.2 million coloured lamps ,! 
P. a. 
(4) Agricultural major new project agricultural N. A. 10000 1971 :h 
Implements in Al- machinery 
exandrla (outside 
Baghdad) 
(5) Plug Making major new project automobile plugs 3 million plugs p. a. 1250 1978* 
Plant in Dials 
(6) Electrical Wire major new project aluminium wires 8000 tons aluminium wires 9200 1978 
and Cable Project (overhead type); 4200 tons cables 
low-pressure cables; 1800 tons copper wires p. a-. 
copper wires 
(7) Telephonic Cable major new project binding wires; 8000 tons binding wires 17000 1978* 
and Binding Wire telephonic cables 6000 tons telephonic 
Project In Nasiriya cables p. a. 
ý: il 
INDUSTRIAL SECTOR NATURE OF NATURE OF PLANNED INVESTMENT YEAR 
I PROJECT TITLE PROJECT PRODUCT(S) PRODUCTION COST OF OF 
CAPACITY PROJECT COMPLETIO 
(ID'OOO) 
(C) BASIC METAL AND 
(1) Iron and Steel major new project various types of Iron 400000 tons iron p. a. 52000 1978* 
Plant 
(2) Sponge Iron Plant major new project various types of 1.2 million tons p. a. 82000 1979* 
sponge Iron 
z ,. 
(3) limestone Heating extension at calcium oxide 100000 tons p. a. 4100 1978* 
Plant new location 
(4) Sulfur-Extraction major new project acid gas; dry steam; 984000 metric tons acid gas 9000 . 1972 
Project in Kerkkuk liquified gas; 2145000 metric tons dry 
sulfur steam 
646750 metric tons liquifie d 
gas 
123750 metric tons sulfur 
p. a. 
(5) Metal Cans Project extension at metal cans 79 million cans p. a. N. A. 1971 
in Baghdad new location 
Estimated year of completion 
}. I 
Sources: (1) "Ten Years of Industrial Progress" A Special Issue of the "Industry Journal" published by the Departme nt of 
Public Relations - Ministry of Industry and Minerals, Baghdad-Iraq 1978, pp 106 - 122. 
(II) "Working Paper of the Industrial Sector 1983" Ministry of Industry and Minerals, Ministry of Light Industries, 
1983, Baghdad-Iraq, pp 18 - 83. 
'r 
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CHAPTER TWELVE 
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER TO THE PRIVATE AND MIXED 
SECTORS OF IRAQI INDUSTRY 
New industrial projects in the private and mixed sectors are initiated by one 
individual, a group of people, or alternatively by State owned or non- 
government organization(s). With respect to expansionary projects, these 
emanate mostly from operating firms within these two sectors. Because all 
such new and expansionary projects require a permit from the respective 
State authority, the Government has been able to draw up and enforce policies 
which have the effect of generally directing industrial firms that are 
'ý; ` private or jointly owned. 
State direction of the development process of private and mixed sectors in 
industry is manifested through official determination of the basic framework 
within which these two sectors may function and expand. This basic framework 
is characterized by two main dimensions, as follows: 
(a) Selection of industrial sectors that are open in principle for private 
and/or mixed sector investment, whilst others (e. g. oil extraction, oil 
refining, vehicle assembly, steelmaking) are closed. 
(b) Determination of the maximum share assigned to these two sectors in the 
case of each allowable sector, in terms of both production capacity and 
investment outlay. 
Central plans delineate the available options to the private and/or mixed 
sector, so that various existent and impending establishments may react to 
relevant opportunities as they see them. Applications for new projects as 
well as extensions have to be lodged with the State Organization for 
Industrial Development (SOID) in order for these to be considered and pertinent 
decisions to be taken. As will be clarified in section 12.3 below, SOID 
Is charged with the primary responsibility of supervising, guiding, and 
assisting both private and mixed sectors in the country. 
Needless to say, the applications submitted must be in harmony with the basic 
framework laid down for the private and mixed sectors, and the openings that 
these firms purport to exploit (in terms of capacity and investment expenditures) 
must not have been fully allocated to other enterprises. In addition, each 
Y1 
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request needs to be accompanied by an explanatory note setting out main 
features, requirements, and funds needed by the project. In particular, 
it is necessary to clarify- would-be product(s), types and quantities of 
equipment/machinery that have to be imported, required materials and their 
sources, and the number of employees. 
It is also worth pointing out that a fourth sector exists in Iraqi industry, 
in addition to the public, private, and joint sectors. This is the "co- 
operative sector" where the enterprise is collectively owned and managed by 
the total body of its erployees. However, this sector is still in its 
infancy, as only five co-operatives were operational by the end of 1982.1 
These five co-operatives had a combined membership of 534 people, of whom 
only a small fraction were actively engaged in their respective enterprises. 
2 
The overall paid-up capital of these enterprises totalled ID 200000, i. e. 
an average of ID 40000 per co-operative. 
3 
Actual co-operative production is very low, despite some recent, but limited, 
advances in both qualiteative and quantitative terms. 
4 Though the co-operative 
movement has attained some obvious successes in the fields of agriculture, 
housing and retailing, industrial co-operatives have stopped far short of 
their counterparts in those other fields. They have also been hindered 
by notable apathy on the part of many of their members, and an apparent lack 
of enthusiasm for the creation of new establishments. 
5 
12.1 Process of Industrialization in the Private Sector 
Until the beginning of the 1950's, the private sector played the major role 
in the industrialization process in Iraq, though little industrial progress 
took place before then. However, during the period 1950-68 both public and 
private sectors participated in the country's industrial development, 
with the third emerging sector (ie joint ownership) gaining some further 
ground in the aftermath of the political change brought about in 1958. 
1 "Working Paper of Industrial Sector 1983". An unpublished paper prepared 
by the Ministry of Industry and Minerals and the Ministry of Light Industries 
1983, p 180 (This document is in Arabic). 
2 Loc. Cit. 
3 Loc. Cit. 
4 Loc. Cit. 
5 Ibid. p 180-181 
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By the end of 1968, the total value of accumulated funds invested in 
manufacturing industry stood at ID 352 million, of which ID 168 million, ie 
48%, was accounted for by the private and mixed sectors, while the rest 
(ie ID 184 million representing 52%) belonged to the public sector. 
6 
The combined production of manufacturing industry at that time amounted to 
ID 103 million at current prices, of which ID 62.7 million (ie 61% of total) 
was manufactured by the private and joint sectors.? At the, same time, the 
value of the country's manufacturing industry output formed 9.3% of GDP. 
B 
Following the revolution in July 1968, a higher level of orientation towards 
industrial development became discernible. The need for the participation of 
the private and joint sectors in industrialization was given some prominence 
by State authorities, particularly in the areas of small scale consumer- 
product and complementary industries. 
9 
12.1.1 Development of the Private Sector in the 1970's 
As noted earlier, Iraq witnessed little industrial progress in the pre-1950 
era, and what advancements were achieved were through developments in the 
private sector. However, it was during this period that the first foundations 
of industrial development began to be laid. The Industrial Project 
Encouragement Act was promulgated in 1929, to be followed by the setting up 
of the "Agricultural and Industrial Bank" in 1936.10 This Bank was split 
in 1947 into two separate specialized banks, ie the "Industrial Bank" and 
the "Agricultural Bank". 11 
During the 1950's and 1960's significant advances were attained by the private 
industrial sector, due largely to constant increments in the country's oil 
revenues and the birth of the Reconstruction Council at the beginning of the 
1950's. The latter proved to be both the basis and forerunner of the central 
planning apparatus which was subsequently built up. An Industrial Development 
Act was passed in 1961 with the stated objective of providing certain 
incentives to the private industrial sector. 
12 There was, in addition, a 
gradual increase in the paid-up capital of the Industrial Bank, which sub- 
sequently became a powerful instrument in supporting the evolution of the 
private industrial sector. A total of 1264 licences for setting up new or 
expansionary projects were granted during 1957-68, with a gross investment 
6 "Ten Years of Industrial Progress" A Special Issue of the "Industry Journal" 
published by the Department of Public Relations - Ministry of Industry and 
Minerals, Baghdad/Iraq, 1978, p 102 (This publication is in Arabic) 
7 Loc. Cit. 
8 Loc. Cit. 
9 Loc. Cit. 
10 "Working Paper ..... ", Op. Cit p 167 
1 Ibid. p 148 
1 Ibid. p 167 
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of ID 42.633 million. 
13 
! 
The development plan for the years 1970/71 to 1974/5 (or 1970-74) stipulated 
a total investment outlay by the private industrial sector of ID 50 million 
14 
during those years, ie an average of ID 10 million per annum. That plan . 'i ' 
also defined the types of produc 
sector. 
15 It was envisaged that 
private sector projects would be 
in five product groups, viz food 
and leather, metal products, and 
is which could be produced by the private 
during the plan's period a total of 820 
set up, which were to be mainly concentrated 
and drink, textile and clothing, plastics 
construction materials. 
is 
This programme provided the first indications to a more systematic approach 
for the private industrial sector. Actual expenditure by the private sector 
reached 94% of the figure postulated by the plan. 
17 As regards the number 
of projects executed, this exceeded the planned figure by 27%, 
18 
An additional relevant point was the identification by the plan of certain 
high development-priority branches. Ostensibly, the selection of those 
product groups was based on the need to satisfy prospective demand levels 
for certain classes of goods, the desirability of import substitution, and 
encouragement of innovations. 
19 
The paid-up capital of the Industrial Bank, which advanced loans to the 
private sector, was increased during this span from ID 4.75 million to ID 
50 million. 
20 Furthermore, the Development and Organization of Industrial 
Investment Act, introduced in 1973, was designed to provide certain facilities 
and exemptions to this sector. 
21 
The development plan for the years 1976-80 was evidently more ambitious than 
the previous one, as it made room for a total investment by the private 
sector in the region of ID 194 million spread among 4415 new and expansionary 
projects. 
22 Amongst the main declared objectives of the plan was the raising 
of technological intensiveness in industry, so that average investment per 
industrial project would rise appreciably during this period. 
23 
13 Ibid., p 168 
14 "Ten Years ..... ", Op. Cit., p 102 
15 Loc. Cit. 
16 Ibid., p 137 
17 Ibid., p 102 
18 "Working Paper ..... ". p 174 
19 Ibid., p 169 
20 Loc. Cit. 
21 Loc. Cit. 
22 Ibid., p 170 
23 "Ten Years ..... ". Op. Cit., p 103 
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The plan also purported to redistribute the geographical spread of industrial 
firms more evenly within the country, so much so that 96.5% of all new 
industrial projects were to be outside Baghdad. This was intended to reduce 
Baghdad's share of all industrial projects from 64% at the end of 1975 to 
38% by the end of 1980.24 Furthermore, concerted effort was made to co- 
ordinate industrial development with the development of other economic 
sectors, as well as to integrate properly the planned expansions of the various 
branches of industry across both product and ownership types. 
It is worth noting in this context that the level of expansion envisaged 
by the 1976-80 plan for the private sector proved to be wide off the mark, 
particularly when ratios of actual to planned results are compared with the 
previous plan. Only 38% of the planned number of projects were in fact 
effected during 1976-80, while total investment expenditures represented 
67% of the planned sum. 
25 
The obvious shortfall in the realization of planned expansions during 1976-80 
can, in large measure, be attributed to over-optimism and faulty planning, 
particularly since: 
(a) The gross number of projects conceived by the planners was obviously 
far too large. 
(b) It became clear subsequently that some repetition was implicit in the 
number 'of projects contemplated among the various industrial sectors. 
26 
The obvious implication here is that sufficient co-ordination was not forth- 
coming in integrating the various constituents of the overall private sector 
industrial plan. 
(c) The clampdown on the number of licences granted for the Baghdad area 
dissuaded many sponsors from undertaking their proposed projects. 
27 
(d) There was an apparent paucity of statistical data, particularly field 
studies, on which objective forecasts could have been founded. This had 
presumably led to an undue dependence on intuition as well as personal 
conceptions and experience . 
24 Loc. Cit. 
25 "Working Paper ..... " Op. Cit. p 174 
26 Loc. Cit. 
27 Loc. Cit. 
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The constant increase in the country's oil revenues throughout the 1970's 
had a direct impact on boosting demand levels for various goods and services 
in the country. In particular, construction activity became markedly 
Intensified, so that actual demand for various construction materials 
was steadily increased. This is reflected in the number of projects commenced 
in the 1970's. During the period 1969-81,8167 establishment licences were 
issued by SOID for the private sector, with a total investment of ID 317 
million. 
28 
The resultant average annual number of licences and investment 
outlay figure were 628 and ID 24.4 million, respectively, during this span. 
It is obvious from table 12.1 that in terms of number of projects, the three 
most significant product groups during 1957-82 were construction materials; 
textile and clothing; food, drink and tobacco. On the basis of funds invested, 
the most important sectors are slightly different: construction materials 
is again in first place; food, drink and tobacco second; chemicals and 
plastics third. 
12.1.2 Features of Technology Transfer to the Private Industrial Sector 
It is obvious that the period 1969-8l witnessed a remarkable expansion in the 
number of licences and level of investment funds in this sector. Compared 
with the period 1957-68, the number of establishment licences granted 
represented an advance of 546%, while the corresponding increase in investment 
expenditure was 643%. 
A number of important features characterize the process of technology 
acquisition by the private sector of Iraqi industry. These go a long way in 
distinguishing this sector from the practices and methods adopted by State 
owned firms in this respect. Indeed, the general pattern adopted by privately 
owned enterprises Is in some ways quite different from those of the joint 
sector, which is frequently viewed as combining many characteristics of the 
private sector. 
Taking an aggregate profile during the era from the beginning of 1957 up 
until 3o September 1982, a total of 11115 private industrial projects were 
initiated with a gross investment of ID510 million, i. e. 45886 dinars 
per project. 
29 Five main features can be associated with these projects and 
28 Ibid., P 171 
29 See Table 12.1 
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the associative transfer process, as follows: 
(a) The vast majority of private sector projects were small in size. 
However, the average investment amount mentioned above conceals some 
notable variations, both over the various time spans during the period 
1957-82 and at any one defined date. It Is known, for Instance, that the 
average investment cost per project during the period 1968-70 was ID 18000 
and during 1970-74 ID 41000, whereas it was intended to raise the figure 
ID 61000 in the years 1976-80.30 
(b) Embodied technology had on the whole been relatively simple. Indeed, 
a sizeable proportion of projects had been designed to be essentially of 
the assembly, mixing, or partially conditioning types, eg toiletry products, 
knitting fibres, metal furniture, and light garments. 
31 Such projects depend 
heavily on imported materials, with little added value achieved by the local 
enterprise. ` 
(c) Transfer methods utilized by these enterprises had mostly been of the 
package-free category, particularly the method of ad hoc machinery supplies. 
While smallness and technological simplicity had undoubtedly been major 
factors, the sharp cost-, consciousness frequently displayed by owner-managers 
could also be regarded as powerfully instrumental. 
(d) Evidence suggests that certain obstacles played their part in barring 
entrepreneurs from embarking upon more sophisticated types of technology and/ 
or high risk product-projects. Quite apart from the understandable propensity 
of private industrialists for risk evasion, three significant considerations 
have had a noticeable impact in this connection. The first is the oft-explicit 
opposition shown by the public and mixed sectors to the entry of the private 
sector to certain areas, while the second pertains to the nature of the tax 
and national contributions system. 
32 This latter factor is thought to 
discourage the quest for high profits without due regard for the possibilities 
of failure or loss occurrence. 
33 The third problem springs from the almost 
total absence of home-based consultancy bodies which might conduct requisite 
feasibility studies, render specialist advice, and liaise with pertinent 
firms and/or organizations abroad. 
34 
30 "Ten Years... ", Op. Cit. P103 
31 "Working Paper.. ", Op. Cit. P175 
32 Ibid., P176 
33 Loc. Cit. 
34 Ibid, P177 
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12.2 Process of Industrialization in the Mixed Sector 
The first beginnings of mixed sector enterprises in Iraq can be traced 
back to the second half of the 1930's when the newly formed Agricultural 
and Industrial Bank commenced participation in the equity of certain 
industrial firms. This Bank has since come to the fore as the State's 
vehicle of investment in the mixed sector. Renamed as the "Industrial 
Bank", it had by end-1958 shareholdings in 14 companies possessing between 
them a combined paid-up capital of ID 7 million. 
35 
During the period 1958-68, mixed-sector firms 
number and size, but nine of these firms were 
firms nationalized had a paid-up capital of 
2 million was owned by the Industrial Bank. 
36 
during the years from 1964 until the onset of 
continued to grow in both 
nationalized in 1964. The 
9.2 million, of which ID 
Little progress was achieved 
the political change in 1968. 
The combined paid-up capital of all mixed-sector firms was ID 2.00 million 
in 1968.37 Of this, ID 0.845 belonged to the State, i. e. 42.2% of total, 
whereas the rest, ID 1.155 million representing 57.8%, was privately owned. 
38 
By 1980, these two percentages were altered drastically, as the public sector 
then possessed 67.5% of the equity while the rest, 32.5% of total, was left 
to private investors. 
39 As regards the number of operating firms in this 
sector, this rose from 9 in 1968 to 18 at the beginning of 1978.40 
Information regarding the actual contribution of mixed sector firms in total 
industrial output is rather scant. The 1983 Working Paper states that in 
1979 the value of the mixed sector's output represented 12.9% of the output 
produced by state owned establishments now working within MIM and MLI. 
41 
In view of the existence of some, though limited, industrial production under 
the umbrella of certain other ministries and the expansion experienced by the 
mixed sector during the 1970's, it is perhaps reasonable to suppose that the 
output value of this sector represented around 10% of that of the public sector 
in 1977. As public sector output in 1977 formed 51% of total industrial out- 
put, 
42 
the resultant share of the mixed sector of total industrial output In 
that year is 5.1%. When this figure is subtracted from the combined proportion 
of both private and mixed sectors in 1977, which is 49%, the respective shares 
emerge as 51%, 43.9%, and 5.1% for public, private, and mixed sectors. 
35 Ibid., P148 
36 Loc. Cit. 
37 Ibid., P154 
38 Loc. Cit. 
39 Loc. Cit. 
40 "Ten Years... ", Op. Cit. P97 
41 "Working Paper..... ", Op. Cit. P152 
42 Table 9 . 10 , Chapter 9 
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Support for this estimated share of the mixed sector is provided by 
official figures, which have set this sector's proportion of industrial 
43 
production at 0.3% in 1965,0.5% in 1968, and 4% in 1976. 
The formation of a mixed sector firm depends essentially on the identifica- 
tion of an investment opportunity, in which both the Industrial Bank and a 
group of private investors show primary interest. The proposal needs to 
be appraised, so that if overall assessment is favourable and resources can 
be catered for, initial steps may be taken to set up the company and execute 
the relevant project. It is the general policy of the Bank to confine its 
initial shareholding in mixed firms to within the range of 25-30%. 
44 However, 
the Bank's share of the equity capital may be raised due to poor public 
response to" the share offering, or at a later stage when the fi rm requi res 
extra capital for expansion. 
In order for a new company to be formed in Iraq, a relevant application must 
be made to the Ministry of Trade. After the granting of this permit, a share 
subscription is undertaken, so that subsequently a general sharheolders' meet- 
ing is held to elect members of the first board of directors. This board is 
then empowered to execute the project(s) in question and carry out any other 
necessary duties. 
Monitoring of the company's activities is performed by the industrial Bank's 
staff and other investors in the firm, through analysis of annual reports 
and final accounts. Also, the Bank usually nominates certain members of the 
board of directors, with the actual number varying with the size of the 
Bank's shareholding. An additional forum for assessing the company's progress 
and discussing its future is provided by the annual general meeting. At end- 
1980, the task of supervising the functioning of mixed sector firms was trans- 
ferred from the Bank to a new body within SOID called "the General Directorate 
for Affairs of Mixed Sector Companies". 
45 
12.2.1 Development of the Mixed Sector in the 1970's 
Table 12.2 presents some relevant figures regarding the growth profile of 
this sector during the crucial years of the 1970's. It is quite obvious that 
the pace of expansion during that decade had been impressive, in spite of 
the fact that the financial data was not adjusted for inflation. 
43 "Ten Years... ", Op. Cit., P98 
44 "Working Paper.... ", Op. Cit., P153 
45 Loc. Cit. 
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TABLE 12.2 
GROWTH OF THE INDUSTRIAL 
MIXED SECTOR IN IRAQ 
1970-80 
Indicators 
Measuring 
Units 1970 
1980 
Value % Change 
(or number) on 1970 
1. Nominal Capital' IDm 2.7 71.0 2529.6 
2. Paid-up Capital IDm 2.04 45.9 2150.0 
3. Total Investments IDm 2.5 125.0 4900.0 
4. Fixed Investments IDm 1.70 41.0 2311.8 
5. Sales IDm 1.70 92.0 5311.8 
6. Net Profits IDm 0.287 14.8 5056.8 
7. Employees Number 745 6912 831.1 
8. Wages & Salaries IDm 0.268 8.1 2922.4 
Source: "Working Paper of the Industrial Sector 1983" P150 
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In 1968, only eight products were produced by the mixed sector. 
46 These 
were heaters, cookers, television sets, air coolers, welding cables, springs, 
pressed wood products and date syrup. 
47 By 1975, the number of goods produced 
48 increased to 17, rising still further to 29 in 1978 and 45 in 1982. Table 
12.3 sets out the types of products made in 1975 and 1978 alongside actual 
production in 1975 and planned production for 1978. It is plain from this table 
that of the 17 products that were being produced back in 1975, ten witnessed an 
increase in their production level in excess of 200%, with the overall average 
rise for all seventeen products standing at 7552.8%. 
A number of major expansions and new projects had by 1978 been planned to 
take place during the following few years. These included projects for produc- 
ing wall papers, paints, textile and clothing, washing machines, pre- 
fabricated partitions, hand tools, cosmetics, building materials, and others. 
49 
Among the planned expansions on plants operating in 1978 were those relating 
to the increase in production capacities of beer, plastic products, bicycles, 
date products and electronic products. 
50 
12.2.2 Features of Technology Transfer to the Mixed Industrial Sector , 
The mixed sector is often viewed in Iraq as filling the medium ground between 
the public and private sectors. While the public sector covers industrial 
activities requiring relatively large-scale operations and/or industrial 
branches characterized by medium to high technological complexity, the 
private sector is seen to comprise primarily small-scale units concentrated 
in the main within the lighter and less technologically sophisticated industries. 
With respect to the average mixed sector firm, there are some grounds for 
supposing that it is larger and more technically advanced than its counter- 
part in the private sector. Yet methods of project execution, and orientation 
towards both day-to-day management and expansion, are all heavily inclined to 
follow in the footsteps of private firms. 
It is thus possible to sum up the principal features of mixed sector enter- 
prises and the nature of the embodied process of technology-transfer under 
nine main points, as follows: 
(a) Projects are mostly within the medium size category, where the private 
sector is frequently reluctant to commit itself owing to the large capital 
outlay required and consequent high risk involved. 
46 "Ten Years.... ", Op. Cit. P97 
47 Loc. Cit. J 
48 Ibid., P97-8 and "Working Paper... ", Op. Cit. P155 
49 "Ten Years.... ", Op-c Cit. P99-100 
so Ibid., P100 
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TABLE 12.3 
MANUFACTURED PRODUCTS AND PRODUCTION LEVELS 
ATTAINED BY THE INDUSTRIAL 
MIXED SECTOR IN IRAQ 
1975-78 
PRODUCTS 
MEASURING 
UNITS ACTUAL 
1975 
1978 
PLANNED 
FIGURE 
% CHANGE 
ON 1975 
1. Refrigerators Quantity 33833 130000 284.2 
2. Gas Heaters " 24686 80000 224.1 
3. Gas Cookers " 22153 110000 396.5 
4. Oil Heaters & Cookers 97167 235000 141.9 
5. T. V. Sets 26230 93500 256.5 
6. Radio Sets 14852 80500 442.0 
7. Air Coolers 26153 100000 282.4 
8. Automobile Springs Ton 840 840 0.0 
9. Welding Cables " 1426 5500 285.7 
0. Bicycles Quantity 42671 65000 52.3 
1. Metal Pipes Metre - 8.5 m - 
2. Plastic Molecules Ton 2650 3800 43.4 
3. Synthetic Sponge Cubic Metre m 7.5 13.0 73.3 
4. Synthetic Leather Metre 1000 1.25m. 124900.0 
5. Wooden Sheets Ton 570 1650 189.5 
6. Plastic Pipes Metre 250 300 20.0 
7. Molecule Wood Cubic Metre - 2400 - 
8. Date - Syrup Ton 3702 2500 -32.5 
9. Beer Litre m. 2.4 22.5 837.5 
0. Plastic Sheets Quantity - 90000 - 
1. Household Plates - 125000 - 
2. Air Conditioners " - 10000 - 
3. Kitchen Sinks " - 26000 - 
4. Freezers 20000 - 
5. Picnic Gas Cookers " - 110000 - 
6. Radio/Cassette Players " - 15020 - 
: 7. Calculators " - 1800 - 
: 8. Telephone Receivers " - 30000 - 
: 9. Recording Tapes " - 1.8m - 
Source: "Ten Years of Industrial Progress", 1978- Pp97-8 
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(b) The criterion of commercial profitability is paramount in evaluating 
and selecting new projects. Unlike public sector projects, where wider issues 
may be considered, due regard to prospective profitability is deemed essential 
if private investors are to be involved in the establishment and working of 
these projects. 
(c) Firms tend to utilize locally available materials for the most part, and 
attempt simultaneously to meet home demand for the goods they produce. 
(d) A fairly high level of flexibility is shown by the mixed sector, in terms 
of speed and maturity associated with company formation and project execution 
as well as managerial decision-making when the project enters the operational 
51 
stage. 
(e) An impressive expansion has been apparent in this sector in its drive to 
manufacture products in substitution for imports, whilst at the same time 
attempting to meet local demand by endeavouring to widen its product range 
52 
and improve product spetifications. 
(f) The claim is made in the Working Paper that this sector "has actively 
participated in transferring technologies that are relatively more sophisti- 
cated and suitable to the country, especially in the fields of durable consumer 
goods and plastic products". 
53 
(g) It is additionally emphasized that highly packaged means of project 
execution, particularly total project contracting, have mostly been avoided 
by firms in this sector. 
54 The point is made clear in the Working Paper that 
"national cadre have fulfilled certain essential parts related to the founda- 
tion and running of mixed projects, including the preparation of economic 
and technical studies, choice of product specifications, selection of required 
machinery and equipment, as well as the installation, commissioning, and 
operation of hardware". 
55 Available evidence indicates, furthermore, that 
local personnel have been able to take an active part in the development of 
these projects 
?6A logical relationship can, therefore, be deducted between 
this evident preference to make use of low and free-packaged transfer methods, 
on the one hand, and the strong cost-consciousness that is so prevalent in 
51 "Working Paper.... ", Op. Cit. P149 & P155 
52 Ibid. P155 
53 Ibid, P156 
54 Loc. Cit. 
55 Loc. Cit. 
56 Loc. Cit. 
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both private and mixed sector enterprises. 
(h) It is to the credit of this sector that it has proved capable of 
achieving both expansion and technological improvement during the 1970's. 
The lion's share of some of the more sophisticated branches of Iraqi industry 
are found within this sector (e. g. electronics), although the assembly and 
low added-value nature of plants in these branches has also been one of 
their marked features. 
The achievements of this sector are reflected in the remarkable advances 
accomplished in the area of enhancing employee performance, which have 
surpassed those in both public and private sectors by a wide margin. Between 
1965 and 1976, average "employee productivity in the mixed sector rose by 
705%, compared with 251% and 184% in the private and public sectors 
respectively. "57 Average productive value of "each dinar of wages and 
salaries within this sector also increased by 600% over the same period, in 
58 
comparison with 137% and 175% in the private and public sectors". 
Pertinent information points to the tendency of the public sector to 
subjugate mixed firms to many of their own practices and State directives 
which do not legally pertain to the mixed sector. 
59 While it is recognized 
that this is an ill-founded practice, it is unfortunate that it has achieved 
some headway, e. g. in the fields of recruitment procedure, transfer of 
employees, and financial directives relating to budgeting. 
60 It seems, however, 
that certain measures are presently under way to remedy this situation. 
12.3 State Organization for Industrial Development (SOID) 
SOID was set up in 1973 to replace its forerunner, the General Directorate 
for Industrial Development. 61 Three General Directorates were created in 
that year to form the main body of SOID, which also comprised certain centra- 
lized departments such as those for "Assessment and Planning" and "Company 
62 Affairs". The three main establishments were: 
63 
57 "Ten Years.... ", Op. Cit., P98 
58 Loc. Cit. 
59 "Working Paper .... ", Op. Cit., P157 
60 Loc. Cit. 
61 "Ten Years .... ", Op. Cit. P92 
62 Loc. Cit. 
63. Ibid., Pp94-5 
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(a) The Industrial Bank; 
(b) General Directorate of Organization and Assistance; - 
(c) General Directorate of Research and Industrial Control. A fourth 
establishment was added in 1980 under the title "General Directorate for 
Affairs of Mixed Sector Companies". 
64 
Five principal functions were assigned to SOID by the 1973 enactment which 
founded this agency, these being: 
65 
(a) Formation of policies pertaining to industrial development in Iraq, 
and the study of relevant enactments and follow up thereof. 
(b) Undertaking pertinent studies on both private and mixed sectors in 
industry; identification of problems facing them; providing them with 
information, guidance, and technical assistance. 
(c) The drawing up of proposal plans for the private and mixed sectors. 
These were intended to be incorporated within the overall five-year and annual 
plans worked out by the State planning authorities, whereby SOID was charged 
with their implementation once they were agreed upon. 
(d) Evaluation of proposed industrial projects in both the private and 
mixed sectors, and the granting of establishment (and import) licences for 
worthwhile (and operating) projects. 
(e) Co-operating with government and non-government bodies in order to provide 
adequate facilities and incentives for these two sectors, especially as regards 
the designation of industrial districts; provision of training/scholarships; 
alleviating the impact of the national system of taxation, contributions, and 
import duties. It is also charged with maintaining contacts with regional 
and international agencies that are concerned with industrial development. 
12.3.1 The Industrial Bank 
As remarked earlier, the Agricultural and Industrial Bank was first established 
in 1936 and was split into two Banks in 1947, thereby signalling the birth of 
the "Industrial Bank" in that year. Right from the start, and throughout its 
64 "Working Paper..... ", Op. Cit., P153 
65 "Ten Years..... ", Op. Cit., Pp92-3 
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operating life, the main function of this Bank was seen as the provision of 
banking facilities to private and mixed firms in addition to equity partici- 
pation in the latter. 
The funds allocated to this Bank were raised several times during the post- 
war period, enabling it meanwhile to expand its credit and other facilities to 
industrial enterprises with which it deals. Quite apart from putting up share 
capital and offering loans (for project establishment, expansion and moderniza- 
tion), the Bank has been rendering a number of other valuable services to 
industrialists. 66 These include the discount of bills of exchange; overdrafts; 
liaising with foreign suppliers of machinery, equipment, and required materials; 
issue of financial guarantees; conduct of feasibility studies for setting up 
new projects and expanding/improving existing ones. 
67 
It is clear from Table 12.4 that an impressive. profile of progress is 
depicted by the expansion of the Bank's activities over the span 1969-77. The 
overall growth rate in the value of the Bank's shareholdings between 1969 and 
1977 exceed 1070%, whilst the advance in the Bank's loans and other credit 
facilities was even more striking. Over the period, import credits and 
other loans/credits increased by 2618.2% and 2092.6% respectively. 
TABLE 12.4 
EXPANSION OF THE INDUSTRIAL 
BANK'S ACTIVITIES 1969-77 
Activity Indicators 1969 1977 % Rise 
1. Loans & other credit facilities 
(other than import credit) 
(a) Number 302 1327 339.4 
(b) Value (ID1000) 570 12498 2092.6 
2. Sum of Share Capital in industrial 
firms (ID'000) 973 11420 1073.7 
3. Import transactions 
(a) Number 333 1732 420.1 
(b) Value of import credit (ID'000) 1157 31449 2618.2 
Source: "Ten Years of Industrial Progress" P94 
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66 Ibid., P94 
67 Loc. Cit. 
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TABLE 12.5 
INVESTMENTSOF THE INDUSTRIAL BANK IN 
OPERATING MIXED SECTOR FIRMS III IRAQ 
AS AT 31.12.1977 
Company Paid-up Bank's Investments % of Company's 
Capital Over- Products 
(ID'OOO) (ID'OOO) % of all 
Paid-up Bank's 
Capital Inymen t. 
1. Light Industries Co. 2500 1005 40.19 10.2 Refrigerators, 
Heaters, Cöoke rs 
Freezers. 
2. Electronic Industries 2500 750 30 7.6 TV Sets, Radio 
Co Sets, Radio/ 
Cassette Players. 
Cassette Tapes, 
Tel. Receivers 
Calculators 
3. New National Beer Co 1500 840 56 8.5 Beer 
4. National Co for 2000 1120 56 11.3 Synthetic Sponge 
Chemical Industries Leather & 
Plastic Products 
5. Al Hilal Industrial 3000 1200 40 12.1 Air Coolers, 
Co Automobile 
Springs, Welding 
Cables, Sinks, 
Metal Household 
Plates, Air 
Conditioners 
6. Bicycle & Metal 1000 400 40 4.0 Bicycles, Metal 
Pipes Co. Pipes 
7. Date Manufacturing Co 878 351 40 3.5 Date Puree, 
Tomato Paste 
8. Al-Kut Manufacturing Co 500 317 63.4 3.2 Bricks 
9. Arab Co for Wood 1023 714 69.8 7.2 Wood Molecules, 
Products Wooden Furniture 
O. Plastic Related 1500 765 51 7.7 Intermediate 
Intermediate Products Material for 
Co Plastic 
Molecules 
I1. Plastic Sheets Co 750 383 51 3.9 Formica 
12. Plastic Sacks & Covers 200 102 51 1.0 Plastic Sacks 
Co I & Covers 
ýy d 
i fý 
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TABLE 12.5 CONTD 
Paid-up Bank's Investments % of Company's 
Capital Over- Products 
Company (ID'000) 0D'000) % of all 
Paid-up Bank' 
Capital Invment. 
13. Plastic Goods &" 1500 752 50.1 7.6 Plastic parts 
Materials Co (for Radios, 
TV Sets and 
Air Coolers). 
14. Ready Clothes Co 627 256 40.79 2.6 Clothes 
15. Textile Manufacturing 250 123 49.0 1.3 Industrial 
Co Textiles 
16. Modern Construction 375 191 50.81 1.9 Construction 
Materials Co Materials 
17. Iraqi Co for Carton 739 126 17.0 1.3 Carton & 
Manufacturing Carton Boxes 
18. Modern Paint 1125 503 44.7 5.1 Paints 
Manufacturing Co 
TOTAL 21967 9898 45.1 100.0 
AVERAGE 1220.4 549.9 46.7 5.6 
Source: "Ten Years of Industrial Progress" P101 
Table 12.5 presents some details with respect to operating industrial firms 
in the mixed sector at the end of 1977, the level of the Bank's equity partici- 
pation in them, and the nature of their products. It is obvious from the 
table that the Bank had a total equity capital in these firms of ID 9.898, 
while its share of the equity varied between a maximum of 69.8% and a minimum 
of 17%. The individual companies' paid-up capital, on the other hand, ranged 
from three to o. 2 million Iraqi dinars, with an average of ID 1.22 million. 
12.3.2 General Directorate of Organization and Assistance (GDOA) 
This department was formed in 1973 with the principal task of assessing 
proposals for establishing new projects or expanding/modernizing existing 
ones. 
68 All such proposals (including those in the public sector) must first 
68 Ibid., Pp 92-5 
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gain the approval of this department before proceeding. 
69 
While the sanction- 
ing of public-sector projects comes as a matter of course (due to extensive 
evaluations carried out by other State bodies), others are usually subjected 
to a fair degree of scrutiny. Moreover, this department is charged with the 
task of granting import permits to private and mixed firms for purchasing 
machinery, equipment, and materials from abroad. 
70 
GDOA is also concerned with gathering statistics and conducting relevant 
research for the purpose of preparing development plans. It is, moreover, 
charged with administering certain special facilities to private and mixed 
firms, such as the allocation of State land designated for industrial districts 
and the granting of tax exemptions and allowances. 
71 Other special concessions 
that are supervised by this agency include a ten-year "grace period" from 
estate duties; waving of import duties on imports of machinery, equipment, 
spare parts, and some materials; the provision of industrial buildings (if 
needed) at low rents. 
72 
Table 12.6 contains some data regarding the activities of this department 
whereby two years, 1969 and 1977, have been taken for the purpose of comparison. 
It is clear from. this table that the number of licences granted by GDOA was 
84.4% higher in 1977 than in 1969, whereas the corresponding leap in invest- 
ment funds exceeded 1350%. It is also obvious that in terms of the level of 
investment sums committed, the public sector grabbed the lion's share, while 
the reverse picture is presented by the actual number of licences. 
69 Ibid., P95 
70 Loc. Cit. 
71 Ibid., PP 95-6 It is worth noting here that newly founded industrial 
projects in the private and mixed sectors are by law exempt from paying 
corporation tax for the first five years of their operations, provided 
those profits do not exceed 10% of paid-up capital. Any excess above 
this percentage is subject to tax. Also, annual profits allocated by any 
private or mixed firm to "reserves" ear-marked for expansion or moderniza'ion 
are exempt from tax as long as such appropriations are 25% or less (in 
backward areas 40% or less) of actual profits in any one year. "Ten 
years..... " PP 95-6 
72 Ibid., P96 
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TABLE 12.6 
GROWTH IN NUMBER OF ESTABLISHMENT 
LICENCES ISSUED AND INVESTMENT 
FUNDS AUTHORIZED BY GDOA 1969-77 
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INDUSTRIAL SECTORS TOTAL 
PUBLIC PRIVATE MIXED 
No. / % of No. / % of No. / % of 
Sum Total Sum Total Sum Total 
(A) Number of Establishmen 
Licences Granted: 
1969 12 4.9 230 94.7 1 0.4 243 
1977 31 6.9 413 92.2 4 0.9 448 
% Increase 158.3 - 79.6 - 300.0 - 84.4 
i 
i 
ý} 
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(B) Investment Funds IIIII 
Sanctioned (IDm): 
1969 36.5 85.1 3.4 7.9 3.0 7.0 42.9 
1977 593.0 95.2 20.0 3.2 10.0 1.6 623.0 
% increase 1524.7 - 488.2 - 233.3 - 1352.2 
Source: "Ten Years of Industrial Progress", 1978, P 95 
12.3.3 General Directorate of Research and Industrial Control 
The responsibility of this department centres on monitoring and supervising :t 
specific qualitative and quantitative aspects of local industrial production. 
73 
For this purpose, the department undertakes research aimed at ascertaining the 
qualitative level of certain home-produced products and comparing this with 
specifications set jointly by this body and the Central Organization for 
Standardization and Quality Control. 
74 It needs to be mentioned, however, 
73 Ibid., P95 
74 Loc. Cit. 
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that available information indicates that this work is still in its early 
stages and progressing rather slowly. Furthermore, this agency issues 
"quality certificates" for Iraqi industrial products, again in association 
with the aforementioned Central Organization. 
75 
Research related to costs and prices seems to be on a more solid footing. 
Studies are frequently carried out in order to assess the level of costs of 
locally made goods. 
76 This is intended to furnish the basis for price-fixing, 
the final responsibility of which is vested with the Ministry of Trade. The 
department uses this data for the sake of monitoring actual changes in price 
levels of various products and making pertinent recommendations to other 
government agencies on related issues, e. g. the levels of duty on 
imported 
goods. 
12.3.4 General Directorate for Affairs of Mixed Sector Companies 
This department was formally set up at end-1979 and began operating by end- 
1980.77 It has been charged with the prime responsibility of supervising 
mixed sector firms. 
78 In this regard, the department undertakes the study and 
analysis of these firms' annual reports and accounts; co-ordination of their 
activities; probing of major problems confronting them; provision of 
specialist advice and taking up an official stand on behalf of mixed 
firms 
vis-a-vis other bodies. 
79 
12.4 Comments and Conclusions 
This chapter has shown that during the 1970's, an unmistakable tendency 
by 
the State tosubordinate the private sector became clearly recognizable. In 
the 1970-74'plan, the industrial branches open to the private sector were 
identified in addition to the determination of the private and mixed sectors' 
shares of both production capacity and investment outlays in each allowable 
branch. Within boundaries firmly laid down by the State, private and mixed 
sector enterprises may at present set up new plants and expand in accordance 
with State direction. 
75 Loc. Cit. 
76 Loc. Cit. 
77 "Working Paper.... ". Op. Cit., P158 
78 Loc. Cit. 
79. Loc. Cit. 
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In spite of increased intervention by the State, however, a remarkable 
expansion was recorded by the private sector during the 1970's, in terms 
of both new projects established and actual investment expenditure. Within 
this overall expansion, the most important product. groups, in terms of the 
level of funds invested, have been those of construction materials, food, 
drink, and tobacco and chemical and plastic products. 
A notable expansion of the industrial mixed sector was also apparent in the 
1970's, alongside an impressive advance in the productivity of employees in 
this sector. Both production volumes and employee performance increased 
appreciably, quite apart from the addition of many new products during this 
period. 
In evaluating the nature of the industrialization process and transfers of 
technology associated with the private and mixed sectors, four main observa- 
tions can be made, namely: 
(a) While most private projects have been small in size, those in the 
mixed sector are within the medium category. 
(b) Embodied technology has on the whole been simple, so much so that a 
noticeable proportion of projects have been of the assembly, mixing or part- 
processing varieties. Despite this, some progress can be detected in certain 
relatively sophisticated fields, particularly in the case of mixed sector 
enterprises. This statement is corroborated by the beginnings that have 
been made in such fields as electronics and certain sections of the 
chemical, plastic, and engineering industries. 
(c) A fairly high level of resilience is evident in implementing private 
and mixed projects, in terms of both project design and speed of execution. 
(d) Highly packaged means of transfer have generally been avoided by these 
two sectors, whereby local personnel have been fulfilling an active role in 
determining product specifications, selection of requisite machinery and 
equipment, and their installation. Indigenous manpower have also been 
involved in the running of these projects and attaining some significant 
improvements in their operations. 
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SOID has been the main governmental agency for directing, supervising, and 
supporting both the private and mixed sectors of Iraqi Industry. This body 
is charged with the task of undertaking relevant studies as well as proposing 
policies, legislation, and plans concerned with these two sectors. In the 
field of administrative duties, SOID Is responsibile for executing official 
policies and plans related to private and mixed firms, including the provision 
of various forms of assistance, guidance and information to these enterprises. 
It is clear, therefore, that the two sectors with which this chapter has 
dealt have made a noticeable contribution during the 1970's to the process of 
industrial development and technology transfer in the country. When this 
contribution is viewed against the relative industrial positions of each of 
these two sectors back in 1970, the performance of the mixed sector is 
particularly striking, since it grew at a faster rate than the public or 
private sectors and proved to be more efficient than either of them. 
It is, however, necessary for the State to encourage firms in both sectors 
(especially private firms) to expand the scale of their operations, in terms 
of both production volumes and added value per product. Consideration may 
also be given to the opening of new industrial branches for firms in these 
sectors, and the expansion of pertinent facilities and incentives for their 
benefits such as consultancy services, tax exemptions and the provision of 
loan and equity capital. However, the long-established tradition in these 
sectors for primary reliance on less packaged transfer channels ought to be 
continued and encouraged. 
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PART IV 
EMPIRICAL STUDY, CONCLUSIONS 
AND PROPOSALS 
METHODOLOGY OF THE EMPIRICAL STUDY 
Previous parts of this research have dwelt on several aspects of the broad 
topic of North-to-South technology transfer, and a special reference has been 
made to Iraq's experience in this field. Particular attention has also been 
directed to the problem of the determination of the level of packaging in 
technology transfer deals, with the aim of examining the major factors which 
influence the degree of packaging involved in these transactions. 
This and the next three chapters of the thesis are devoted to the design and 
methodology of the field study, analysis of its findings, and final conclusions 
and proposals. This present chapter explains the basis and techniques of the 
empirical study, so that the main body. of the findings, their analysis, and 
final inferences and recommendations may be taken up in subsequent chapters. 
Transactions embodying the transfer of technology from Britain to Iraq form 
the basis of the empirical part of this research, and consequently a sample 
of such transactions has been obtained. The main objective has been to 
discover any links between the level of packaging associated with transfer 
deals and certain defined factors. In the design of the main questionnaire 
and subsequent discussions with industrialists, several factors were 
hypothesized as significant, e. g. pattern of ownership of the Iraqi enterprise, 
complexity of technology transferred, and size of the project executed. 
It is worth noting in this context that a fundamental premise implicit in 
this study is that the level of transfer packaging is determined basically by 
objective factors. In the real world, however, it is impossible to rule out 
the presence of "irrational" or subjective considerations in any individual 
transaction, e. g. the individual desire for prestige and/or personal satis- 
faction that is sometimes accompanied with larger projects or more complex 
techniques. There is, in addition, the possibility of honest errors of judg- 
ment, although purely personal advantages may also influence such decisions. 
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1 Section 3.2 above contains a discussion of the various imperfections 
that may be involved in the process of decision making in Third 
World countries. 
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Notwithstanding the possible effects of certain imperfections in the process 
of technology acquisition by a Third World developing country, the aim of the 
empirical part of this study is to test the hypothesis that transfer packag- 
ing is determined by a group of factors. These are considered to include 
the newness of the recipient enterprise, its ownership structure, the size of 
the project in question, sophistication of the technology involved, and the 
type of industry. Emphasis has been placed on these five variables, though 
other data has been gathered in the course of this investigation, including 
those relating to financial matters, the time span in project execution, and 
levels of operational success attained by personnel of recipient enterprises. 
Four major stages have characterized the empirical study that has been under- 
taken, as follows: 
(a) Choice of relevant types of product groups. 
(b) Selection of overall sample of British companies and initiation of 
contact with them. 
(c) Study of replies received from firms in the overall sample. 
(d) Selection of core and final sample of firms for in-depth study, and 
gathering of requisite information from them. 
13.1 Selection of Relevant Product Groups 
As the central part of this study is concerned with transfers of technology 
from the United Kingdom to Iraq, an attempt has been made to Identify those 
technology products most significant in Anglo-Iraqi trade in technology 
Items. 2 Moreover, attention has. been directed towards manufacturing industry, 
so that concentration was centred on technology products thought to be destined 
either specifically for manufacturing or, alternative, where they could be 
utilized in an ancillary or associated capacity in this field. 
2 The author is of the opinion that "technology products" may be defined as 
those which embody by their nature useful know-how either directly or 
indirectly, particularly in the stages of installation, operations, and 
maintenance of such products. 
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It is worth noting at this point that section 10.3 above contained an 
analysis of the importance of the various types of manufacturing technology 
items exported by UK to Iraq. Thirteen such product types were put in 
sequence of their significance in terms of average annual value during the 
period 1964-80. 
In this section, another attempt is made to identify the most Important types 
of British exports of technology products to Iraq. This present attempt is 
different from the previous one in two respects, thus: 
(a) The focus is now on "industrial technology" as opposed to both 
"technology" in general and the more restricted term "manufacturing technology". 
(b) As the emphasis of the empirical research is on the decade of the 1970's, 
the ten year period 1969-78 was taken as the relevant period. It was decided 
to leave out the two years 1979 and 1980, because a new system of product 
classification began to be applied in 1979 by the Bulletin of Statistics 
utilized for this purpose. 
Hence, on the basis of the classification used by the UN's "Bulletin of 
Statistics on World Trade in Engineering Products" during 1969-78, twenty 
eight product types have been selected. These are thought to be the most 
relevant types of industrial technology products according to the basic 
aforementioned criterion. In the case of each product type, the total value 
of British exports to Iraq during the ten year period 1969-78 was obtained. 
3 
Then, the average annual value of these exports was calculated, together with 
the percentage figure representing each group out of the grand total (Table 
13.1). In Table 13.2 , the various product groups have been ordered in the 
sequence of their relevant percentages of the grand total. Two product types 
were dropped due to the absence of relevant UK-to-Iraq exports during this 
period, namely electron and proton accelerators, and electro-magnetic appliances. 
From the remaining 26 product groups mentioned in Table 13.2 , nineteen were 
chosen on the basis of their importance for industrialization in general and 
manufacturing industry in particular, taking into account their relative 
positions in UK-Iraq trade in technology items. With the exception of three 
3 Attention had been centred on this era as it was intended for the core sample 
of industrial projects to be chosen mainly from the mid-1970's in order to 
provide an opportunity for the evaluation of the level of success attained by 
recipient enterprises in assimilating the technology. 
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Table 13.1 
RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF VARIOUS 
TYPES OF INDUSTRIAL TECHNOLOGY 
PRODUCTS EXPORTED BY UK TO IRAQ 
DURING THE PERIOD 1969-78 
Types of Industrial Technology Products 
Total 
Value of 
1x697 s 
1969--78 8 
(Millions 
of US 
Dollars) 
Average 
Annual 
969- 
1 1969-78 
(Millions 
of US 
Dollars) 
% of 
Grand 
Total 
1. Steam engines 7.3 0.73 1.6 
2. Other internal combustion engines 
(non-steam and non-aircraft) 28.8 2.88 6.3 
3. Gas turbines 27.8 2.78 6.1 
4. Dairy Farm equipment 2.1 0.21 0.5 
5. Metal-working machinery 12.3 1.23 2.7 
6. Textile and leather machinery 19.9 1.99 4.4 
7. Paper and pulp machinery 2.8 0.28 0.6 
8. Printing machinery 9.0 0.90 2.0 
9. Food-processing machinery 5.4 0.54 1.2 
10. Mineral-processing machinery 26.9 2.69 5.9 
11. Glass-working machinery 0.3 0.03 0.1 
12. Industrial furnaces, stokers, ovens 2.5 0.25 0.6 
13. Refrigerating equipment 5.1 0.51 1.1 
14. Other heating - cooling equipment 6.7 0.67 1.5 
15. Pumps and centrifuges 69.6 6.96 15.3 
16. Mechanical-handling equipment 26.1 2.61 5.7 
17. Powered tools, other 9.5 0.95 2.1 
18. Packaging machinery 9.6 0.96 2.1 
19. Weighing machinery 3.7 0.37 0.8 
20. Spraying, vending and other machinery 8.9 0.89 2.0 
21. Appliances, parts, and accessories, 
other 63.8 6.38 14.0 
22. Electrical power machinery 71.5 7.15 15.7 
23. Automotive electrical equipment 8.0 0.80 1.8 
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Table 13.1 Contd 
Total Average % of 
Value of Annual Grand 
Exports Value Total 
Types of Industrial Technology Products 1969-78 1969-78 (Millions (Millions 
of US of US 
Dollars) Dollars) 
4. Electrical measuring apparatus 16.7 1.67 3.7 
5. Electro-mechanical hand tools 2.7 0.27 0.6 
! 6. Electron & proton accelerators 0.0 0.0 0.0 
U. Electro-magnetic appliances 0.0 0.0 0.0 
! 8. Electric furnaces 7.1 0.71 1.6 
GRAND TOTAL 454.1 45.41 100.0 
Source: Bulletin of Statistics on World Trade in Engineering Products 
1969-78 
product groups, the first twenty-two groups of the list in Table 13.2 have 
been chosen. 
4 The three product-types that have been removed from further 
study are as follows: 
(a) Electrical power machinery. This product group is somewhat general in 
nature, being rather loosely related to the country's acquisition of 
technology. Indeed, one of the most significant factors which contributed to 
the importation of such machinery to Iraq had been the constant and continuous 
attention devoted to the need for rural electrification in the country. This 
had essentially been prompted by general economic and social considerations. 
(b) Appliances, parts and accessories. This group is a miscellaneous collec- 
tion of relatively small items. Once again, these products are seen to 
contribute to technology-acquisition in a rather indirect and subsidiary 
fashion, even though their total annual value is evidently large. In addition, 
4 Due to the insignificant amounts associated with the annual exports of the 
last four product types, these were not taken up for any further consideration. 
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Table 13.2 
TYPES OF BRITISH EXPORTS TO IRAQ 
OF INDUSTRIAL TECHNOLOGY PRODUCTS 
IN ORDER OF. RELATIVE VALUES 
Average % 
Annual Value of 
Types of Industrial' Technology Products in Millions of TOTAL 
US Dollars 
(1969-78) 
1. Electrical power machinery 7.15 15.7 
2. Pumps and centrifuges 6.96 15.3 
3. Appliances, -parts and accessories, 
other 6.38 14.0 
4. Other internal combustion engines 
(non-steam and non-aircraft) 2.88 6.3 
5. Gas turbines 2.78 6.1 
6. Mineral-processing machinery 2.69 5.9 
7. Mechanical-handling equipment 2.61 5.7 
8. Textile and leather machinery 1.99 4.4 
9. Electrical measuring apparatus 1.67 3.7 
10. Metal-working machinery 1.23 2.7 
11. Packaging machinery 0.96 2.1 
12. Powered tools, other 0.95 2.1 
13. Printing machinery 0.90 2.0 
14. Spraying, vending, other machinery -0.89 2.0 
15. Automotive electrical equipment 0.80 1.8 
16. Steam engines 0.73 1.6 
17. Electric furnaces 0.71 1.6 
18. Other heating-cooling equipment 0.67 1.5 
19. Food-processing machinery 0.54 1.2 
20. Refrigerating equipment 0.51 1.1 
21. Weighing machinery 0.37 0.8 
22. Paper and pulp machinery 0.28 0.6 
23. Electro-mechanical hand-tools 0.27 0.6 
24. Industrial furnaces, stokers, ovens 0.25 0.6 
25. Dairy-farm equipment 0.21 0.5 
6. Glass-working machinery 0.03 0.1 
TOTAL 45.41 100.0 
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no appropriate corresponding products could be distinctly identified in 
the relevant trade directories that have been utilized. 
(c) Automotive electrical equipment. These products have been regarded as 
specific to transportation, being related primarily to automobile repairs, 
despite the existence of some limited assembly operations in this area within 
Iraq. Therefore, this group has been excluded since it is of a peripheral 
nature as far as manufacturing industry is concerned. 
Hence, firms in phase I of the study have been chosen from nineteen product 
groups, which are in effect the first twenty two in Table 13.2 minus the 
three excluded ones. In the second phase, however, selection was further 
restricted to encompass manufacturing technology products only. 
13.2 Selection of Firms and Initial Contacts 
In the first phase of the study, a group of firms was chosen to represent the 
various nineteen product groups taken as the basis of the study. These firms 
were contacted, but the response received from them proved rather limited, 
so a second group (phase il) was selected and written to. Hence, the initial 
contact with the overall sample was carried out in two phases, resulting 
eventually in having 32 different transactions as the core sample of the study. 
13.2.1 First Phase of Preliminary Contact 
A total of 164 firms were selected from the nineteen types of industrial 
technology products that had been chosen. It was intended at this stage to 
take 10 firms from each product group under consideration. However, in some 
cases not enough firms could be found to make up this number (e. g. In the 
case of steam engines). In other cases there was some overlapping between 
the product groups, in the sense that some firms appeared in more than one 
product group. Under these circumstances, repetition had to be avoided, 
though effort was in fact made to select extra firms from product groups with 
long lists of producers in order to have a total of 10 firms wherever possible. 
Essentially, firms were selected within each product group on an alphabetical 
basis. However, some exceptions were made to this rule in cases where the 
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relevant product group comprised a very high number of products and the 
number of firms producing them was correspondingly large. The exceptions 
were made in order to pick a few firms that were common to a number of 
products within the same general group. 
Two types of directories issued by "Kompass Publishers Ltd" were utilized 
for this purpose, as follows: 
(a) "British Exports" published in 1982. This directory is in three volumes. 
The first is entitled "Products", the second "Technical Data", and the third 
"Exporters". The first volume gives a detailed alphabetical classification of 
the various products manufactured and/or sold by firms in the UK. In the 
case of each product, the names and addresses of companies supplying that 
product are given in this volume, together with an indication as to whether 
the supplying firm manufactures the product itself. The volume also gives a 
brief reference to the areas in the world where the relevant firm is interested 
to export, and where it has selling agents. As would be expected, only firms 
with manufacturing facilities have been selected for the purpose of this 
sample, provided they were interested in exporting to the Middle East, which 
was referred to by the number "4" in this directory. 
In a number of cases, a product type referred to by the Bulletin of Statistics 
on World Trade in Engineering Products is covered by several, sometimes many, 
product subgroups in this directory. For instance, in the case of textile 
and leather machinery there were 37 specific products which fall under the 
umbrella of textile machinery, and six in the case of leather equipment. In 
such cases an attempt was made to choose the products that were thought to be 
more relevant, and the number of firms required was drawn from these defined 
products. 
Under these circumstances, an attempt was occasionally made to waive the 
criterion of "alphabetization" to some extent, by including a few firms that 
were common to a number of products within the same product group. The end 
result of this procedure was to have a list of firms chosen alphabetically 
side by side with a few others selected on the ground of having production 
facilities for making a number of the products within the relevant group. 
i 
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(b) "Register of British Industry and Commercd'published in 1981. This is 
one of the main country based business directories, published by Kompass. 
Again, this publication is divided into two volumes, the first is for 
"Products and Services", whereas the second is for "Company Information". 
Primary reliance was placed on "British Exports Vol I" in selecting the 
first ten companies within each product group on the basis of their 
alphabetical sequence. In cases where the appropriate product types did not 
appear in this directory, the first volume of the Kompass main UK directory 
(i. e. "Products and Services") was made use of, where again selection was 
made alphabetically. Once more, where two or more products could be found 
in relation to the product type in question, firms were drawn from the 
various relevant product groups. Also, the firms chosen were those with 
manufacturing facilities and export activities in the relevant field. 
Having obtained the names and addresses of the companies in the sample, an 
additional effort was made to find the name of the chairman or managing 
director of each firm that was chosen. The second volume of the main Kompass 
directory (i. e. "Company Information") was utilized for this purpose. In this 
volume, companies are grouped geographically, where each British county is 
taken in turn and the companies located within it given in alphabetical order. 
Details presented in this volume include the name, address and telephone 
number of the firm in question, as well as the general nature of its business. 
Moreover, the names of the chairman, managing director and other directors 
are usually presented in each case. 
Having chosen the firms making up the sample at this stage, the next move 
was to write to each individual firm to enquire about any export of manufactur- 
ing or associated equipment to Iraq. In addition to this letter (Appendix 
13.1), the correspondence to each firm contained two covering letters from the 
supervisor of the research, Dr MR Hill, and the commercial attache of the 
Iraqi Embassy (Appendices 13.2 and 13.3 respectively). { 
A preliminary enquiry form was also enclosed for the convenient use of 
respondent firms (Appendix 13. k). This form presented the respective firm 
with brief questions concerning any export that might have taken place to 
Iraq during the 1970's, the years during which such export(s) had occurred 
(if any), and the nature of equipment involved. In addition, the opportunity 
lop 
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was given to every firm to make any relevant remarks on this form. It 
was intended that this form would facilitate the task of respondents, in 
that they could dispense with letter-writing in their replies. In the event 
some firms did reply by making use of this form, whereas others preferred to 
send a letter. Yet others filled the form and sent it accompanied by a 
covering letter. 
5 
Contact was initiated with a total of 164 firms covering the nineteen chosen 
product-groups. Replies were received from 104 of these, of which 22 pointed 
out that they either had relevant transactions with Iraq or were in the process 
of obtaining business there for the first time. 
6 Firms who responded to the 
enquiry represented 63.4% of the total, whereas the ones who replied positively 
formed 13.4% of the whole group and 21.2% of those who replied. Table 13.3 
gives a breakdown of the number of firms that had been written to at this 
stage of the study and those who responded. 
7 
It is noteworthy that the bulk of positive responses came from firms in 
certain manufacturing - product groups, notably textile and leather machinery, 
mineral processing machinery, printing machinery, packaging machinery, and 
refrigerating equipment. The positive responses received from these five 
groups added up to 15 cases representing around 68.2% of total positive 
replies. 
5 It should. however,, be pointed out here that an attempt was made through the 
telephone to follow-up firms who did not reply within the first few weeks. 
Response to this endeavour was mixed. Some sent their replies in due course, 
while others asked to be excused because of insufficiency of data or sensitive 
nature of their dealings with the respective clients. Yet a third group gave 
the impression of being evasive or indecisive. 
6 Most firms replied by mail, with only a few giving their answers in response 
to telephone calls from the researcher. 
7 It may be remarked here that in a few cases positive response was forthcoming 
by the mere identification of other firms who had supplied equipment or 
executed projects in Iraq. Such an occurrence was invariably the consequence 
of the supply of certain parts or equipment by the initial respondent 
enterprise to the one so identified. 
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Table 13.3 
COMPANY REPLIES TO PRELIMINARY 
ENQUIRY ON THE EXPORT OF 
MANUFACTURING EQUIPMENT FROM UK 
TO IRAQ (PHASE I) 
PRODUCT GROUPS (in order Number of Number of Number of 
of value of UK exports Companies in Positive Negative 
1969-78) Sample Replies Replies 
1. Pumps & centrifuges 10 2 6 
2. Internal combustion engines 
(non-steam S non-aircraft) 9 0 2 
3. Gas turbines 8 1 5 
4. Mineral-processing machinery 10 4 3 
5. Mechanical handling equipment 10 0 
4 
6. Textiles & leather machinery 10 4 
4 
7. Electrical measuring apparatus 10 0 9 
8. Metal working machinery 10 0 
6 
9. Packaging machinery 10 2 2 
10. Powered tools 10 1 8 
11. Printing machinery 10 3 4 
12. Spraying & vending machinery 6 1 3 
13. Steam Engines 1 0 0 
14. Electric Furnaces 7 0 7 
15. Heating & cooling equipment 9 0 7 
16. Food processing machinery 7 1 
4 
17. Refrigerating equipment 9 2 1 
18. Weighing machinery 9 1 
4 
19. Paper & pulp machinery 9 0 3 
TOTAL 164 22 82 
% of TOTAL 100 13.4 50.0 
As the number of positive replies was considered to be small, it was decided 
to write to an additional sample of firms. Also, the focus of the second 
sample was placed on manufacturing equipment. Five product groups were thus 
excluded from the second sample, namely, pumps and centrifugres, internal 
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combustion engines, gas turbines, powered tools, and steam engines. It is 
noteworthy that the positive response rate in the case of these five groups 
had on the whole been comparatively low. Taking the ratio of positive replies 
to the number of firms contacted, the respective percentages for the five 
groups just mentioned were 20%, nil, 13%, 10% and nil. The average of these 
five figures is 8.6% which is lower than the overall positive response rate 
for the whole phase I sample, i. e. 13.4%. 
13.2.2 Second Phase of Preliminary Contact 
It is thus clear that the second sample was focused on fourteen product groups, 
all of which involved the provision of manufacturing technology equipment. A 
total of 176 firms was written to this time, but the number of firms In each 
group varied widely, ranging from 43 in the case of mineral processing 
machinery to zero in three other product groups. Basic reliance was placed at 
this stage on the volume "British Exports: Vol I" in selecting firms in the 
sample. Indeed, with the exception of firms producing "electric furnaces", 
which were obtained from the "Register", all phase 11 samples came from the 
aforementioned directory. 
Two basic criteria were taken into account for determining the size of the 
second sample to be drawn from each main product group. Namely, these related 
to the relative importance of each product type and-the number of firms that 
could be found in the relevant directory, i. e. British Exports Vol I. Matters 
were complicated further by the fact that most product types were composed of 
two or more sub-groups, for each of which a list of suppliers was given by the 
directory. 
The minimum size of the total sample, for both phases, was chosen to be 25A 
of the grand number of firms for each main product group. However, the actual 
sample size formed a much higher percentage of the total population in several 
cases, particularly where the product group occupied a high position in the 
table. To explain how the actual total sample size was determined with respect 
to each product group, four different circumstances may be mentioned here, 
thus: 
- -------- --- - 
sö 
(a) High ranking product types with small populations. In the case of the 
first seven product-types, the whole population was taken whenever the 
population was composed of 25 firms or less. As can be seen from Table 
13.4 , this rule was applied to mechanical 
handling equipment, electrical 
measuring apparatus, metal working machinery, and printing machinery. 
(b) High ranking product types with large populations. A minimum coverage 
of 40% of manufacturers was attempted in the case of the seven first product 
groups with a list of over 25 names. Three product types came within the 
validity of this rule, viz. mineral processing machinery, textile and 
leather machinery, and packaging machinery. Because each of these three types 
contained a number of sub-groups, the firms selected in the second phase 
were those producing two or more product sub-groups, resulting thereby in a 
second sample of 43,15 and 12 for these three product groups respectively. 
(c) Medium ranking product groups which comprised three groups, namely spray- 
ing and vending equipment, electric furnaces, and heating and cooling equipment. 
Here again, product groups with 25 firms or less were covered 100%, with one 
exception, i. e. electric furnaces with 27 names, where the whole list was 
included. As regards "heating S cooling", firms producing two or more 
products were taken in the second sample. 
(d) Low ranking product groups. A maximum of 10 firms was selected for both 
samples where the number of firms did not exceed 25, i. e. in the case of 
food-processing machinery and refrigeration equipment. As for the other two 
product groups (weighing machinery, paper & pulp machinery) the second sample 
contained firms with three or more products. In consequence, the overall 
samples drawn from these two groups were 15 and 17 respectively. 
A total of 94 firms replied to the initial enquiry at this stage, forming 53.4% 
of the total phase II sample. Twenty of these firms asserted that they either 
had previously effected exports to Iraq or were in the process of doing so. 
This number represented 21.3% of those replying and 11.4% of the total that 
had been written to. Classified figures relating to the number of firms 
contacted and their responses are given in Table 13.5 . 
Table 13.4 
SAMPLES DRAWN FROM MANUFACTURING 
PRODUCT GROUPS 
PRODUCT Total Size of Sample Comments 
GROUPS Number % of 
of Firms Phase Phase Total Total 
in Directory I II Sample 
to Pop- 
ulation 
1. Mineral (a) (c) Phase 
I sample 
Processing 110 10 43 53 39.1 was obtained 
Machinery (48.2) from the 
"Register of 
British Indus-" 
try & Commercd' 
by Kompass, 
1981 
2. Mechanical (a) 
Handling 23 10 13 23 100 
Equipment 
3. Textile (a) 
Leather 55 10 15 25 45.5 
Machinery 
4. Electrical (a) 
Measuring 18 10 8 18 100 
Apparatus 
5. Metal 
Working 22(a) 10 22 32 100(c) Phase I sample 
Machinery (-) was obtained 
from the 
"Register" 
1981. None of 
them replied 
positively. 
6. Packaging (a) 
Machinery 34 10 12 22 64.7 
7. Printing (a) 
There was an 
Machinery 20 10 10 20 100 additional 
firm which was 
repeated in 
another group. 
This directory 
total is (21). 
8. Spraying (a) Vending mach- 
Vending 6 6 0 6 100 Ines have been 
Machinery excluded as 
these are more 
for consumer 
use than 
industrial 
production. 
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Table 13.4 Contd 
PRODUCT Total Size of Sample Comments 
GROUPS Number % of 
of Firms Phase Phase Total Total 
in Directory I II Sample 
to Pop- 
ulation 
9. Electric (b) Four other 
Furnaces 27 7 20 27 100 firms were 
repeated in 
other product 
groups. Thus 
total is 31 
0. Heating 
Cooling 
(a) 
62 9 18 27 
(c) 
29.0 Phase I sample 
Equipment was obtained (43.5) from the 
"Register" 1981 
1. Food Process- (a) 
ing 7 7 0 7 100 
Machinery 
2. Refrigerating (a) 
Equipment 15 9 1 10 66.7 
3. Weighing 
Machinery 
(a) 
39 9 6 15 
(c) 
15.4 Phase I sample 
(38.5) was taken from 
the "Register" 
1980. 
4. Paper & (a) (c) Pulp 40 9 8 17 20.0 Phase I sample 
Machinery (42.5) was obtained 
from the 
"Register" 
1981 
TOTAL 478 126 176 302 
Notes: 
(a) This figure was obtained from "British Exports Vol I: Products" 
(Kompass Publishers Ltd 1982) 
(b) Firms in this product group were selected from the "Register of British 
Industry & Commerce" by Kompass, 1981, as no relevant heading could be found 
in "British Exports Vol W. is 
(c) First figure shows percentage of firms drawn from the total list of firms 
on 
found in the respective directory, whereas the second (in brackets) gives the 
percentage of all firms written to out of the total list from which the total 
population figure was obtained (i. e. the figure in the second column of this 
Table). 
3 
13.3 Core Sample and Collection of Data 
The basic intention which underlaid the initiation of contacts with respective 
British firms was to obtain a sample of transactions involving transfers of 
technology to Iraq. In order to test out the hypotheses, it was decided that 
the final core sample of firms should be in the region of 25 to 35, with one 
relevant transaction'taken from each of these firms. Main focus was directed 
towards transactions during the 1970's, particularly around the middle of that 
decade. 
On that basis, firms in the final fourteen product groups who had responded 
positively to our initial enquiry were contacted individually with requests 
for visiting them to investigate pertinent transactions that had previously 
been effected. 
8 On obtaining the approval of the respective manager in each 
case, a visit was arranged to the company's premises. In every case a copy 
of the questionnaire was sent in advance of the visit to indicate the main 
areas of enquiry. 
Table 13.6 contains some details regarding the size of sample, number of 
respondent firms and companies actually visited with respect to each main 
product group. It is obvious from this table that details about 32 separate 
transactions were acquired from the same number of firms which had been visited. 
9 
When this figure is compared with the number of positive responses received 
(i. e. 38), it is seen that six cases could not be pursued, due essentially to 
unwillingness of the respective firms. 
Appendix 13.5 presents the questionnaire format that was utilized in gather- 
ing the required data from the various firms in the, core sample. Emphasis 
was directed towards the identification of the method employed in the transfer. 
8 In the case of the 12 relevant positive replies obtained in phase I, separate 
letters were forwarded to the firms concerned together with subsequent tel-hone 
calls for fixing dates of visits. In phase II, primary reliance was placed 
on telephone communications with firms who had replied positively. 
9 Actual number of visits was in fact somewhat higher. In one case, it transpired 
that the firm had not exported any manufacturing equipment to Iraq, and there- 
fore no transaction was taken for the sample. In two other cases, separate visits 
were made to two different firms in each case with respect to the same transaction 
In a third case, not enough information could be gained from the firm visited, 
nor was it possible to enlist the requisite co-operation and obtain relevant 
details from the main contractor who apparently had supplied the finished 
equipment. Hence this transaction was removed from the sample. 
f 
t 
ýi. 
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Table 13.5 
COMPANY REPLIES TO PRELIMINARY ENQUIRY 
ON THE EXPORT OF MANUFACTURING EQUIPMENT 
FROM UK TO IRAQ (PHASE II) 
Number of Number of Number of 
Firms in Positive Negative 
PRODUCT GROUPS Sample Replies Replies 
1. Mineral Processing Machinery 43 5 18 
2. Mechanical Handling Equipment 13 0 5 
3. Textile & Leather Machinery 15 1 5 
4. Electrical Measuring Apparatus 8 1 3 
5. Metal Working Machinery 22 3 
8 
6. Packaging Machinery 12 2 6 
7. Printing Machinery 10 2 3 
8. Spraying & Vending Machinery 0 0 0 
9. Electric Furnaces 20 3 11 
10. Heating & Cooling Equipment 18 2 
8 
Il. Food Processing Machinery 0 0 0 
12. Refrigerating Equipment 1 0 0 
13. Weighing Machinery 6 0 4 
14. Paper & Pulp Machinery 8 1 
3 
TOTAL 176 20 74 
% OF TOTAL 100 11.4 42.0 
I 
t 
deal and the degree of relevance of the various factors which were hypothesized 
as significant in shaping the exact form of the transaction. In addition, 
effort was made to obtain any other relevant information concerning each case, 
particularly the chronology of events leading up to the finalization of the 
transfer deal, the receipt or otherwise of any type of aid by the transferee 
enterprise, and the involvement of other firms (British or overseas) In the 
execution of the project. It was also intended to assess the level of success 
of the recipient project in understanding, manipulating, and developing the 
technology acquired. 
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Table 13.6 
OVERALL SAMPLES, POSITIVE RESPONSES 
AND ACTUAL VISITS TO FIRMS IN 
CORE SAMPLE 
PRODUCT GROUPS Overall 
Samples 
(Phases I& II) 
Number of 
Positive 
Responses 
Number of 
Actual 
Transactions Taken 
1. Mineral Processing 53 9 9 
Machinery 
2. Mechanical Handling 23 0 0 
Equipment 
3. Textile & 'Leather 25 5 5 
Machinery 
4. Electrical Measuring 18 1 1 
Apparatus 
5. Metal Working 32 3 3 
Machinery 
6. Packaging Machinery 22 4 3(a) 
7. Printing Machinery 20 5 4(a) 
8. Spraying & Vending 6 1 0(b) 
Machinery 
9. Electric Furnaces 27 3 2(a) 
0. Heating & Cooling 27 2 2 
Equipment 
(b) 
1. Food Processing 7 1 0 
Machinery 
2. Refrigerating Equipment 10 2 2 
0(b) 3. Weighing Machinery 15 1 
4. Paper & Pulp Machinery 17 1 1 
TOTAL 302 38 32 
Notes: 
(a) One of the firms which had replied positively was very reluctant to 
co-operate further, despite repeated requests. 
, 0 
(b) No further co-operation was forthcoming from the firm in this case. 
On visiting each firm in question, a brief introduction on the nature of 
the research was given, with the associated request for some details on 
any one transaction involving the export of manufacturing equipment to 
Iraq. Invariably, effort was made to take a case from the mid-1970's 
wherever possible, while at the same time allowing management to choose 
the exact deal which they were free to talk about. 
A complete list of the transactions representing the final core sample of 
the field study is given in Table 13.7 . It is clear 
from this table 
that the final transactions have in general been drawn from ten original 
product groups. It is also clear that in five cases, the relevant trans- 
actions were obtained from firms other than the ones initially written to. 
In most cases, an obvious correspondence exists between the original product 
groups, on the one hand, and the technologies supplied by the relevant trans- 
actions, on the other. However, matching appears to be absent in a few 
cases. This is particularly valid when large diversified firms have been 
involved, and where the final transaction was taken from a different firm. 
Table 13.7 
FINAL CORE SAMPLE OF THE 
FIELD STUDY 
PRODUCT GROUP Firm Contacted Final Respondent Nature of 
Initially Firm Technology 
Supplied 
1. Mineral Processing (a) Adamson & Same Petrochemical 
Machinery Hatchett Ltd Processing Plant 
(b) Aerex Stag Same Support Bearing. 
Ltd for Cement Kiln 
(c) Alfa Laval Ruston Diesels Electrical Powei 
Ltd Ltd Generating 
Stations 
(d) BOC Linde Same Refrigeration 
Refrigeration Plant 
Ltd 
(e) Johnson Tilghman Shot Blasting 
Progress Ltd Wheelabrator Equipment 
Ltd (parent) 
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PRODUCT GROUP Firm Contacted Final Respondent Nature of 
Initially Firm Technology 
Supplied 
(f) Torrance 8 Same Paint Making 
Sons Ltd Machinery 
(g) A Johnson & Same Shortening 
Co Ltd Equipment 
(h) Lightnin Chiyoda Oil Refining 
Mixers & International 
Aerators Ltd 
(i) Winkworth Same Drum Tumbler 
Machinery Ltd Mixer 
2. Textile 8 Leather (a) FE Lupton Same Cotton-yarn 
Machinery Ltd Treatment 
(b) Platt Saco Same Yarn Sizing 
Lowell (UK) Ltd Machinery 
(c) Edward Same Leather Drying 
Wilson & Son Machinery 
Ltd 
(d) Cosrol Ltd Same Cotton Carding 
Machinery 
(e) Haigh Same Woollen Carding 
Chadwick Ltd Machinery 
3. Electrical Measuring Crompton Same Techno-generatot 
Apparatus Parkinson Int. 
Ltd 
4. Metal Working (a) Metco Ltd Same Metal spraying 
Machinery Guns 
(b) AJ Morgan Same Rolling Machine- 
& Son (Lye) Ltd 
(c) Leo Refinery Same Key Refinery 
Fittings & Fittings 
Supplied Ltd 
5. Packaging Machinery (a) Barry Same Electronic 
Wehmiller Ltd Empty Bottling 
Inspector 
(b) Newman Same Labelling 
Labelling Machine 
Machines Ltd 
(c) Meyer Dumor Same Bottling Plant 
Int. Ltd 
"1 
.ý 
1 
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PRODUCT GROUP Firm Contacted Final Respondent Nature of 
Initially Firm Technology 
Supplied 
6. Printing Machinery (a) Cobden Same Paper Bag 
Chadwick Ltd Making 
(b) Rotaprint Same Offset Litho- 
plc graphic Machine 
(c) Strachan Same Paper Cutting 
Henshaw Machine 
Machinery 
(d) Linotype & Same Hot Metal 
Machinery Ltd Composing 
Machines 
7. Electric Furnaces (a) Davy McKee Davy McKee Phosphate 
(Stockton) Ltd (London) Ltd Processing Plant 
(b) Monometer Same Bogle Hearth 
Manufacturing C o Furnace 
Ltd 
8. Heating & Cooling (a) Bray Chroms Same Heating Ovens 
Equipment lox Ltd 
(b) Refrigera- Chloride Automotive 
ting Heating b Technical Battery Making 
Recirculating Ltd Plant 
Ltd 
9. Refrigerating (a) Hall Thermo - Same Refrigerating 
Equipment tank Products Reciprocating 
Ltd Compressors 
(b) Lightfoot Same Refrigeration 
Refrigeration Equipment 
Co Ltd 
0. Paper & Pulp Paper Convertin g Tissue Making 
Machinery Machine Co Ltd Same Machinery 
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APPENDIX 13.1: Researcher's Initial Enquiry Letter to Firms 
Un vc1'sify of Teclinologj 
LOUGHBOROUGH LEICESTERSHIRE LEi I 3TU Tel: ogog 263171 Telex 343ig Telegrams'Ccchnology Lough1mruugh 
DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT STUDIES 
May 1983 
&NAME& 
&ADDR 1& 
&ADDR2& 
&ADDR3& 
&ADDR4& 
&ADDR5& 
Dear &APPEL& 
I am writing this letter to request your co-operation in a research project 
dealing with the transfer of technology from the United Kingdom to Iraq. 
Particular attention is to be paid to successful project implementation in 
Iraq, with special reference to imported equipment intended for use in 
manufacturing industry. 
I understand that your company has experience in exporting to the Middle 
East, and it would be extremely useful to this research if I could visit 
your organisation to discuss your company's experience in that market, with 
either yourself or one of your executives. I am particularly interested in 
companies that were involved in the execution of manufacturing industry 
projects in Iraq during the mid 1970's, or the export of manufacturing 
equipment to Iraq during those years. In the meantime it would be greatly 
appreciated if the enclosed preliminary enquiry form could be completed and 
returned to me at your earliest convenience. Confidentiality with respect 
to sources of information will be observed in any publication based on the 
results of this survey. 
I also enclose for your information two covering letters of support from 
the Commercial Section of the Embassy of the Republic of Iraq, and my 
research supervisor at Loughborough University (Dr MR Hill). 
I look forward to your reply. 
Yours sincerely 
KJA Shubber 
Research Student 
Enc 
APPENDIX 13.2: Research Supervisor's Covering Letter 34, 
University of Technology 
TEL: 0509 
LOUGHBOROUGH LEICESTERSHIRE LEII 3TU '263 17 1 Telex 343 i9 Telegrams Technology Loughborough 
DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT STUDIES 
To Whom It May Concern 
MR KADOM JA SHUBBER 
Mr Shubber is a research student in this University Department, pursuing 
an investigation into the transfer of manufacturing technology to Iraq. 
As his research supervisor, I would be grateful for any assistance that 
your organisation and yourself could give to Mr Shubber in the execution 
of his studies. 
Should you require any further information, do not hesitate to contact me. 
%ti1! 
Gi Iý: GI. (ý 
Dr. MR Hi 11 
Senior Lecturer 
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APPENDIX 13.3: Commercial Counsellor's Covering Letter 
EMUSSY OF ME IIEPUBLIC OF IRAQ 
CO), 5 E LCIAL OFFICE , OUR REF.: RD/SA/ 565 
20 QUEEN'S GATE , DATES 27/7/1982 
LONDON SW7 5JG 
OI-584 7I'&I 
Messrs. 
Dear Sir, 
We would like to introduce Mr. KADOM J. A. SHUBBEl% who is conducting a 
research into the transfer of technology to Iraq. It would be greatly 
appreciated by the Embassy of the Republic of Iraq if all possible assistance 
is rendered to make this endeavour successful. 
The aim of this research is to examine. the state of the flow of technology 
goods from the U. H. to Iraq and the impact of this flow on industrial develop- 
ment in Iraq. It is hoped that this study will present some useful recommenda- 
tions that will contribute towards increased overall development in general and 
improved technological planning in our expanding economy. Needless to say that 
higher national rates of development coupled with enhanced planning of the 
technology intake would provide exporters with a better understanding of marke. 
ting trends and open the opportunity for improved forecasting . 
Mr. Shubber is on a scholarship from the Iraqi Government and undertakes 
bis research at Loughborough University of Technology. before commencing this 
research Mr. Shubber occupied the position of Assistant Profesor of Production 
Management at the University of Baghdad . 
We would like, at this stage, to express our appreciation for your 
co-operation 
Yours faithfully ., 
$. H. ALI. -' . 
Commercial Counsellor 
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APPENDIX 13.4: Preliminary Enquiry Form 
PRELIMINARY ENQUIRY 
ON THE EXPORT OF MANUFACTURING EQUIPMENT 
FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM TO IRAQ 
A. Name of Company 
B. Export of Manufacturing Equipment to Iraq 
(i) has been effected 
(ii) has not been effected 
(please tick as appropriate) 
C. If the answer to B above is positive, please state the year(s) in 
which exports took place: 
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 
1977 1978 1979 
(please tick as appropriate) 
D. If the answer to B above is positive, please state below the general 
nature of the goods that were exported. 
E. Other Comments. Please give us below any comments, ideas or 
suggestions that you would regard as relevant. Kindly use a separate 
sheet if this space is insufficient. 
Signature: Name: 
Position in responding firm: 
On completion please return this form to: KJA Shubber, Research Student 
Department of rianagement Studies 
University of Technology 
LouEhborough 
Leicestershire LE11 3TU 
.I 
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APPENDIX 13.5: Questionnaire Format 
LOUGHBOROUGH UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY 
DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT STUDIES 
I 
FIELD STUDY ON THE 
EXPORT OF EQUIPMENT INVOLVING INDUSTRIAL TECHNOLOGY 
TO IRAQ. 
K. J. A. Shubber, 
Research Student. 
A. BACKGROUND DATA 
Firm supplying technology (in UK): 
Establishment receiving technology (in Iraq): 
Nature of technology (or product) transferred: 
Type of industry within which this technology (or product) falls: 
Approximate value of transaction: £ 
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APPENDIX 13.5 contd 
B. METHODS OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
1. Which of the following thirteen methods of technology-transfer have 
been employed in this case? 
(Please tick as appropriate) 
a) Total-Project contracting 
b) Total-Process contracting 
c) Major-process contracting 
d) Know-how contracting 
e) Patent contracting 
f) Engineering-services contracting 
g) Technical-consultancy contracting 
h) Trade-mark contracting 
i) Franchise contracting 
j) Employment of foreign experts 
k) Machinery supplies 
1) Technical publications 
m) Personal contacts 
C. CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS 
2. Would you please provide the following chronological information: 
a) When was the first contact made in connection with 
this transaction? Year only: 
b) When was the agreement finalised to effect this 
transfer? Year only: 
c) When did work start to fulfil the transaction from 
the supplying end? Year only: 
d) When did the recipient enterprise using the 
technology begin operating? Year only: 
3. Was the technology-receiving enterprise being set up for the 
first time when the relevant transaction was agreed upon? Yes 
No 
4. If the recipient enterprise had already been in existence when 
the deal came through, in what year was that firm established? Year: 
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APPENDIX 13.5 contd 
D. OWNERSHIP & FACTORS AFFECTING CHOICE OF TRANSFER METHODS 
5. Which of the following five patterns of ownership structure is 
associated with the technology-receiving enterprise? 
(Please tick) 
a) Wholly foreign-owned 
b) Joint venture (ie: foreign & national ownership) 
c) Wholly State-owned 
d) Wholly privately owned 
e) Mixed State/private ownership 
6. On the basis of the five under-mentioned levels of importance, how would 
you rate each of the following factors in affecting the choice of 
technology-transfer methods in this case? 
(Please tick) 
Levels of Importance 
Highly Fairly Medium Low 
Factors Significant Significant Significance Significance Irrelevant 
i) Ownership structure of 
, recipient enterprise 
1) Newness or otherwise 
of the enterprise 
Complexity of the 
technolo involved 
d) Speed required in 
, __effecting the transfer 
") Cost estimates associated 
, -With alternative methods 
7. Did the project receive any type of aid on the basis of a bilateral/ 
regional agreement, or any relevant assistance by an international/ 
multi-country organisation? 
Yes 
No 
8. If the answer to question 7 is positive, please confirm: 
a) Whether the general nature of that aid was technical 
or financial 
b) Identity of the donor country/organisation offering 
the assistance 
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APPENDIX 13.5 contd 
E. GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF PROJECT IN ASSIMILATION OF TECHNOLOGY 
9. Using the five under-mentioned levels of success, how would you rate the 
performance of the recipient enterprise in this particular transfer? 
(Please tick) 
Levels of Success 
Criteria of Success Very Good Good Fair Poor Very Poor 
a) Depth of understanding of the 
technology by local personnel 
b) Speed in achieving a proper 
understanding of that technology 
by local personnel 
c) Ability of local personnel to 
manipulate, develop, and improve 
on the acquired technology. 
K. J. A. Shubber, 
Research Student, 
Department of Management Studies, 
Loughborough University of Technology, 
Loughborough, 
Leicestershire, 
LE11 3TU. 
I. 
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CHAPTER FOURTEEN 
GENERAL FINDINGS OF THE EMPIRICAL 
STUDY 
As indicated in the previous chapter, details regarding 32 cases of 
technology transfer to Iraq have been gathered in the course of interviews 
with industrialists. In two cases, one extra visit was made in connection 
with each transaction, whereas in the other 30 the one visit effected was 
sufficient for the purpose of obtaining most of the requisite data. 
The information obtained during these visits were recorded on the questionnaire 
form pertaining to each case, and additional information regarding each case 
were appended to the relevant form . The three appendices to this chapter 
give details regarding three of the 32 cases in the sample. One of these 
cases is highly packed, another is medium packaged, and the third is package 
free. The technology recipient in the latter case is a private firm, while 
those in the other two are State-owned. 
With only one exception, all firms visited have their own manufacturing 
facilities in this country. The one exception is the London-based Chiyoda 
International Ltd, which is essentially the European procurement office of 
the Japanese firm "Chiyoda Chemical Engineering and Construction". This 
company completed an oil refinery in Iraq, for which it purchased side mixers 
from a firm in our sample, Lightnin Mixers and Aerators, which is itself a 
wholly owned subsidiary of an American firm. 
It should perhaps be mentioned at the outset that twenty-two of the firms 
visited were British-owned, representing about 69% of the core sample. Of 
the other ten firms, seven (i. e. 22% of total) were American owned, whereas 
the other two were subsidiaries of European companies. As Table 14.1 makes 
clear, British owned firms included equal numbers of public and private 
enterprises. "" 
14.1 Transaction Values, Recipient Firms' Ownership, 
and Transfer Methods 
It can be seen from Table 14.2 that in 23 cases (i. e. 72% of the total sample), 
transfers were made to public sector enterprises in Iraq, while the remaining 
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Table 14.1 
OWNERSHIP PATTERNS OF 
RESPONDENT FIRMS IN CORE SAMPLE 
Transactions Final Respondent OWNERSHIP PATTERN 
Code Firm British American Other 
1/4/1 Adamson & Hatchett Ltd PLC 
(part of Acrow Group) 
2/4/2 Aerex Stag Ltd Private 
3/4/5 Ruston Diesels Ltd PLC 
(part of GEC) 
4/4/10 BOC Linde 25% 75% Linde 
Refrigeration Ltd BOC AG of 
Germany 
5/4/11 Tilghman Weelabrator Ltd 
(part of Whee l ab rator Frye Inc) X 
6/4/38 Torrance & Sons Ltd PLC 
(part of Stothert & Pitt) 
7/4/41 A Johnson & Co Ltd Swedish 
(part of Axel Johnson Group) 
8/4/42 Chiyodan International Ltd Japanese 
(part of Chiyodan Chemical 
Engineering & Construction Co Ltd) 
9/4/45 Winkworth Machinery Ltd Private 
10/6/4 FE Lupton Ltd Private 
11/6/6 Platt Saco Lowell (UK) Ltd 
(part of Hollingsworth-on- 
Wheels Inc) X 
12/6/8 Edward Wilson & Son Ltd Private 
13/6/9 Crosrol Ltd Private 
14/6/18 Haigh Chadwick Ltd Private 
15/7/16 Crompton Parkinson PLC 
International Ltd (part of 
Hawker Siddeley) 
16/8/21 Metco Ltd (part of Metco Inc. 
which is a subsidiary of 
Perkin Elmer) X 
17/8/23 AJ Morgan & Son (Lye) Ltd Private 
18/8/28 Leo Refinery Fittings & Supplies PLC 
Ltd (part of Larke & Elliot 
Group) 
19/9/9 Barry Wehmi l ler Ltd X 
(part of Barry Wehmiller Inc) 
I 
ýa 
ýy 
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Table 14.1 contd 
Transaction's Final Respondent OWNERSHIP PATTE RN 
Code Firm British American Other 
20/9/13 Newman Labelling Machines Ltd Private 
21/9/17 Meyer Dumor International Ltd x 
(part of Figgie International 
Inc. ) 
22/11/3 Cobden Chadwick Ltd Private 
23/11/8 Rotaprint PLC PLC 
24/11/17 Strachan Henshaw Machinery PLC 
(art of DRG) 
25/11/20 Linotype & Machinery Ltd x 
(art of Al 1 ied Corporation) 
26/14/17 Davy McKee (London) Ltd PLC 
(part of Davy Corporation)_ 
27/14/25 Monometer Manufacturing Co Ltd Private 
28/15/14 Bray Chromalox Ltd Private 
(art of Bray Holdings)_ 
29/15/24 Chloride Technical Ltd PLC 
(art of Chloride Group) 
30/17/6 Hall-Thermotank Products Ltd PLC 
(art of APV Group) 
31/17/8 Lightfood Refrigeration Co Ltd PLC 
(art of Lonrho Group) 
32/19/16 Paper Converting Machine Co Lt d x 
(part of Paper Converting 
Machine Corn) 
TOTAL 22 7 3 
(11 public 
11 private) 
9 transfers to the private sector represented 28% of the sample. 
1 It is 
also apparent from this table that the typical value of a public sector 
transaction was much higher than that for the private sector. Indeed, the 
1 The transaction involving Basrah Petroleum Company has been included among 
private sector transfers, since this company was not fully nationalized when 
the relevant transaction order was placed (1974). American and Dutch share- 
holdings in this firm were taken over in 1973 but British and French shares 
were not nationalized until 1975 (Source: Ministry of Information: "The 
Economy of Iraq : Development and Perspectives 1958-1976-1980", 1977, P102). 
It is felt that this firm was at that time (1974) operated on primarily 
commercial considerations, which in principle were very much in tune with 
those of the private sector. 
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figures given in this table demonstrate that for the transactions included 
in this sample, the average value of a public sector transaction is 273 
times that of the private sector. In these calculations, only the values 
of contracts to the firms visited have"been taken into account. In the 
case of five transfers, all of which were to public enterprises, the 
respondent firm was a subcontractor supplying only one part of the project. 
As can be seen from the notes to Table 14.2 , four of those contracts were 
evidently quite large, running into several, or many, millions of pounds. 
Had total values of the main contracts been considered, the average value 
of public sector transactions would have been much higher, sharpening the 
contrast between the two sectors. 
A further dichotomy between public and private sector transactions is 
illustrated by the period of project realization. As can be seen from 
Table 14.3 , public sector projects 
In the sample generally took longer 
to implement than private ones. Illustrated in this table also are the 
transfer methods embodied in the various transactions within the core 
sample. The range of public sector realization periods Is I to 9 years 
(i. e. 8 years), with an overall average of 2.6 years. Also, a direct 
relationship is indicated between packaging level and length of this period. 
With respect to the private sector, the corresponding range is I to 2 years 
(i. e. one year), with an average of 1.1 years. 
Data concerning packaging levels of transfer methods utilized by these two 
main sectors are presented in Table 14.4 . It can thus be seen that 
8 
out of the 9 transfers effected by private sector enterprises were of the 
package-free variety, since they involved mainly purchases of machinery 
and/or equipment. The ninth case was rather exceptional, in the sense that 
it related to a comparatively advanced piece of equipment (i. e. an 
electronic empty bottle inspector) where it was the suppliers' policy to 
send their own technicians to instal and commission their equipment. 
Indeed, the point came out clearly in the discussion with the respective 
executive that that policy was adhered to even in sales transactions with 
clients operating In developed countries, save in very exceptional 
circumstances. 
The evident tendency of the private sector to rely principally on machinery 
supplies as a means of technology acquisition supports earlier remarks, 
in Chapter 12, concerning the process of technology transfer and development 
in this sector. In particular, three main features of this process 
I 
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Table 14.2 
RECIPIENT IRAQI ENTERPRISES, NATURE 
OF TECHNOLOGY, AND RELEVANT TRANSACTION VALUES 
(CORE SAMPLE OF 32 CASES) 
Transaction Nature of Technology Receipient Enterprise Value o 
Code and Year Transferred in Iraq Trans- 
of Contract action (£'000) 
1/4/1 Petrochemical processing Iraq National Oil (1 
(1975) equipment Company (public) 250.00 
2/4/2 Support bearings for State Establishment 
(1975) cement kiln for Iraqi Cement (public) 60.62 
3/4/5 Electric power generating State Organization 
(1981) equipment for Electricity 66000.0 (public) 
4/4/10 Refrigeration plant State Dairy Estab- 2) (1972) lishment (public) 8.00 
5/4/11 Shot-blasting equipment Basrah Petroleum Co 2.00 
(1974) (public - forei n) 
6/4/38 Paint-making machinery Al Salam Paint & 37.00 
(1976) Metal Can Co (private) 
7/4/41 Shortening equipment for State Establishment 350.00 
(1979) ghee-making for Vegetable Oils 
(public) 
8/4/42 Oil refining plant State Organization 100000.0 
(1978) for Oil Projects 
(public) 
9/4/45 Drum tumbler mixer Baghdad Chemical & 
(1978) Colours Co (private) 2.60 
10/6/4 Cotton yarn machinery State Establishment 
(1975) for Iraqi Textiles 
(public) 10.09 
11/6/6 Yarn sizing machinery State Establishment 
(1975) for Fine Textiles 100.00 
(public) 
12/6/8 Leather drying machinery NOT DIVULGED 10.00 
(1976) (private) 
13/6/9 Cotton carding machinery State Establishment (3) 
(1974) for Iraqi Textiles 480.00 
(public) 
14/6/18 Worsted carding machinery SOIDAC (4) 
(1979) (public) 200.00 
15/7/16 Techno generators State Establishment 
(1980) for Fine Textiles 1.00 
(public) 
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Table 14.2 contd 
Transaction Nature of Technology Recipient Enterprise Value o- 
Code and Year Transferred In Iraq Trans- 
of Contract action (£'000) 
16/8/21 Metal spraying guns Iraq I National Oil 
(1977) Co (ublic) 3.00 
17/8/23 Rolling machines State Organization 
(1981) for Iraqi Ports 13.00 
(public) 
18/8/23 Key refinery fittings State Organization 
(1980) for Refineries 
(public) 1.00 
19/9/9 Electronic empty-bottle Shabi Mineral Water 
(1977) inspector Co (private) 11.00 
20/9/13 Labelling machine Iraqi Chalk Factory 
(1975) (private) 1.97 
21/9/17 Bottling plant State Establishment 
(1974) for Soft Drinks 
(public) 500.00 
22/11/3 Paper Bag marking machinery Al-Hilal Factory 10.52 
(1974) (private) 
23/11/8 Offset printing machinery Rafidarin Bank 
(1978) (public) 9.17 
24/11/17 Paper cutting machine Mazin Factory 30.00 
(1977) (private) 
25/11/20 Hot metal composing Printing Works/ 
(1977) machinery Ministry of 
Defence (public) 117.60 
26/14/17 Phosphate processing plant State Organization 
(5 
(1974) for Minerals (public) 122.00 
27/14/25 Drying furnace State Establishment 
(1980) for Sar inar Cement 
(public) 20.32 
28/15/14 Heating ovens State Organization 
(1978) for Technical Indus- 
tries (public) 2.09 
29/15/24 Automotive-battery State Establishment 
(1975) making plant for Battery 4875.00 
Manufacturing 
(public) 
30/17/6 Refrigerating reciprocating State Establishment 
(1977) compressors for Vegetable Oils 
(public) 15.00 
31/17/8 Refrigeration equipment State Organization 
(1965) for Refineries 
(public) 20.00 
1 
,ä 
.. 
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Table 14.2 contd 
Transaction Nature of Technology Recipient Enterprise Value o 
Code and Year Transferred in Iraq Trans- 
of Contract action (£'000) 
32/19/16 Tissue making Rafidain Paper (6) 
(1975) machinery Co (Private) 160.00 
TOTAL 23 public 
9 private 185235.8 
Averages: 
Public 8053.7 
Private 29.4 
Overall 5796.9 
NOTES: 
(1) This is the value of the subcontract to the British firm visited in this 
case. Value of contract to main contractor (French) is believed to be 
around $8.5 million. 
(2) This is the value of the subcontract to the British firm visited in this 
case. The plant was executed by way of a total process contract by 
A Johnson, the value of which was £30645 C&F. 
(3) This is the value of the subcontract to the British firm visited in this 
case. The value of the total contract to the main contractor is believed to 
be around $12 million. 
(4) This is the value of the deal to the firm visited in this case. The 
whole project is believed to have been executed by Wogan Brameast Ltd which 
has since been dissolved and broken up into more than one new enterprise. 
All efforts to establish the value of the total contract achieved no 
success in this instance. 
', 
(5) This is the value of the subcontract to the British firm visited in 
this case. The whole project was executed by a Belgian concern. The value 
of the project is believed to be I. D. 410m (around £650 million). 
(6) The value of the transaction was in this case expressed in US dollars 
(i. e. $80000). A general exchange guide of £l=$2 has been assumed in this 
case as indicative of prevailing rates during that period (i. e. 1975-6). 
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Table 14.3 
PERIODS + OF REALIZATION OF TRANSFER 
k 
(CORE SAMPLE OF 32 CASES) 
*tact IonIs Recipient Enterprise in Public Sector Recipient Enterprise In Private/Mixed Sector 
Total Total Major Machinery/ Total Total Major Machinery/ 
Project Process Process Equip. Suppl. Project Process Process Equip. Suppl. 
(A) (B) (C) (E) (A) (8) (C) (E) 
3 
2 
nis 2 
rVlo 2 
'V 
'V31 
FM 3 
rk/42 6 
rWýS 
ý/1 
+6/6 1 
º6/e 
rJ/5 4 
F11/18 3 
17/16 2 
rin 1 
rUi) 
1421 
Pin 
'3/13 
ý/I l 
"11/j 
fll/e 
ril/1) 2 
+Ilno I 
PA/17 9 
'14/25 2 
'IS/16 
tIS/24 7 
F11/6 1 
'1j/1 5 
ýtý/16 
5.25 3.2 1.67 1.64 - - 1 1.13 
490 for 
'th %)or sect or 2.61 1.11 
1 average 2.19 
ý'104s 
are express In years only 
herbe the time span elapsing between the first concrete contact made between the taken ealiza "Per 
operation a project. er , 
ýt 
and of+r 
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1, 
i 
I 
have very plainly surfaced, namely those relating to primary dependence on 
package free methods, unsophisticated nature of technologies imported, and 
small size of projects and transactions. 
It is also clear from Table 14.4 that a higher degree of diversity is 
displayed by public sector transactions in so far as the methods employed 
in technology transfer are concerned. Of the 23 public sector transactions, 
eleven were package free, representing 48% of all public sector deals in 
the sample. The remaining 12 were somewhat evenly distributed among the 
other three packaging levels. It must, however, be stressed that out of 
the five packaging levels that were set out in subsection 6.2.2 above, 
the results of the field study demonstrate that only four have actually been 
used by public sector firms. For private enterprises, the range of transfer 
packaging levels that have been utilized are obviously much more restricted, 
being confined virtually to the package free category. 
`t 
The implication is clear from Table 14.4 that technology has been channelled 
through four methods in the case of public enterprises, and only two in the 
case of the private sector. The other nine transfer methods which were not 
encountered in the sample and ostensibly, were not relied upon in a primary 
capacity, comprised the following: 
(a) Know-how contracting ) Medium packaged 
(b) Patent contracting ) 
(c) Trade-mark contracting Low packaged 
(d) Franchise contracting ) 
(e) Engineering services contracts ) 
(f) Technical consultancy contracts 
(g) Employment of foreign experts Package-free 
(h) Technical publications 
(i) Personal contacts ) 
Available evidence indicates, however, that most of these methods have 
been tapped, either in an ancillary capacity or as ingredients of more com- 
prehensive methods. The information obtained throughout the field visits 
contains important elements which mean in effect that legal patents and 
technical know-how were major ingredients of several contracts within the 
sample. This is particularly true of total project and process deals 
involving the public sector. 
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Table 14.4 
LEVELS OF PACKAGING ASSOCIATED WITH TRANSFERS 
OF TECHNOLOGY 
(CORE SAMPLE OF 32 CASES) 
'++ctIon's Recipient Enterprise in Public Sector 
Total Total Major Machinery/ 
Project Process Process Equip. Suppl. 
(A) (B) (C) (E) 
Recipient Enterprise In Private/Mixed Sector 
Total Total Major Machinery/ 
Project Process Process Equip. Suppl. 
(A) (B) (C) (E) 
4i x 
12 X 
(/S X 
+a x 
4+t x 
08 x 
ý4i X 
X 
vý5 x 
4r, x 
x 
'4 x 
x 
yi 6 x 
716 x 
1/21 x 
V21 X 
n8 x 
h x 
, /13 x 
illy x 
., x 
+/e x 
x 
1/2p x 
1/I7 x 
V2g X 
Vii X 
/2% X 
1/L X 
1ý4 x 
V16 x 
: "ks 4 5 3 Il - - I 8 
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In the course of interviews with respective executives, the issue of 
patents crept up clearly in two cases, where it was stressed that 
patented processes were involved in the transfer transaction. The two 
cases were the following: 
(a) Case 26/14/17 which involved the execution of a phosphate 
project together with fertilizer-manufacturing facilities. In 
the British firm visited (i. e. Davy McKee Ltd) utilized a pate 
process, purchased from Fisons Ltd, in designing and selecting 
equipment for the three fertilizer-producing plants for which 
mining 
this case, 
ited chemical 
requisite 
it was 
responsible. 
(b) Case 29/15/24 where Chloride Technical Ltd had executed a major 
extension on a plant it had itself originally set up back in 1968-70. Here, 
legal patents held by the transferor firm were crucial in designing both 
projects and the choice of required hardware. 
In addition to these two cases, specific mention was made of patented 
technology items, supplied in the course of relevant transfer transactions, 
in five other cases. These were: 
(a) Case 7/4/41 which involved the supply of votators, and complementary 
parts, by A Johnson to the State Enterprise for Vegetabl Oils in Iraq. 
(b) Case 13/6/9 which involved the supply of cotton carding machinery 
by Crosrol Ltd to a textile extension plant, which was executed on a total 
project basis by a West German firm. 
(c) Case 18/8/28, in which a key refinery fitting was supplied by Leo 
Refinery Fittings & Supplies Ltd to the Daura Refinery in Baghdad. 
(d) Case 19/9/9, where an electronic empty bottle inspector was provided 
by Barry Wehmiller Ltd to a soft drink plant in Baghdad. 
(e) Case 25/11/20, in which hot metal composing machines were supplied 
to government printing works in Iraq. 
The transfer of technical know-how through direct personal exchange was 
particularly evident in the case of total-protect and process contracts. 
Indeed, in a few cases, specific provisions were made for the training of 
local personnel by the transferor firm. Four cases may be cited here, 
these being: 
i 
3 
(a) Case 3/4/5, where Ruston Diesels Ltd undertook the establishment of 69 
stand-by power generating stations attached to manufacturing plants in 
various parts of the country. This contract contained stipulations" for 
the setting up of a central workshop with a training school for local 
personnel as well as the initial training of workmen who were to operate 
the stand-by stations. For this purpose, one technician was to remain at 
each station for six months after the start of operations. Five other 
training personnel were to remain in Iraq for five years subsequent to 
the completion of the project. In addition, 85 Iraqi personnel were 
trained by the transferor firm at their UK works. 
(b) Case 13/6/9, where Crosrol Ltd supplied 36 cotton carding machines 
to a textile plant and had to instruct local personnel on matters relating 
to operation and maintenance. Crosrol served as a major sub-contractor to 
a German firm who fulfilled the contract on a total project basis. 
(c) Case 25/11/20 whereby Linotype & Machinery Ltd supplied four hot-metal 
composing machines to Ministry of Defence presses in Iraq. In this case, 
three Iraqi personnel were trained in the UK for eight weeks, on both 
operational and maintenance aspects. 
(d) Case 29/15/24, in which Chloride Technical Ltd executed a major 
extension on a battery manufacturing plant. This firm was charged, under the 
terms of the contract, with training local personnel who undertook technical 
tasks, i. e. from plant manager to shop-floor operatives. Also, a group of 
local personnel were given some training in the UK. 
In two other cases, the supplying firm in the UK had previously set up 
the client enterprise and provided, at the outset, the required training 
for plant personnel. Consequently, no additional training was needed to 
accompany the supply of further equipment, which were for the purpose of 
replacement. The two transactions here were case 2/4/2, where Aerex Stag Ltd 
supplied kiln support bearings to an Iraqi cement making plant, and case 
11/6/6 where Platt Saco Lowell (UK) Ltd supplied sizing machines to the 
State Establishment for Fine Textiles. 
All total-project and process transactions involved an element of "engineering 
services" in them. Also, two of three major-process contracts (i. e. cases 
11/6/6 and 25/11/20) contained stipulations for the provision of engineering 
services by the transferor firm. This means that of the 32 cases in the 
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sample, those which involved a discernible element of engineering services 
numbered eleven, thus representing 34% of the sample. 
As regards "technical consultancy" contracts, these have often been used 
as a supplement to, and in conjunction with, many large public projects in 
Iraq. In some cases, technical consultancy contracts for long/medium 
term(s) have also been incorporated in the main body of transfer transactions, 
especially the ones that are more highly packaged. 
The other three package-free methods (i. e. employment of foreign experts, 
technical publications and personal contacts) have been of service to 
technology receiving. enterprises in both public and private sectors. But, 
once again, these methods have only been used in a complementary status. 
Pertinent comments by interviewed executives have shown that personal contacts 
and technical publications were often instrumental in providing basic back- 
ground knowledge for making relevant purchasing decisions and/or designing 
the project in question. Finally, no significant use of trademark or 
franchise contracting seems to have taken place in the public sector in 
Iraq since the early 1970's, particularly in the light of official policy 
of shunning dependence on foreign trademarks. 
14.2 Technological and Industrial Characteristics of Sample Transfers 
The transactions within the core sample have been classified into twelve 
small groups on the basis of the type of industry to which they belong 
(Table 14.5). It is clear from this table that private sector transactions 
in the sample were, to a high degree, concentrated in certain industrial 
branches, principally paper products (33.3%) and chemical products (22.2%). 
Three other industries are represented in transfers to the private sector. 
These are oil, textile and leather, and construction materials, each of 
which occupies a 14.8% proportion of the total number of private sector 
transfers. 
Primary position among all public sector transfers in the sample is 
occupied by three industries with a combined share of 61% of all public 
transfers in the sample. The three industries are oil, gas, and petro- 
chemicals (5 transfers); textile and leather (5 transfers); food products 
and drinks (4 transfers). The respective percentages of these three industries 
out of all public transactions in the sample amount to 22%, 22% and 17%" 
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Table 14.5 
A CLASSIFICATION OF INDUSTRIAL 
SECTORS RECEIVING TECHNOLOGY 
(CORE SAMPLE OF 32 CASES) 
Ownership of Recipient Enterprise and Transfer Methods 
Industrial (Number of Cases) 
Sectors 
Receiving Public Sector Private Sector 
Technology Machine Machine 
in Iraq T Project T Procress M Process Supplies M Process Supplies TOTi 
Oil, gas, & 
1 1 - 3 - 1 6 petro- 
chemicals 
Textile & 
leather l l l 2 6 (5 textile; 
one leather) 
Construction 
Materials (2 2 - 1 3 
Cement &I 
paint) 
, 
Food- 
process-ing (2 vege- 
1 1 - - 3 table oil & - 1 
1 dairy pro- 
ducts) 
Paper pro- _ _ - - - 
3 3 
ducts 
Printing - - 1 1 - 
2 
Chemical 2 2 
products 
Metal 2 - - 2 
products 
Soft 2 
drinks 
Mining 
(phosphate) 1 - - - - - 
Automotive 
products - 1 - - - 
(batteries) 
Electricity 
generation 
TOTAL 4 5 3 11 1 8 3 
Construction materials, printing, and metal products follow up with 
two transactions each, thus giving them 9% each. 
The aggregate picture presented by the overall sample illustrates that 
five industries possessed the lion's share of all transfers, with a 
combined share of 72%. The five industries are oil, gas and petrochemicals 
(6); textile & leather (6); food products & drinks (5); construction 
materials (3); paper products (3). These are followed by three others 
with two transfers each, these being printing, chemical products, and 
metal products. 
An industrial breakdown of transaction values is given in Table 14.6 
whereby a distinction is also made between public and private deals. As 
regards the public sector, the most valuable transactions were found to be 
in electricity and eiefr'-chemicals; oil, gas and petrochemicals; chemicals 
and fertilizers. On the other hand, the biggest financial deals in the 
private sector were those in paper and printing, and construction materials. 
Table 14.7 classifies the various transactions according to their level of 
technological complexity and on the basis of replies and comments made by 
industrialists in the course of the various interviews. Five degrees of 
complexity have been chosen in this regard, as mentioned in the table. 
Also, two perspectives were utilized to assess this factor : complexity in 
project design, planning and execution; complexity in project operation 
and maintenance. 
It is clear from this table that the vast majority of projects in the sample 
are relatively simple as regards pre-operational aspects. Only three 
projects could be viewed as of either high or high-to-medium complexity in 
this connection, representing thereby less than 10% of the total sample. 
Project technologies classified as "medium-to-low" occupied the highest 
percentage among the five groups, followed by the "medium" group. 
With respect to the criterion of operational complexity, the contrast 
is more stark, with 62.5% of project technologies viewed as associated with 
low-complexity level. No project was here thought to be highly complex, 
while each of the two categories of "high-to-medium" and "medium" was 
associated with a percentage of 3.1% of all projects. 
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Table 14.6 
AVERAGE VALUES OF TECHNOLOGY 
TRANSFER TRANSACTIONS IN DIFFERENT 
RECIPIENT INDUSTRIAL SECTORS IN IRAQ 
(A CORE SAMPLE OF 32 CASES) 
Industrial Public Sector Private Sector 
Sector Enterpri es Enterprises 
Receiving Number of Average Number of Average 
Technology Transactions Value (£) Transactions Value (£) 
1. Oil, gas & 
Petrochemicals 5 20,054,800 1 2,000 
2. Textile & 
leather 5 15,822 1 10,000 
3. Food & drink 4 218,250 1 11,000 
4. Paper & 
Printing 2 63,385 3 66,840 
5. Construction 
Materials 2 40,465 1 37,000 
6. Chemicals & 
Fertilizers 1 12,200,000 2 2,285 
7. Metal 
Products 2 7,546 - - 
8. Electricity & 
Electro- 
Chemicals 2 35,437,500 - - 
Number of project s 23 9 
Overall 
Average Project 8,053,714 29,454 
Value 
14.3 Appraisal of Recipient Firms' Success in Assimilating Technology 
Interviewed executives were questioned about their impressions (if any) 
regarding the degree of success attained by receipient enterprises in 
absorbing the acquired technology in each case. As most of the transactions 
had taken place during the 1970's, it was possible for most managers inter- 
Table 14.7 
LEVELS OF TECHNOLOGICAL COMPLEXITY ASSOCIATED 
WITH PROJECTS IN THE CORE SAMPLE 
Transaction's Complexity in Project Design, Planning, Complexity in Project Operation and 
Code and Execution Maintenance 
High to Medium High to Medium 
High Medium Medium to Low Low High Medium Medium to Low Low 
1/4/1 X X 
2/4/2 X X 
3/4/5 X X 
4/4/10 X X 
5/4/11 x X 
6/4/38 x X 
7/4/41 x X 
8/4/42 x X 
9/4/45 X x 
10/6/4 X X 
11/6/6 X X 
12/6/8 X x 
13/6/9 X X 
14/6/18 x X 
15/7/16 X X 
16/8/21 X X 
17/8/23 X X 
18/8/28 X X 
19/9/9 X X 
20/9/13 x X 
21/9/17 x x 
22/11/3 X X 
23/11/8 X X 
24/11/17 X X , 25/11/20 X X 
26/14/17 x X 
27/14/25 X X 
28/15/14 X X 29/15/24 X x 
30/17/6 X x 
31/17/8 x X 
32/19/16 X x 
TOTAL 1 2 8 15 6 - 1 1 10 20 
of Total 3.1 
L 
6.2 25.0 46.9 18.8 0.0 3.1 3.1 31.3 62,! 
4r 
viewed to make an assessment in this connection. In almost all cases, the 
respective transaction was handled by the executive(s) interviewed and he 
(they) had consequently gained some first-hand experience in dealing with 
Iraqi personnel in the recipient project, either here in Britain or in 
Iraq. Indeed, in a number of cases the respondent executive had visited 
Iraq several times in the past in connection with the respective transaction, 
or other deals, and had on each occasion stayed there for a few days or a 
few weeks. 
Even in the few cases where the Iraqi project was still being implemented, 
it was possible for respondents to comment on the ability of local personnel 
with whom they had become acquainted. In addition to direct contacts, the 
opinion was expressed by some executives that orders for spare parts and 
maintenance requests received from Iraq had given them some idea about the 
respective technical accomplishments of those enterprises. 
Table 14.8 summarizes the answers of interviewed executives to the three 
main questions regarding the success of their client enterprises. While it 
must be remembered that no highly sophisticated technology was involved in 
the majority of. cases, relevant "poor" and "very poor" assessments are 
non-existent in response to the first question. Indeed, in 27 cases, i. e. 
84.4% of total, "depth" of understanding was regarded as either "very good" 
or "good". 
A more varied pattern of assessment is shown by the set of answers to the 
second question, i. e. speed of understanding of technology. In 24 cases 
out of 31, i. e. 77.4%, it was thought that the "speed" was either "very 
good" or "good". In five cases, i. e. 16%, "speed" was regarded as "fair", 
while in two cases, i. e. 6.4%, it was viewed as "poor". 
As regards the third question, 12 out of 16 executives regarded local 
personnel either "very good" or "good" inmanipulating, developing and 
improving the technology in question. However, in three cases (18.8% of 
total) this ability was seen as "poor". It is also noteworthy that the 
executives who felt able to answer this last question were only half the 
number of those interviewed. 
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Table 14.8 
A SUMMARY OF INTERVIEWED EXECUTIVES' ASSESSMENTS 
OF THE LEVELS OF SUCCESS ACHIEVED BY THEIR CLIENT TECHNOLOGY 
RECIPIENT ENTERPRISES IN IRAQ 
(A SAMPLE OF 32 CASES) 
LEVELS OF SU CCESS 
Criteria of Success Very Good Good Fair Poor Very Poor 
(a) Depth of understanding 12 15 5 - - 
of Technology by local 
personnel 
(b) Speed in achieving a 
proper understanding of (aJ 7 
17 5 2 - 
that technology 
(c) Ability of local 
personnel to manipulate, 
develop and improve 
on the acquired 2 10 1 3 - 
technology (b) 
NOTES: 
(a) In one case here the respective executive felt unable to provide the 
necessary assessment due to inadequate knowledge concerning the enterprise 
which received the technology. 
(b) In sixteen cases here the interviewed executives felt unable to make 
the required assessment due to various factors. These included the limited 
scope for making such improvements on the equipment in question, their lack 
of sufficient knowledge to enable them to comment, or the mere fact that the 
project had not then been operational. 
The three tables 14.9 , 14.10 and 
14.11 present a classification of 
interviewed executives' assessments of recipient enterprises as regards 
the three main criteria, as compared with the level of estimated operational 
complexity in the various cases. Each table looks at one of the three yard- 
sticks of success, whereupon the correspondence is illustrated between levels 
of success and levels of operational complexity. Some support can be 
detected from these three tables for the hypothesis that an inverse relation- 
ship exists between success and the level of operational complexity. 
Looking at Table 14.9 , projects branded as 
"very good" represent 30% of 
those in the "medium-to-low"-category, whereas those achieving the same level 
of success represent 40% of the "low" complexity group. Again, 30% of the 
'former group have a "good" rating, whereas 55% of the "low" group are of the 
: same rating. In contrast, 40% of the "medium-to-low" group are said to be 
fairly successful, whereas only 5% of the "low" group were given the same 
assessment. 
A broadly similar profile is presented by answers to the second question 
(Table 14.10). It is clear that whereas only 10% of projects of "medium- 
to-low" complexity was regarded as "very good", the corresponding proportion 
for the "low" group was 32%. Also, half of the first group was viewed as 
"good" but 53% of the latter group was so regarded. Conversely, 20% of 
"medium-to-low" projects were assessed as poorly operated according to this 
measure, while no project was so graded among the other group. 
The figures in Table 14.11 tend to corroborate once more the basic relation- 
ship suggested in the previous two tables. While no "medium-to-low" project 
has been rated as "very good", 22% of "low" ones were so graded. Moreover, 
half the projects in the former category were seen as "good", whereas 55.5% 
of the latter group were so rated. Conversely, 33% of the first category 
were viewed as "poor" but this adjective was associated with only 11% of 
projects in the other group. 
.0 
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Table 14. cl 
INTERVIEWED EXECUTIVES' ASSESSMENTS OF THE DEPTH OF 
UNDERSTANDING BY LOCAL PERSONNEL OF TRANSFERRED TECHNOLOGY 
(A SAMPLE OF UK-TO-IRAQ TRANSFERS) 
Levels of Operational 
Complexity of 
Technology 
Levels of success in "Depth of Understanding" 
Very Good Good Fair Poor Very Poor TOTAL 
High - - - - - - 
High to Medium 1 - - - 1 
Medium 1 - - - - 1 
Medium to Low 3 3 4 - - 10 
Low 8 11 1 - - 20 
TOTAL 12 15 5 - - 32 
Table 14.10 
INVERVIEWED EXECUTIVES' ASSESSMENTS OF THE SPEED OF 
UNDERSTANDING BY LOCAL PERSONNEL OF TRANSFERRED TECHNOLOGY 
(A SAMPLE OF UK-TO-IRAQ TRANSFERS) 
Levels of Operational 
Complexity of 
Technology 
Levels of success in "Speed 
Very Good Good Fair 
of Und 
Poor 
erstanding" 
Very Poor TOTAL 
High - - - - - - 
High to Medium - 1 - - - 1 
Medium - 1 - - - 
Medium to Low 1 5 2 2 - 10 
Low 6 10 3 - - 19 
TOTAL 7 17 5 2 - 31* 
* In the case of one of the firms visited, the respective executive felt unable 
to assess the level of speed of understanding of the relevant technology by 
local personnel, even though he rated "depth" as "very good". 
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Table 14.11 
INTERVIEWED EXECUTIVES' ASSESSMENTS OF THE ABILITY OF 
LOCAL PERSONNEL TO MANIPULATE,. DEVELOP AND IMPROVE ON 
ACQUIRED TECHNOLOGY (A, SAMPLE OF UK-TO-IRAQ TRANSFERS) 
Levels of Operational 
Complexity of 
Technology 
High 
High to Medium 
Medium 
Medium to Low 
Low 
TOTAL 
Levels of success in "Ability to Manipulate.... etc" 
Very Good 
I 
. 
Good 
I 
Fair 
I 
Poor 
( 
Very Poor 
I 
TOTAL 
- 3 1 2 - 6 
2 5 1 1 - 9 
* 
2 9 2 3 - 16 
* In the case of . 
16 firms visited, intervlewed executives felt unable to 
make an appropriate assessment of this success measure due to a number of 
factors. These-included the perceived limited scope for any relevant improve- 
ments or manipulations on the equipment, the fact that the project had not 
started operating in some cases, and constrained knowledge of events and 
developments at the client enterprise since the finalization of the transaction 
in question. 
14.4 Comments and Conclusions 
This chapter has attempted to present the general findings of the field study, 
which comprised 32 cases of UK-to-Iraq transfers of technology. Despite the 
fact that the sample's size is small, the general results tend to corroborate 
the analysis and conclusions, concerning the transfer process in Iraq, set out 
in Chapters 11 and 12 above. These two Chapters have shown the public and private/ 
mixed sectors to differ in their general orientation towards the acquisition of 
foreign technology. 
The results of this study support the contention that private sector projects 
are much smaller and less costly than public ones. Moreover, the private 
sector appears to rely almost totally on package-free transfer methods, 
--- 
particularly the method of machinery/equipment supplies. In contrast, the 
public sector displays more variety in its selection of transfer methods, 
and consequently of packaging levels linked to these methods. Of the 23 
public sector transactions in the sample, elevent were package free, three 
medium packaged, five highly packaged and four ultra packaged. 
The study has shown that primarily four basic methods were utilized by 
public sector enterprises to effect transfers, i. e. total project contracting, 
total process contracting, major process contracting and ad hoc machinery/ 
equipment supplies. However, other transfer methods had been used. The three 
methods of know how contracting, patent contracting and engineering services 
have appeared in. the sample as parts of more packaged means of transfer. 
Pertinent information also suggests that two other means (i. e. technical 
publications and personal contacts) have been used in a supplementary fashion 
rather than in a primary capacity. Another two methods, namely, technical 
consultancy and employment of foreign experts, have probably been tapped in 
both ways. 
The vast majority of projects in the sample were viewed by respondent 
executives as simple, in terms of both pre-operational and post-operational 
aspects. As regards levels of success attained by recipient enterprises, 
opinions of managers were on the whole favourable. However, a broad 
relationship seems to exist between levels of success and two relevant 
criteria, i. e. the project's operational complexity and stringency of the 
success "yardstick" that is utilized. Across the sample, evidence points 
in the direction of a positive relationship between operational simplicity 
and the degree of success achieved by the client enterprise. Moreover, 
the use of more exacting measures of success tend to lead to less marks 
being attained on the success scale. 
ý3%b 
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Appendix 14.1 
Case No 29/15/24 
A. BACKGROUND DATA 
Firm supplying technology (in UK): 
Chloride Technical Ltd.. 
Establishment receiving technology (in Iraq): 
State Establishment for Battery Manufacturing 
Baghdad - Iraq 
Nature of technology (or product) transferred: 
Automotive Battery Manufacturing 
Type of industry within which this technology (or product) falls: 
Electro-chemical Products 
Approximate value of transaction: £ 4875000 
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B. METHODS OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
1. Which of the following thirteen methods of technology-transfer have 
been employed in this case? 
(Please tick as appropriate) 
a) Total-Project contracting 
b) Total-Process contracting 
c) Major-process contracting 
d) Know-how contracting 
e) Patent contracting 
f) Engineering-services contracting 
g) Technical-consultancy contracting 
h) Trade-mark contracting 
i) Franchise contracting 
j) Employment of foreign experts 
k) Machinery supplies 
1) Technical publications 
m) Personal contacts 
C. CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS 
2. Would you please provide the following chronological information: 
a) When was the first contact made in connection with 
this transaction? Year only: 75, 
b) When was the agreement 
transfer? 
c) When did work start to 
the. supplying end? 
d) When did the recipient 
technology begin opera 
finalised to effect this 
Year only: 76 
fulfil the transaction from 
Year only: 76 
enterprise using the 
ting? Year only: 8? 
3. Was the technology-receiving enterprise being set up for the 
first time when the relevant transaction was agreed upon? Yes 
No x 
4. If the recipient enterprise had already been in existence when 
the deal came through, in what year was that firm established? Year: 1970 
- -- 
D. -OWNERSHIP & FACTORS AFFECTING CHOICE OF TRANSFER METHODS 
5. Which of the,. following-five patterns of ownership structure is 
associated with the technology-receiving enterprise? 
(Please tick) 
a) Wholly foreign-owned 
. b) Joint venture 
(ie: foreign & national ownership) 
c) Wholly-State-owned x 
d) Wholly privately owned 
e) Mixed State/private ownership 
6. On the basis of'the five under-mentioned levels of importance, how would 
you rate each of the following factors in affecting the choice of 
technology-transfer methods in this case? 
(Please tick) 
Levels of Importance 
Highly Fairly Medium Low 
: tors Significant Significant Significance Significance Irrelevant 
ýi Ownership structure of 
recipient enterprise 
b) Newness or otherwise 
the enterprise 
Complexity of the 
. technology involved 
Speed required in 
. effecting the transfer 
st estimates associated 
with alternative methods 
Co 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
7. Did the project receive any type of aid on the basis of a bilateral/ 
regional agreement, or any relevant assistance by an international/ 
multi-country organisation? 
Yes 
No x 
8. If the answer to question 7 is positive, please confirm: 
a) Whether the general nature of that aid was technical 
or financial 
b) Identity of the donor country/organisation offering 
the assistance 
a- 
_____ 
E. GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF PROJECT IN ASSIMILATION OF TECHNOLOGY 
9. Using the five under-mentioned levels of success, how would you rate the 
performance of the recipient enterprise in this particular transfer? 
(Please tick) 
Levels of Success 
Criteria of Success Very Good Good Fair Poor Ver Poor 
a) Depth of understanding of the 
technology by local personnel 
x 
b) Speed in achieving a proper 
understanding of that technology 
x 
by local personnel 
c) Ability of local personnel to 
manipulate, develop, and improve X 
on the ac uired technology. 
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Supplementary Interview Notes (Case No 29/15/24) 
Executive interviewed: Mr Gordon Foster (Senior Projects Engineer and Manager 
of the project in this case). 
Date of visit: 25 August 1983 
(a) About this firm. It is a subsidiary of Chloride Group, which produces 
a complete range of batteries as well as certain types of capital equipment 
for battery manufacturing. While Chloride Technical Ltd (CTL) is specialised 
in the field of research and development, it is able to enter into total 
project and process contracts. 
(b) About this transaction. This project was an extension on the initial 
plant which was also implemented by CTL. The first plant was completed in 
1970, but the extension was about two and a half times the size of the initial 
plant in terms of production capacity. Also, the technology embodied in the 
extension was more advanced than in the original one. 
The project makes batteriesfor all types of vehicles, from small cars to very 
large ones, ranging from 7 to 29 plate batteries. The plant is self-contained, 
ie producing all the necessary components for battery making. CTL designed the 
whole project, including the buildings, but the buildings were constructed by 
a different firm chosen by the Iraqi side. CTL supplied all the equipment 
for the plant, supervised equipment installation and undertook commissioning. 
The firm had a staff of 6 to 25 in Iraq during the-period of project execution. 
Mr Foster comments that supervision over installation was performed via 
example. CTL was also responsible for all training for various levels, both 
in Uk and Iraq. Training covered personnel from plant manager to shop floor 
operatives. 
Most of the equipment required was obtained from engineering firms, who 
produced them according to specifications laid down by CTL. Equipment design 
was undertaken within CTL on the basis of in-house know-how and legal patents 
held by CTL. Some of the hardware was produced by other parts of the Chloride 
Group. 
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Mr Foster pointed out that the technology required for designing the project 
was fairly highly complex, but the actual operation of the plant was fairly 
easy. He also maintained that it was necessary for a firm like CTL to undertake 
the tasks related to project design, planning, and supervision of execution 
in order to ensure both qualitative and quantitative standards of operation. 
Pertinent knowledge and expertise were not available in Iraq for such tasks. 
Also, the transfer method used in this case, ie, total process contracting, 
was frequently employed in the execution of similar plants in other parts of 
the world, in cases of both State owned and private enterprises. 
Technical co-operation between the two sides has continued since the execution 
of the. first plant. Apart from the supply of spare parts, CTL has some personnel 
stationed with the Iraqi enterprise for the purpose of training local personnel. 
Mr Foster believes that graduate Iraqi engineers are generally of good quality, 
but they are reluctant to work on the shop floor and their knowledge tends 
to be concentrated on theoretical aspects. Nonetheless, local personnel 
have been able to make certain minor improvements on some of the equipment. 
This transaction was initiated by an enquiry from the Iraqi side asking for 
a quotation for the then envisaged extension. It is believed that no other 
parties were asked to bid, as CTL was seen as the appropriate body to execute 
the project. A quote was submitted and negotiations ensued, so that agree- 
ment was reached in 1976. At present, CTL are executing another project 
for the same Iraqi enterprise. This is a batte ry-breaking plant costing 
£1.617 million. 
z--- 
Appendix 14.2 
Case No 7/4/41 
A. BACKGROUND DATA 
Firm supplying technology (in UK): 
A Johnson & Co Ltd 
Establishment receiving technology (in Iraq): 
State Establishment for Vegetable Oils 
Baghdad - Iraq 
Nature of technology (or-product) transferred: 
Shortening processing equipment for edible vegetable fat 
(five sets with three-year requirements of spare parts) 
Type of industry within which this technology (or product) falls: 
Food Processing 
Approximate value of transaction: £ 350000 C&F Baghdad 
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B. METHODS OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
1. Which of the following thirteen methods of. technology-transfer have 
been employed in this case? 
(Please tick as appropriate) 
a) Total-Project contracting 
But the installation was b) Total-Process contracting undertaken by local personnel. 
c) Major-process contracting x The supplier commissioned the 
equipment after erection, d) Know-how contracting 
e) Patent contracting 
f) Engineering-services contracting 
g) Technical-consultancy contracting 
h) Trade-mark contracting 
i) Franchise contracting 
j) Employment of foreign experts- 
k) Machinery supplies 
1) Technical publications 
m) Personal contacts 
C. CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS 
2. Would you please provide the following chronological information: 
a) When was the first contact made in connection with 
this transaction? Year only: 79 
b) When was the agreement finalised to effect this 
transfer? Year only: 
_ 
c) When did work start to fulfil the transaction from 
the supplying end? Year only: 8o 
d) When did the recipient enterprise using the 
technology begin operating? Year only: 82 
3. Was the technology-receiving enterprise being set up for the 
first time when the relevant transaction was agreed upon? Yes 
No x 
4. If the recipient enterprise had already been in existence when 
the deal came through, in what year was that firm established? Year: 1941 
t 
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D. OWNERSHIP & FACTORS AFFECTING CHOICE OF TRANSFER METHODS 
5. Which of the following five patterns of ownership structure is 
associated with the technology-receiving enterprise? 
(Please tick) 
a) Wholly foreign-owned 
b) Joint venture (ie: foreign & national ownership) 
c) Wholly State-owned x 
d) Wholly privately owned 
e) Mixed State/private ownership 
6. On the basis of'the five under-mentioned levels of importance, how would 
you rate each of the following factors in affecting the choice of 
technology-transfer methods in this case? 
(Please tick) 
Levels of Importance 
Highly Fairly Medium Low 
! ctors Significant Significant Significance Significance Irrelevant 
i) Ownership structure of X 
recipient enterprise 
b) Newness or otherwise 
of tha enterprise 
0) Complexity of the 
technology involved 
4)Speed required in 
effecting the transfer 
t) Cost estimates associated 
with alternative methods 
X 
X 
X 
1. Did the project receive any type of aid on the basis of a bilateral/ 
regional agreement, or any relevant assistance by an international/ 
multi-country organisation? 
Yes 
No 
8. If the answer to question 7 is positive, please confirm: 
a) Whether the general nature of that aid was technical 
or financial 
X 
e 
b) Identity of the donor country/organisation offering 
the assistance 
- 
E. GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF PROJECT IN ASSIMILATION OF TECHNOLOGY 
9. Using the five under-mentioned levels of success, how would you rate the 
performance of the recipient enterprise in this particular transfer? 
(Please tick) 
Levels of Success 
Criteria of Success Ver Good Good Fair Poor Very Poor 
a) Depth of understanding of the x 
technolo by local personnel 
b) Speed in achieving a proper 
understanding of that technology 
x 
by local personnel 
c) Ability of local personnel to Not much om f r ma ipul tion 
manipulate, develop, and improve or develo ent n th s eq uipment. 
on the ac uired technology. 
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Supplementary Interview Notes (Case No 7/4/41) 
Executive interviewed: Mr WS Kulesza (Area Sales Manager) 
Date of visit: 13 June 1983 
(a) About this firm. It is a subsidiary of Axel Johnson Group, a 
Swedish company. The firm (ie A Johnson) makes processing equipment 
primarily for the food making industry. It is prepared to take up contracts 
for the supply, installation, and commissioning of equipment for a whole 
plant or a major part of a plant. However, it is not customary for the 
firm to undertake total project contracts. 
(b) About this transaction. The equipment supplied included votators 
and necessary complementary parts, eg pipes. The order was for an extension 
of production facilities at the recipient enterprise. The technology 
involved in this project was of a medium degree of complexity, but actual 
operation was somewhat easier. 
The votators were orginally produced by A Johnson on the basis of a 
licence obtained from the American firm Chemtron, but the product is 
now designed in the UK, though royalties are still paid to Chemtron. Some 
of the items that were supplied in this case had not been made by A Johnson. 
The equipment was installed by the recipient firm's personnel, but A Johnson's 
technicians went to Iraq to commission them after installment. Other 
equipment required for the extension, such as those for seed crushing, oil 
mixing and packaging, were not supplied by A Johnson. The Iraqi firm made 
separate orders for these items with respective suppliers. 
The impression given by Iraqi personnel was fairly good. For instance, 
they were able to determine their exact needs and install the equipment 
satisfactorily. No requests have been received for maintenance or spare 
parts after the completion of the project, especially in view of the fact 
that the transaction included a three-year supply of spare parts. 
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Appendix 14.3 
Case No 6/4/38 
A. BACKGROUND DATA 
Firm supplying technology (in UK): 
Torrance & Sons Ltd 
Establishment receiving technology (in Iraq): 
Al-Salam Paint and Metal Can Company 
Baghdad - Iraq 
Nature of technology (or product) transferred: 
Paint-making machinery, including mixers, grinders 
and grinding media 
Type of industry within which this technology (or product) falls: 
Paint-making (both decorative and industrial use) 
Approximate value of transaction: £ 37000 F. O. B. 
jyu 
B. METHODS OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
1F. Which of the following thirteen 
methods of, technology-transfer have 
been employed in this case? 
(Please tick as appropriate) 
a) Total-Project contracting 
b) Total-Process contracting 
c) Major-process contracting 
d) Know-how contracting 
e) Patent contracting 
f) Engineering-services contracting 
g) Technical-consultancy contracting 
h) Trade-mark contracting 
i) Franchise contracting 
j) --Employment of foreign experts 
k) Machinery supplies 
1) Technical publications 
m) Personal contacts 
C. CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS 
2. Would you please provide the following chronological information: 
a) When was the first contact made in connection with 
this transaction? Year only: 76 
b) When was the agreement finalised to effect this 
transfer? Year only: 76 
c) When did work start to fulfil the transaction from 
the supplying end? Year only: 
76 
d) When did the recipient enterprise using the 
technology begin operating? Year only: 
ýý 
3. Was the technology-receiving enterprise being set up for the 
first time when the relevant transaction was agreed upon? Yes x 
No 
4. If the recipient enterprise had already been in existence when 
the deal came through, in what year was that firm established? Year: 1977 
jy 
D. OWNERSHIP & FACTORS AFFECTING CHOICE OF TRANSFER METHODS 
5. Which of the following five patterns of ownership structure is 
associated with the technology-receiving enterprise? 
(Please tick) 
a) Wholly foreign-owned 
b) Joint venture (ie: foreign & national ownership) 
1c) Wholly State-owned 
. 
d) Wholly privately owned x 
e) Mixed State/private ownership 
6. On the basis of'the five under-mentioned levels of importance, how would 
you rate each of the following factors in affecting the choice of 
technology-transfer methods in this case? 
, 
(Please tick) 
Levels of Importance 
Highly Fairly Medium Low 
actors Significant Significant Significance Significance Irrelevant 
Ownership structure of x 
recipient enterprise 
_ 
Newness or otherwise 
, of the enterprise 
x 
)Complexity of the 
, technology 
involved x 
)Speed required in 
. --effecting the transfer 
x 
)Cost estimates associated 
with alternative methods 
x 
. 
7. Did the project receive any type of aid on the basis of a bilateral/ 
regional agreement, or any relevant assistance by an international/ 
multi-country organisation? 
Yes 
No x 
8. If the answer to question 7 is positive, please confirm: 
a) Whether the general nature of that aid was technical 
or financial 
b) Identity of the donor country/organisation offering 
the assistance 
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E. GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF PROJECT IN ASSIMILATION OF TECHNOLOGY 
9. Using the five under-mentioned levels of success, how would you rate the 
performance of the recipient enterprise in this particular transfer? 
(Please tick) 
Levels of Success 
Criteria of Success' Ver Good Good Fair Poor Very Poor 
a) Depth of understanding of the x 
technology b local personnel 
b) Speed in achieving a proper x 
understanding of that technology 
by local personnel 
c) Ability of local personnel to 
manipulate, develop, and improve 
x 
on the acquired technology. 
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Supplementary Interview Notes (Case No 6/4/38) 
Executive interviewed: Mr GE Troughton (Director and General Manager). 
Date of visit: 20 July 1983 
(a) About this firm. It is a subsidiary of Stothert and Pitt PLC, a 
British group. The firm produces machinery and other equipment for paint 
and ink making. Primarily, these include mixers and milling equipment. 
This firm has the ability, and is prepared, to execute major process and 
total process contracts. It is also ready to provide services with its own 
equipment when sold by themselves, including erection, commissioning, and 
training. Usually, the equipment sold is commissioned by the firm, and 
sometimes installed by the firm's own technicians. This firm has exported 
to many parts of the world. Exports to Iraq have been mainly to the 
private sector. 
(b) About this transaction. The transaction was initiated by an enquiry 
received from a Baghdad-based export/import merchant acting on behalf of the 
technology recipient enterprise in this case. The equipment was erected 
by local personnel, but commissioned by the supplier's personnel. Spare 
parts have since been sold to the Iraqi enterprise. 
The client enterprise bought some can-making equipment from other suppliers, 
in Portugal, for the new project. The project can be said to be of the 
medium-to-low variety as far as technological complexity is concerned. 
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CHAPTER FIFTEEN 
DETERMINANTS OF THE LEVEL OF 
PACKAGING IN TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER TRANSACTIONS 
While the main findings of the empirical study were spelled out in the 
previous chapter, no attempt has yet been made to examine the main 
hypotheses of this research. It is, therefore, the purpose of the 
present chapter to assess the detailed findings of the empirical 
research, in order to examine the significance of the five factors that 
have been chosen. 
It has been hypothesized that five variables relate to the determination 
of the level of transfer packaging, and these variables will be looked at 
here in order to appraise their relevance. These factors can be classified 
into two main types, namely: 
(a) variables related to the recipient firm, namely, the type of 
industrial sector to which the recipient enterprise belongs, ownership 
pattern of recipient enterprise, and the length of its operational 
experience; 
(b) variables related to the nature of the project in question, ie, 
the size of the project receiving the technology and complexity of the 
technology transferred. 
15.1 Relevance of Industrial Sector and Ownership Pattern 
The various transactions in the sample have been classified into eight 
main industrial sectors to test the existence of any relationship 
between-the level of transfer packaging and type of recipient industrial 
sector (Table 15.1). The researcher had wished to make use of the 
chi-square method to test the strength of relationship between these 
two variables, but this could not be done, because of the relatively 
large number of industrial sectors in this case, coupled with the small 
size of the core sample. The utilization of the chi-square test would 
have meant that the number of "expected frequencies" in each cell would 
be less than five, which is the minimum figure normally regarded as 
statistically acceptable. 
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15.1.1 Importance of Incustrial Sector 
Despite the smallness of the final sample, however, the observed data 
shows that given packaging levels tend to be associated with certain 
industrial sectors. For instance, only package-free methods were used 
in projects involving the transfer of technology to the construction - 
materials and metal-products industries. Conversely, only ultra and 
highly packaged methods appeared in electricity and electrochemicals. 
Also, the majority of transfer cases in the three industries of paper 
and printing, chemicals and fertilizers, and oil, gas and petrochemicals 
fell within the package-free category. 
Table 15.2 classifies the transfer methods adopted in the various cases 
within the sample into two basic categories, namely, package-free methods 
and other (non-package-free) methods. The figures contained in this 
table show that in five industrial sectors, package-free methods account 
for over 50% of the transfer cases recorded. In two other industrial 
sectors, non-package-free methods are dominant, while in the case of 
one sector, ie textile and leather, there is parity between the two main 
categories of methods. 
It can thus be asserted that some grounds exist for supposing that there 
is a measure of correspondence between the level of transfer packaging 
and the type of industrial sector receiving the technology. However, 
as the size of the sample is small in this case, no conclusive results 
have emerged and the matter needs to be assessed and elaborated further 
in future studies. 
15.1.2 Importance of Ownership of Firm 
Next, the factor of ownership pattern has to be scrutinized. Two 
ownership types have to be considered here, ie, State ownership and 
private ownership. In Table 15.3, the 32 recipient firms which were 
involved in the various cases in the sample are classified accordingly. 
Also, the transfer methods utilized are divided into two main categories, 
ie, "non-package-free and package-free methods. As the use of four 
package levels in this case would result in most "expected" frequencies 
being less than five, only two packaging levels are employed here for 
the purpose of calculating the value of the chi-square. 
l 
1 As can be noted from Table 15.3, the expected frequency is below "5" in one 
cell, but this is just atout permissible, since the shortfall is small and 
appears in only one cell. See: D. L. Davies and P. L. Goldsmith: "Statistical 
Methnhc in Pocoarch and Prnhiintinn" Fhinhiirvh (Oliver & Bovd 19721 o 329. 
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Table 15.1 
PACKAGING LEVELS FOR TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER IN RECIPIENT INDUSTRIAL 
SECTORS (FOUR PACKAGING LEVELS) 
Industrial Sector 
Receiving Technology 
Levels of Transfer Packaging 
Ultra- Highly Medium Package- 
packaged packaged packaged free 
(A) (B) (C) (E) 
TOTAL 
1) Oil, gas, & petrochemicals 1 1 - 4 
6 
2) Textile and leather 1 1 1 3 6 
3) Food and drink - 2 2 1 5 
4) Paper and printing - - 1 4 5 
5) Construction materials - 3 3 
6) Chemicals and fertilizers 1 - - 2 3 
7) Metal products - - - 2 2 
8) Electricity and electro- 1 1 - - 2 
chemicals 
TOTAL 4 5 4 19 32 
Table 15.2 
PACKAGING LEVELS FOR TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER IN RECIPIENT INDUSTRIAL 
SECTORS (TWO MAIN CATEGORIES OF PACKAGING LEVELS) 
Industrial Sector 
Receiving Technology 
Levels of Transfer Packaging 
Package-free Other Methods 
Methods (E) (A, B, C) 
Number % of Total Number % of Total 
TOTAL 
1) Oil, gas, & petrochemicals 4 67% 2 33% 
6 
2) Textile and leather 3 50% 3 50% 
6 
3) Food and drink 1 20% 4 80% 5 
4) Paper and printing 4 80% 20% 5 
5) Construction materials 3 100% 0% 3 
6) Chemicals and fertilizers 2 67% 1 33% 3 
7) Metal products 2 100% - 0% 2 
8) Electricity and electro- - 0% 2 100% 2 
chemicals 
TOTAL 19 13 32 
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As the tabular value of x 
2, 
with one degree of freedom, is 3.84 at 
the 95% level and 5.02 at the 97.5%, the actual 
x2 value found in 
Table 15.3 is significant at the former level but not the latter. This 
indicates that reasonable grounds exist for the supposed link between 
the level of transfer packaging and ownership type of the technology 
receiving enterprise. It may thus be asserted that public sector firms 
are more inclined, than privately owned ones, to adopt non-package free 
transfer methods. 
Only a limited measure of support for this conclusion is afforded, 
however, by the views of interviewed executives regarding the importance 
of ownership of firm in determining the level of transfer packaging 
(Table 15.4). In only 10 cases (ie 31% of total) did respective executives 
regard ownership type either highly or fairly significant in this sphere. 
Conversely, in nineteen cases (ie 59% of total) interviewed executives 
thought this factor to be either of low significance or irrelevant. 
15.2 Newness of Enterprise, Technological Complexity, and Project Size 
In this second section, three other variables are examined to assess 
their association with the level of transfer packaging. Namely, these 
three factors are the recipient firm's operating experience, the level of 
complexity associated with the project, and project size. 
15.2.1 Operating Life of Technology-receiving Firm 
Table 15.5 sets out the number of years of operation of the recipient 
firm in each of the 32 cases within the core sample. For this purpose, 
the year when the contract was finalized was taken as the "cut off" point 
to calculate the respective period for each firm. As the table shows, 
an "age factor" was found in each case on the basis of the length of the 
recipient firm's operating life when the respective deal was agreed 
upon (note 2 to the table). The reason for calculating this factor 
stems from the need to reduce the wide variations in operating life 
among recipient firms. This is intended to facilitate the appraisal of 
the degree of correspondence (if any) between levels of transfer packaging 
and levels of "enterprise maturity". 
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Tnh1a 1S_2 
PACKAGING LEVELS FOR TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER COMPARED WITH OWNERSHIP OF 
RECIPIENT FIRMS (TWO MAIN CATEGORIES OF PACKAGING LEVELS) 
(a) OBSERVED FREQUENCIES 
Levels of Package free Other Methods TOTAL 
Packaging Methods (E) (A, B, C) 
Sectors 
Public 11 12 23 
Private 8 1 9 
TOTAL 19 13 32 
(b) EXPECTED FREQUENCIES 
Levels of Package free Other Methods 
TOTAL 
ackaging Methods (E) 
(A, B, C) 
Sectors 
Public 13.7 9.3 23 
Private 5.3 3.7 9 
TOTAL 19 13 32 
2 
, /K _ 
4.662 (with one degree of freedom) 
Table 15.4 
INTERVIEWED EXECUTIVES' ASSESSMENTS OF THE IMPORTANCE OF OWNERSHIP TYPE 
IN DETERMINING TRANSFER PACKAGING LEVELS 
Levels of Significance Number of Cases % of Total 
High 6 18.8 
Fair 4 12.5 
Medium 3 9.4 
Low 10 31.2 
Irrelevant 9 28.1 
TOTAL 32 100.0 
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Table 15.5 
OPERATING PERIODS OF TECHNOLOGY RECEIVING ENTERPRISES AND PACKAGING 
LEVELS OF TRANSFER TRANSACTIONS 
Transaction's 
Code 
First 
operating 
year of 
recipient 
firm 
(a) 
Year when 
contract was 
finalized 
(b) 
Relevant 
operating 
period (C) 
(a - b) 
Length level 
of relevant 
period (2) 
(d) 
Packaging 
level of 
transfer 
method (R) 
1.4.1 1969 (1) 1977 8 years 1.6 .2 4 
2.4.2 1949 1975 26 years 5.2 C5 
3.4.5 1974 (3) 1981 7 years 1.4 '= l 5 
4.4.10 1960 1973 13 years 2.6 =3 4 
5.4.11* 1951 1974 23 years 4.65 
1(4) 6.4.38k 1977 1976 - 
7.4.41 1941 1980 39 years 7.8 .8 3 
8.4.42 1965(10) 1979 14 years 2.8 3 5 
4 1(4) 1 9.4.45' 1976 1978 2 years . - 0. 
10.6.4 1950 1975 25 years 5 1 
11.6.6 1970 1975 5 years 1 3 
12.6.8* N. A. (6) 1977 - - 
13.6.9 1950 1974 24 years 4.8 5 5 
14.6.18 1970 (5) 1979 9 years 1.8 `. 2 4 
15.7.16 1970 1981 11 years 2.2 ý2 1 
16.8.21 1969 (1) 1977 8 years 1.6 ". 2 
17.8.23 1925 1982 57 years 11.4 ='11 
18.8.25 1952 1980 28 years 5.6 6 1 
19.9.9* 1975 1978 3 years 0.6 -ý 1 3 
20.9.13* 1959 1975 16 years 3.2 =3 
21.9.17 1970 (7) 1974 4 years 0.8 C= 1 4 (4) 
22.11.3* 1975 1974 - 1 
23.11.8 1946 1978 32 years 6.4 =6 1 
24.11.17* 1977 1977 - 1 
(4) 
25.11.20 1950 (8) 1977 27 years 5.4 5 3 
26.14.17 1969 (9) 1976 7 years 1.4 "'1 5 
27.14.25 1957 1982 25 years 5 1 
28.15.14 1960 1978 18 years 3.6 =4 1 
29.15.24 1970 1976 6 years 1.2 "1 4 
30.17.6 1941 1977 36 years 7.2 7 
31.17.8 1952 1968 16 years 3.2=3 1 
32.19.16* 1976 1976 - 1(4) 
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Notes to Table 15.5: 
(1) In this case, the Iraqi enterprise was set up in 1964 but active 
operations began in 1969. 
(2) This figure is obtained by dividing the figure in the previous 
column by a factor of "5", and the fraction (if any) rounded. This is 
intended to reduce the variation in operating life among the various 
recipient firms covered by this study. 
(3) The State Organization for Electricity was set up in 1974 as a 
central body for electricity generation, transmission and distribution 
covering the whole country. Prior to that date, these activities were 
being undertaken by a number of different authorities within various 
ministries. 
(4) Whenever the recipient enterprise was being set up for the first 
time a minimum figure of "I" has been inserted in this column. This is 
intended to express the view that the relevant enterprise must have had 
some personnel responsible for the requisite activities of study and 
evaluation, negotiations with outside bodies, planning, financing and 
execution. 
(5) This is the year when SOIDAC was set up in its present form. 
SOIDAC had in this case been charged with the project's execution. 
(6) Company's name was not provided by the firm visited in this case. 
(7) The company receiving the technology in this case came into being 
in 1970 as a result of the nationalization of a number of soft drink 
plants in the country, including the Pepsi-cola plant referred to in 
this case. This latter establishment had been in existence for much longer. 
(8) This figure is approximate. There were some printing activities 
within MOD prior to the 2nd World War, but these activities were 
centralized and given a new status after that War. 
(9) This is the date when the "State Organization for Minerals" was 
established. The project in question was a new, integrated, mining-to- 
fertilizer complex being set up for the first time. 
(10) This is the first year of operation of the Administration for Planning 
and Construction of Oil Projects (later St Orgn for Oil Projects) which 
supervised this project subsequent to its overall design and planning. 
* Technology receiving firm is privately owned. 
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It could be hypothesised that longer operational periods might be expected 
in the case of recipient firms opting for package-free methods. This is 
based on the assumption that the well established firm normally possesses 
some of the requisite expertise for unpackaging technology intakes, thus 
suggesting an inverse relationship between the age factor and the level 
of transfer packaging. 
As regards packing levels, the ratings of the various projects have been 
chosen from a scale of 1 to 5. The basic rules governing correspondence 
between ratings and transfer packaging levels are as follows: 
"5" Ultra-packaged transfers (le packaging level "A") 
"4" Highly-packaged transfers (ie packaging level "B") 
"3" Medium-packaged transfers (ie packaging level "C") 
"2" Low-packaged transfers (ie packaging level "D") 
"1" Package-free transfers (ie packaging level "E") 
As no low packaged transfers have been encountered in the course of the 
field study, the transfer rating "2" is not found in Table 15.5. 
Taking the figures relating to operational life and packaging level, as 
appearing under columns (d) and (R) in Table 15.5 respectively, the 
linear coefficient of correlation turns out to be -0.353. This means 
that only about 12.5% of the variations in R (ie level of packaging) 
may be explained by the length of operational life. 
As N= 31 in this case, and assuming a 95% confidence level, the following 
two critical values apply for testing the significance of the actual value 
of "r" in this case: 
r 0.025 = 0.349 
-r0.025 =-0.349 
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Since the actual value of "r" found in this case is slightly less than 
-0.349, the correlation coefficient may just be regarded as "significant". 
However, due to the closeness of the two figures, this result can be 
seen as somewhat inconclusive. Indeed, if we use the 98% level, the 
critical value of "r" will be + 0.409. It is, thus, clear that the value 
of "r" found in this case is insignificant at the 98% level. 
The main thrust of executives' opinions in this connection tends to 
underline this conclusion. As Table 15.6 shows, in 53% of the cases in 
the sample this factor was viewed as either highly significant or 
fairly significant, while another 25% of executives regarded it of 
medium importance. The rest, ie 22%, viewed "age" of recipient enterprises 
as either low in significance or irrelevant. 
Table 15.6 
INTERVIEWED EXECUTIVES' ASSESSMENTS OF THE IMPORTANCE OF AGE OF 
RECIPIENT ENTERPRISES IN DETERMINING TRANSFER PACKAGING LEVELS. 
Levels of Significance No of Cases % of Total 
High 5 15.6 
Fair 12 37.5 
Medium 8 25.0 
Low 3 9.4 
Irrelevant 4 12.5 
TOTAL 32 100.0 
A chi-square test of the association between packaging level and operational 
life is carried out in Table 15.7. As the tabular value of the X2 
for one degree of freedom, at the 95% confidence level is 3.84, the 
actual , 
ý(2 
value arrived at here is very insignificant at this level. 
A similar conclusion holds at the 90% level where 
k 20.90 
= 2.71. 
However, significance may be attached to the actual )C 
2 
result in this 
case at the 75% level, since 
20.75 
= 1.32. 
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Table 15.7 
TEST OF RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PACKAGING LEVEL AND LENGTH OF 
OPERATIONAL LIFE OF RECIPIENT FIRMS 
(a) OBSERVED FREQUENCIES 
Levels of Package free Other Methods TOTAL 
Packaging Methods (E) (A, B, C) Length 
Factor of 
Operational 
Life 
1 and 2 7 8 15 
3 and over 11 5 16 
TOTAL 18 13 31 
(b) EXPECTED FREQUENCIES 
Levels of Package free Other Methods TOTAL 
Packaging Methods (E) (A, B, C) 
Length 
Factor of 
Operational 
Life 
1 and 2 8.7 6.3 15 
3 and over 9.3 6.7 16 
TOTAL 18.0 13 31 
.. 
y2=1.533 
15.2.2 Technological Complexity 
Having regard to relevant assessments made by interviewed executives, 
projects in the sample have been grouped according to their level of 
technological complexity. Two dimensions of complexity were considered, 
ie, complexity in project design, planning, and execution; and complexity 
in operation and maintenance. 
2 
2 In section 14.2 above, the various cases in the sample were ranked on a 
scale according to the two dimensions of technological complexity cited 
here, ie pre-operational complexity and post-operational complexity. The 
ranking was made on the basis of replies and comments made by industrialists 
in the course of the various interviews. See Table 14.7. 
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An attempt to appraise the link between the former and packaging levels 
is made in Table 15.8, where a given digit is attached to each project 
to express the level of its technological complexity. The "complexity" 
figure assigned in each case is based on the following: 
"5" high level of complexity 
"4" high-to-medium level of complexity 
"3" medium level of complexity 
"2" medium-to-low level of complexity 
"1" low level of complexity 
It is obvious from Table 15.8 that the correlation coefficient between 
the ratings of prospective projects' pre-operational complexity and their 
, ratings of transfer packaging is 0.725. This means that around 53% of 
, the variations in "R" (level of packaging) can be explained by Cl (complexity 
in design, planning and execution). 
I 
! At the 95% level and having regard to the fact that N= 32 in this case, 
we have the following two critical values of "r" from the tables: 
r 0.025 = 0.349 
-r0.025 =-0.349 
Since the actual value of "r" obtained is over double the positive 
critical value, the value of the correlation coefficient can confidently 
be regarded as highly significant. Indeed, it is very significant even 
at the 99% level where the critical value of Y 0.005 is 0.449. 
It is evident, therefore, that reasonable grounds exist for the assertion 
that packaging level and pre-operational complexity are strongly related. 
This furnishes the basis for supposing that more complex projects tend 
to be associated with more highly packaged transfer methods. 
Further support for this causality relationship is provided by the 
chi-square test (Table 15.9). The five degrees of complexity ratings 
have been grouped in this test within two categories, together with 
, only two levels of transfer packaging. This is intended to reduce the 
number of cells and raise expected frequencies to a minimum of "5" - 
a basic condition of chi-square testing. 
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Table 15.8 
RATINGS OF PRE-OPERATIONAL COMPLEXITY OF WOULD-BE PROJECTS AND 
PACKAGING LEVELS 
Transaction's 
Code 
Rating of Project's Complexity 
in Design, Planning and 
Execution (C1) 
Rating of Packaging 
Level in Transfer 
(R) 
1.4.1 4 4 
2.4.2 2 
3.4.5 3 5 
4.4.10 1 4 
5.4.11 1 
6.4.38 2 
7.4.41 3 3 
8.4.42 5 5 
9.4.45 1 1 
10.6.4 2 
11.6.6 2 3 
12.6.8 2 1 
13.6.9 3 5 
14.6.18 3 4 
15.7.16 2 1 
16.8.21 2 1 
17.8.23 1 1 
18.8.28 2 1 
19.9.9 3 3 
20.9.13 2 1 
21.9.17 3 4 
22.11.3 1. 1 
23.11.8 2 1 
24.11.7 2 1 
25.11.20 3 3 
26.14.17 3 5 
27.14.25 2 1 
28.15.14 1 
29.15.24 4 4 
30.17.6 2 
31.17.8 2 1 
32.19.16 2 1 
TOTAL 73 71 
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N=32 ! -ýXY=196 EY 
= 
(i. e. )) ýY2 = 235 X 73 (i. e. EC1 ý X2 = 195 
r= Ný XY - (i X) ('ýzY) 
j(NX2 
- (2X)2) (NFL Y2 - (ý7-Y)2 
= 32 (196) - (73) (71) 
((32) (195) - (73)2) 
((32) <235) - (71) 
2 
= 0.725 
It is clear, in this case, that the value of chi-square arrived is 
highly s4ignificant even at the 99.5% confidence level where 
Y2 
0.995 = 7.88.3 
The views of interviewed executives underpin further the supposed strong 
link between packaging level and pre-operational complexity. As can be 
ascertained from Table 15.10, in over 90% of the cases within the sample 
this factor was thought to be either highly or fairly significant in 
affecting the actual shaping of the transfer transaction. It is also 
noteworthy that none of the executives concerned viewed technological 
complexity as either low in significance or irrelevant, while only 9.4% 
of them regarded it as medium in importance. 
3 It is obvious from Table 15.9 that the expected frequency is slightly 
less than "5" in one cell, but it appears that this is just permissible. 
0L Davies, et al, Op Cit., p 322 and p 329. 
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Table 15.9 
TEST OF RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PACKAGING LEVELS AND RATINGS OF PROJECT 
PRE-OPERATIONAL COMPLEXITY. 
(a) OBSERVED FREQUENCIES 
Levels of Package-free Other Methods TOTAL 
Packaging Methods (E) (A, B, C) 
Ratings 
of Pre- 
operational 
Complexity 
1 and 2 19 2 21 
3,4,5 0 11 11 
TOTAL 19 13 32 
(b) EXPECTED FREQUENCIES 
Levels of Package-free Other Methods TOTA 
Packaging Methods (E) (A, B, C) 
Ratings 
ofP re- 
operational 
Complexity 
1 and 2 12.5 8.5 21 
3,4,5 6.5 4.5 11 
TOTAL 19 13 32 
.. 
-vc 
2= 24.239 
15.2.3 Project Size 
The issue of project size has to be considered next, in order to examine 
the association of this factor with packaging level. No specific question 
was put to the firms visited regarding the influence of this factor on 
packaging levels. However, during the course of the interviews major 
aspects of the projects in question were discussed. 
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Table 15.10 
INTERVIEWED EXECUTIVES' ASSESSMENTS OF THE IMPORTANCE OF PRE- 
OPERATIONAL COMPLEXITY IN DETERMINING TRANSFER PACKAGING LEVELS 
Levels of Significance No of Cases % of Total 
High 12 37.5 
Fair 17 53.1 
Medium 3 9.4 
Low - 0.0 
Irrelevant - 0.0 
TOTAL 32 100.0 
In addition to the items contained in the questionnaire, these discussions 
dwelt on such matters as products manufactured by the recipient enterprise, 
other suppliers of equipment/machinery, problems encountered by the 
respondent firm, and general comments on the design and implementation 
of the transfer project. 
On the basis of information obtained about each transaction, an evaluation 
of project size was undertaken by the researcher. As can be seen from 
Table 15.11, four elements have been taken into account in assessing 
this factor, ie, extent of variety of equipment, quantity of required 
equipment, need for equipment-related services, and need for other items/ 
facilities. Projects were assessed in turn with respect to each of 
these four factors, on a scale of 0 to 5. The average was then calculated 
for each project, so as to indicate the size of the project in question. 
It is felt that this procedure may result in a more accurate appraisal 
of project size than merely taking financial values of relevant transactions. 
A chi-square test of the relationship between packaging level and project 
size is attempted in Table 15.12. Only two categories of project size 
are used, alongside two basic levels of transfer packaging. Again, this 
is done with the purpose of reducing the number of cells, so that the 
number of "expected" frequencies does not fall below "5" in most cases. 
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Table 15.11 
ASSESSMENT OF PROJECT SIZES ASSOCIATED WITH TRANSFER TRANSACTIONS 
Transaction's 
Code 
Extent of 
Variety of 
Equipment 
(a) 
Quantity of 
Equipment 
Required 
(b) 
Need for 
Equipment 
Related 
Services 
(c) 
Need for 
Other 
Items/ 
Facilities 
(d) 
TOTAL 
(e) 
Final 
Assessment 
of Project 
Size 
(f) 
1.11. 4 5 4 3 16 4 
2.4.2 1 2 1 0 4 1 
3.4.5 4 5 5 4 18 4.5 =5 
4.4.10 4 3 3 0 10 2.5 =3 
5.4.11 1 1 0 0 2 0.5 =1 
6.4.38 3 3 1 1 8 2 
7.4.41 4 4 1 0 9 2.25 =2 
8.4.42 5 5 4 4 18 4.5'=5 
9.4.45 1 1 0 o 2 0.5 =1 
10.6.4 1 1 0 0 2 0.5 N1 
11.6.6 1 2 3 0 6 1.5-'2 
12.6.8 1 2 0 0 3 0.75 =1 
13.6.9 4 5 3 2 14 3.5=4 
14.6.18 4 3 3 1 11 2.75- 3 
15.17.16 1 2.5 0 0 3.5 0.875 =1 
16.8.21 1.5 2 0 0 3.5 0-875= 1 
17.8.23 1 2 0 0 3 0.75'=1 
18.8.28 1 1 0 0 2 0.5 =1 
19.9.9 1 1 4 0 6 1.5 =2 
20.9.13 1 1.5 0 0 2.5 0.625 =-1 
21.9.17 4 4 3.5 0 11.5 2.875. = 3 
22.11.3 1 1 0 0 2 0.5 =1 
23.11.8 1 1 0 0 2 0.5 =1 
24.11.17 1 1 1 0 3 0.75=1 
25.11.20 1 3 4 0 8 2 
26.14.17 5 5 5 5 20 5 
27.14.25 1.5 1.5 0 0 3 0.75 .1 
28.15.14 1 1.5 0 0 2.5 0.625 ýl 
29.15.24 4 4.5 4.5 3 16 4 
30.17.6 1 2.5 0 0 3.5 0.875 =1 
31.17.8 1 1 0.5 0 2.5 0.625 =l 
32.19.16 1.5 1.5 0.5 0 3.5 0.875 =1 
NOTE to Table 15.11 
For the purpose of assessing "size", the whole project was looked at in each case. 
In cases where the firm visited was a subcontractor, an attempt was made 
to obtain information concerning the project in toto, eg total project 
, value and main constituent elements comprising it. In certain other cases, 
the transferee firm/enterprise did not grant an ultra or highly packaged 
contract to the main contractor but endeavoured to obtain various elements 
of the project from several, or a few, suppliers independently, such relevant 
aspects were taken into account in this assessment, insofar as pertinent 
: information could be obtained. 
It is clear that the value of 
x2 
arrived at in Table 15.12 is highly 
significant even at the 99.5% confidence level where 
)C2,995 
7.88.4 
This result points to a strong relationship between the level of transfer 
packaging and project size, thus indicating that large projects tend to 
be associated with higher packaging levels. 
, 
In Table 15.13, the coefficient of correlation between packaging level and 
project size is calculated. The value of the coefficient arrived at in 
this table indicates that roughly 91% of the variations in R (ie level of 
packaging) can be explained by the factor of "project size". 
To test the significance of "r" in this case, we note that at N= 32 
and for a 99% confidence level, we have the following two critical values 
from the tables: 
r 0.005 = 0.449 
-r0.005 =-0.449 
Since- the actual value of "r" found in this case is over double the first 
(positive) value, the correlation can confidently be regarded as highly 
significant. Indeed, this factor (ie project size) has proved to be more 
relevant than the other two variables considered in this section, le 
technological complexity and operational life of the recipient enterprise. 
4 It is obvious from this table that the expected frequency is a little less 
than "5" in one cell, but this is probably allowable in this case. Loc. Cit. 
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Table 15.12 
TEST OF RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PACKAGING LEVELS AND RATINGS OF 
PROJECT SIZE 
(a) OBSERVED FREQUENCIES 
Levels of Package-free Other Methods TOTAL 
Packaging Methods (E) (A, B, C) 
Ratings 
of 
Project Size 
1 and 2 19 4 23 
3,4,5 0 9 9 
TOTAL 19 13 32 
(b) EXPECTED FREQUENCIES 
Levels of Package-free Other Methods TOTAL 
Packaging Methods (E) (A, B, C) 
Ratings 
of 
Project Size 
1 and 2 13.7 9.3 23 
3,4,5 5.3 3.7 9 
TOTAL 19 13 32 
"'" = 17.963 
15.3 A Linear Regression Model 
In view of these results, a mathematical model may now be built to express 
, the dependence of the level of packaging on the last two variables, ie 
technological complexity and project size. Using the data in Table 15.14, 
a three-variate linear regression model is devised. As the results 
. recorded at the end of this table indicate, the model is as follows: - 
R=0.007 + 1.065 (F) + 0.036 (C1) 15.1 
where 
F C1 5 
and: 
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R: level of packaging associated with transfer transaction 
F: size factor of would-be project 
Cl: pre-operational complexity factor of would-be project. 
Table 15.13 
CORRELATION BETWEEN PROJECT SIZE AND PACKAGING LEVEL OF TRANSFER 
TRANSACTIONS 
Transaction's Rating of Project Size 
Code (F) 
1.4.1 4 
2.4.2 1 
3.4.5 5 
4.4.10 3 
5.4.11 1 
6.4.38 2 
7.4.41 2 
8.4.42 5 
9.4.45 1 
10.6.4 1 
11.6.6 2 
12.6.8 1 
13.6.9 4 
14.6.18 3 
15.17.16 1 
16.8.21 1 
17.8.23 1 
18.8.28 1 
19.9.9 2 
20.9.13 1 
21.9.17 3 
22.11.3 1 
23.11.8 1 
24.11.17 1 
25.11.20 2 
26.14.17 5 
27.14.25 1 
28.15.14 1 
29.15.24 4 
30.17.6 1 
Rating of Packaging Level 
(R) 
4 
5 
4 
3 
5 
3 
t 
5 
tI 
3 
4 
3 
5 
0 
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(F) (R) 
31.17.8 
32.19.16 
1 
1 
1 
1 
TOTAL 64 71 
N= 32 E XY = 207 
cY = 71 (i. e. ER) jy2 = 235 EX = 64 (i . e. : EF) em X2 = 188 
K- _N 
2X Y- (e X) (CY) 
(N EX - (EX) ) (Nt y2 - (. Y)2 
_ 
(32) (207) - (64) (71) 
(32 ) 188) - (64') 
21 i 32,235) - (71ý 
= 0.953 
In. Table 15.15, Equation 15.1 is used to calculate the values of 
R' in each of 32 cases in the sample, together with the residuals and their 
squares. On the basis of these results we may proceed to test the 
significance of each of "b1" and "b2" in Equation 15.1 "5 
5 The two regression coefficients in Equation 15.1 are referred to as 
"bl" and "b2" respectively. The first relates to the factor of project 
size (F) and the second to project pre-operational complexity (C1). 
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Table 15.14 
LINEAR REGRESSION OF PACKAGING LEVEL ON PROJECT SIZE AND 
, TECHNOLOGICAL COMPLEXITY 
-Transaction's 
Code 
Packaging Level (R) 
Y 
Project Size (F) 
Xl 
Technological 
Complexity (C1) 
X2 
1.4.1 4 4 4 
2.4.2 1 1 2 
3.4.5 5 5 3 
4.4.10 4 3 1 
5.4.1 1 1 1 1 
6.4.38 1 2 2 
7.4.41 3 2 3 
8.4.42 5 5 5 
9.4.45 1 1 1 
10.6.4 1 1 2 
11.6.6 3 2 2 
12.6.8 1 1 2 
13.6.9 5 4 3 
14.6.18 4 3 3 
15.7-16 1 1 2 
16.8.21 1 1 2 
17.8.23 1 1 1 
18.8.28 1 1 2 
19.9.9 3 2 3 
20.9.13 1 1 2 
21.9.17 4 3 3 
22.11.3 1 1 1 
23.11.8 1 1 2 
24.11.17 1 1 2 
25.11.20 3 2 3 
26.14.17 5 5 3 
27.14.25 1 1 2 
28.15.14 1 1 1 
29.15.24 4 4 4 
30.17.6 1 1 2 
31.17.8 1 1 2 
32.19.16 1 1 2 
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SY = aN + bI E x1 +b21 X2 
YX = a`cXl + bllEXi2 + b2EX1 X2 
ýYX2 =aý XZ + bý EX ý X2 + b2 X2 
ccY=71 N32 
c. x1 = 64 X2 = 73 
, F-YX1 = 207 YX2 = 196 
Xý = 188 XZ = 195 
:, X1 X2 = 177 
71 =a (32) + b1 (64) + b2 (73) 
207 =a (64) + b1 (188) + b2 (177) 
196 =a (73) + b1 (177) + b2 (195) 
a=0.007 
b1 = 1.065 
b2 = 0.036 
We have: 
SS res = 7.036 and 
ý(Y-Y) 2= SS reg + SS res (where "Y" stands for "R") 
(E Y)2 
= 235+ 
(71)2 
32 
= 77.468 (sum of squares of Y, i. e., "R") 
Then: 
. SS reg = 
77.468 - 7.036 
= 70.432 
2 
As Ky-I .2= ss reg 
ý(Y-Y)2 
. ry-. 1.2 = 70.432 = 0.909 77.468 
. '. ß'y. 1.2 = 0.953 
This last fraction is the multiple correlation coefficient between "R", 
on the one hand, and the two independent variables, on the other. 
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As we have: 
Sb1 = S2 y . 1.2 and 
(x1-X1) 2 (1 -V . 2) 
Sy . 1.2 =SS res 
.'. S3.1.2 = 7.036 32 -21 
= 0.243 (variance of estimate) 
ý(X1 - X2 ýXl ( X1) 
2 
N 
= 188 - (64)2 
3 
= 60 (sum of squares of X1, i. e. "F") 
N ý-Xý X2 -(ý X1) ( EX ) 
V 
(1.2 
= ýNtx2 
- (EX )2 - X2) 
2 
1ENX 2 
32 (177) - (64) 73 
2 (188) - (64) 
) (32 (195) - (73)2 
1 
= 0.697 
Sb1 = 0.243 
60 (1 - 0.486) 
= 0.089 (standard error of "b 
tb1 = b1_ 
Sb1 
= 1.065 
0. O 9 
= 11.966 (with 29 decrees of freedom) 
As t0.005 2.756 (with 29 degrees of freedom), the value of "t" 
: found in this case is a highly significant result, even at the 99% 
'confidence level. 
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Table 15.15 
i 
ESTIMATED PACKAGING LEVELS (R's) and RESIDUAL (e's) ON THE BASIS 
OF EQUATION 15.1 
Transaction's 
Code 
R li R-R*' =e e2 
1.4.1 4. 4.411 - 0.411 
1 0.168921 
2.4.2 1 1.144 - 0.144 
1 
0.020736 
3.4.5 5 5.440 - 0.440 0.193600 
4.4.10 4 3.238 0.762 0.580644 
5.4.11 1 1.108 - 0.108 0.011664 
6.4.38 1 2.209 - 1.209 1.461681 
7.4.41 3 2.245 0.755 0.570025 
8.4.42 5 5.512 - 0.512 0.262144 
9.4.45 1 1.108 - 0.108 0.011664 
10.6.4 1 1.144 - 0.144 0.020736 
11.6.6 3 2.209 0.791 0.625681 
12.6.8 1 1.144 - 0.144 0.020736 
13.6.9 5 4.375 0.625 0.390625 
14.6.18 4 3.310 0.690 0.476100 
15.7.16 1 1.144 - 0.144 0.020736 
16.8.21 1 1.144 - 0.144 0.020736 
17.8.23 1 1.108 - 0.108 0.011664 
18.8.28 1 1.144 - 0.144 0.020736 
19.9.9 3 2.245 0.755 0.570025 
20.9.13 1 1.144 - 0.144 0.020736 
21.9.17 4 3.310 0.690 0.476100 
22.11.3 1 1.108 - 0.108 0.011664 
23.11.8 1 1.144 - 0.144 0.020736 
24.11.17 1 1.144 - 0.144 0.020736 
25.11.20 3 2.245 0.755 0.570025 
26.14.17 5 5.440 - 0.440 0.193600 
27.14.25 1 1.144 - 0.144 0.020736 
28.15.14 1 1.108 - 0.108 0.011664 
29.15.24 4 4.411 - 0.411 0.168921 
30.17.6 1 1.144 - 0.144 0.020736 
31.17.8 1 1.144 - 0.144 0.020736 
32.19.16 1 1.144 - 0.144 0.020736 
TOTAL 71 71.012 - 0.012 7.03598 
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Turning now to test the value of "b2 
we have: 
Sb2 =Sy. 1.2 
E(X2-X2)2 (1-r21.2) 
As we have: 
(X2 - X2)2 = -2 
X, )2 
N 
= 195 - (73) 
2 
32 
= 28.469 
Sb2 = 0.243 
28.469 (1 - 0.486) 
= 0.129 (standard error of "b2") 
tb2 = b2 
Sb2 
= 0.036 = 0.279 (with 29 degrees of freedom) 
0.129 
This is insignificant even at the 80% level, since the value of 
t0.100 for 29 degrees of freedom is 1.311. 
This latter result indicates that the second independent factor should be 
dispensed with. Hence, a new linear regression equation can be 
calculated, where there is only one independent variable, ie project size. 
For this purpose, we have the following values: 
ýY = 71 N= 32 
J, XY = 207 ý(2 188 
ýX = 64 
Applying the relevant two simultaneous equations, we have: 
71 = a(32) + b(64) 
207 = a(64) + b(188) 
. '. b=1.083 a=0.053 
. '. Y=0.053 + 1.083 (F) 15.2 
I 
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This equation is utilized in Table 15.16 to find the values of a 's 
in each of the 32 cases in the sample, together with the residuals 
and their squares. On the basis of these results, we may proceed to 
'test the significance of "b" in this case. 
We have: 
SS res - 7.052 
Syx=S res 
N-k-1 
7.052 
32 -1-1 
= 0.485 (variance of estimate) 
Sb 
Syx 
Vx2 
0.485 
60 
0.0626 (standard error of "b") 
. '. tb = 1.083 
0.0626 
= 17.300 (with 30 degrees of freedom) 
This'is highly significant even at the 99°6 level. 
15.4 Comments and Conclusions 
While some grounds exist for supposing that the level of transfer packaging 
dis related to the type of industrial sector in which the new project falls, 
no reasonably conclusive tests can be carried out in order to ascertain 
, this point. 
In essence, this is due to the limited size of the sample 
, coupled with a relatively large number of industrial sectors covered by the 
study. 
The evidence for the association between packaging levels and ownership 
patterns of recipient enterprises is more subtle. When only two 
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Table 15.16 
ESTIMATED PACKAGING LEVELS (RI's) AND RESIDUALS (e's) ON THE BASIS 
OF EQUATION 15.2 
Transaction's 
Code 
R R R-R =e e2 
1.4.1 4 4.385 - 0.385 0.148225 
2.4.2 1 1.136 - 0.136 0.018496 
3.4.5 5 5.468 - 0.468 0.219024 
4.4.10 4 3.302 0.698 0.487204 
5.4.11 1 1.136 - 0.136 0.018496 
6.4.38 1 2.219 - 1.219 1.485961 
7.4.41 3 2.219 0.781 0.609961 
8.4.42 5 5.468 - 0.468 0.219024 
9.4.45 1 1.136 - 0.136 0.018496 
10.6.4 1 1.136 - 0.136 0.018496 
11.6.6 3 2.219 0.781 0.609961 
12.6.8 1 1.136 - 0.136 0.018496 
13.6.9 5 4.385 0.615 0.378225 
14.6.18 4 3.302 0.698 0.487204 
15.7.16 1 1.136 - 0.136 0.018496 
16.8.21 1 1.136 - 0.136 0.018496 
17.8.23 1 1.136 - 0.136 0.018496 
18.8.28 1 1.136 - 0.136 0.018496 
19.9.9 3 2.219 0.781 0.609961 
20.9.13 1 1.136 - 0.136 0.018496 
21.9.17 4 3.302 0.698 0.487204 
22.11.3 1 1.136 - 0.136 0.018496 
23.11.8 1 1.136 - 0.136 0.018496 
24.11.17 1 1.136 - 0.136 0.018496 
25.11.20 3 2.219 0.781 0.609961 
26.14.17 5 5.468 - 0.468 0.219024 
27.14.25 1 1.136 - 0.136 0.018496 
28.15.14 1 1.136 - 0.136 0.018496 
29.15.24 4 4.385 - 0.385 0.148225 
30.17.6 1 1.136 - 0.136 0.018496 
31.17.8 1 1.136 - 0.136 0.018496 
32.19.16 1 1.136 - 0.136 0.018496 
TOTAL 71 71.008 -0.144 7.052092 
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categories of packaging levels are taken, the chi-square test produces 
a: fairly significant result, but the general profile exhibited 
by interviewed executives' assessments stops rather short of backing this 
inference. 
As regards the "age factor", the available evidence tends to show that it 
is a "borderline" variable, indicating that it might have been important 
in some cases. Both statistical testing and assessments of interviewed 
executives seem to point to this conclusion. 
The remaining two variables, ie technological complexity and project size, 
have come to the fore as the most significant of the five examined. A 
very high degree of association between packaging level and technological 
complexity is suggested by the chi-square test as well as the expressed 
views of interviewed executives. The results of the chi-square test as 
regards the factor of project size are also noteworthy, thus indicating a 
high level of association with packaging level. 
It has transpired, moreover, that the last two factors, ie technological 
complexity and project size, are highly correlated. The value of the coefficient 
of correlation between them turned out to be 0.697, which is significant 
even at the 99% level. To a large extent, this explained the result which 
showed the second factor, ie technological complexity, to be redundant 
when the first linear model was constructed, particularly in view of the 
strength of association between packaging level and project size. 
Consequently, the strength of association between the level of packaging (R) 
and project size (F) seems to have dispensed with the variable of pre- 
operational complexity (Cl). This is amply illustrated by the respective 
correlation coefficients. While the coefficient of correlation between 
Rand F is 0.953, no improvement is made on this figure when Cl is added, 
since the multiple correlation coefficient between R and both F and Cl is 
again 0.953. 
It may appear paradoxical, however, that both the chi-square test and the 
simple correlation coefficient show Cl to be associated strongly with R 
while subsequent testing of "bl" and "b2" in equation 15.1 shows C1 to 
be a redundant variable. Two reasons account for this. The first is the 
partial nature of the former tests, since C1 was taken by itself in each 
test. 
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The second reason relates to the very general nature of the chi-square 
-test utilized in this case, as only two levels of packaging were considered 
alongside two groups of pre-operational complexity. This limitation on 
. the 
informational value of the chi-square result also applies in the case of 
: project size. As the coefficients of correlation and regression took into 
account the individual values of R, F, and Cl, these results may confidently 
be regarded as more reliable. 
The second linear model, ie equation 15.2 , emphasizes the point that 
, project size 
is the factor that determines the level of transfer packaging. 
A 
, 
method has been devised by the researcher to assess the "size" of each 
would-be project numerically (table 15.11), though it needs to be remarked 
that an element of subjectivity is involved in this procedure. While 
: there is little doubt that this procedure is preferable to taking project- 
cost as a yardstick of size, more effort is required to elaborate this 
method. Indeed, additional research is called for to assess the value of 
the two linear equations arrived at, especially the second one. 
, 
In Table 15.17 prediction limits are found for each case in the sample by 
`utilizing equation 15.2 and substituting for the value of "F", ie project 
size. The basic formula used to find the two limits is the following: 
R -}- A where 
"R " is the packaging level estimated from equation 15.2 
and "A" is equal to: 
where we have: 
t0.025: value of "t" from the tables for 95% confidence level 
with N-2 degrees of freedom. 
Syx: variance of estimate of Y as dependent of X 
Xo: value of independent variable. 
In this case we have the following values: 
10.025 = 2.045 
Syx = 0.485 
N= 32 
2 
ßx2 = 188 
t0.025 (SY. x) N+1+ 
(Xo -2 
N ýX2 - (N) X2 
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Table 15.17 
PREDICTION LIMITS FOR PACKAGING LEVELS ESTIMATED VIA EQUATION 15.2 
(LIMITS BASED ON 95% CONFIDENCE LEVEL) 
Transaction's 
Code R 
/ 
R 
Prediction Limits 
Upper Lower 
1.4.1 4 4.385 5.398 3.372 
2.4.2 1 1.136 2.145 0.127 
3.4.5 5 5.468 6.489 4.447 
4.4.10 4 3.302 4.311 2.293 
5.4.11 1 1.136 2.145 0.127 
6.4.38 1 2.219 3.226 1.212 
7.4.41 3 2.219 3.226 1.212 
8.4.42 5 5.468 6.489 4.447 
9.4.45 1 1.136 2.145 0.127 
10.6.4 1 1.136 2.145 0.127 
11.6.6 3 2.219 3.226 1.212 
12.6.8 1 1.136 2.145 0.127 
13.6.9 5 4.385 5.398 3.372 
14.6.18 4 3.302 4.311 2.293 
15.7.16 1 1.136 2.145 0.127 
16.8.21 1 1.136 2.145 0.127 
17.8.23 1 1.136 2.145 0.127 
18.8.28 1 1.136 2.145 0.127 
19.9.9 3 2.219 3.226 1.212 
20.9.13 1 1.136 2.145 0.127 
21.9.17 4 3.302 4.311 2.293 
22.11.3 1 1.136 2.145 0.127 
23.11.8 1 1.136 2.145 0.127 
24.11.17 1 1.136 2.145 0.127 
25.11.20 3 2.219 3.226 1.212 
26.14.17 5 5.468 6.489 4.447 
27.14.25 1 1.136 2.145 0.127 
28.15.14 1 1.136 2.145 0.127 
29.15.24 4 4.385 5.398 3.372 
30.17.6 1 1.136 2.145 0.127 
31.17.8 1 1.136 2.145 0.127 
32.19.16 1 1.136 2.145 0.127 
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CHAPTER SIXTEEN 
GENERAL APPRAISAL AND SOME 
PROPOSALS 
It has been the primary aim of this thesis to study the concept of "packaging" 
in technology transfer, and to assess the relevance of certain hypothesized 
factors in influencing the actual determination of packaging level in trans- 
fer transactions. This assessment has been attempted through first designing 
a theoretical framework, and then utilizing this framework to test the main 
hypotheses of the research on the basis of the data and information gathered 
in the field study. 
16.1 Theoretical Framework and Basic Findings 
Thirteen distinct methods for transfering technology were identified in 
Chapter 6, ranging from ultra-packaged to package-free channels. These methods 
have been grouped under five levels of transfer packaging, and the character- 
istics associated with each of these were spelled out as well as the detailed 
transfer method(s) encompassed by them. 
In practice, however, ultra and highly packaged transfers encompass certain 
other less packaged methods as basic ingredients in making up the relevant 
transactions. Also, when methods in the medium, low and package-free 
varieties are utilized, more than one of these is usually involved in order 
to effect the transfer deal. 
On the basis of a classification of five basic and six ancillary elements, 
the primary features of each of the five'packaging levels have been proposed. 
Each of these levels corresponds to the use of one, or more, transfer method, 
so that the packaging level displayed by any transaction is identical to that 
of the highest-packaged method which is embodied in the transaction. 
Consequently, when the transfer method(s) to be used in any particular trans- 
action has (have) been selected, the respective packaging level of the whole 
transaction is chosen simultaneously. 
The elucidation of the concept of transfer packaging constituted the first 
major step in the appraisal of the hypothesized factors which were thought 
to be instrumental in determining the packaging level. Making use of the 
data obtained in the field study, five main variables have been assessed, 
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namely: 
(a)' Project size; 
(b) Technological sophistication; 
(c) Operational life of technology receiving enterprise; 
(d) Type of industrial sector; 
(e) Ownership pattern of recipient firms. 
Empirical findings have suggested that the first two factors, i. e. project 
size and technological sophistication, are strongly correlated with the 
level of transfer packaging. Indeed, using the method developed by the 
researcher for assessing "project size", this factor stood out as the 
all-pervading determinant of the level of packaging. Hence, a two variate 
regression equation (equation 15.2) has been evolved, expressing the 
dependance of packaging level on the rating of project size. 
The field study has also revealed that three other factors may have been 
influencial in determining the level of packaging associated with any trans- 
fer transaction. 
These were: 
(a) Operational life of technology receiving enterprise. The value of 
the correlation co-efficient between this factor and packaging level was 
-0.353, which could just about be regarded as significant at the 95% 
confidence level. However, the views of interviewed executives, as well as 
. the result of a chi-square test, were 
less definite in giving credence to 
this factor. 
(b) Ownership pattern of recipient firms. The result of the chi-square 
test has shown this factor to be significant at the 95% level, but only a 
; -limited amount of support was afforded for this conclusion 
by the views of 
interviewed executives. 
(c) Pre-operational complexity of prospective projects. Both the chi- 
square result and correlation analysis indicated the importance of this 
.. factor. But, because this factor was highly correlated with "project-size" 
it was over-shadowed in the analysis, and hence did not appear in the final 
regression equation. 
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It could be argued, however, that high technological complexity is 
frequently a cause pushing towards increasing the size of project. Where 
this actually occurs and when project size is seen as instrumental in 
raising the packaging level, "technology" may emerge as the root factor for 
determining the level of transfer packaging. This point raises the issue of 
separating "technology" from "size" and evaluating the true or realistic 
influence exerted by each. Clearly, more research is required to untangle 
these two factors and to assess the role played by each in affecting the level 
of packaging. 
Another problem is the link between operating life and packaging level. An 
aprior case can be made to explain the ability of well-established firms to 
unpackage technology intakes by means of dividing a large project into a number 
of smaller ones. The researcher suspects that this factor was potentially 
powerful but could not be studied fully in the empirical part of the research. 
It is conceivable that some of the small projects which appeared in the sample 
and which were sponsored by large and well-established concerns in Iraq might 
have been parts of larger projects undertaken by those concerns. If this was 
the case, it would mean that a higher degree of "unpackaging" had taken place 
than suggested by the information obtained. Consequently, it is possible to 
contend that this factor deserves more study in future research. 
I ", 
16.2 Up-grading the Process of Technology Transfer to Iraq 
It is fairly clear from the available evidence that no coherent. planning 
exists in Iraq with respect to technological development and acquisition. 
Essentially, this stems from the absence of an overall technology policy. 
While there are some signs that this deficiency is becoming more widely 
recognised, no concrete and wide ranging steps appear to be forthcoming in 
this sphere. As for the 1970's, the period of primary concern for this 
research, no serious attempts had been made to formulate pertinent policies, 
, not to mention the initiation of any serious measures towards technological 
strength on q rcasonably comprehensive scale. It is the researcher's belief 
that this policy weakness played a major part in hindering the build up of 
a viable technological infrastructure. It is also very likely that it 
contributed to lessening the effectiveness of the efforts and resources 
directed towards industrial development. 
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Heavy reliance had been placed by the public sector on highly-packaged 
methods for implementing new industrial projects. Especially since 1973, 
when a notable surge in oil revenues took place, attention had been 
directed towards total project and total process contracting as means of 
executing proposed projects. This orientation was prompted by the need for 
speed in project completion and the requirement of operational guarantees and 
continual supply of spare parts. The belief that the local technological 
base was too narrow and insufficiently experienced was at the root of that 
policy. 
However, while the overall profile of technological advancement fell far short 
of what may be viewed as reasonable targets, there were certain exceptional 
patches furnishing some signs of genuine progress and optimism. Notable 
among those was the publicly owned oil sector, where a capability had 
evolved for detailed design of new projects as well as the implementation of 
small and medium sized projects. Another promising area was the private and 
mixed sectors in manufacturing industry, where low-packaged and package-free 
methods were predominantly used. There were, in addition, some instances where 
public sector enterprises executed their own projects (direct implementation), 
particularly where the enterprise in question was well-established and the 
new project was small in size and/or relatively simple in technical character- 
istics. 
These exceptions lend credence to the general rule that ultra and highly- 
packaged transfer methods were the order of the day in the case of large, and 
many medium sized, industrial projects in the state owned sector. They also 
make it clear that possibilities do exist in the country for unpackagfng 
many contemplated transfers, and indicate that more could have been done in 
this direction had the right sort of policies been in force. 
16.2.1 Planning for Technölogy Intakes 
It is thus evident that clear and well founded technology policies are 
required in Iraq. The formation of these policies is essential for the sake 
of developing the country's technological capability, so as to optimize the 
importation of foreign technology and attain an increasing measure of success 
in transferring additional technology to the country. Moreover, technological 
self-reliance would open the way for the evolution of a new generation of 
products and projects that would be uniquely suited to national and, perhaps, 
regional conditions. 
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If this process of technological and industrial advancement can be 
achieved speedily enough, it may even enable the country to become a major 
industrial power in the area. The setting in motion of such a process, 
combined with the country's financial resources, may result in widening 
the product range of Iraqi industry, the design of new products in accordance 
with regional demand, and the ability to control costs and prices at 
competitive levels. It is, therefore, not unreasonable to envisage the 
enhancement of the country's technological base as the key to future 
economic development and growth. This is particularly pressing in view 
of the currently depressing trends prevailing in the oil industry, as it 
seems highly unlikely that oil revenues will rise in the foreseeable future 
to reach the heights accomplished at the start of the present decade. 
Already, Iraqi industry occupies a leading position by the standards of 
industrial development in the region, especially when compared to the 
state of industry in the Gulf countries. But, it is necessary to maintain, 
and build upon, this lead by strengthening the country's technology system 
and directing It for the purpose of enhancing its contribution to industrial 
development. 
It is, therefore, possible to contend that technology planning ought to be 
made an integral part of overall development planning. Whenever a five- 
year plan is being prepared, technology issues must be studied deeply and 
comprehensively, alongside other development problems such as the availability 
of funds, manpower requirements, and the types of new projects that may need 
to be implemented. 
In setting technology plans, decisions need to be taken in five main, 
albeit related, areas, as follows: 
(a) Determination of overall technological requirements for the coming 
period, on the basis of projects that have been envisaged in the various 
sectors. These requirements may be in the form of hardware, software, 
industrial property rights, technical know-how, specialist services, or a 
cofibination of these. 
(b) Consideration of technological elements that are available within the 
country. Whenever steps can be taken to utilize these resources for implementing 
the projects in question, it becomes imperative to dispense with the need for 
importing these elements. 
L 
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(c) Recognition of possible technological developments that could be 
undertaken, and which could become ready in time for the execution of 
relevant projects. A proper and detailed plan has to be laid down for 
each of these future breakthroughs, if realistic assessment reveals that 
proper resources exist for their accomplishment. 
(d) Selection of areas of technoligical research that need to be focused upon 
in the long run. - These are long-range research programmes which may 
produce worthwhile results thought to be instrumental in setting up new 
industries, manufacturing new products, or improving present product 
range. 
(e) Choice of transfer methods for importing foreign technologies. In 
the case of every new project where foreign technology is seen as indispensable, 
a decision has to be taken regarding the most appropriate transfer method(s) 
to be used. This decision is likely to be influenced by a number of 
factors, including the complexity of technology, availability of funds, 
relevant accumulated experience within the country, and perhaps most 
significant of all, as this research has shown, the actual size of the 
proposed project. 
16.2.2 Institutional Arrangements for Technology Transfer 
No one institution exists as yet with overall responsibility for co-ordinating 
and planning matters relating to the transfer and development of technology 
in the country. The nearest institutions in this sphere are SOIDAC, in the 
case of manufacturing industry, and SOOP, in the oil sector. However, 
these two institutions are neither commissioned nor capable, in their 
present respective forms, to discharge functions connected with formulating 
policies and plans in this area. 
This is very evident in the case of SOIDAC, where primary emphasis is 
placed on the task of implementing each prospective project within the 
prescribed time span and allotted budget. While this body is empowered to 
select the most appropriate technology, as well as to prepare basic and 
detailed design for each project, it discharges this duty not on the basis 
of any pertinent guidelines, but in a pragmatic manner involving the consideration 
of each project when it is assigned to it for implementation. What is perhaps 
even more disquieting is the fact that too heavy a burden has been placed on 
the human resources of this institution. 
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The special UNCTAD mission which reported on Iraq suggested the setting up 
of a specialized centre to deal with matters relating to the transfer and 
development of technology. 
1 The primary purpose of this body would be to 
provide the necessary institutional framework for the formulation of 
technology plans as part of national development planning, and to devise a 
co-ordinated set of policies for their implementation. 
2 The new institution 
would also "be able to call upon, through the establishment of the necessary 
interlinkages ...., a series of services required for the purpose of 
decision making and implementation of the technology plan,... " 
3 
Such a newly formed institution ought to be the focus of a restructured and 
integrated technology system in Iraq. The need for up-grading and co- 
ordinating the system comes out clearly in the UNCTAD mission's report, 
where it is rightly pointed out that "the State is the main promoter for 
the generation of domestic technological capacity. The State is also the 
main importer and user of technology. However, while the two systems co-exist 
they are not integrated for there is hardly any operational interaction 
between the import of technology and domestic research, design and development. 
The instruments of central planning and state control should be utilized 
to evolve an integrated system for technological development. " 
4 
The report sets out ten main functions for the proposed body, as follows: 
5 
(a) Preparing a national technology plan, with the central task of identifying 
technological inputs or elements required for each coming period. On the 
basis of this plan, action can be taken towards lessening dependence on 
external sources and progressively increasing the role of domestic avenues 
for rendering such inputs or elements. 
(b) Formation of relevant policies, in order to deal with such matters 
as the stimulation of production-orientated research and development programmes, 
domestic adaptation of imported technologies, technology transfer arrangements, 
and specific issues in sectors of critical importance. 
1 UNCTAD: "Transfer and Development of Technology in Iraq" 
A report submitted by an UNCTAD special mission to the Iraqi Government, 
1978, p 42. 
2 Ibid, p 48 
3 Loc. Cit. 
4 Ibid, p 41 
5 Ibid, p 43-46 
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(c) Identification of technological and other related inputs required for 
each proposed project. This is necessary for the preparation of both 
sectoral technological programmes and national technology plans. 
(d)' Information gathering, analysis, and provision. This is a dynamic 
market information service related to the field of production technology. 
The report stresses that this service "should be able to obtain, process 
and supply suitable information concerning alternative sources of technology 
(domestic and foreign); the type, quality and costs of such technology; 
assessment of performance both in Iraq and abroad; degree of obsolescence 
and alternative technologies; capacity and output scales; procurement of 
related inputs; etc. Such information is essential in the context of 
evaluation of investment projects, cost benefit analyses, appraisal of 
domestic technological development possibilities, negotiation of transfer 
agreements and other related activities". 
6 
(e) Evaluating and selecting technolgies, this being at the core of the 
decision-making process at both the project and policy implementation 
levels. 
(f) Unpackaging imported technology. This necessitates an examination of 
each requisite technological input to ensure that encouragement is given 
to supplying as many components as possible from national sources. 
(g) Negotiating technology agreements and acquisition of related inputs 
in accordance with technology plans and policies, while fulfilling the 
specific requirements of relevant projects. 
(h) Registering, recording and monitoring technology agreements and 
arrangements. This is intended to take stock of what already exists in 
the country by way of tender documents, agreements, and other arrangements 
for the acquisition of technology, for future reference and support for 
decision making. It is also necessary for the purpose of evaluating and 
assessing proposed deals from the general socio-economic aspects, and for 
securing the best terms and conditions in the future. 
g Ibid, p 44 
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(i) Acting as a forum for co-ordination and interlinkages. The new body 
is-to provide the principal vehicle for co-ordination between the productive 
sector and the domestic R&D system, as well as linking these with other 
institutions in the fields of design, engineering and consultancy. There 
is also a need for interaction between the technology system and the educational, 
training and manpower planning processes. 
(j) Other functions, these including the initiation of proposals for the 
enactment of laws, by-laws, and regulations on technology transfer and 
development, as well as consideration of any other matters that are 
technology-related. The putting into practice of any relevant recommendations 
made by the United Nations, and other world bodies, would also come under 
this heading. 
Two critical remarks may be made in connection with the above functions 
outlined by UNCTAD's mission. The first relates to the apparent neglect 
of the private and mixed sectors' role within the technology system. 
While these two sectors had shown little initiative in terms of developing 
new technologies and/or adapting existing ones, this need not remain so 
in the future. Policies and measures ought to be devised with the aim of 
encouraging firms in these sectors to strengthen their technological base. 
These policies and measures may involve the use of tax incentives, financial 
grants, import licences, and regulation of the inflow of foreign know-how 
in whatever form it may take. 
Indeed, new legal provisions need to be enacted in order to deal with a 
host of questions connected with the flow of foreign technology to private 
and mixed firms. These should cover such matters as restrictions on 
transferees, acceptable levels of royalties, possible length of contract 
validity, extent of allowable equity participation, and areas of industrial 
activity where these transactions may be permitted. Pertinent enactments 
are also required for effectively boosting R&D efforts by these firms, 
eg, through generous tax concessions and the provision of requisite 
facilities. 
The second point pertains to the need to build the new institution proposed 
by the UNCTAD mission in a pragmatic and piecemeal fashion. Due to the 
scarcity of specialist manpower, it is advisable for such a body to begin 
on a modest scale, and then develop and expand gradually as requisite 
resources become available in the country. The new centre could concentrate 
on one or a few function(s) at the outset, so as to extend its activities 
with the passage of time. 
16.3 Some Further Comments 
In addition to the various points and proposals contained in the previous 
two sections of this Chapter, it is necessary now to make some supplementary 
remarks. These relate to the general problem of packaging level in 
transferring technologies to developing countries as well as the question 
of. technological development and acquisition in Iraq. Also, areas of 
possible future research shall be briefly touched upon by these points. 
16.3.1 Unpackaging Technology Transfers to Developing Countries 
There is evidently a pressing need for further studies to be undertaken 
on the problem of unpackaging technology transfers to Third World developing 
countries. Pertinent findings concerning factors affecting the level of 
packaging and strategies for unpackaging transfers to these countries can 
be valuable to official authorities in these countries. Such findings may 
also assist transferor firms in the developed world to plan the supply of 
their products and services on a more solid footing. 
While the empirical part of this research has been focused on Iraq, it is 
necessary for other studies to shed some light on other countries. 
Since Iraq is a relatively wealthy country, it would be very interesting to 
see how poorer countries select their methods for acquiring technologies 
from abroad. Would countries like India and Pakistan, for instance, give 
such a high priority to "project size" in choosing the level of packaging 
for implementing their projects? Or would they be more discriminatory in 
their reliance on the methods of total project and total process contracting? 
There is a further country-related variable which needs to be tested in this 
context. Namely, this relates to the stage of development attained by the 
recipient country. While Iraq may be classified as a medium-developed 
country within the large and heterogeneous group of Third World developing 
nations, it would be informative to find out how the more developed countries, 
such as Brazil, Mexico, India, and South Korea, attempt to fix the packaging 
level with respect to their projects. On an apriori basis, it is reasonable 
to suppose that these countries would be more inclined to adopt less 
packaged methods of transfer. 
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it must be emphasized, however, that "country comparison" is only one of 
the areas that need to be researched in this connection. Several major 
areas need to be probed further within this general field, in order to 
identify and quantify the significance of ostensibly relevant factors. 
These studies are required not only for academic purposes, but also for 
guiding decision making by industrialists, planning officials, and regulatory 
authorities. All in all, five main areas mayýthus be outlined in this 
regard. 
(a) - Country comparisons, so as to examine the significance of differences 
in such factors as the availability of natural resources, accumulated 
wealth, standards of living, skill profile, and stage of economic/industrial 
development. Assessemnts have to be made of the influence exerted by these 
differences on the level of packaging in transferring technology to 
various developing countries. 
(b) The results of certain tests made in this research proved to be somewhat 
inconclusive. This was obvious in the previous Chapter where the results 
of some tests and opinion surveys were less significant than others. In 
some cases, the tests could not be carried out due to the small size of the 
sample, while in other instances, the data had to be regrouped in order to 
make the tests feasible. Obviously, more relevant data needs to be gathered, 
so that intensive and extensive tests could be made to assess the variables 
in question, particularly the two variables of "industrial sector" and 
"firm ownership". 
(c) Examination of the issues related to the design and effectiveness 
of"relevant institutions in developing countries, especially R&D centres, 
consultancy and engineering firms, and government authorities regulating 
the inflow of foreign technology to the country. These issues assume high 
importance in view of the obvious weakness of technological infrastructure 
prevailing in developing regions, in both qualitative and quantitative 
terms. 
As has been stressed throughout this research, no concrete steps can be 
taken towards unpackaging incoming technologies without the prior improvement 
of the technology systems in recipient countries. Official policy in each 
country must be focused on strengthening the "chain of innovation", 
beginning from the initiation of research ideas through the various stages 
up to fully-fledged commercial production. In each country, this "chain" 
needs to be tailored according to circumstances, established, and maintained 
in healthy order. 
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There is, in addition, the associated problem of delineating the fields, 
forms, and conditions of foreign technology inflows to suit the circumstances 
of. each country as well as official aspirations and ideological dogmas. 
What sort of transferor-imposed restrictions on transferees would be tolerated? 
What levels of royalties would be acceptable? What is the maximum contract 
period that would be allowable? These and other questions need to be 
evaluated so as to make it possible for sensible policies to be laid down. 
Again, a number of issues have to be addressed concerning the overall 
technology system in the country. What ought to be the general shape of 
the technology system in order to make the utmost contribution for 
unpackaging foreign technology in the long term and maximizing the 
practical value of the home-based R&D system? As the contribution of the 
private industrial sector to technological research is negligible in many 
developing countries, what policies and measures should be applied to 
activate this sector for the sake of playing its full role in this respect? 
How best to integrate the production and technology systems so as to 
enhance technological self-reliance and minimize dependence on external 
sources? What ought to be the guidelines for selecting appropriate 
technologies? What policies and steps would assist most in absorbing and 
adapting imported technologies, developing new technologies within the 
country, and yielding successful new project ideas? 
(d) Pertinent considerations in determining relevant policies and programmes, 
with the object of unpackaging technology intakes to maximum. That is, on 
what basis could policies be set and amended so as to raise the level of 
technological strength progressively and comprehensively? Should, for 
instance, present policies, that are applicable in-some developing countries, 
favouring modern and large scale projects be altered, particularly in view 
of -the obvious 
backwardness of managerial abilities in many of these 
countries? Should measures be taken to shift consumer demand to more 
"appropriate" products, such as manufactured versions of home-grown produce 
or ingredients of local forms of transport? 
Again, what ought to be the policy towards foreign corporations? A range 
of options exist here, starting from an "open-door" type policy to the 
virtual prohibition of any foreign subsidiaries or capital participation. 
Also, what policies and measures should be adopted to evolve attitudes on 
technology issues in the most promising direction? 
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Research is also required on defining the basic principles for locating the 
"cut-off" point between the short-term expediency of highly-packaged 
transfers and long-term requirements of unpackaging those transactions. 
This sort of choice often faces official authorities in developing countries, 
especially relatively wealthy ones which have achieved some measure of 
economic and industrial development, like Iraq. 
A, large and complex project may be executed speedily by the adoption of 
a highly packaged transfer method, but this is likely to be costly and 
unconducive to the development of indigenous technological capabilities. 
Alternatively. the project may be implemented in a piecemeal fashion, or 
broken up into a number of smaller projects to be undertaken separately. 
This is likely to be less costly and more contributory to the development 
of local capabilities, but the project would require a longer time span 
to execute. There can be no doubt that the- decision in each case has to 
depend on its peculiarities, but attempts to arrive at optimum decisions 
ought to be guided by a set of principles in order to locate the watershed 
between long term benefits and short term gains. 
It"is also essential that a methodology for setting relevant policies, 
plans, and programmes is evolved. In each country, such a procedure needs 
to exist, with the purpose of gradually reducing technological dependence 
through, among other things, unpackaging foreign technology transfers as far 
as possible. Steps must be set in motion for gathering basic data, so as 
to provide the groundwork necessary for the identification of possible 
strategies and plans, and their subsequent evaluation. On a more detailed 
level, tactical programmes may need to be prepared for each industrial 
sector, geographical area, group of firms or industrial enterprise. 
(e) Practical criteria for measuring the success of transfers to developing 
countries. It would be illuminating to see how useful are the three 
yardsticks proposed by the researcher (depth of absorption, speed of transfer 
and cost) and how it may be possible to blend these and/or other measures 
in a single compound index. A further question is the relationship, if 
any, between the appropriate choice of packaging level and subsequent level 
of success attained by the project in question. 
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16.3.2 Improving the Process of Technology Transfer to Iraq 
Associated with the setting up of a new centre for the transfer and 
development of technology, detailed planning for technology development and 
intakes, and the formulation of clear technology policies, a number of other 
suggestions can be made to improve the process of technology transfer and 
development in Iraq. These relate to a whole range of issues, and may be 
summed up under five points, as follows: 
(a) The need to avoid ultra and highly packaged forms of transfer as far 
as-possible. This is in view of the relatively high direct and indirect 
costs which these methods involve. It may even be advisable in some 
cases to delay the implementation of a large project until such time when 
the requisite capabilities for unpacking the transfer would be available. 
Alternatively, a large project may be broken up into a few smaller ones 
and executed consecutively. Indeed, this was stressed by some executives 
in the course of the researcher's visits to respondent firms in the sample. 
The point came out clearly that the lack of local capabilities made it 
advisable for very large prospective projects to be executed in stages. 
Alternatively, the large project could be broken into a group of smaller 
undertakings to be implemented either simultaneously or one after the 
other. 
It-may be argued that such attempts at unpackaging technology intakes or 
breaking up would-be projects, may diminish or delay the expected benefits 
from the projects envisaged. In theory at least, a decision on this issue 
may be reached through the use of cost-benefit techniques, though subjectivity 
is bound to creep here because of the need for making various key estimates 
and forecasts in carrying out this task. 
(b) There is an urgent need for effective and comprehensive plans to 
develop the skilled and professional manpower required for building up a 
strong, wide-ranging, and integrated technological infrastructure in the 
country. There are several facets of such a plan, including education, 
training, job enrichment, promotion, pay incentives, and learning by 
doing. 
-ýýý 
This is very much a medium and long term endeavour and needs to be recognised 
as such. The empirical part of this research has shown that the theoretical 
learning received by many university graduates had not been backed up by 
sufficient practical experience. It seems that two factors had in the main 
been responsible for that situation, namely, apathy on the part of the 
people concerned and deficiency of the managerial system in which they 
were working. This latter factor had the effect of keeping engineers and 
other technical personnel bogged down within insignificant, repetitive, and 
limited spheres of job fulfilment. 
Effective and dynamic approaches need to be brought to bear on this problem. 
Due to the sheer size and relative importance of the State apparatus, new 
government policies may go a long way in tackling this problem, provided 
of course that these new policies are sound, practical, and underpinned 
by`a suitable set of measures. 
(c) More attention needs to be given to research and development activity. 
In particular, effort needs to be directed towards two major issues. 
The first concerns the enhancement of the whole R&D activity in the 
country, through the assignment of cash resources and qualified personnel; 
organisational improvement; and better planning of their functions. The 
second aspect is related to the integration of this activity with the 
production system in the country, so as intensify the role of the research 
system within the whole industrial setting. 
As has been shown in Chapter 11, the R&D System in Iraq was largely 
neglected, and generally inefficient, during the decade of the 1970's. 
R&D units were absent from the organisation chart of most publicly 
owned manufacturing establishments until 1981, and only an estimated 
ID 1.2 million had been spent by these enterprises on R&D during period 
1971-80. Needless to say, this is a minute sum compared with the 
ID 4 billion invested in the industrial public sector during that period. 
R t; D units were for the most part functioning in a semi-vacuum with very 
little involvement in, or co-ordination with, production departments. 
During the present decade, a number of new R&D units have been set up 
within publicly owned manufacturing establishments, and research programmes 
began to be prepared. It is doubtful, however, whether managerial and 
financial problems have been overcome, quite apart from the question of 
the availability of qualified personnel and the provision of adequate 
facilities. It seems, therefore, that much more effort needs to be directed 
towards this activity, especially with regard to the provision of requisite 
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9-human and material resources, improvement of managerial capabil'ities, 
planning and programming of activities, and co-ordination with complementary, 
similar, or industrial bodies. 
It may be worthwhile to reflect in this regard on the advisability of 
establishing a central R&D institution for each major industrial State 
Organisation in lieu of having one unit for every establishment. Each 
of these institutions would provide its services to all establishments 
within the Organisation to which it belongs, and should be staffed by a 
sufficient number of qualified personnel and supplied with necessary 
facilities. An example of such a body is afforded by the Specialised 
Centre for Engineering Studies which is attached to the State Organisation 
for Engineering Industries, and which has proved relatively successful 
in the areas of training, research and development, and special studies 
within its field. 
(d) A special law on the transfer of technology is required. This is to 
deal with relevant transactions involving the private and mixed sectors, 
in order to encourage such transfers and bring them in line with official 
policy and thinking. 
(e) There is a need for reassessing the whole process of project appraisal, 
selection, and execution in the public sector. Relevant documentation 
ought to be brought up-to-date and become much more extensive. Feasibility 
studies have to be more thorough and businesslike. It is apparent also 
that more co-ordination is required among the different State organs 
concerned with project initiation, evaluation and execution. Fundamental 
questions like the choice of technology for a proposed project and transfer 
method(s) to be utilised (thereby determining the level of packaging to be 
adopted) have to be discussed and agreed jointly among the agencies 
concerned. 
There is also a necessity for the adoption of modern methods in planning and 
controlling project execution, due to present methods being out-dated and 
largely ineffectual. Also, there seems to be a need for the executory 
authority, especially SOIDAC, to follow up completed projects so as to 
judge their operational standards, take measures to rectify any deviations, 
evaluate contractors, and make use of this information in future. 
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